MOHD ZAHIDversusSTATE THROUGH NCB

372                       [2021]
               SUPREME COURT     9 S.C.R. 372
                              REPORTS                        [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A                                MOHD ZAHID
                                         v.
                            STATE THROUGH NCB
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 1457 of 2021)
B                             DECEMBER 07, 2021
               [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.427 – Narcotics Drugs
      and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – ss. 23, 29 and s.21 –
      Appellant-accused was held guilty by the PS Customs, Amritsar
C
      u/s.23 and s.21 of the NDPS Act for recovery of 4 kg of heroin and
      sentenced to undergo 12 years rigorous imprisonment (RI) –
      Thereafter, he was again held guilty for the offence u/s.29 r/w. s.21(c)
      of the NDPS Act after recovery of 750 grams of heroin from Delhi
      and was sentenced for 10 years RI by the Trial Court at Delhi,
D     however, in view of the provisions of s.31 (ii) of the NDPS Act,
      which provides for an enhanced punishment for offences after
      previous conviction, and considering the fact that earlier appellant
      was convicted for the offence under the NDPS Act by the Amritsar
      Court, the Trial Court at Delhi awarded minimum sentence of 15
      years RI – No specific order was passed by the Trial Court at Delhi
E
      that the sentence imposed of 15 years RI would run concurrently or
      consecutively – Plea to direct the subsequent sentence to run
      concurrently with the previous sentence rejected by the High Court
      – On appeal, held: In the instant case, the appellant was convicted
      with respect to two different transactions, there are different crime
F     numbers and the cases have been decided by the different judgments
      – Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to any benefit of concurrent
      sentence u/s. 427 of Cr.P.C. – There is no specific order or direction
      issued by the court while imposing the subsequent sentence that the
      subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence
      – As far as discretiory power u/s. 427 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, the
G
      discretion shall not be in favour of the accused who is found to be
      indulging in illegal trafficking in the narcotic drugs and
      psychotropic substances – Even while exercising discretion u/s. 427
      of Cr.PC to run subsequent sentence concurrently with the previous
      sentence, the discretion is to be exercised judiciously and depending
H
                                        372
           MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                            373


upon the offence/offences committed – Thus, plea to direct the        A
subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence
is rejected.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. From various decisions of the Supreme Court,
the principles of law that emerge are as under:-                      B

      (i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such
subsequent term of imprisonment would normally commence at
the expiration of the imprisonment to which he was previously
sentenced;                                                            C

      (ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence
at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the
court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with
the previous sentence;
                                                                      D
      (iii) the general rule is that where there are different
transactions, different crime numbers and cases have been
decided by the different judgments, concurrent sentence cannot
be awarded under Section 427 of Cr.PC;
      (iv) under Section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the power
                                                                      E
and discretion to issue a direction that all the subsequent
sentences run concurrently with the previous sentence, however
discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the
nature of the offence or the offences committed and the facts in
situation. However, there must be a specific direction or order
by the court that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently         F
with the previous sentence. [Para 9][386-D-H]
      2. Applying the law laid down by this Court and the
principles of law enumerated hereinabove to the facts of the case
on hand, the submissions on behalf of the appellant – accused
that his subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous    G
sentence is to be rejected outright. In the present case the
appellant has been convicted with respect to two different
transactions, there are different crime numbers and the cases


