Holding

The detention order is illegal and is quashed because the detaining authority did not apply his mind and the ground does not relate to public order; non‑specification of a detention period does not invalidate the order.

Summary

Mrs. T. Devaki, wife of R. Thamaraikani, challenged a detention order dated 15‑08‑1989 issued under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1982. The order, passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, alleged that Thamaraikani’s assault on a minister at a public seminar threatened public order. The petitioner argued that the order was invalid because it did not specify the period of detention and because the sole incident did not constitute a public‑order threat. The Court held that the Act does not require the detaining authority to state a detention period, but more importantly, the detaining authority, who was present at the incident, failed to apply his mind and relied solely on the police report. The Court further found that a solitary assault on an individual does not amount to a disturbance of public order. Consequently, the detention order was declared illegal and quashed, and the petitioner was ordered to be released.

Issues considered

The detention order is invalid for not specifying the period of detention under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1982.
Whether the ground of detention – a single assault on a minister – falls within the meaning of ‘public order’ contemplated by the Act.
Whether the detaining authority applied his mind, given he was present at the incident but relied on the sponsoring authority’s report.

Legislation cited

COFEPOSA Act
Maintenance of Internal Security Act
National Security Act, 1980
Preventive Detention Act, 1950
Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982s. 10, s. 11, s. 13, s. 3(1), s. 3(2), s. 3(3), s. 8

Subjects

preventive detentionpublic ordernon‑application of minddetention periodpolitical vendettaArticle 32Tamil Nadu Act 1982detention order quashed

Judgment

MRS. T. DEVAKI
A v.
GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS.
-{
MARCH 7, 1990

B [K.N. SINGH, M.H. KANIA AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Immoral Traffic Offenders and
Slum Grabbers, Act, 1982.

Detention Order-Whether detaining authority required to specify
c period of detention-Solitary incidelll of murderous assault-'Law and
order' or 'public order' problem-Distinction between-Solitary inci-
dent can raise only a law and order problem and nothing more.

D
Detention Order-Subjective satisfaction-Detaining authority
himself present at the place of occurrence-Should have relied more on
>--.
own knowledge and observations than report of sponsoring authority-
Non-application of mind in making the order of detention-Order
quashed.

This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was "----.
E filed by the wife of the detenu challenging the validity of the Detention
Order dated 15.8.1989 passed against her husband by the Collector and

F
District Magistrate of Kamarajar District Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu
on allegations inter alia that the District Magistrate had issued the
impugned order for detention of her husband, who is an active member
of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party, an active
social and political worker and ex-member of the Tamil Nadu Legisla-
live Assembly, at the behest of Respondent No. 3--a Minister in the
,
~

present DMK Government, on account of personal and political
animosity between the two.
1
Counsel for the Detenu urged two grounds to attack the order of
G detention. Firstly that the order did not specify the period of detention,
and secondly that the sole ground of detention as reflected in the
Grounds of Detention bas no relevance to the maintenance of 'Public
Order' as the facts mentioned therein donot make out any case of viola-
lion of public order. At best, it may be a case of law and order only
>--..
which exhibits non-application of mind by the detaining authority.
H

836
MRS. T. DEVAKI v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU 837

Allowing the writ petition and quashing the impugned order of A
·'t· detention on the ground of non-application of mind by the Detaining
Anthority in passing the Detention order, this Court,
;.-·
; HELD: (1) Since the Act does not reqnire the detaining authority
to specify the period for which a detenu is required to be detained the
B
order of detention is not rendered invalid or illegal in the absence of
such specification in the Detention order. [843E]

Commissioner of Police & Anr. v. Gurbux Anand ram Biryani,
[1988] Supp. SCC 568-0ver-ruled. Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administ-
ration & Ors., [1982] 2 SCC 403, Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab,
[1952] 3 SCR 756; Suna Ullah Butt v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, c
[1973] 1 SCR 870; Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra,
[1983] l SCC 382 and A.K. Roy v. Union of India & Ors., [1982] l SCC
271, approved.

(2) In a case where the_ detaining anthority may not be present at
D
the place of the incident or the occurrence, he has to form the requisite
opinion on the basis of materials placed before him by the sponsoring
authority but where tbe detaining authority was himself present at tbe
scene of occurrence he should have relied more on his own knawledge and
observation then on the report of the sponsoring authority. [853H; 854A]

In the instant case, the detaining authority though present at the · E
scene of occurrence does not support the incident as presented to him by
the sponsoring authority, and yet he issued the detention order on the
report of sponsoring authority. In these circumstances, there was uon-
applicalion of mind by the detaining authority in making the order of
detention. [854B]
F
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] l SCR 709;
Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR
635; Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta & Anr.,
[1970] l SCR 762; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR
288; Nagendra Nath Monda/ v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 1SCC498;
Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, [1970] 3 SCR G
360; S.K. Kedar v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 816; Kanu
Biswas v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 831; Kishori Mohan v.
State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 845; Amiya Kumar Karmakar v.
State of West Bengal, [1972] 2 SCC 672 and Manu Bhusan Roy
Prodhan v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [1973] 3 SCC 663, referred to.
H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] I S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Cri-
minal) No. 468 of 1989.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

R.K.Garg, K. Subramaniam, E.C. Agarwala, Ms. Purnima
B Bhatt, Mr. V.K. Pandita, A.V. Pillai and Atul Sharma for the
petitioner.

