Holding

The words "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" are to be read disjunctively, so insect infestation alone makes the food adulterated, and the invoice description does not amount to a statutory warranty, leaving the vendor liable.

Summary

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi appealed the acquittal of Tek Chand Bhatia, a wholesale dealer in cashew nuts, who was charged under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling insect‑infested nuts. Samples taken from his shop were found to be infested by more than 20% insects. The Supreme Court examined whether such infestation alone makes the food "adulterated" under s.2(i)(f) or whether proof of being "otherwise unfit for human consumption" is also required. It held that the phrase "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" is disjunctive, so insect infestation per se satisfies the definition of adulteration. The Court also ruled that the invoice description "SW Best Borma" was merely a description, not a statutory warranty, and therefore Bhatia could not rely on the protection of s.19(2). Consequently, the conviction was reinstated and a fine imposed, with no imprisonment due to the respondent’s age and other mitigating factors.

Issues considered

Whether insect infestation of cashew nuts alone renders them 'adulterated' under s.2(i)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
Whether the description on the invoice constitutes a warranty under s.19(2) of the Act, thereby exempting the vendor from liability.
Whether provisions of s.20AA (Act 34 of 1976) preclude the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Legislation cited

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 16(1)(a), s. 19(2), s. 20AA, s. 2(i)(f), s. 7(1)
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955s. Rule 12A, s. Rule 48-B, s. Rule 50
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958s. 16, s. 4

Subjects

Food adulterationInsect infestationStatutory interpretationWarrantyPrevention of Food Adulteration ActVendor liabilityDisjunctive reading

Judgment

910

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
v.
TEK CHAND BHATIA
October 11, 1979

• [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
Pre;,ention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, Section 2(i)(f). interpreiation ~
of-The words "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" are disjunctive of ~~
the rest of the words preceding them-Warranty, whether the mere description
of the words in the sealed container as "SW Best Born1a" entitles protection
C under S. 19(2) of the Act, I·
The respondent is a partner of the Firm M/s. Narain Dass Tek Chand, Khari
Baoli, Delhi. The firm is engaged in wholesale business in dry fruits including
cashew nuts which it gets from different manufacturers, On August 1, 1968,
these samples of cashew nuts were taken from its shop by the Food Inspectors
PWs I and 3, ftom three sealed tins supplied by Sri Venkateswara Cashews,
Panruti and were for\varded to the Public Analyst, Delhi who by his three
D reports dated August 3, 1968 in Form III Ex!$. 'PE, PE/I and PE/2. found
ti::tat all the three samples taken were "insect infested". Of these, two were
insect-infested to the extent of 20.6 and 20.7 per cent and the third to the
extent of 5.63 per cent. Both the trial Magistrate and the Delhi High Court
1J.cquitted the Respondent. The High Court relying on its earlier decision in
Dha11raj"s case ILR (197()) 2 Delhi 681, held th~t merely because an article of
food is insect-infested it cannot be treated as "adulterated" within the meaning
E of section 2(i) (f) of th~ Act, unless it is further proved to be 'otherwise unfit •
for huma..'"! consumption' within the meaning of that section. In that view, it
did not touch upon the question whether the invoice Ext. ow· 3/A was sufficient
warranty in law as to the purity of the article sold.

Allowing the appeal on certificate, the Court,

F HELD : L The interpretation of Section 2(i) (f) by the High Court was
clearly wrong. On the plain language of the definition section, it is quite
apparent that the words "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" are
disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them. (b) It relates to.a distinct
and separate class altogether. The last clause "or is otherwise unfit for human
consumption" is residuary provision which would apply to a case not covered
by or falling squarely within the clauses preceding it. (c) If the phrase is to be
G read disjunctively the mere proof of the article of food being "filthy, 'putrid,
rotten, decomposed ...... or insect-infested" would b:.;! per se sufficient to bring
the case within the purview of the word "adulterated" as defined ill sub-clause
( f) and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the
article of food was unfit for human consmuption. [914 F-H, 915A]

(c) The decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo
Mal, [1976] 2 SCR I approving the decision in Dhanraj's case ILR (1970) 2
Delhi 681 should be confined to the particular facts of that case. The decision
in tllat case was largely based on the circumstance that the standard of quality
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. T. C. BHATIA 911