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374           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     have been decided by the different judgments. Therefore, the
      appellant is not entitled to any benefit of concurrent sentence
      under Section 427 of Cr.PC. As there is no specific order or
      direction issued by the court while imposing the subsequent
      sentence that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with
      the previous sentence. [Para 10][387-A-C]
B
            3. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove under Section
      427 (1) of Cr.PC, the Court has the power and discretion to issue
      a direction that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with
      the previous sentence in that case also, the discretion has to be
      exercised judiciously depending upon the nature of offence or
C     the offences committed. In the present case the appellant –
      accused has been convicted for the offences under the NDPS
      Act. He has been convicted in one case for recovery of 4 kg
      heroin and sentenced to undergo 12 years RI and in another case
      there is a recovery of 750 grams of heroin and considering the
D     Section 31 (ii) of the NDPS Act, he has been sentenced to undergo
      15 years RI. No leniency should be shown to an accused who is
      found to be guilty for the offence under the NDPS Act. Those
      persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instruments in
      causing death or in inflicting death blow to a number of innocent
      young victims who are vulnerable. Such accused causes
E     deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society. They are
      hazard to the society. Such organized activities of clandestine
      smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into
      this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances
      have a deadly impact on the society as a whole. Therefore, while
F     awarding the sentence or punishment in case of NDPS Act, the
      interest of the society as a whole is required to be taken into
      consideration. Therefore, even while applying discretion under
      Section 427 of Cr.PC, the discretion shall not be in favour of the
      accused who is found to be indulging in illegal trafficking in the
      narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. As observed
G     hereinabove, even while exercising discretion under Section 427
      of Cr.PC to run subsequent sentence concurrently with the
      previous sentence, the discretion is to be exercised judiciously
      and depending upon the offence/offences committed. Therefore,

H
           MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                            375


considering the offences under the NDPS Act which are very            A
serious in nature and against the society at large, no discretion
shall be exercised in favour of such accused who is indulging into
the offence under the NDPS Act. [Para 11][387-C-H; 388-A-B]
      4. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the submissions on behalf of the appellant – accused to direct        B
the subsequent sentence by the Trial Court at Delhi in case arising
out of FIR No.43/1999 to run concurrently with the previous
sentence by the PS Customs, Amritsar arising out of FIR No.134/
1999 is hereby rejected. [Para 12][388-B-C]
      Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti Vs.             C
      Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad
      & Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 747;
      Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Anr.
      (1991) 4 SCC 304 : [1991] 3 SCR 742; V. K. Bansal
      Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2013) 7 SCC 211 : [2013]
      7 SCR 617 – relied on.                                          D

      Neera Yadav Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2017)
      8 SCC 757 : [2017] 8 SCR 498; Vicky @ Vikas Vs.
      State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 11 SCC 540; Gurdev Singh
      Vs. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558; Sharad Hiru
      Kolambe Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2018) 18               E
      SCC 718 : [2018] 11 SCR 720; Rajpal Vs. Om Prakash
      & Anr. (2019) 17 SCC 809; Gulam Mohammad Malik
      Vs. State of Gujrat and Anr. (2018) 14 SCC 473 –
      referred to.
                      Case Law Reference                              F
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 747        relied on              Para 5.4
[1991] 3 SCR 742               relied on              Para 5.4
[2013] 7 SCR 617               relied on              Para 5.4
[2017] 8 SCR 498               referred to            Para 5.4        G

(2020) 11 SCC 540              referred to            Para 5.4
(2021) 6 SCC 558               referred to            Para 5.4

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376            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     [2018] 11 SCR 720                 referred to               Para 5.4
      (2019) 17 SCC 809                 referred to               Para 5.4
      (2018) 14 SCC 473                 referred to               Para 8.3.6
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
B     No.1457 of 2021.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 31.03.2017 of the High Court
      of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal NO.879 of 2002.
            Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, Ms. Vidushi Garg, Ms. Vithika Garg,
      Ratneshwar Das, Advs. for the Appellant.
C
           Ms. Akaanksha Kaul, Rajan Kr. Chourasia, Uday Prakash Yadav,
      Sandeep Mahapatra, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH, J.
D            1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
      and order dated 31.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
      Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 879 of 2002, by which the High Court has
      dismissed the said appeal preferred by the appellant herein - original
      accused and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned
E     Trial Court, convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 29
      read with Section 21(c) of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
      Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the NDPS Act) and
      sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for a period of 15
      years with a fine of Rs.1,50,000/- for the aforesaid offence in view of
      the provisions of Section 31(ii) of the NDPS Act, the original accused
F     has preferred the present appeal.
            2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:-
            2.1 That the appellant herein – original accused faced the trial in
      connection with FIR No.134/1999 for the offence under Section 23 and
G     Section 21 of the NDPS Act, PS Customs, Amritsar, Punjab for recovery
      of 4 kg of heroin. He was sentenced to undergo 12 years RI by the
      Amritsar Court. One another FIR was also filed against the appellant
      herein – original accused being FIR No.43/1999 at New Delhi for
      recovery of 750 grams of heroin from Delhi. In the second case also by
      judgment and order dated 30.01.2002, he was held guilty for the offence
H
            MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                                   377
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