K. Alagiriswamy, Adv. General of Tamil Nadu, N. Natarajan,

-
G. Krishnamurthy, V. Krishnamurthy and K. Rajendra Choudhury for
the Respondents.
c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SINGH, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, by Mrs. P. Devaki wife of the detenu R. Thamaraikani,
challenges the validity of her husband's detention under the order_ of
D the Collector and District Magistrate of Kamarajar District Virud-
hunagar, Tamil Nadu dated 15.8.1989 issued under Section 3(1) of the
Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-
offenders, Forest-offenders, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum
Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) (as amended by Act
52 of 1986 and Act 1of1988) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
E
After hearing arguments of the learned counsel for the parties at
length, we allowed the petition on 10.11.1989 and issued directions for
.the release of the detenu forthwith. We are now giving the reasons for
our Order dated 10.11.1989.

F The detenu R. Thamaraikani is a member of the All India Anna
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Party, briefly described as AID MK. He
has been an active social and political worker. He was elected Member
of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from Srivilliputhur Consti-
tuency in the General Elections held in 1977, 1980 and 1984. In the
General Elections held in January 1989 to the Tamil Nadu Legislative
G Assembly, he was defeated by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Party
candidate. He continues to be Joint Secretary of the AIDMK Party for
Kamrajar District in Tamil Nadu and he has been taking active part in L.
social and political activities in the District of Kamrajar. The
petitioner has stated that there has been personal and political animo-
sity between the detenu and Thim Durai Murugan, Minister for Public
H Works and Highways in the present DMK Government. The District
MRS. T. DEVAKl v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU [SINGH, J.] 839

Magistrate issued the impugned order for the detention of her husband
at the behest of Thim Durai Murugan, the aforesaid Minister, respon- A
dent No. 3. The petitioner has referred to a number of incidents and to
the proceedings of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Asseinbly in support of
her submission that there was political and personal animosity bet-
ween the aforesaid Minister and her husband and the order of deten-
tion was made ma/a fide at the instance of the Minister, respondent B
No.3.

The facts leading to the making of the impugned detention order
are necessary to be noted. On 29. 7. 1989 a Seminar on Irrigation was
held at Virudhunagar at the Dry Chilly Merchants' Association Kalai
Arangarn, Aruppukkotai Road, which was attended by Thim Durai
Murugan and by Pon. Muthurarnulingarn, Minister of Labour and Dis- c
trict Magistrate, Karnarajar and other important personalities. A
number of political and social workers and agriculturists attended the
Seminar. According to the petitioner the detenu was invited to attend
the Seminar although it is denied by the respondents but there is no
dispute that the detenu was present in the hall where the Seminar was D
held. The petitioner has asserted that the detenu wanted opportunity
to address the gathering for placing the grievances of the local people
before the gathering but he was not permitted to do so. He insisted for
placing the grievances of his Party before the audience whereupon he
was forcibly removed away by the Police and later a false criminal case
was registered against him under Sections 147, 148, 307 read with E
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Indian
Arms Act at the Virudhunagar East Police Station. These allegations
have been denied by the respondents. According to the respondents
the detenu was not invited, even then he entered the hall where semi-
nar was being held alongwith a number of persons and created dis,
orderly scene in the hall which disturbed the Seminar. He threw a F
knife towards the Minister respondent No. 3, with an intention to kill
him but he missed the target, later on, he was over powered by the
Police. The violent activities of the detenu and his men caused panick
in the hall, the audience raised alarm and ran outside the auditorium
and outside the hall also people got scared, they ran helter skelter,
causing obstruction to traffic. The proceedings of the Seminar came to G
an abrupt halt for a while. The detenu was taken into custody and he
was enlarged on bail by the Sessions Judge on 3.8.1989. Thereafter the
District Magistrate and Collector Kamarajar, respondent No. 2, issued
the impugned detention order after 17 days of the aforesaid incident
under Section 3(1) of the Act, as he was satisfied that it was necessary
to detain the detenu under the Act with a view to prevent him from H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 1 S.C.R.

acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
A
Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the District Magistrate the detenu "( •
was kept in detention.

