Holding

A Special Director, as an adjudicating authority, lacks specific authorization to file an appeal to the High Court; only the Central Government may do so, and the High Court erred in interfering with the Board’s factual findings and ignoring the retraction of the confession.

Summary

The appellant, Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail, was served with a show‑cause notice under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) for allegedly remitting funds from the UAE through unauthorized persons and was penalised by the Special Director of Enforcement under section 9(3). He appealed to the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, which set aside the penalty, finding no material to support a contravention. The Special Director then filed an appeal before the High Court against the Board’s order, without the Central Government being a party. The High Court set aside the Board’s order and entertained the appeal, also considering the appellant’s retraction of his confession. The Supreme Court held that the Special Director, as an adjudicating authority, was not specifically empowered to file an appeal to the High Court; only the Central Government could do so under section 54, and a quasi‑judicial authority cannot appeal as an aggrieved party. The Court also ruled that the High Court should not have interfered with the Board’s factual findings and must have taken into account the retraction of the confession, which cannot be treated as substantive evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appellant’s appeal and set aside the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

Whether a Special Director of Enforcement appointed under FERA 1973 is authorized to prefer an appeal to the High Court against an order of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board under section 54.
Whether the High Court may interfere with the factual findings of the Appellate Board.
Whether the retraction of the appellant’s confession affects the validity of the penalty imposed.

Legislation cited

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973s. 3, s. 4(3), s. 5, s. 51, s. 52, s. 53, s. 54, s. 9(1)(c), s. 9(1)(d), s. 9(3)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 24

Subjects

Foreign Exchange Regulation Actappeal to High Courtadjudicating authorityquasi‑judicial authorityconfession retractionevidentiary value of confessionsection 54section 9(3)Central Governmentpenalty

Judgment

A MOHTESHAM MOHD. ISMAIL
-(
v.
SPL. DIRECTOR, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE AND ANR.

OCTOBER 9, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973-ss. 5, 9(J)(b), 9(l)(d)
and 9(3) ands. 54-Proceedings under the Act-Against the accused-
c Retraction of confession by the accused-Adjudicating authority
imposing penalty-Appeal of accused allowed by Appellate Board-
Appeal against the order ofthe Board by the Adjudicating Authority-
High Court maintaining the appeal and setting aside order ofthe Board
on Merit--On appeal, held: Power to prefer appeal to High Court is
D with Central Government-Adjudicating Authority having not been
authorised to act on behalf of Central Government could not prefer
....
the appeal-The Adjudicating Authority being a quasi-judicial
authority cannot prefer appeal being dissatisfied with the judgment
ofthe appellate authority-High Court was not correct in inter/erring
E with finding offact arrived at by Appellate Authority-In view of
retracted confession, conviction of the accused was not correct.
Evidence-Confessional statement-Evidentimy value of-Held:
Such evidence cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

F By a Notification, Central Government appointed the
respondent-Special Director of Enforcement for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
The respondent adjudicated the case of the appellant and imposed·
penalty in terms of Section 9(3) of the Act. Appeal of the appellant
G thereagainst was allowed by Foreign Exchange Regulation
Appellate Board. Respondent preferred app~al against the order of ~-
the Board before High Court. In the appeal, Board was impleaded
as party but Central Government was not. High Court set aside the
question of maintainability of the appeal and also set aside the order
H 804
MOHTESHAMMOHD. ISMAIL v. SPL. DIRECTOR, 805
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE
of the Board, on merit. Hench the present appeal. A
>
Appellant contended that in view of Section 54 of the Act, only
officers authorised in this behalf could prefer an appeal; and that
order of High Court is unsustainable because High Court failed to
consider the question that the appellant had retracted from his
confession. B
Respondent contended that in view of the Notification, he was
authorised to prefer the appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD : 1.1. The Central Government for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973
is empowered to appoint officers. From a bare perusal of Sections
5, it would be evident that notifications are required to be issued by
the Central Government delegating specific functions under the Act. D
[Para 11] [813-F]
1.2. From the Notification dated 22.09.1989, it would appear that
the officer authorized by the Central Government for the purpose
of enforcing the provisions of the Act was specifically empowered
to adjudicate upon the dispute. The said Notification itselfis a pointer E
to the fact that for the purpose of exercising the functions of the
Central Government under one provision or the other, the officer
concerned must be specifically empowered in that behalf. A general
empowerment would, however, be permissible. Before the High
Court, no Notification was filed to show that the authority concerned F
was empowered to prefer an appeal on behalf of the Central
Government. The Central Government was not even imp leaded as
a party to the appeal. First Respondent did not file the appeal on
behalf of or representing the Central Government. It was filed in its
official capacity as the adjudicating authority and not as a delegatee G
of the Central Government. [Para 12] [813-G, H; 814-A, B]
1.3. An adjudicating authority exercises a quasi-judicial power
and discharges judicial functions. When its order had been set aside
by the Board, ordinarily in absence of any power to prefer an appeal,
H
\-
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I 0 S.C.R.