under Section 29 read with Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act. The learned         A
Trial Court at Delhi imposed the sentence of 10 years RI (minimum
sentence), however, in view of the provisions of Section 31 (ii) of the
NDPS Act, which provides for an enhanced punishment for offences
after previous conviction, and considering the fact that earlier appellant
was convicted for the offence under the NDPS Act in a case arising out
                                                                              B
of the FIR No.134/1999, the learned Trial Court awarded minimum
sentence of 15 years RI. No specific order was passed by the learned
Trial Court at Delhi in the trial arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (subsequent
trial) that the sentence imposed of 15 years RI would run concurrently
or consecutively.
       3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order      C
of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court at Delhi in a case arising
out of FIR No.43/1999 (second/subsequent case), the appellant – original
accused preferred the appeal before the High Court. Before the High
Court, it was mainly submitted on behalf of the appellant – accused that
as the appellant – accused had already undergone 12 years sentence in         D
a case arising out of FIR No.134/1999, he cannot be punished twice and
that in a case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 he has already undergone
sentence of 6 years and 2 months, a lenient view may be taken and the
sentences imposed in both the cases/trials, one arising out of FIR No.134/
1999 (Amritsar Case) and another arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (New
Delhi Case) shall be held to run concurrently. By the impugned judgment       E
and order the High Court has not accepted the above and has dismissed
the appeal. Hence, the accused has preferred the present appeal.
       4. Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, in her short written submissions, has stated that the appellant
is a foreign national, resident of Lahore, Pakistan and has been behind       F
bars for the last nearly 22 years as he was arrested on 15.06.1999 in
respect of FIR No. 134 of 1999 by the Police Station, Customs, Punjab
and he was charged for the offences under Sections 21 and 23 of NDPS
Act, 1985, for import of 4kg heroin and was convicted by the order of
the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, dated 08.12.2000.                    G
       Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel
for the appellant submitted that the appellant was under trial for the
period from 17.09.1999 to 14.02.2002 and for the second offence the
said period has not been taken into consideration. It was submitted that
if the sentences are to run consecutively and if the aforesaid period is      H
378            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     also taken into consideration, then the number of years that the appellant
      has to be behind bars, would have to be reduced.
            4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant
      was 30 years of age when he was convicted and presently, he is 52
      years old. His conduct in jail is good and there is no adverse remark
B     made against him by the Jail Superintendent. Hence, the two sentences
      which the appellant is now undergoing, may be held to run concurrently
      under Section 427 Cr.P.C.
             4.2 It is submitted that the appellant – accused has already
      completed 12 years RI in FIR No.134/1999 and if the sentences imposed,
C     in both the cases – arising out of FIR No.134/1999 registered at Amritsar
      and arising out of FIR No.43/1999 registered at New Delhi, are not held
      to run concurrently and the appellant – accused is to undergo sentences
      consecutively, in that case the appellant is required to undergo in all 27
      years of imprisonment. It is submitted that therefore the sentences
      imposed in both the cases are to be held to run concurrently.
D
            4.3 It is submitted that as such in the case arising out of FIR
      No.43/1999, the Delhi Court while imposing the sentence of 15 years RI
      has not passed any order whether the sentences in both the cases to run
      concurrently or not. It is submitted that therefore the appellant should be
      given benefit of Section 427 of Cr.PC.
E
            5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Akaanksha
      Kaul, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State – respondent.
      Heavy reliance is placed on Section 427 of Cr.PC. It is submitted that in
      the present case the accused faced two separate trials for separate
      offences and not arising out of the same transaction and therefore the
F     sentences imposed in both the cases are to run consecutive only.
             5.1 It is submitted that general rule is that sentences imposed in
      two separate trials in separate offences will run consecutively where
      there are two different transactions; different crime numbers and cases
      have been decided by different judgments. It is submitted that exceptions
G     are cases falling under proviso to Section 427(1) of Cr.PC; falling under
      Section 427(2) of Cr.PC or when the court directs sentences shall run
      consecutively.
            5.2 It is submitted that even the power conferred on the court
      under Section 427 of Cr.PC to order concurrent sentence is discretionary,
H
             MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                                    379
                      [M. R. SHAH, J.]