:and purity '.Vas .not prescribed in respect of oashe,vnuts. Now that Rule 48-B of A
:the Preventi•)n of Faod Adulteration Rules in 1955 has been framed, the decision
in Kacheroo Mal's case is rendered inapplicable. [916 B-C]
(d) In the definition clause, the collocation of words filthy, rotten, decom-
posed a.n<l i:nsect-infested" which are adjectives qualifying the term 1an article
'Of food' show that it is not of the nature, substance and quality fit for human
consumption. A comma after each of the first three words is significant. These B
qualifying adjectives cannot be read with the Jast portion of the definition i.e.,
the v.·ords "or is otherwise unfit for human consump~ion" which is quite separate
and distinct from others. [916 D-E]
(e) The word "otherwise" signifies unfitness for human consumption due
to other ai.uses. If the last portion is meant to mean Something different, it
becomes diJficult to understand how the word 'or' as used in the definition of
'adulterated' in s. L(i) (f) between "filthy, putrid, rotten, etc." and "otherwise c
unfit for human consumption" could have been intended to be used con-
junctively. It would be more appropriate in the context to read it disjunc-
iive!y. [916 E-F]

(f) The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunc-
tive, but at times they are read as vice versa. To carry out the intention of
the legislature, it is occasionaly found necessary to read the conjunctions 'ot' D
and ••and" one for the. other. The substitution of conjunctions however, has
been sometimes made without sufficient reasons and it has been doubt.ed
whether so1ne of the cases of turning 'or' into 'and' and vice versa have not
gone to the extreme limit of interpretation. [917 A·C]

• Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R. [1928] I K. B. 561 at 568;
Mers~y Docks & Harbour Board v. Henderson L.R. [1888] 13 A.C. 603,
referred to.
E

2. (a) ''arious categories of 'adulterated food' mentioned in s. 2(i) (f)
·broadly fall into two kinds of adulteration; firstly where the constituent ele-
menUi mato the food obnoxious .to human health or the existence of the par-
-ticular composition. of it, itself makes the food 'adulterated' and secondly,
wµere the adulteration is constituted by the fact that the prescribed standard
has not bef:~n observed in selling what purports to be a food of that standard
F
or quality. [917 D-E]

(b) Mere proof of an article of food like decomposed or diseased meat
o( or rotten fish or putrid fruits and vegetables by the condition of the articles
should be !iufficient to attract the definition of "adulterated" contained in

•• t s. 2(i) (f) :ind further proof of 'unfitness of the articles for human consump-
tion' still is not necessary for bringing home the guilt. [917E·F]

(c) Th'e decision in Kacheroo Mal's case is however distinguishable in-
G

i'· asmuch as there Was no evidence that the cashew nuts, which were insect-
infested to the extent of 21.9 per cent, were unfit' for hum3n consumption.
In regard to ,cashew nuts there was, at the material time, no statutory provision
prescribing any minimum standards of purity. It was, therefore, for the
-J.

•...
Court to d1~cide upon the evidence in the same, whether the insect infestation H
found was of such nature and extent as to make it unfit for humall consump-
tion. [917 F-HJ
-j

•
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A (d) Asouming the test in Kacheroo Mal's case to be correct, and the
report of the Public Analyst to be just a piece of evidence which has to be
evaluated by the .Court in the facts and circumstances of each particular case
to reach a finding as to the unfitness or otherwise of the sample for human
consumption, there is in the present case, the evidence of respondent's own
witness Dr. B. D. Narang DW.1. In view of clear evidence, two of the
samples or cashew nut! purchased from the respondent, which were found te>
B be in.sectwinfested to the extent of 20.6 per cent and 20.7 per cent are "adul-
terated" within the meaning of section 2'(i) (f). [918 A·D]

(e) Part IX of the Prevention of Food Adultemtion Rules, 1955 deals with
th'e conditions of sale and licence. Rule 50 states that no person shall manu-
facture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit for sale the article of food mentioned
therein except under a licence. "Nuts" is one of the articles mentioned there--
c in. It is wide and enough to include cashew nuts. Originally the Rules did
not prescribe the standards of quality or purity in relation- to dry-fruits. That
lacuna has, however, now been removed by the insertion of Rule 48B. [920A·B}

3. In the instant case (a) there is no proof that the samples were taken
from tins bearing the manufacturer's label guaranteeing purity of goods, nor
is there any such warranty in the invoice Ext DE3/A. There is nothing to
D substantiate this fact, and even if it were so, it is of little consequence. [921 D-E]i

(b) The word "good" merely contains a description of the goods. The
weird "good'' is not warranty as to the quality. The respondent is, therefore,
not protected under section 19(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954 read with r. 12A of the rules framed under the Act. [921E-F]

Ranganatha Reddiar v. The State of 'Kera/a [1970] 1 SCR 864; Andhra
E Pradesh Grain & Se~d Merchants' Association v. Union of India [1971] 1
SCR 166, distinguished.

