Holding

When a suit under Section 209 is filed beyond the limitation period and the decree of the partition suit is not executed, the occupier becomes a sirdar under Section 210, and the High Court cannot overturn the consolidation authorities' concurrent findings.

Summary

Muneshwar (deceased) filed a partition suit under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, which was decreed but never executed, leaving him in possession of the land. The respondents later filed a suit for possession under Section 209, more than six years after the date prescribed in Appendix III, and the suit was abated under Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The consolidation authorities, applying Section 210 of the Zamindari Abolition Act, declared Muneshwar a "Sirdar" because the suit was barred by limitation and no decree had been executed. The Allahabad High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226, set aside the consolidation authorities' order, holding that the suit was timely and no sirdari rights accrued. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, holding that the suit was indeed barred, sirdari rights arose under Section 210, and the High Court could not disturb the concurrent findings of the consolidation authorities. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the consolidation authorities' order restored.

Issues considered

Whether a suit for ejectment under Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act filed after the statutory limitation period is barred, giving rise to sirdari rights under Section 210.
Whether a final decree in a partition suit that was never executed can be the basis for a suit under Section 209.
Whether the High Court may interfere via writ jurisdiction to set aside the findings of the consolidation authorities under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.
Interpretation of Section 210 regarding the consequences of failure to file a suit under Section 209 or to execute its decree.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 27
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953s. 5, s. 9, s. 9-A
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950s. 129, s. 176, s. 209, s. 210

Subjects

Zamindari abolitionland reformsirdari rightslimitation periodconsolidation of holdingspartition suitpossessionadverse possessionSection 209Section 210writ jurisdiction

Judgment

MUNESHWAR (DEAD) BY LRS. A
v.
RAJA MOHAMMAD KHAN AND ORS.

AUGUST 20, 1998
B
(M.K. MUKHERJEE AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Tellallcy and Land Laws :

U.P. Zamilldmi Abolition and Land Refonns Act, 1950 : Sections 209
md2la C

Suit filed for pmtition of land under S. 176 decreed-Dwi11g pendency
of appeal S deposited ten times of the land revellue alld obtailled 'Bhwnidmi
sanad'of the land in his name-Thereafte1; S executed sale deed in favour of
•.. i respondents ill respect of the lalld in his share under the decree-Appeal D
agai11st decree dismissed and it became fill al-But decree never executed-Ap-
pellant remained in possession of the land throughout---Respolldents filed suit
for possession under S . 209 after more than 6 years from the date provided
ill Ent1y 30 of Appendix III to the Rules-Suit abated under S. 5 of the
Consolidation Act ill view of notification under S. 4 thereof for b1ingi11g the
land ill the dist1ict under consolidation operations-Then i11 pursuance to S. E
9 of the Consolidation Act the appellant brought proceedings before the
Consolidation Officer 011 the grounds that the disputed la11d was wrongly
entered in the 11ames of the respo11dents and that the appellallt was in
possession of the lalld for the last 20 years---Auth01ities under Collsolidation
Act co11cwrently found that it was the appellant who was i11 possessio11 of the F
land a11d since the suit under S. 209 was not filed within the pe1iod of
limitatio11 the appella11t became a 'Sirdar' thereof i11 view of S. 21(}-High
Cowt i11 w1it petition filed by responde11ts took the view that the suit :vas filed
within limitation and it abated because of stmt of co11solidation operations
and that 'sirda1i' 1ights did not accnte i11 favour of the appellants and that
even if the respondents could not get possession after final decree no 1ight G
accnted in favour of the appellant within that period-Therefore, High Cowt
quashed the order passed by Consolidation Authorities-Held : Since final
decree in the pmtition suit by S could not be executed it is debatable if
recourse could be had to S. 209, particularly when share of S had not bee11
separated and possession always remai11ed with appella11t---Moreover, in the H
53
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A suit for possession under S. 209 no decree was passed as that suit had
abated-Consequences, as given in S. 210 follow when there is failure to file
suit w1~er S. 209 or to execute a decree obtained thereunder-Accordingly,.
the autho1ities under the Consolidation Act concluded that the suit under S.
209 was filed beyond the pe1iod of limitation and confe1red 'sirda1i' 1ights
B on the appellant-In the circumstances of the case, High Cowt e1red in
inte1fe1i11g in the w1it jwisdiction to upset the concwrent findings of the
auth01ities ·under the Consolidation Act-{}.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953, Ss. 5 and 9--U.P. Zamindmi Abolition and Land Refom1s Rules, 1952,
E11t1y 30 Appendix-Ill-Constitution of India, 1950, A1t. 226.