but the discretion ought to be exercised having regard to the nature of         A
the offence committed and the facts situation in which the question arises.
      5.3 It is submitted that in the present case, the sentencing court
did not direct the sentences to run concurrently. It is submitted that in
the present case appellant – accused faced two separate trials for two
separate offences and for two different transactions (not arising out of        B
the same transaction) and therefore the submissions on behalf of the
appellant that the sentences imposed in both the cases to run concurrently
has no substance and cannot be granted.
      5.4 In support of her above submissions, she has relied upon the
following decisions of this court:- Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias                  C
Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti vs. Assistant Collector of Customs
(Prevention), Ahmedabad & Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183; Ranjit Singh
vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Anr. (1991) 4 SCC 304; V.K.
Bansal vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2013) 7 SCC 211; Neera Yadav
vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2017) 8 SCC 757; Vicky @
Vikas vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 11 SCC 540; Gurdev Singh                  D
vs. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558; Sharad Hiru Kolambe vs.
State of Maharashtra & Ors.(2018) 18 SCC 718 and Rajpal vs. Om
Prakash & Anr. (2019) 17 SCC 809.
       5.5 It is further submitted that in the present case, the appellant –
accused as such is a habitual offender. In connection with FIR No.134/          E
1999, he was convicted for the offence under Section 23 and Section 21
of the NDPS Act for having in possession/recovery of 4 kg of heroin
and in another case arising out of FIR No.43/1999, he has been convicted
for the recovery of 750 grams of heroin. It is submitted that therefore
the appellant – accused is not entitled to any leniency as prayed.              F
       6. Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisions
of this court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.
      7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.
                                                                                G
      8. The short question which is posed for the consideration of this
Court is, whether, the sentences imposed against the appellant – accused
by two different courts in two different trials but against the same accused/
person should run concurrently as submitted on behalf of the appellant –
accused or consecutively.
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380             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A            8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case,
      the appellant – accused has been convicted by two different courts in
      two different trials for the offences with respect to the different
      transactions. In one case, he has been sentenced to undergo 12 years
      RI for the offence under Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act by
      Amritsar Court and in another case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 he
B
      has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI for the offence under Section
      29 read with Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act by Delhi Court. In one
      case he has been convicted for having in possession of 4 kg of heroin
      and in another case for having 750 grams of heroin. It is also required to
      be noted that judgments have been delivered in both the cases one after
C     another and in the subsequent judgment and order of conviction and
      sentence by the Delhi court there is no specific order passed by the
      learned Trial Court (Court at Delhi) that the sentences to run concurrently.
      In view of the above facts, the question posed for the present appeal is
      required to be considered.
D           8.2 While considering the issue in the present appeal Section 427
      of Cr.PC is required to be referred to which reads as under:-
             427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.
             (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
             is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or
E            imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life
             shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he
             has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the
             subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
             sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced
F            to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of
             furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced
             to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of
             such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.
             (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
G            for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment
             for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall
             run concurrently with such previous sentence.
            Therefore on a fair reading of Section 427 of Cr.PC, when a
      person who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is
      sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment
H
            MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                                   381
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at        A
the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously
sentenced. Meaning thereby the sentences in both the conviction shall
run consecutively. However, there is an exception to that, namely unless
the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence. There is one another exception. As per
                                                                              B
Sub-section (2) of Section 427 of Cr.PC when a person already undergoing
a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction
to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent
sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Therefore,
in aforesaid two cases only the subsequent sentence shall run
concurrently with previous sentence. Otherwise the subsequent sentence        C
shall run consecutively and the imprisonment in subsequent sentence
shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has
been previously sentenced.
       8.3 At this stage, few decisions of this court on whether the
subsequent sentence should run concurrently or consecutively are required     D
to be referred to.
       8.3.1 In the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (Supra), it is