A it could not do so. For the purpose of exercising the functions of the
Central Government, the officer concerned must be specifically
authorized. Only when an officer is so specifically authorized, he can
act on behalf of the Central Government and not othenvise. Only
because an officer has been appointed for the purpose of acting in
B terms of the provisions of the Act, the same would not by itself entitle
an officer to discharge all or any of the functions of the Central
Government. Even ordinarily a quasi-judicial authority cannot prefer
an appeal being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of
the appellate authority whereby and whereunder its judgment has
C been set aside. An adjudicating authority, although an officer of the
Central Government, should act as an impartial Tribunal. An
adjudicating authority, therefore, in absence of any power conferred
upon it in this behalf by the Central Government, could not prefer
any appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Board.
[Para 13] [814-C, D, E, F]
D
Director ofEnforcement, Madras v. Rama Arangannal andAnr.,
AIR (1981) Madras 80 and Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Director of Enforcement v. Lal Chand and Anr., (1985) 6 ECC 55,
referred to.
E
2.1. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court,
should not have interfered with the findings of fact arrived at by the
Appellate Board: without arriving at a finding that the same was
perverse or in arriving thereat, the Board ignored legal principles.
[Para 18H816-E]
F
2.2. The jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised only
when there existed a question oflaw and not a question of fact. The
Board, arrived at a finding of fact that there did not exist any material
for holding that any violation of Section 9(3) of the Act had taken
G place. [Para 14] [815-D]
2.3. High Court was bound to take into consideration the factum
of retraction of the confession by the appellant. It is now a well-
settled principle of law that a confession of a co-accused person
cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into
H
MOHTESHAMMOHD. ISMAIL v. SPL. DIRECTOR, 807
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE [SINHA, J.]
sen1ice only when the court is inclined to accept other evidence and A
feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of the
conclusion deducible therefrom. [Para 15] [815-E, F]
Haricharan Kurmi etc. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1964) SC 1184,
Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1968) SC 832,
Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto etc. v. State ofGujarat, [2007] B
4 SCC 266, Francis Stanly@Stalin v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic
Control Bureau, Thiriuvanthapuram, (2006) 13 SCALE 386 and The
Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajamundry v. Duncan Agro
Industries Ltd., JT (2000) 8 SC 530, relied on.
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1216of2001.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.4.2001 of the High Court
ofKamataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. No. 2857/1994.
D
Harjinder Singh, H.K. Puri. S.K. Puri, Priya Puri, U. Banerjee, V.M.
Chauhan and B.K. Sharma for the Appellant.
Ashok Bhan and B. Krishna Prasad for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. A short but an interesting question as to whether
a Special Director appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1973 (for short, 'the Act') himself can prefer an appeal before the High
Court against an order passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Appellate Board{for short, 'the Board') arises for consideration herein. F
2. Before embarking upon the said question, we may briefly state
the fact of the matter.
Appellant herein was served with a show cause notice by the
· > Enforcement Directorate on 04.07.1991 for alleged contravention of the G
provisions of Section 9( 1)(b), 9( 1)(d) and 9(3) of the Act, alleging, inter
alia, that during the period June 1989 to July 1990, he caused to remit
various payments aggregating to Rs. 2,81,73,700/-to India from United
Arab Emirates (UAE) through persons other than authorized dealers.
H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A Cause was shown thereto by the appellant. The Special Director, however, ~,
adjudicated the matter and by an order dated 06.10.1993 imposed a
penalty of Rs. 2,50,000/- on the appellant in terms of Section 9(3) of the
Act. Penalty was also imposed on one Shri Champalal Singhvi.
3. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, an appeal was preferred
B by the appellant before the Board. The Board allowed the said appeal,
inter alia, holding :
"12. It would appear from the above discussion that neither in the
documents seized from Champalal Singhvi and those seized from
c the premises of Yousuf Kazia, nor in the statements of Champalal
Singhvi and Kazia Brothers, there is any evidence of actual
remittance of any amounts from abroad as alleged, even though
prima facie that evidence may indicate distribution of amounts in
India on the instructions from persons abroad ...."
D It was further observed :
" .. .In our opinion, in view of the conclusions already made by us
that the charge of contravention of section 9(3) cannot be made
out on the basis of the facts as assumed by the Department, it is
E not necessary to consider other grounds on which the adjudication
order has been impugned in this appeal. We are of the view that
consideration of those grounds would amount to expressing opinion
in respect of the evidence which tends to implicate Kazia brothers
and Champalal Singhvi and therefore, any pronouncement on those
grounds should be avoided if possible." t
F
4. Respondents herein preferred an appeal thereagainst before the
High Court. The Central Government was not impleaded as a party
therein. The appellate authority, namely, the Board, however, was
impleaded as a party, although it should not have been.
G
5. Before the High Court, the appellant, inter alia, raised a question
in regard to the maintainability of the appeal at the instance of the
respondents herein on the premise that it was the Central Government
who could prefer an appeal and not the adjudicating authority itself.
H Reliance, in this behalf, was placed on a decision of the Madras High
MOHTESHAM MOHD. ISMAIL v. SPL. DIRECTOR, 809
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE [SINHA, J.]
Court in Director of Enforcement, Madras v. Rama Arangannal and A
Anr., AIR (1981) Madras 80 as well as on a decision of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Director ofEnforcement v. Lal Chand and Anr.,
(1985) 6 ECC 55 : CFC (P&H) 24].
6. Before the High Court, it was furthermore contended that the
finding of fact arrived at by the Board cannot be interfered with by the B
High Court having regard to the scope and purport of Section 54 of the
Act. On the first contention, the High Court opined that as the respondent
has been appointed under the Act, in terms whereof he was authorized
to enforce the provisions thereof, an appeal at its instance would be
maintainable, stating : C
"A perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 per se reveals that unless and until
the Central Government has put certain conditions or limitations
on the powers of the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, the D
law authorizes and requires the officers of Enforcement Directorate
to exercise powers and to discharge the duties conferred and
imposed upon them under the Act. No doubt, under Section 5 of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 the Central'
Goverprtlent is empowered subject to the conditions and limitations E
to authorize other officers such as·officers of the Central Excise,
or a~y Police Officer or any other officer of the Central
Government or State Government to exercise the powers and to
discharge the functions of the Enforcement Directorate or any other
officer of the Enforcement Directorate under the Act as may be
specified. So far as the entrustment of the functions of or F
authorization to exercise powers of the Directors or other officers
of the Enforcement Directorate in favour of the officers other than
those of Directors Enforcement consisting of Directors of
.\ Enforcement, Additional Directors of Enforcement, Deputy
Directors of Enforcement, Assistant Directors of Enforcement and G
such other class of officers of Enforcement is concerned the Central
Government is empowered under Section 5 of the Act to confer
those powers on the officers referred to as above i.e., the officers
of the Customs Department, Central Excise etc. But, the officers
H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A of the Enforcement Directorate as mentioned in Section 4(3) of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 can exercise the
powers by virtue of the provisions of the Act. Seetion 54 of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, does not specifically
mention and provide that the Principal officers of Enforcement
B Directorate cannot file the appeal. It cannot be assumed in the
absence of such a bar that the Enforcement Directorate could not
file the appeal. The appeal could be fil~d by the Directors of
Enforcement as instrumentality of the Central Government in
matters covered by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973,
c in cases decided against the Department, as appeals could be filed
either under the Income Tax Act, or under the Land Acquisition
Act. Explanation (2) to section 54 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 cannot be read as providing that the appeal
cannot be filed by the Directors of Enforcement which is
instrumentality of the Government of India or the Central
D
Government. ..."