C One S filed a suit for partition of land under Section 176 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which was decreed.
During the pendency of the appeal against the decree, S deposited ten
times of the land revenue and obtained 'Bhumidari sanad, of thdand in
his name. Thereafter, S executed sale deed in favour of the resplmdents in
D respect of the land in his share under the decree. The appeal against the
decree was dismissed and the decree became final. But the decree was
never executed and the appellant remained in possession throughout.

The respondents filed a suit for possession of the land under Section
209 of the Zamindari Abolition Act after more than six years from the date
E provided in Entry 30 of Appendix III to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Rules, 1952. However, the suit abated nuder Section 5 of
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 vide notification issued under
Section 4 of the Consolidation Act for bringing the land in the district
under consolidation operations. Then in pursuance to Section 9 of the
F Consolidation Act the appellant brought proceedings before the Con-
solidation Officer on the ground that the disputed land was wrongly
entered in the names of the respondents and that the appellant was in
possession of the land for the last twenty years. The authorities under the
Consolidation Act concurrently found that it was the appellant who was in
·possession of the land and the suit under Section 209 of the Zamindari
G Abolition Act not having been filed within the period of limitation the
appellant had become 'Sirdar' thereof in view of Section 210 of that Act.

The High Court in the writ petition filed by the respondents took the
view that the suit was filed by the respondents within limitation and it
H abated because of the start of consolidation operations and that it could
MUNESHWAR v. R.M. KHAN [D.P. WADHWA,J.] 55

not be said that 'sirdari' right accrued in favour of the appellant. The High A
Court further held that even if the respondents could not get the posses-
sion after the final decree, no rights accrued in favour of the appellant
within that period and as such it quashed the order passed by the con-
solidation authorities. Hence this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court B
HELD : 1. Since the final decree in partition suit by S could not be .
executed it is debatable if recourse could be had to Section 209 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, particularly when share
of S had not been separated and possession always remained with the
appellant. Moreover, in the suit filed by the respondents under Section 209 c
of the Zamindari Abolition Act no decree had been passed as that suit had
abated. Consequences as given in Section 210 follow when there is failure
to file suit under Section 209 or to execute decree obtained thereunder.
· Accordingly, the authorities under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953 came to the conclusion that suit under Section 209 wa1> filed beyond the D
. period of limitation and confirmed 'sirdari' rights on the appellant. The
High Court, therefore, should not have interfered in the writ jurisdiction to
upset the concurrent findings of the authorities under the Consolidation
Act. [63-F; 64-G-H; 65-A-B]

Hasan Ali v. State of U.P., AIR (1990) SC 1980, relied on. E
Din Dayal, v. Rajaram, AIR (1970) SC 1019, held inapplicable.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2057 of
1984.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.80 of the Allahabad High
Court in W.P. No. 809 of 1973.

Mahabir Singh for the Appellant.

In-person for the Respondent. G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J. Appellant is aggrieved by judgment dated
December 2, 1980 of the Allahabad High Court rejecting his objections
filed by him under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. lS.C.R.

A 1953 (for short 'the Consolidation Act') which objections had been upheld
by the authorities under that Act.