Mr. R.K. Garg learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the
validity of the detention order on two grounds. Firstly, he urged that
B the order of detention was illegal since it did not specify the period of
detention. Secondly, the sole ground of detention has no relevance to
the maintenance of 'public order' as the facts set out in the grounds do
not make out any cas~ of violation of public order, at best, it may be a
case of law and order only.

c learnedThisJudges
petition was heard by a Division Bench consisting of two
of this Court. After hearing counsel for the parties at
length the leaned Judges referred the matter to a three Judges' Bench,
in view of the conflict of decisions of this Court in Commissioner of )c -
Police & Anr. v. Gurbux Anandram Biryani, [1988] Supp. SCC 568
and Ashok Kumarv. Delhi Administration and Ors., [1982] 2 SCC 403
D on the question of validity of detention order on its failure to specify
period of detention. That is how the petition was heard by this Bench.

The first contention is founded on the provisions of Section 3 of ·~
the Act which read as under: I

E "3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons-

( 1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to
any bootlegger or drug-offender (or forest offender) or )(
goonda or immoral traffic offender or slum grabber that
with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner.pre-
F judicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary
so to do, make an order directing that such person be
detained.

(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing, or
likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the
G jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of
Police, the State government are satisfied that it is neces-
sary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that
during such period as may be specified in the order, such
District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if
satisfied as provided in sub-section ( 1), exercise the powers
H conferred by the said sub-section:
MRS. T. DEYAK! v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU !SINGH, J.J 841

Provided that the period specified in the order made
A
by the State Government under this sub-section shall not,
in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State
Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is neces-
sary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from
time to time by any period not exceeding three months at
any one time. B

• (3) When any order is made under this section by an
officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith
report the fact to the State Government together with the
grounds on which the order has been made and such other
particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter,
and no such order shall ramain in force for more than c
twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the
meantime, it has been approved by the State Govern-
ment."

Placing reliance on Section 3(2) Mr. Garg urged that since the D
impugned detention order did riot specify the period for which the
detenu was required to be detained, the order was rendered illegal. On
an analysis of Section 3 of the Act as quoted above, we find no merit in

( the submission. Section 3(1) confers power on the State Government
to detain a bootlegger or drug-offender, or forest-offender or goonda
or an offender in immoral traffic or a slum grabber with a view to E
prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order. Section 3(2) empowers the State Government to dele-
gate its power as conferred on it under sub-section (1) to District
Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, if it is satisfied that the
circumstances prevailing, or likely to prevail in any area within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate or the Com- F
missioner of Police, make it necessary to delegate the power to them.
It further provides that the order of delegation shall be in writing and it
shall also specify the period during which the District Magistrate or the
Commissioner of Police, are authorised to exercise the powers of the
State Government under sub-section (1) of Section 3. Proviso to
sub-section (2) lays down that the delegation should not be for an G
unlimited period, instead it should not be for a period of more than
three months. If the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary
to extend the period of delegation it may amend its order, extending
such period from time to time but at no time the extension shall be for
a period of more than three months. Once the State Government's
power under Section 3(1) is delegated to the District Magistrate or the H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] I S.C.R.

Commissioner of Police, they are authorised to exercise that power on
A the grounds, specified in Section 3( 1) of the Act. Neither sub-section
( 1) nor sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act require the detai.1ing
authority to specify the period of detention for which a detenu is t J be
kept under detention.

B Section 3(3) requires that where detention is made by the cele-
gate of the State Government, namely, the District Magistrate or the
Commissioner of Police, they should report the fact to the State
Government together with the grounds on which the order may have
been made and such other particulars as, in their opinion, may have a
bearing on the matter. A detention order made by a District Magis-
trate or Commissioner of Police in exercise of their delegated autho-
c rity does not remain in force for more than twelve days after the
making thereof, unless in the meantime the detention order is
approved by the State Government. Section 8 requires the detai:ling
authority to communicate to the detenu, grounds on which, the order
is made within five days from the date of detention to enable the
D detenu to make representation against the order to the State Govern-
ment. Section 10 requires the State Government to place before the
Advisory Board the detention order and the grounds on which ';uch
order may have been made alongwith the representation made by the
detenu as well as the report of the officers made under Section 3(:>) of
the Act within three weeks from the date of detention. Under Section
E 11 the Advisory Board is required to consider the materials placed
before it and after hearing the detenu, to submit its report to the State
Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the
a
person concerned. In case where the Advisory Board forms opinion, l
that there was no sufficient cause for the detention the State Gonrn-
ment shall revoke the detention order but if in its opinion sufficient
F cause was made out, the State Government may confirm the detention
order and continue the detention of the person concerned for 'uch
period not exceeding the maximum period as specified in Section l3 of
the Act. Section 13 provides the maximum period for which a person
can be detained in pursuance of any detention order made and con-
firmed under the Act. According to this provision the maximum
G period of detention shall be twelve months from the date of detention.
The State Government has, however, power to revoke detention o::der
at any time, it may think proper.