observed and held that if the transaction relating to offences is not the
same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different in that
case the subsequent sentence should run consecutively.                        E
       In the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain, this Court observed that
the broad expanse of discretion left by legislation to sentencing Courts
should not be narrowed only to the seriousness of the offence. No single
consideration can definitively determine the proper sentence. In arriving
at an appropriate sentence, the court must consider, and sometimes            F
reject, many factors. The court must ‘recognise, learn to control and
exclude’ many diverse data. It is a balancing act and tortuous process to
ensure reasoned sentence. In consecutive sentences, in particular, the
Court cannot afford to be blind to imprisonment which the accused is
already undergoing.
                                                                              G
        Mohd. Akhtar Hussain is a case which arose under Gold
(Control) Act, 1968 involving a Pakistani national, the sentence in the
first case was imprisonment for 7 years and fine of Rs. 10 lakhs awarded
by the court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad in CC No.
1674 of 1982. Upon appeal, the High Court confirmed the sentence but
reduced the fine to Rs. 5 lakhs. The special leave petition filed by the      H
382            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     appellant therein was dismissed by this Court and the conviction and
      sentence became final. When the appellant was under judicial custody
      in the aforesaid case, there was further investigation with regard to his
      smuggling activities. It revealed widespread racket of smuggling gold
      and silver in collusion with several persons. The appellant therein was
      again prosecuted along with 18 others under Section 135 of the Customs
B
      Act, 1962. The appellant therein was convicted and sentenced for 4
      years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. Two lakhs and default
      sentence in case of non-payment of fine.
             Thereafter, the State as well as the appellant therein approached
      the High Court. The High Court accepted the State’s appeal and it
C     enhanced the sentence from 4 years to 7 years and made it consecutive.
      Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant. The
      result was that he had to serve in all 14 years imprisonment which he
      had challenged before this Court. Ultimately, this Court restored the
      sentence imposed by the Trial Court and set aside the sentence enhanced
D     by the High Court by allowing the appeal.
            8.3.2 In the case of Ranjit Singh (Supra) in paragraph 8, it is
      observed and held as under:-
            “8. Sub-section (1) of Section 427 CrPC provides for the situation
            when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is
E           sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life
            imprisonment. In other words, sub-section (1) of Section 427 CrPC
            deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed
            term is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term
            or for life. In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed
F           term, expires on a definite date which is known when the
            subsequent conviction is made. Sub-section (1) says that in such
            a situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the
            offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent
            sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of
            imprisonment unless the court directs the subsequent sentence to
G           run concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases
            covered by sub-section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term,
            the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to
            run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, provides for
            an offender “already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for
H           life” who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment
            MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                                    383
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      for a term or for life. It is well settled since the decision of this    A
      Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse [Ranjit Singh v. U.T. of
      Chandigarh, (1984) 1 SCC 31 following Mithu v. State of
      Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277 and reiterated in Maru Ram [(1981)
      1 SCC 107 that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the
      remainder of the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence
                                                                               B
      is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This being
      so at the stage of sentencing by the court on a subsequent
      conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be
      understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question
      of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life
      running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-        C
      section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and
      not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment
      for life being understood to mean as a sentence to serve the
      remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the
      appropriate authority and a person having only one life span, the
                                                                               D
      sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term
      or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier
      life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life
      span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human
      might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub-section (2)
      of Section 427 since the general rule enunciated in sub-section          E
      (1) thereof is that without the court’s direction the subsequent
      sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. The only
      situation in which no direction of the court is needed to make the
      subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence
      is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid
                                                                               F
      any possible controversy based on sub-section (1) if there be no