Consolidation proceedings were taken up in the village of the appel-
lant under Section 8 and 8-A of the Consolidation Act. Thereafter, notices
were issued inviting objections to the records so prepared. The land in
B question in the records was shown in the names of the respondents to
which the appellant filed objections. Under Section 9-A of the Consolida-
tion Act the Consolidation Officer by judgment dated July 12, 1972 upheld
the objections of the appellant and names of the respondents were
removed from the records and name of the appellant was entered as
C 'Sirdar'. Respondents took up the matter in appeal before the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation), who dismissed the same by order dated Septem-
ber 27, 1972. The matter was yet further taken in revision by the respon-
dents and by order dated April 12, 1973 Deputy Director Consolidation
dismissed the revision. Respondents thereafter filed writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High Court which by
D impugned judgment dated December 2, 1980 quashed the orders of all the
three authorities. The result was that disputed land stood in the names of
the respondents in the revenue records under the Consolidation Act.

To understand the rival contentions we may briefly refer to the
E background of the case.
The appellant claimed that he was the sole heir of his father Baldev,
who was having tenancy rights in the land and after the death of his father
appellant inherited the tenancy rights. Appellant said that Shivrati, who
claimed to be his brother, was not in fact his brother and that when his
F father remarried his second wife was already having a son named Shivrati.
However, in the revenue record the names of both the appellant and
Shivrati were entered which entries according to the appellant were false
and were being heirs of Baldev made by Patwari of the village in collusion
with Shivrati. Baldev died sometime in 1945, appellant claimed he had been
G in exclusive possession of the land as owner irrespective of the entries in
the revenue records.

In 1959 Shivrati filed a suit for partition under Section 176 of the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short 'Zamin-
dari Abolition Act'). The case set up by the appellant that Shivrati was not
H his brother was negatived and on February 24, 1961 final decree was passed
MUNESHWAR v. R.M. KHAN [D.P. WADHWA,J.] 57

for partition in favour of Shivrati. An appeal against the judgment and A
decree thus passed was taken by the appellant but that was dismissed by
judgment dated July 17, 1961. The decree for partition became final. It is,
however, admitted case of the parties that this decree was never executed
and that appellant always remained in possession of the land since the
death of his father which, as stated above, was some time in 1945.
B
During the pendency of the appeal against the decree of partition,
Shivrati, it would appear deposited ten times of the land revenue and on
May 1, 1961 obtained 'Bhumidari sanad' of the land in his name. Shivrati,
thereafter, executed two sale deeds dated May 4, 1961 and June 20, 1961
in favour of the respondents in respect of the land of his share under the C
decree.

In 1962 respondents filed a suit against the appellant in the Court of
Additional Munsif claiming Rs. 500 as damages on the ground that Shivrati
had transferred the possession of the land in question to them in 1961 and D
that the respondents had sown crop of wheat etc. in the land and that the
appellant unauthorisedly harvested the crop on March 10, 1962 while the
respondents were themselves in the process of harvesting the same.
Respondents said that in that process they suffered a loss of Rs. 800 but
they limited their loss to Rs. 500 and filed the suit for recovery of the same.
Appellant contested the suit. He denied that respondents were ever in E
possession of the land or that they had grown any crop there. Various
issues were framed in the suit. The court held that the plea of the respon-
dents th.at they were in possession of the land was not true and that the
possession of the land always remained with the appellant. As a matter of
fact, the court noted that respondent No.l had admitted that possession of F
the land was never delivered to Shivrati or to any of the respondent in
consequence of final decree of partition passed in favour of Shivrati. The
court said it was hard to believe that when possession had not been
obtained through execution of the decree Shivrati would have delivered
possession of his own share to the respondents. As a matter of fact the
court remarked that Shivrati appeared to be a tool in the hands of the G
respondents. The court by judgment dated May 25, 1964 dismissed the suit
of the respondents holding that possession of the land always remained
with the appellant an"d that it was he who was growing his crop there. For
some years the respondents kept quiet and then on June 19, 1968 filed suit
for possession under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition Act. On H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A October 10, 1969 this suit abated in view of the provisions of Section 5 of
the Consolidation Act. By that date notification under Section 4 of the
Consolidation Act had been issued for bringing the land in the district
under consolidation operations. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 5
of the Consolidation Act provided that every proceeding for correction ~f
B records in every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or
interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of
any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken
under the Act, pending before any court or authority, whether of the first
instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed
in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceed-
C ing is pending stand abated. Then in pursuance to Section 9 of the
Consolidation Act the appellant brought proceedings before the Con-
solidation Officer that disputed land was wrongly entered in the names of
the respondents and that appellant was in possession of the land for the
last twenty years. The case of the appellant was that he had acquired rights
,D in whole of the land as owner and in any case he became entitled to the
land falling to the share of Shivrati on the basis of adverse possession and ,
he also took up the plea that Shivrati was not the son of Baldev, his father.
Issues were framed and parties led evidence. Consolidation Officer by
judgment dated July 12, 1972, held that it was the appellant who was in
possession of the land and that the ownership of the respondents came to
E an end. He held that the appellant became 'Sirdar' on the basis of the
adverse possession and since the respondents did not file any suit in time
for possession. Zamindari Abolition Act recognizes three classes of tenure-
holders, namely, 'bhumidhar', 'Sirdar', and 'asami' (Sec. 129), Accordingly
the names of the respondents were removed from the record and that of
F the appellant was entered as 'Sirdar' regarding the disputed land under
Section 210 of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Settlement Officer, Consolida-
tion in appeal, filed by the respondents, also held that it was the appellant
(before us) who was in possession of the whole land, which was proved
from the records and entries. Again, in the revision filed by the respondents
before the Deputy Director, Consolidation, same view was taken. The
G operative portion of the order in revision dated April 12, 1973 reads as
under:-