Provisions of the aforesaid Sections are inbuilt safeguards
against the delays that may be caused in considering the representa-
H tion. If the time frame, as prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is not
MRS. T. DEYAK! .-. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU [SINGH, J.l 843

adhered, the detention order is liable to be struck down and the detenu A
is entitled to freedom. Once the order of detention is confirmed by the
State Government, maximum period for which a detenu shall be
detained can not exceed 12 months from the date of detention. The
Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for
which the detenu is required to be detained. The expression "the State
Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by
B
order in writing direct that during such period as may be specifieri in
the order" occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 3 relates to the period
for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to
remain in force and it has no relevance to the period of detention. The
Legislature has taken care to entrust the power of detention to the
State Government, as the detention without trial is a serious encroach- c
ment on the fundamental right of a citizen, it has taken further care to
avoid a blanket delegation of power, to subordinate authorities for an
indefinite period by providing that the delegation in the initial instance
will not exceed for a period of three months and it shall be specified in
the order of delegation. But if the State Government on consideration
of the situation finds it necessary, it may again delegate the power of D
detention to the aforesaid authorities from time to time but at no time
the delegation shall be for a period of more than three months. The
period as mentioned in Section 3(2) of tbe Act refers to the period of
delegation and it has no relevance at all to the period for which a
person may be detained. Since the Act does not require the detaining
authority to specify the period for which a detenu is required to be E
detained, order of detention is not rendered invalid or illegal in the
absence of such specification.

Mr. R.K. Garg placed strong reliance on the decision of this
Court in Gurbax Biryani's case (supra) to support his submission. In
that case the detenu had been detained under the Maharashtra Preven- F
tion of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug
Offenders Act 55 of 1981. The High Court quashed the detention
order on the ground that the detenu had been released in criminal
prosecution under Section S(c) read with Section 21 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and he had been
released on bail, but that fact had not been placed before the detaining G
authority, On appeal by special leave a Division Bench of this Court
consisting of two Judges, dismissed the appeal without going into the
merits of the case on the sole ground that the detention order was bad
as the period of detention was not specified in the detention order.
The Court observed as under:
H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 1 S.C.R.

"The order is bad ()n another ground, namely, the period
A
of detention has not been indicated by the detaining autho-
rity. The scheme of this Act differs from the provisions
contained in similar Acts by not prescribing a period of
detention but as Section 3 of the Act indicates, there is an
initial period of detention which can extend upto three
B months and that can be extended for periods of three
months at a time. It was open to the detain.ing authority to
detain the detenu even for a period of lesser duration than
three months.That necessitated the period of detention to
be specified and unless that was indicated in the order, the
order would also be vitiated. In scores of decisions this
Court has been emphasising the necessity of strict comp-
c liance with the requirements of the preventive detention
law; yet authorities on whom the power is conferred have
not been complying with the requirements and even if there '
be merit to support the order of detention, the procedural
,>---·- -
defects lead to quashing thereof as a result of which the
D purpose of the Act if frustrated and the suffering in the
community does not abate."

With great respect we do not agree with the view expressed by the
learned Judges.

E Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities
of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders Act, 1981 is identical in
terms to Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act. Section 3 of Maharashtra
Act does not require the State Government, District Magistrate or a
Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention in the order
made by them for detaining any person with a view to preventing the
F detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order. Section 3(1) which confers power on the State Govern-
ment to make order directing detention of a person, does not require
the State Government to specify the period of detention. Similarly,
sub-sections (2) or (3) of Section 3 do not require the District Magis-
trate or the Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention
G while exercising their powers under sub-section(!) of Section 3. The
observations made in Gurbux Biryani's case that the scheme of the
Maharashtra Act was different from the provisions contained in other
similar Acts and that Section 3 of the Act contemplated initial period
of detention for three months at a time are not correct. The scheme as
contained in other Acts providing for the detention of a person with-
H out trial, is similar. In this connection we have scrutinised, the Pre-
MRS. T. DEYAK! v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU \SINGH, J.] 845

ventive Detention Act, 1950, the Maintenance of Internal Security
A
Act, COFEPOSA Act, National Security Act but in none of these
Acts the detaining authority is required to specify the period of deten-
tion while making the order of detention against a person.