On the second contention, it was held :
"Thus considered and applying the above principles of law to
the effect that if the sender of money from a foreign land or from
E
m
foreign country collects money and directs to his own men India
to distribute the said amount to the persons concerned to whom it
was meant to be paid and then that person under the instructions
of the former distributes the said amount of money to the persons
for whom it has been sent and to them is paid in Indian currency,
F
it can well be said to be a case of remittance or remitting of money
or causing to remit money from a foreign land into India for
distribution and disbursement, in such a case charge of Section 9(3)
of the Act may be found to have been established and in the
present case the charge against the respondent remitting the amount {-
G otherwise than in accordance ·with law under Act in India stands
established. Thus, considered in our opinion the order of the
Appellate Board is not only erroneous on facts, but also is
erroneous in law as it is based on failure to apply its mind to the
essential requisites of section. The order passed by the adjudicating
H
MOHTESHAM MOHD. ISMAIL v. SPL. DIRECTOR, 811
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE [SINHA, J.]
}
authority appears to be correct, just and proper and has to be A
restored after setting aside the order of the Appellate Board."
7. Mr. Harjinder Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant, inter alia, would submit that on a plain reading of Section
54 of the Act, it would appear that only officers authorized in this behalf
could prefer an appeal. B
It was further submitted that the High Court having failed to consider
the question that the appellant had retracted from his confession, the
impugned judgment is wholly unassailable.
8. Mr. Ashok Bhan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the C
respondents, however, relied upon a notification dated 22.09.1989, which
reads as under· :
"In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (1) of
Section 4, read with clause (e) of section 3 of the Foreign D
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973 ), the Central
Government hereby appoints Shri S.S. Ranjhan to be an officer
of Enforcement with the designation of Special Director of
Enforcement, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the said
Act; and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 51 of the E
said Act hereby empowers him to adjudicate cases of contravention
of any of the provisions thereof, other than section 13, clause (a)
of sub-section (1) of section 18 and clause (a) of sub-section (1)
of section 19 or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder."