"After evaluating above mentioned facts and evidence from the
judgments of the courts below, it is clear from the facts, the
H possession of land in dispute remained with Muneshwar con-
MUNESHWAR v. R.M. KHAN [D.P. WADHWA,J.] 59

tinuously and Shivrati and Raja Mohd. never had possession. In A
the absence of the formal mutation I am of the opinion that
Muneshwar never lost his possession of land in dispute. Raja
Mohd. etc. did not obtain possession even after the sale deed and
so the sale deed never got executed. Hence the decision of the
lower court is legal and hence the revision petition is dismissed."
B
High Court, however, in the writ petition filed by the respondents
observed that the suit by the respondents in 1968 was filed within limitation
and it abated because of the start of consolidation operations and that it could
not be said that 'sirdari' rights accrued in favour of the appellant. The High
Court said that Section 210 specifically provided that if decree under Section
209 was not executed within a particular period 'sirdari' rights would accrue c
in favour of the judgment-debtor but there was no corresponding section in
the Zamindari Abolition Act to the same effect in the case of decree for
partition. High Court, therefore, was of the view that since suit under Section
209 of the Zamindari Abolition Act was filed within the period of limitation
the consolidation authorities committed an error in holding that 'sirdari' rights D
accrued in favour of the appellant and further that even if the respondents
could not get the possession after the final decree, no rights accrued in
favour of the appellant within that period and as such High Court quashed
the order passed by the consolidation authorities. View taken by the High
Court is now being challenged by the appellant before us.
E
We may, at this stage, refer to the relevant provisions of law :

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953

"9-A. Disposal of cases relating to claims to land and pmtition of joint
holdings - (1) The assistant consolidation Officer shall - F

(i) where objections in respect of claims to land or partition of
joint holdings are filed, after hearing the parties concerned;
and

(ii) where no objections are filed, making such enquiry as he may G
deem necessary,

settle the disputes, correct the mistakes and effect partition as far
as may be by conciliation between the parties appearing before
him and pass orders on the basis of conciliation. H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A (2) ················································
(3) The Assistant Consolidation Officer, while acting under sub-
section (1) and the Consolidation Officer, while acting under sub-section
(2), shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to
the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force not-
B withstanding."

U.P. Zamindali Abolition and Land Refonns Act. 1950

"176. Holding of a bhumidhar or Sirdar divisible. - (1) A bhumidhar
or Sirdar may sue for division of his holding.
c
(2) To every such suit the Gaon Samaj concerned shall be made
a party."