      express direction of the court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in
      the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted in sub-
      section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction
      commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the court directs
      it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of sub-sections          G
      (1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub-section
      (2) is, therefore, clear.”
        8.3.3 In the case of V.K. Bansal (Supra) after relying upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Akhtar (Supra) in paragraph
10 it is observed and held as under:-                                          H
384             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A           “10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the nature
            of power available to the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code,
            which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to be followed except
            in three situations: one falling under the proviso to sub-section (1)
            to Section 427; the second falling under sub-section (2) thereof;
            and the third where the court directs that the sentences shall run
B
            concurrently. It is manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court
            has the power and the discretion to issue a direction but in the
            very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the
            discretionary power shall have to be exercised along the judicial
            lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is
C           difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of
            exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut and
            dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or
            refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1).
            Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case
            would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences
D
            committed, and the fact situation in which the question of concurrent
            running of the sentences arises.”
              8.3.4 In the case of Neera Yadav (Supra) while interpreting/
      considering Section 427 of Cr.PC it is observed and held that Section
      427 of Cr.PC deals with sentence passed on an offender who is already
E     sentenced for another offence and the power conferred on the Court
      under Section 427 to order concurrent sentence is discretionary. It is
      further observed that the policy of the legislature is that normally the
      sentencing should be done consecutively. It is further observed that only
      in appropriate cases, considering the facts of the case, the court can
F     make the sentence concurrently with an earlier sentence imposed. It is
      further observed that the discretion exercised by the sentencing court to
      direct the concurrency will have to be exercised on sound principles and
      not on whims. Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given
      case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed.
      It is further observed and held in the said decision that it is well settled
G     that where there are different transactions, different crime numbers and
      the cases have been decided by the different judgments, concurrent
      sentences cannot be awarded under Section 427 of Cr.PC. It is further
      observed that however, the general rule that there cannot be concurrency
      of sentences if conviction relates to two different transactions, can be
H     changed by an order of the court.
            MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                                  385
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       8.3.5 In the case of Sharad Hiru Kolambe (Supra), it is observed      A
and held that unless the court directs that the punishment for such two
or more offences at same trial should run concurrently, the normal
principle is that the punishments would commence one after the expiration
of the other. Similarly, in a case where a person already undergoing a
sentence is later imposed sentence in respect of offence tried at
                                                                             B
subsequent trial, the general rule is that the subsequent sentence imposed
run consecutively unless there is a specific order passed by the court
while imposing any subsequent sentence, exercising discretion conferred
under Section 427 of Cr.PC that in the facts and circumstances the
subsequent sentence should run concurrently, the sentence imposed in
both the cases shall run consecutively.                                      C
       8.3.6 In the case of Gulam Mohammad Malik vs. State of
Gujarat and Anr. (2018) 14 SCC 473, this Court considered two appeals.
One from the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat and the other from
the High Court of Bombay in respect of the same appellant. In both
cases, the appellant was charged for the offences under Section 8(c),        D
20(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985. Insofar as the case filed in Gujarat
was concerned, registered as NDPS Case No. 1 of 2002, the appellant
was convicted and directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten
years and to pay fine of Rs. 1 lakh and in default to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for one year in case the fine was not paid.
Appellant therein preferred an appeal challenging the aforesaid conviction   E
and sentence before the High Court which dismissed his appeal. In fact,
the appeal by the State for enhancement of sentence was dismissed.
       In the second case, the appellant therein was tried by the Special
Judge for NDPS, Court of Sessions, Greater Bombay in Special Case
No. 60 of 2002, culminating in the conviction and sentence of appellant      F
therein under Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii) read with Section 31A of the NDPS
Act and was sentenced to death. Death reference had been sent for
confirmation before the High Court. The appellant therein had also filed
an appeal against the aforesaid conviction and sentence in the High
Court of Bombay. The High Court rejected the Confirmation Case no. 2         G
of 2008, filed by the State by not affirming the death sentence and
dismissed the appeal of the appellant and the death sentence was
converted into thirty years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3
lakhs. The matter pertaining to the conversion of the death sentence
was considered before this Court and on considering Section 31 of the
                                                                             H