This Court has consistently taken the view that an order of
detention is not rendered illegal merely because it does not specify the B
period of detention. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ujagar
Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1952] 3 SCR 756 while considering
validity of detention order made under Section 3 of the Preventive
Detention Act 1950 held that non-specification of any definite period
in a detention order made under Section 3 of the Act was not a material
omission rendering the order invalid. In Suna Ullah Butt v. State of
Jammu & Kashmir, [1973] 1SCR870 validity of detention order made c
under Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act 1964 was under
challenge on the ground that the State Government while confirming
the detention order under Section 12 of the Act had failed to specify
the period of detention. The Court held that since the State Govern-
ment had power to revoke or modify the detention order at any time D
before the completion of the maximum period prescribed under the
Act, it was not necessary for the State Government to specify. the
period of detention. In Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra,
[ 1983 I 1 sec 382 while considering the validity of the detention order
made under Section 3( 1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 this Court rejected simi- E
Jar submission made on behalf of the defenu that order of detention
was vitiated as the Government had failed to mention the period of
detention while confirming the order of detention. The Court held that
the COFEPOSA Act did not require the detaining authority to men-
tion the period of detention in the order of detention. When no period
is mentioned in an order, the implication is that the detention is for the .F
maximum period prescribed under the Act.

In A.K. Roy v. Union of India & Ors., [1982] 1 SCC 271 a
Constitution Bench of this Court considered the validity of the
National Security Act (65 of 1980), Chandrachud, CJ (as he. then was)
speaking for the Bench rejected the arguments made on behalf of the G
petitioner that the absence of provision requiring the detaining autho-
rity to provide for maximum period of detention was illegal. The
learned CJ, observed:

"There is no substance in this grievance because, any law
. of preventive detention has to provide for the maximum H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19901 1 S.C.R.

period of detention, just as any punitive law like the Penal
A
Code has to provide for the maximum sentence which can '-{
be imposed for any offence. We should have thought that it
would have been wrong to fix a minimum period of deten-
tion, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the
grounds of detention. The fact that a person can be
B detained for the maximum period of 12 months does not
place upon the detaining authority the obligation to direct
that he shall be detained for the maximum period. The
detaining authority can always exercise its discretion
regarding the length of the period of detention. It must also
be mentioned that, under the proviso to Section 13, the ~
appropriate Government has the power to revoke or
c modify the order of detention at any earlier point of time."

On the basis of the above observations validity of a detention order
passed under Section 3 of the National Security -Act was challenged
before this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration & Ors.,
D ( 1982] 2 SCC 403 on the ground that the Commissioner of Police, as
well as the Administrator of Delhi Administration who confirmed the
detention order failed to specify the period of detention while making
the order of detention. A three Judge's Bench of this Court rejected
the detention and upheld the validity of the detention order. A.P. Sen,
J. observed:
E
"It is plain from a reading of Section 3 of the Act that there
is no obvious fallacy underlying the submission that the

F
detaining authority had the duty to specify the period of
detention. It will be noticed that sub-section ( 1) of Section
3 stops with the words "make an order directing that such
person be detained", and does not go further and prescribe
that the detaining authority shall also specify the period of
detention. Otherwise, there should have been the follow-
'
ing words added at the end of this sub-section "and shall
specify the period of such detention". What is true of sub-
section (1) of Section 3 is also true of sub-section (2)
G thereof. It is not permissible for the courts, by a process of
judicial construction, to alter or vary the terms of a Sec-
tion. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of detention
must necessarily vary according to the exigencies of each
case i.e. the nature of the prejudicial activity complained
of. It is not that the period of detention must in all
H circumstances extended to the maximum period of 12
MRS. T. DEYAK! v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU [SINGH, J.] 847

months as laid down in Section 13 of the Act."
A
It is thus clear that the view taken in Gurbux Biryani's case on
the interpretation of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Act is incorrect.
This Court has while considering the question of the validity of the
detention order made under different Acts, consistently taken the
view that it is not necessary for the detaining authority or the State B
Government to specify the period of detention in the order. In the
absence of any period being specified in the order the detenu is
required to be under detention for the maximum period prescribed
under the Act, but it is always open to the State Government to modify
or revoke. the order even before the completion of the maximum
period of detention. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
impugned order of detention is not rendered illegal on account of the c
...I detaining authority's failure to specify period o,f detention in the order.