209. ·Ejectment of persons occupying land without title.- A person
taking or retaining possession of land otherwise than in accordance
D
with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, and -

(a) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar,
Sirdar of asami without the consent of such bhumidhar, Sirdar
or asami,
E
(b) . where the land does not form part of the holding of a
bhumidhar, Sirdar or asami without consent of the Gaon
Samaj.

shall be liable to ejectment on the suit, in cases referred to in clause
F (a) above, of the bhumidhar, Sirdar or asami concerned, and in
cases referred to in clause (b) above, of the Gaon Samaj and shall
also be liable to pay damages."

"210. Failure to file suit under Section 209 or to execute decree obtained
G thereunder.- If a suit is not brought under Section 209 or a decree obtained
in any such suit is not executed within the period of limitation provided for.
the filing of the suit or the execution of the decree, the person taking or
retaining possession shall -

(i) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar, or
H Sirdar, become a Sirdar thereof and the rights, title and
MUNESHWAR v. R.M. KHAN [D.P. WADHW A, J. J 61

interest of an asami, if any, on such land shall be extinguished, A

(ii) where the land forms part of the holding of an asami on behalf
of the Gaon Samaj, become an asami thereof holding from
year to year,
B
(iii) in any case to which the provisions of clause (b) of Section
209 apply, become a Sirdar or asami holding from year to
year as if he had been admitted to the possession of the land
by the Gaon Samaj."
c
U.P. Zamindwi Abolition and Land Ref01111 Rules, 1952

"338. The suit applications and other proceedings specified in
Appendix III shall be instituted within the time specified therein D
for them, respectively."

Appendix III Entry 53

Sr. Section Description of suit, of the Period Time from E
No. of the application and other of which peri-
Act proceeding limitation od begins to
run
21 176 Suit for partition of holding of None None
bhwnidhar or Sirdar
F
30 209 Suit for cjectment of a person
taking or retaining possession
of the land unlawfully and for
damage:
(i) If the person was in Three From the G
possession of the land on the years date of
date of vesting and the period vesting
of limitation for his ejectment
specified in the U.P. Tenancy
Act, 1939, had not expired.
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A (ii) In case of occupant Three From the
referred to in Section 144. years date of
declaration
under Section
144
B (iii) In cases where land Six From 1st of
whose possession is taken or Years July following
retained unlawfully, forms a the date of
part of the holding of a occupation.
bhumidhar, Sirdar or asami.

c (iv) In any other case -
(a) Where action under Rule Twelve From the
115-C has been started before Years date of the
the expiry of the period of order under
limitation under sub-item (b ). rule 115-E
D (b) In other cases. Twelve From the 1st
Years of July
following the
date of
occupation
E 53 .... For the execution of any One The date of
decree other than a money Year final decree
decree in the case.

Limitation Act, 1963
F
"27. Extinguislzmelll of 1ight to property. - At the determination of
the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for
possession of any property, his right to such property shall be
extinguished.

G In Din Dayal & Anr. v. Rajaram AIR (1970) SC 1019, this Court was
considering the ;irguments of the appellant before it that in view of the
principle underlying Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which
principle is not confined to suits and applications for which limitation is
prescribed under that Act but is of general application, the plaintiffs' right
H to the suit properties must be held to have been extinguished. In other
MUNESHWAR v. R.M. KHAN [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 63

words, the contention was that in view of the aforementioned provisions, A.
the plaintiffs had not merely lost their right to sue for possession of the
suit properties, their right in the properties itself had been extinguished. ,
This Court held that it is well settled that the principle underlying Section.
28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (same as Section 27 of the Indian
Limitation, 1963) is of general applications for which a period of limitation
is prescribed under the Limitation Act. In the present case, however, we
B
are concerned with the consequences which followed when suit under
Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition Act is not filed against the person
in possession of the land within the period prescribed.