R •. G. Pamanani v. The State df Maharashtra [1975] 2 SCR 886, applied.

4. The provisions of Section 20AA inserted by Act 34 of 1976 interdicts
the Court from applying the provisions of section 4 of the Probation of Offen-
F ders Act, 1958 to a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954. [921GJ

[Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 16 of POPA, 1954 giving the
Court the discretion for special and adequate re360ns under proviso to sub-
section (1) not to pass a sentence of imprisonment and considering the agf'
of respondent the Court sentenced the respondent to the period already
G undergone and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/ .]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 195
of 1973.
From the Jndgment and Order dated 26·5-1972 of the Delhi
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 177 /71.
H
V. S. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi and B. Bhaduraj for
the Appellant.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. T.· c. BHATIA (Sen, J.) 913

._ "°')- 0. P. Soni, S. N. Mehta, Miss Kamlesh and V. D. Chopra for the II.
Respondent,

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SEN, J. In this appeal, on certificate, from a judgment of the
Delhi High Court, by which it acquitted the respondent of an offence B·
punishable under s. 16(1) (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954, for the alleged contravention of s. 7(1) thereof, two
questions arise, namely (1) whether even though the Public Analyst
found in one of the reports, Ext. PE that a particular sample of
cashew nuts purchased from the respondent's shop was 'insect-infest- c·,
ed' to the extent of 20.6 per cent and that it contained living insects,
that circumstance by itself was not sufficient to warrant a conviction,
and (2) whether the respondent was protected by sub-s. (2) of s. 19
of the Act inasmuch as he had purchased / the cashew nuts in scaled
tins from a dealer in cashew nuts under the invoice Ext. DW 3 /A,
which contained a description of the goods as 'SW Best Bormia'.
I
The facts of the prosecution case are these. The respondent is a
partner of the firm M/s. Narain Dass Tek Chand, Khari Baoli, Delhi.
The firm i:; engaged in wholesale business in dry-fruits including
cashew nuts which it gets from different manufacturers. On August
1, 1968 three samples of cashew nuts were taken from its shop by E
the two Food Inspectors, S. L. Mehra, P.W. 1 and H. K. Bhanot,
P.W. 3 from three sealed tins supplied by Sri Venkateswara Cashews,
Panruti. These samples were duly forwarded to the Public Analyst,
Delhi who by his three reports dated August 3, 1968 in Form III,
. Exts. PE, PE/1 and PE/2 found that all the three samples taken
were 'inseclt-infested'. Of these, two were insect-infested to the extent P"
of 20.6 and 20.7 per cent and the third to the extent of S.63 per cent.
The Magistrate 1st Class, Delhi acquitted the respondent hold-
ing (1) that the respondent was a sleeping partner residing at Kanpur,.
and that there was nothing to show that he was incharge of and was.
responsible for the conduct of the business which, was carried on at G,
the shop of the firm at Khari Baoli, Delhi; (2) that alternatively, the
invoice Ext. DW 3/A produced by the respondent contained a
warranty which absolved him from liability, and (3) that the ratio
of living insects to dead insects not having been given in the Public
Analyst's report, there being no evidence to show that the cashew
nuts in question were deleterious to health, and if so, how much harm- ll
ful effect it would have upon the health of a person consuming them,
4-743 SCl/79
{

914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A the mere fact of the cashew nuts being insect-infested was not suffi-
cient to bring home the charge.