Mr. R.K. Garg then urged that the sole ground on which the
detention order is founded does not. relate to maintenance of public
order, and it exhibits non-application of mind by the detaining autho- D
rity. While considering this submission it is necessary to reproduce the
detention order as well as the grounds in support thereof. The deten-
tion order is as under:

"DETENTION ORDER
E
WHEREAS, I, Thim T.S. Sridhar, IAS, Collector
. ·and District Magistrate, Kamara jar District, Virudhuna-
gar, am satisfied with respect to the person known as Thim
'fhamaraikani son of Ramaswamy Nader, residing at Sing-
ammalpuram Street, Srivilliputhur Town and Taluk that
with a vi1'w to preventing him from acting in any manner F
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is neces-
. .
sarv .to
. make the following order.
2. Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Preven-
tion of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offen-· G
ders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offen-
ders and Slum-Grabbers Act 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14/82)
read with orders issued by the Government in G.O. Ms.
No. 230, Prohibition and Excise Department, dated
23.3.1985 and subsequently amended in G.O. Ms. No. 815,
Home Prohibition and Excise Department dated 13.7.1989 H
848 SUPREME -COURT REPORTS I1990] 1 S.C.R.

A under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, I hereby '--i
direct that the said Thiru R. Thamaraikani son of Rama-
samy Nader be detained and kept in Central Prison,
Madurai.

Sd/-
B Collector and District
Magistrate, Kamara jar,
District Virudhunagar."

The ground of detention supplied to the detenu stated that the detenu
JI
was a habitual criminal, a goonda and his activity had come to adverse
notice in some cases reference to which was made by referring to some
c FIRs lodged against the detenu at the Police Station. But the incidents
referred in those FIRs have not been made ground for detention in-
stead facts stated in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the grounds constitute
material on which the District Magistrate formed the requisite opinion
under Section 3( 1) of the Act in making the order of detention._ These
D are as under:

"(3) The ground on which the said detention order has
been made as follows:

•- On 29.7 .1989, the Kamara jar District Irrigation
E Seminar was held at "Dry Chilly Merchants' Association
Kalai Arangam" at Arupoukottai Road, Viruthunagar
Town. Hon'ble Minister for P.W.D. Thiru Durai Murugan
and Hon'ble Minister for Labour Thim Pon. Muthuma-
laingam attended the Seminar which was presided over by
the District Collector. At about 12.30 p.m. while the pro-
F ceedings of the Seminar were on, suddenly there was a
commotion in front of the dias. Thiru Murali, Sub-Inspec-
tor of Police, Vembakottai alongwith posse of men who
were on bandobust duty there, rushed up Thiru R.
Thamaraikani inducing his henchmen saying "Finish Durai
Murgan's chapter today". The same time he (Thamarai-
G kani) also threw a dagger aimed at Hon'ble Minister ThirL
Durai Murugan shouting "Finish Durai Murgans Chapter
today". But the dagger missed the target and fell down on
the stage. At once Thiru R. Thamaraikani took out a bottle
containing petrol and a match box out of a hand bag which
he carried in his hand. Instantly Thiru Murali, Sub-Inspec-
H tor of Police, Vembakottai and the P.C. 168 Murugesan
MRS. T. DEYAK! v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU [SINGH, J.] 849

pounched and caught hold of Thim R. Thamaraikani. The
A
former seized the bottle and the match box. At the instiga-
tion of Thim R. Thamaraikani, his henchmen viz. Thim
Valargal Kenna, son of Thangaraj Nader of Kammapatti,
Nareeswaran, son of Smaraj Nadar of Kammapatti, Kali-
pandian, son of Krishna son thevar of Mall and Nagarajan,
on of Paramasive Thevar of Mangeseri who accompanied B
him also_ attempted to attack the Hon'ble Minister for
P.W.D., with knives in their hands. H.C. 829 Thim Sub-
biahni P.C. 231 Thim Subbiah and P.C. 469 Thim Manraj
duly assisted by some agriculturists surrounded and over-
powered them and seized their knives, Seeing the violent
activities of Thim R. Thaniaraikani and his men, the·
gathering in the hall panicked. They raised an alarm and c
ran outside the auditorium and the crowd outside also got
scared and ran helter skelter, causing obstruction to traffic
along Aruppukottai Road. The proceedings of the Seminar
also came to an abrupt halt for a while. The Sub-Inspector
of Police arrested Thiru R. Thamaraikani and his four D-
associates at about 1300 hrs. and brought them out with the
help of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Virudhuna-
gar and other Police Officials who were then on duty there.
On seeing this about 10 other henchmen of Thiru R .
. Thamaraikani who were waiting outside the auditorium
escaped, leaving behin.ed an Ambassador Car IDR 667-and E
a van TCM 7797. On searching the car, the Sub-Inspector
•• of Police found legal weapons viz. 1 sword, 4 koduvals and
also 4 torch sticks, the cloths of which were doused in
kerosene. The said two vehicles along with the lethal
weapons, hand bag containing bottle with petrol. Rs. 1000
~··
match box, papers etc., were seized under an attachi at F
1330 hrs. Then •the Sub-Inspector of Police, handed over
the accused persons and the properties seized under a
special report at Virudhunagar East Police station. A case
was registered in Cr. No. 180/89 u/ss 147, 148, 307 read
with 149 I.P.C. and 27 Indian Arms Act at the Virudhuna-
gar East Police Station. The Inspector of Police, Law and G
order, Virudhunagar Rural Circle took up the investiga-
tion. On Production before the Judicial Magistrate Court
No. 1, Thiru R. Thamaraikani was remande.d to judicial
custody in Central Prison, Madurai on 30.7.89 and released
on bail with condition to stay at Madurai on 3.8.89. The
case properties were deposited in the Court. The case is H
still under investigation.
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ! 1990J 1 s.c.~.
(4) The offence u/s 307 IPC is punishable under Chapter
A XVI of the IPC. By committing the above described grave
offence in public, in broad day light, Thiru R. Thamarai-
kani has created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of
insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby
acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
B order. His unlawful, disorderly and dangerous activities on
29.7.89 are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
and have affected the even tempo of life of the community.