From the record before us it is not clear if the suit filed by Shivrati C
was merely for partition or it was for partition and possession of his
separate share. Since the appellant was claiming exclusive possession of the
land, it would appear to us that the suit was for partition and possession.
Admittedly no execution was taken out after the final decree was passed
on February 24, 1961. Before the time for execution of the decree had D
elapsed ownership of the land falling to the share of Shivrati changed hands
and he executed two sale deeds in favour of the respondents. Suit under
Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition Act was filed on June 19, 1968.
Authorities under the Consolidation Act as well as the· High Court
proceeded on the footing that suit under Section 209 was maintainable.
Since the final decree in partition suit by Shivrati could not be executed it E
is debatable if recourse could be had to Section 209, particularly when
share of Shivrati had not been separated and possession always remained
with the appellant. Be that as it may the authorities under the Consolida-
tion Act reached concurrent finding that appellant was in adverse posses-
sion of the land and though the respondents claimed their right as owners
F
but since the suit under Section 209 was not filed within the period of
limitation prescribed appellant became a 'Sirdar' thereof. Under Section
209 a suit had to be filed within six years beginning "from 1st of July
following the date of occupation" as provided in Entry 30 of Appendix III
to the Rules under the Zamindari Abolition Act. It could not be disputed
that the suit in question was filed more than six years from the date as G
provided in Entry 30 of Appendix III as aforesaid. Record shows that it
~··

was always the appellant who was in possession of the land from the date
his father Baldev died to the exclusion of any other person.

There is another feature of the case which relates to attempts made H
•,

...,,...
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A by the respondents to get possession of the land from the appellant. First
respondent had been a Patwari. The other respondents are his; kinsmen. In
March, 1962 appellant and nine others were prosecuted for offences under
Section 147, 148, 323, 324, 395 and 397 IPC. This was on a complaint made
by the first respondent that when the respondents went to the land for
harvesting the crop they were attacked by the appellant and his party.
B Sessions Judge, who tried the case, found the case to be false and acquitted
all the accused holding that the respondents were never in possession of
the land and that it was the appellant who had grown his crops there and
was ploughing the same. Not satisfied first respondent instituted a com-
plaint under Sections 218/109 IPC against the appellant and Patwari of that
C village (who was holding the office at that time) stating that the Patwari
made wrong entries in the revenue records showing possession of the
appellant of the land. This complaint was also dismissed by the Magistrate
holding that it was the appellant who was in possession of the land. During
the course of evidence in these cases it came on record from the statement
D of Shivrati that the land in question valued Rs. 7,000 but then he sold the
same for Rs. 1200 to the respondents. It is interesting to note that in the
suit filed by the respondents for recovery of Rs. 500 claiming to be same
as loss they had stated that they, in fact, suffered a loss amounting to Rs.
800 . For a land of value of Rs. 1200 the respondents claimed to have
suffered loss of Rs. 800 only on one crop! All this leads us to conclude that
E Shivrati was a tool in the hands of the first respondent who was earlier
Patwari and then the first respondent adopted all sorts of foul means to
dispossess the appellant.

We are of the considered view that in a matter like this High Court
F should not have interfered in the writ jurisdiction to upset the concurrent
findings of the authorities under the Consolidation Act holding that it was
the appellant who was in possession of the land and the suit under Section
209 of the Zamind.ari Abolition Act not having been filed within the period
of limitation appellant had become 'Sirdar' thereof in view of Section 210
of that Act. As a matter of fact no decree had been passed as the suit liled
G under Section 209 abate<l. Consequences as given in Section 210 follow
when there is failure to file suit under Section 209 or to execute decree
obtained thereunder. In the present case the authorities under the Con-
solidation Act came to the conclusion that suit under Section 209 was filed
beyond the period of limitation and conferred sirdari rights on the appel-
H !ant. In Hasan Ali and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, AIR (1990) SC
MUNESHWARv. R.M. KHAN [D.P. WADHWA,J.] 65

1980, a case also under the Zamindari Abolition Act, in somewhat similar A
circumstances this Court said that High Court should not have exercised
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case High Court
had held that the view as to the possession taken by all the three consolida-
tion authorities was manifestly erroneous inasmuch as the possession could
have been only permissive and not adverse. This Court said that High
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
B
was not justified in arriving at a contrary conclusion in face of the clear
evidence of possession and entries in the records of right sufficiently
discussed by the three consolidation authorities.

Accordingly we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment C
of the High Court and restore that of the consolidation authorities under
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The appellant will be entitled to
costs throughout.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.