386                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     NDPS Act on the facts of the said case, it was held that the appellant
      therein had to be given maximum punishment and thereafter multiplier
      of one and a half times applied. Minimum term of imprisonment
      prescribed under Section 31 is 10 years, on that reckoning, when it is
      enhanced by one and a half times, the minimum sentence comes to 15
      years. Ultimately, sentence ordered by this Court was rigorous
B
      imprisonment of 16 years. The Court also had in mind that the appellant
      therein was 65 years of age and suffering from various ailments. It was
      also ordered that the sentence would run concurrently and so far as with
      regard to both the cases, fine of Rs. 1 lakh which was imposed by the
      Trial Court in Gujarat was concerned, the same would remain. As far as
C     fine of Rs. 3 lakhs in Bombay case was concerned, the same was reduced
      from Rs. 3 lakhs to Rs. 2 lakhs. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed.
            9. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the principles
      of law that emerge are as under:-
            (i)      if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
D                    is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment,
                     such subsequent term of imprisonment would normally
                     commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which
                     he was previously sentenced;
            (ii)     ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the
E                    expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the court
                     directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with
                     the previous sentence;
            (iii)    the general rule is that where there are different transactions,
                     different crime numbers and cases have been decided by
F                    the different judgments, concurrent sentence cannot be
                     awarded under Section 427 of Cr.PC;
            (iv)     under Section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the power
                     and discretion to issue a direction that all the subsequent
                     sentences run concurrently with the previous sentence,
G                    however discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending
                     upon the nature of the offence or the offences committed
                     and the facts in situation. However, there must be a specific
                     direction or order by the court that the subsequent sentence
                     to run concurrently with the previous sentence.
H
            MOHD ZAHID v. STATE THROUGH NCB                                    387
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid           A
decisions and the principles of law enumerated hereinabove to the facts
of the case on hand, the submissions on behalf of the appellant – accused
that his subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous
sentence is to be rejected outright. In the present case the appellant has
been convicted with respect to two different transactions, there are
                                                                               B
different crime numbers and the cases have been decided by the different
judgments. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to any benefit of
concurrent sentence under Section 427 of Cr.PC. As observed
hereinabove, there is no specific order or direction issued by the court
while imposing the subsequent sentence that the subsequent sentence to
run concurrently with the previous sentence.                                   C
       11. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove under Section 427
(1) of Cr.PC, the Court has the power and discretion to issue a direction
that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous
sentence in that case also, the discretion has to be exercised judiciously
depending upon the nature of offence or the offences committed. In the         D
present case the appellant – accused has been convicted for the offences
under the NDPS Act. He has been convicted in one case for recovery
of 4 kg heroin and sentenced to undergo 12 years RI and in another case
there is a recovery of 750 grams of heroin and considering the Section
31 (ii) of the NDPS Act, he has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI.
No leniency should be shown to an accused who is found to be guilty for        E
the offence under the NDPS Act. Those persons who are dealing in
narcotic drugs are instruments in causing death or in inflicting death
blow to a number of innocent young victims who are vulnerable. Such
accused causes deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society.
They are hazard to the society. Such organized activities of clandestine       F
smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have a deadly impact
on the society as a whole. Therefore, while awarding the sentence or
punishment in case of NDPS Act, the interest of the society as a whole
is required to be taken into consideration. Therefore, even while applying
discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC, the discretion shall not be in          G
favour of the accused who is found to be indulging in illegal trafficking in
the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. As observed
hereinabove, even while exercising discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC
to run subsequent sentence concurrently with the previous sentence, the
                                                                               H
388                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     discretion is to be exercised judiciously and depending upon the offence/
      offences committed. Therefore, considering the offences under the
      NDPS Act which are very serious in nature and against the society at
      large, no discretion shall be exercised in favour of such accused who is
      indulging into the offence under the NDPS Act.
B             12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
      submissions on behalf of the appellant – accused to direct the subsequent
      sentence in case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 to run concurrently with
      the previous sentence arising out of FIR No.134/1999 is hereby rejected.
      In view of the above and for the reasons stated above the present appeal
      fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
C

      Ankit Gyan                                                Appeal dismissed.




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