(5) I am aware that Thiru R. Thamaraikani is now on bail
with condition to stay at Madurai since 3.8.89. I am
satisfied that his unlawful activities warrant his detention
c under the Tamil Nadu Act No. 14 of 1982.

(6) I am s.atisfied that on the materials mentioned above, if
Thiru R. Thamaraikani is left to remain at large, he will
indulge in'further activities prejudicial to the maintenance
D of public order and further recourse to normal law would
not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him
from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order and therefore I consider that it is necessary
to detain him in custody with a view to preventing him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
E public order."

In substance the ground of detention states that while a Seminar
was going on the detenu incited his men saying "Finish Durai
Murgan's Chapter today" and after saying that he threw a dagger
aiming at Thiru Durai Murgan, Minister but the dagger missed the
p target and fell down on the stage. Thereafter, the detenu took out a
bottle containing petrol and a matchbox out of a hand bag which he
carried in his hand. Meanwhile, the Sub-Inspector of Police, caught
hold of the detenu. seized the bottle and the matchbox. It is further
stated that the detenu and those who accompanied him attempted to
attack the Minister with knives in their hands but they were over-
G powered by the Police and the members of police. As a result of the
incident those present in the hall panicked and got scared and ran
helter skelter, causing obstruction to traffic on Aruppukottai Road.
The Seminar also came to an abrupt bald for a while. paragraph 4 of
the detention order further states that the detenu by committing the
aforesaid grave offence in public, in broad day light created a sense of
H alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the
MRS. T. DEYAK! v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU {SINGH, J.] 851

area and thereby he acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance
A
of the public order. His unlawful, disorderly and dangerous activities
on 27. 7 .89 were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which
affected the even tempo of life of the community. On the aforesaid
facts, the District Magistrate was satisfied that if the detenu was left to
remain at large he would indulge in further activities prejudicial to
maintenance of public order and recourse to normal law would not B
have the desired effect of preventing him from indulging in activities
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The question which falls for consideration is whether single inci-
dent of murderous assault by the detenu and his associates on the
Minister at the Seminar held at Dry Chilly Merchants' Association
Kalai Arangam Hall was prejudicial to the maintenance of public c
order. Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commis-
....i sion of a criminal offence is bound to some extent affect the peace
prevailing in the locality and it may also affect law and order problem
but the same need not affect maintenance of public order. There is
basic difference between 'law and order' and 'public order', this aspect D
has been considered by this Court in a number of decisions, see: Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] 1 SCR 709; Pushkar
Mukherjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR 635 and
Shymal Chakraborty v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta & Anr.,
[ 1970] 1 SCR 762. In these cases it was emphasised that an act disturb-
ing public order is directed against individuals which does not disturb E
the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public
peace and tranquillity. lt·is the degree of disturbance and its effect
upon the life of the community in the locality which determines the
nature and character of breach of public order. InArun Ghosh v. State
of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 288 the Court held that the question
··whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order, or has F
acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order, is a
question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the
society. This view was reiterated in Nagendra Nath Monda! v. State of
West Bengal, [1972] 1 SCC 498; Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner
of Police, Calcutta, [1970] 3 SCR 360; S.K. Kedar v. State of West
Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 816; Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal, [1972] G
3 SCC 831; Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 845
and Amiya Kumar Karmakar v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 2 SCC
672.