The Delhi High Court without going into the question as to
whether the respondent was protected under sub-s. (2) of s. 19,
maintained the order of acquittal, holding that merely because an
, B article of food is insect-infested, it cannot be treated as 'adulterated'
within the meaning of s. 2(i) (f) of the Act unless it is further proved
to be 'otherwise unfit for human consumption' within the meaning
of the section following its decision in Dhanraj v. Municipal Corpora·
tion of Delhi.(') In that view, it did not touch upon the other
question namely, whether the invoice Ext. DW, 3/A was sufficient
c, warranty in law as to the purity of the article of food sold.
The term 'adulterated' as defined in s. 2(i) (!) reads :
"(f) if the article consists wholly or in part of any
filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or
vegetable substance or is insect-infested or is otherwise un-
D
fit for human consumption."
In Dhanraj's case (snpra) the High Court construed sub-cl. (f)
thus :
"The word 'otherwise' in sub-clause (!) of cl. (1) of
E sec. 2 does suggest that all the adjectives used earlier refer
to the quality of the article being unfit for human consump-
tion. To fall under that sub-clause an article of food must
be unfit for human consumption because it consists wholly or
in part of any fifthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed
or diseased animal or vegetable substance or because it is
·F insect-infested or on account of any other cause."

We are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly wrong in
its interpretation of s. 2(i) (!). On the plain language of the defini-
tion section, it is quite apparent that the words 'or is otherwise unfit
for human consumption' are disjunctive of the rest of the words pre-
G ceding them. It relates to a distinct and separate class altogether. It·
seems to us that the last clause 'or is otherwise unfit for human con-
sumption' is residuary provision which would apply to a case not
covered by or falling squarely within the clauses preceding it. If the
phrase is to be read disjunctively the mere proof of the article of food
I ,<- ._
being 'filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed .... or insect-infested' would
be per se sufficient to bring the case within the purview of the word
(I) I.L.R. (1970) 2 Delhi 681.
M1PUCIPAL CORPORATION v. T. c. BHATIA (Sen, J.) 915

'adulterated' as defined in sub-cl. (f) and it would not be necessary A
.in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for
human consumption.

It is, however, pointed out that the construction placed by the
High Court in Dhanraj's case upon s. 2 (i) (f) of the Act has been
received with approval by this Court in Municipal Corporation of B
Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal.(') where it is observed that 'the construction
placed by the High Court in Dhanraj's case is the correct exposition
of .the law embodied in s. 2(i) (f)'. It is added for the sake of
elucidation that the adjectiws which precede the phrase 'or is other-

' wise unfit for human consumption' indicate presumptive but not
absolute criteria as to the quality of the article of food. If we may c
say so with respect, we have reservations about the correctness of ~
decision, but it is not necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench.

In Kacheroo Mal's case it is observed :
"The phrase "or is otherwise unfit for human consump- D,
tion" ca:n be read conjunctively as well as disjunctively. If
it is read conjunctively, that is, in association with what pre-
cedes it, sub-clause (f) with slight consequent rearrange-
ment and parenthesis would read like this : "If the article
is unfit for human consumption on account of (a) its con-
sisting wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, E
.rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable subst-
ance or being insect-infested, (b) or on account of any
other cause". In this view of the sub-clause, proof of
unfitness of the article for human consumption' is a must for
bringing the case within its purview. F
If the pharse is to be read disjunctively, the mere proof
of the whole or any part of the article being "filthy, putrid,
disgusting, rotten. . . . or insect-infested" would be con-
clusive to bring the case within the mischief of this sub-
clause, and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove
G
further that the article was unfit for human consumption.
We would prefer the first construction as it comports
best with reason, commonsense, realities, the tenor of this
provisio:n and the main purpose and scheme of the Act. The
adjectives "filthy", "putrid", "disgusting", "decomposed",
"rotten". . . . "insect-infested" refer to. the quality of the H
(l) [1976) 2 S.C.R. 1.
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980J 1 S.C.R.