9. Before embarking upon the rival contentions raised on behalf of F
the parties, let us have to look at the relevant provisions of the Act.
10. Section 3 of the Act provides for classes of officers of
Enforcement. Section 4 of the Act empowers the Central Government to
appoint such persons, as it thinks fit, to be officers of Enforcement and G
for the said purpose confer power thereupon. Sub-section (3) of Section
4 reads as under :
"(3) Subject to such conditions and limitations as the Central
Government may in1pose, an officer of Enforcement may exercise
H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed on him
under this Act."

Section 5 providing for delegation of the powers in relation to
functions of the Director or other officers of Enforcement, reads as under:

B "Entrustment of functions of Director or other officer of
enforcement -
5. The Central Government may, by order and subject to such
conditions and limitations as it thinks fit to impose, authorise any
officer of customs or any Central Excise Officer or any police
c officer or any other officer of the Central Government or a State
· Government to exercise such of the powers and discharge such
of the duties of the Director of Enforcement or any other officer
of Enforcement under this Act as may be specified in the order."

D Section 9 provides for restrictions on payments; clauses (c) and (d)
of sub-section ( 1) whereof read as under :

"Restrictions on payments -
9. (1) Save as may be provided in, and in accordance with any
E general or special exemption from the provisiom of this sub-section
which may be granted conditionally or unconditionally by the
Reserve Bank, no person in, or resident in, India shall-

" y

F (c) draw, issue or negotiate any bill of exchange or promissory note
or acknowledge any debt, so that a right (whether actual or
contingent) to receive a payment is created or transferred in favour
of any person resident outside India;

(d) make any payment to, or for the credit of, any person by order
G { '
or on behalf of any person resident outside India;

"
Section 52 of the Act provides for an appeal to the Board. Section
53 thereof provides for the powers of the adjudicating officers and the
H
MOHTESHAMMOHD.ISMAILv. SPL.DIRECTOR, 813
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE [SINHA, J.]
Board to summon witnesses, etc. Section 54 which provides for an appeal A
to the High Court, reads as under :
"Appeal to High Court
54. An appeal shall lie to the High Court only on questions oflaw
from any decision or order of the Appellate Board under sub- B
section (3) or sub section (4) of section 52:
Provided that the High Court shall not entertain any appeal under
this section if it is filed after the expiry of sixty days of the <late of
cominunication of the decision or order of the Appellate Board,
unless the High Court is satisfied that the appellant was prevented C
by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
Explanation. -In this section and in section 55, "High Court"
means-
(i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved D
party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain; and
(ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High
Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a E
case where there are more than one respodnent, any of the
respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or
personally works for gain."
11. The Act imposes restrictions on transactions of money from one
country to the another. The Central Government for the purpose of F
enforcing the provisions of the Act is empowered to appoint officers. From
a bare perusal of Section 5 of the Act, it would be evident that notifications
are required to be issued by the Central Government delegating specific
functions under the Act.
12. From the notification dated 22.09.1989, whereupon reliance has G
been placed by Mr. Bhan, it would appear that the officer authorized by
the Central Government for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of
the Act was specifically empowered to adjudicate upon the dispute. The
said notification itself is a pointer to the fact that for the purpose of
H
)