In the instant case the detenu was placed under detention on the
sole incident which took place on 29.7.89 and in respect of which the H
. 852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990) l S.C.R.

detenu is facing criminal trial before a court of law. The alleged
A attempted murderous assault made by the detenu and his associates on ·.'T
Thiru Durai Murugan, Minister for Public Works Department may
have been made on account of political rivalry. In fact, in his affidavit
Thiru Durai Murugan has admitted that in the past the detenu had
misbehaved with him even on the floor of the Legislative Assembly of
B Tamil Nadu while participating in discussion. The attempted assault
took place in the hall of Dry Chily Merchants' Association Kalai
Arangam where two Ministers, a number of officials including the
District Magistrate, as well as members of the public were present. It is
alleged that the attempted murderous assault on Thiru Durai Murugan
created scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the persons
present in the hall and the detenu 's action interrupted the "proceed-
C in gs of the Seminar for a while" (emphasis supplied). This shows that
the detenu's activity disturbed the proceedings of the Seminar for a
while but the Seminar appears to have continued later on. The incident
did not and could not affect public peace and tranquillity ·nor it had
potential to create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. How
0 could a single murderous assault on the Minister concerned at the
Seminar could prejudicially affect the even tempo of the life of the
community? No doubt in paragraph 4 of the grounds the detaining
authority has stated that by committing this grave offence in public, in
broad day light, the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a )..._
feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and there by
E acted in a manner pre judicial to the maintenance of public order which
affected even tempo of life of the community. Repitition of these
words in the ground are not sufficient to inject the requisite degree of
quality and potentiality in the incident in question. A solitary assault
on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place
public order in jeopardy somuch as to bring the case within the
F purview of the Act. Such a solitary incident can only raise a law and
order problem and no more. Moreover, there is no material on record
to show that the reach and potentiality of the aforesaid incident was so
great as to disturb the normal life of the community in the locality or it
disturbed general peace and tranquillity. In the absence of such mate-
rial it is not possible to hold that the incident at the seminar was
G prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In Manu Bhusan Roy
Pradhan v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [1973] 3 SCC 663 this Court
held that a solitary assault on one individual, which may well be
equated with an ordinary murder which is not an uncommon occu-
rrence, can hardly be said to disturb public peace and its impact on the
society as a whole cannot be considered to be so extensive, widespread
H and forceful as to disturb the normal life of the community, thereby
MRS. T. DEYAK! v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU [SINGH, l.] 853

shaking the balanced tempo of the orderly life of the general public. A
The Court held that the detention order which had been made for
preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, was not sustainable in law. On a careful
consideration of the matter in all its aspects and having regard to the
circumstances in which the alleged incident took place on 29. 7 .89, we
B
are of the opinion that the solitary incident as alleged in the ground of
detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the
purpose of preventing the 'petitioner from acting in a manner prejudi-
cial to the maintenance of public order.

The detaining authority, namely, the District Magistrate of
Kamarajar District who was admittedly present at the Seminar, has c
filed his own affidavit stating that he was sitting on the dias alongwith
the Minister for Public Works Department. Thus the incident which is
the basis for detention of the detenu took place in the presence of the
detaining authority. In his affidavit the District Magistrate has, how-
ever, stated that he made the detention order against the detenu on
D
perusal of the materials, facts and documents placed before him by the
police as he was satisfied that detenu 's detention was necessary for the
purpose of maintenance of public order. He has denied the allegation
that the detention order was passed by him under the influence of the
Minister. Since the District Magistrate was present on the dias along-
with the Minister and the alleged murderous assault is alleged to have
been made by the detenu in the presence of the detaining authority, E
one would expect him to have witnessed the occurrence himself. But it
is interesting to note that in paragraph 23 of his affidavit, the District
Magistrate has stated that though he was present on the dias but did
not witness the incident as he was concentrating on the proceedings of
the Seminar and preparing replies to the querries raised by Speakers at
the Seminar. It is difficult to believe the District Magistrate that he F
could not see the occurrence although he was seated on the dias along-
with the Minister, on whom murderous assault was allegedly made by
the detenu. He is not ready to corroborate the occurrence as presented
to him by the sponsoring authority, namely, the Police. If the detain-
ing authority was himself present and was an eye-witness to the occur-
rence on the basis of which detention order was made, it was impera- G
tive for the detaining authority to have honestly and bona fide formed
the requisite opinion in making the order of detention on the basis of
his own knowledge and perception instead of relying more on the
version of the incident as placed before him by the sponsoring authO-
rity. In a case where the detaining authority may not be present at the
H
854. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 1 S.C.R.

A place of the incident or the occurrence, he has to form the requisite
opinion on the basis of materials placed before him by the sponsoring
authority but where the detaining authority was himself present at the
scene of occurrence he should have relied more on his own observation
and knowledge than on the report of the sponsoring authority. In the
B instant case the detaining authority though present at the scene of
occurrence does not support the incident as presented to him by the
sponsoring authority. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that
there was non-application of mind by the detaining authority in mak-
ing the impugned order of detention.

In view of the above discussion the detention order is rendered
C illegal and it is accordingly quashed.

R.N.J. Petition allowed.