· A article and furnish the indicia for presuming the article to be
unfit for human consumption. But the presumption may not
be conclusive in all cases, irrespective of the character of the
article, and the nature and extent of the vice affiicting it.
This is particularly so, where an article is found to be 'insect-
infested'." · ·
' B
·"'-
With utmost respect, we are not able to share this view and would
hold that the observations made in the judgment should be confined
.
''·"' ....
to the particular facts of that case.
The decision in Kacheroo Mal's case (supra) was largely based on I
- C the circumstances that the siandard of quality and purity was not pres-
cribed in respect of cashew nuts. Now that r. 48-B of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 has been framed, the decision in
Kacheroo Mal's case (supra) is rendered inapplicable.
In the definition clause, the collocation of words 'filthy, putrid',
D rotten, decomposed and insect-infested' which are adjectives qualify-
ing the term 'an article of food', show that it is not of the nature,
substance and quality fit for human consumption. It will be noticed
that there is a comma after each of the first three words. It should also
be noted that these qualifying adjectives cannot be read into the last
portion of the definition i.e., the words 'or is oth~se unfit for human •
E consumption', which is quite separate and diStil\\lt from others. The
word 'otherwise' signifies unfitness for human consumption due to
other causes. H the last portion is meant to mean something different,
it becomes difficult to understand how the word 'or' as used in the
definition of 'adulterated' in s. 2(i} (f) between 'filthy, putrid, rotteu
. etc.' and 'otherwise unfit for human consumption' could have been
intended to be used conjunctively. It would be more appropriate in
the context to read it disjunctively. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd
Edu., vol. 1, it is stated st p. 135 :
"And" has generally a cumulative sense, requmng the
fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and
f
G herein it is the antithesis of OR. Sometimes, however, even
in such a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as
"or"."
While dealing with the topic 'OR is read' as AND, and vice verm'
Stroud says in vol. 3, at p. 2009 :
II
"You wil! find it said in some' cases that 'or' means 'and';
but 'or' never does mean 'and'."
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. T. {;, BHATIA (Sen, J.) 917

Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., p. 229- A
30, it has beon accepted that 'to carry out the intention of the legis-
lature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions "or"
and "and" one for the other'. The word 'or' is nonnally disjunctive
and 'and' is normally conjunctive, but at times they are read as vice
versa. As :Scrutton L.J. said in Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate
·Co.('). 'you do sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute... But you B
do not do it unless you are oblized, because 'or' does not generally
mean 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or'. As Lord Halsbury
L.C. obse1ved in Marsey Docks & Harbour Board v. Henderson(')
the reading of 'or' as 'and' is not to be resorted to "unless some other
part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to c
be done". The substitution of conjunctions, however, has been some-
times made without sufficient reasons, and it has been doubted '
whether some of cases of turning 'or' into 'and' and vice versa have
not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation.
Various categories of 'adulterated food' mentioned in s. 2(i) (f) D
'broadly fall into two kinds of adulteration; firstly, where the consti-
tuent elements make the food obnoxious to human health or the
·existence of the particular composition of it, itself makes the food
'adulterated', and secondly, where the adulteration is constituted by
the fact that the prescribed standard has not been observed in selling
-what purports ·to be a food of that standard or quality. E
We really fail to comprehend why the mere proof of an article of
food like decomposed or diseased meat or rotten fish or putrid fruits
•and vegetables by the condition of the article itself should not be
-sufficient to attract the definition of 'adulterated' contained in
·s. 2(i) (f) and further proof of 'unfitness of the article for human F
consumption' is still necessary for bringing home the guilt.
The decision in Kacheroo Mal's case is, however, distinguishable
inasmuch as there was in that case no evidence that the cashew nuts,
which were insect-infested to the extent of 21.9 per cent. were unfit
for human consumption.
G
In regard to casew nuts there was, at the material time, no statu-
tory provision prescribing any minimum standards of purity. It is, ·
'therefore, for the Court to decide upon the evidence in the case,
·whether the insect infestation found was of such nature and extent as
:to make it unfit for human consumption. Assuming the test in
B
•(I) L.R. [1928] I K.B. 561 at p. 568.
~2J L.R. [1888] !3 A.C. 603.
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R:.