lJ'-l

814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A exercising the functions of the Central Government under one provision
or the other, the officer concerned must be specifically empowered in that
behalf. A general empowerment would, however, be permissible. Before
the High Court, no notification was filed to show that the authority
concerned was empowered to prefer an appeal on behalf of the Central
B Government. The Central Government was not even impleaded as a party
to the appeal. First Respondent did not file the appeal on behalf of or
representing the Central Government. It was filed in its official capacity
as the adjudicating authority and not as a delegatee of the Central
Government.
C 13. An adjudicating authority exercises a quasi-judicial power and
discharges judicial functions. When its order had been set aside by the
Board, ordinarily in absence of any power to prefer an appeal, it could
not do so. The reasonings of the High Court that he had general power,
in our opinion, is fallacious. For the purpose of exercising the functions
D of the Central Government, the officer concerned must be specifically
authorized. Only when an officer is so specifically authorized, he can act
on behalf of the Central Government and not otherwise. Only because
an officer has been appointed for the purpose of acting in terms of the
proVisions of the Act, the same would not by itself entitle to an officer to
E discharge all or any of the functions of the Central Government. Even
ordinarily a quasi-judicial authority cannot prefer an appeal being
aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the appellate authority
whereby and whereunder its judgment has been set aside. An adjudicating
authority, although an officer of the Central Government, should act as
F an impartial Tribunal. An adjudicating authority, therefore, in absence of
any power conferred upon it in this behalf by the Central Government,
could not prefer any appeal against the order passed by the Appellate
Board.
The Madras High Court in Rama Arangannal (supra) opined:
G
"4. On the question as to the maintainability of the appeal, it is
seen that the Explanation to Section 54 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act 1973 treats only the Central Government as an
aggrieved party for the purpose of filing an appeal to the High Court
H in respect of orders passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation
MOHTESHAMMOHD.ISMAILv. SPL.DIRECTOR, 815
ENFORCEMENT DIRECT ORA TE [SINHA, J.]
Appellate Board under that section. Therefore, only the Central A
Government can file and prosecute an appeal against the order of
the Appellate Board, and not any other authority, In this case, the
appeal has been filed by the Director of Enforcement, who is the
initial authority who passed the adjudication order against the
respondents and whose order has been set aside by the Appellate B
Board on an appeal filed by them. Therefore, the Director of
Enforcement cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order of the
Appellate Board merely because its order of adjudication has been
set aside by the Appellate Board ... "
The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Lal Chand (supra) followed Y
the said decision.
14. The High Court was, in our considered view, not correct to take
a contrary view.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised D
only when there existed a question of law and not a question of fact. The
Board, as noticed hereinbefore, arrived at a finding of fact that there did
not exist any material for holding that any violation of Section 9(3) of the
Act had taken place.
E
15. Apart therefrom the High Court was bound to take into
consideration the facturn of retraction of the confession by the appellant.
It is now a well-settled principle of law that a confession of a co-accused
person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into
service only when the court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels F
the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of the conclusion
deducible therefrom. [See Haricharan Kurmi etc. v. State ofBihar, AIR
(1964) SC 1184; Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
(1968) SC 832 and Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto etc. v. State
of Gujarat, [2007] 4 SCC 266].
G
16. We may, however, notice that recently in Francis Stanly@
Stalin v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau,
Thiruvanthapuram, (2006) 13 SCALE 386, this Court has emphasized
that confession only if found to be voluntary and free from pressure, can
H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A be accepted. A confession purported to have been made before an {
authority would require a closure scrutiny. It is furthermore now well-settled
that the court must seek corroboration of the purported confession from
independent sources.
17. In The Assistant Collector of Central l;,,xcise, Rajamundry
B v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd JT (2000) 8 SC 530, this Court held :
" ... The inculpatory statement made by any person under Section
108 is to non-police personnel and hence it has no tinge of
inadmissibility in evidence if it was made when the person
c concerned was not then in police custody. Nonetheless the caution
contained in law is that such a statement should be scrutinised by
the court in the same manner as confession made by an accused
person to any non-police personnel. The court has to be satisfied
in such cases, that any inculpatory statement made by an accused
person to a gazetted officer must also pass the tests prescribed in
D
Section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such a statement is impaired
by any of the vitiating premises enumerated in Section 24 that
statement becomes useless in any criminal proceedings."
18. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court, in
E our opinion, should not have interfered with the findings of fact arrived at
by the Appellate Board; without arriving at a finding that the same was
perverse or in arriving thereat, the Board ignored legal principles.
19. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot
F be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.