Kacheroo Mars case to be correct, and the report of the Public
Analyst to be just a piece of evidence which has to be evaluated by
the Court in the facts and circumstances of each particular case to
reach a finding as to the unfitness or otherwise of the sample for human
consumption, there is in the present case such evidence. Dr. B. D.
Narang, DW 1, examined by the respondent, is an expert on the
~. B subject, being a member of the Q:ntral Committee of Food Standards
besides holding Ph. D. degree in Chemistry from the University of
Texas. He unequivocally states that although in regard to cashew
nuts, there was at that time no statutory provision prescribing any
minimum standard of purity, the Committee had reco=ended te
.. 8 allow a 10 per cent insect infestation as it was of the view that this
much infestation should not be taken as an act of adulteration since
it was not harmful to human consumption. In view of this clear
evidence, two of the samples of cashew nuts purchased from the
respondent, which were found to be insect-infested to the extent of 20.6
and 20.7 per cent, must be held to be 'adulterated' within the mean-
.D ing of s. 2(i) (f). There is no reason for us not to act upon the testi-
mony of Dr. Narang, who is. the respondent's own witness.
That takes us to the next ground namely whether the respondent
having sold cashev.; nuts from sealed tins purchased from the supplier
Sri Venkateswara Cashews, Panruti under the invoice Ext. DW 3/A
E bearing the description that they were 'SW Best Borma' cashew nuts,
was protected under s. 19 (2) of the Act which reads :
"19. (2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have commit-
ted an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or
misbranded article of food if he proves-
( a) that he purchased the article of food-
F
(i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale
thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, distri-
butor or dealer;
(ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor
or dealer, '
- G with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and
(a) that the article of food while in his possession was pro-
perly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he
purchased it."
There can be no doubt that M/s. Narain Dass Tek Chand had
H purchased the cashew nuts in question from Sri Venkateswara Cashews.
Ramesh Chand, DW 3, manager of the firm states that the goods are
purchased and sold by the firm in wholesale at its shop at Kbari
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. T. c. BHATIA (Sen, l.) 919

Baoli, Delhi. According to this witness, all the three partners of the A'
firm reside at Kanpur. They come to Delhi in a month or two for
scrutinising the accounts. He states that the cashew nuts were pur-
chased under the invoice Ext. DW 3 /A and they were of 'SW' mark.
We are left to gm!ss what tlr~ letters 'SW or 'SW Best Borma' signify.
It is, however, strenuously urged that the invoice describes the B
cashew nuts to be 'SW Best Borma' and this amounts to a warranty
as to quality. Strong reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in
Ranganatha Reddiar v. The State of Kerala(') and Andhra Pradesh
Grain & Seed Merchants' Association v. Union of India(') for the
contention that if an article of food is sold in the same condition in
1( which it was purchased from the manufacturer or dealer, the vendor C'
i.e., the retailer, like the respondent will not lose the protection of
sub-s. (2) of s. 19, particularly when it is certified to be of good
quality. We are, afraid we cannot appreciate this line of reasoning. The
two decisions in Ranganatha Raddiar's case and in A11dim1 Pradesh
Grain & Seed Merchants' case are clearly distinguishable. In the
former case, the cash memo contained the words 'quality is up to the I>
mark' which meant that the quality of the article supplied· was up to
the standard required by the Act and the vendee. It was observed :
"It must be remembered that it is not a document drafted
by a solicitor; it is a document nsing the language of a
tradesman. Any tradesman, when he is assured that the E. l
qu.ality of the article is up to the mark will readily conclude
that he is being assured that the article is not adulterated."
In the latter case, it was a branded article of food, and it was said :
"If the article of food is sold in the same condition in
which it was purchased from a licensed manufacturer or p r

dealer, or was purchased with a warranty, the vendor will
not lose the protection of sub-s. (2) of s. 19 merely because
he opened the container. If the vendor has obtained the
article from a licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer
or from a manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a·
warranty, he is protected, provided he has properly stored G
the article and sells it ii) the same state as he purchased the
article, even if it turns out that the article was adulterated or
misbranded."

•• In the absence of any evidence that the respondent had purchased the
cashew nuts under warranty, these authorities are of no avail.
(!) [1970] l S.C.R. 864.
(2) [1971) 1 S.C.R. 166.
B
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

Part IX of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 deals
with the conditions of sale and licence. Rule 50 states that no person
shall manufacture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit for sale the articles
of food mentioned therein except under a liD-'"11C'~. 'Nuts' is one of the
articles mentioned therein. It is wide enough to include cashew nuts.

•• Originally the rules did not prescribe the standards of quality or purity
in relation to dry-fruits. That lacuna has, however, now been removad
by the insertion of r. 48-B, which is in these terms :
"48-B. Sale of insect-damaged dry fruits and nuts.-The
dry fruits and nuts like raisins, currents, figs, cashewnuts,
apricots, almonds may contain not more than 5 per cent of
. -c insect-damaged fruits and nuts, by count."
Rule 12A which deals with warranty reads thus :
"Rule 12-A. Warranty-Every trader selling an article of
food to a vendor shall, if the vendor so requires, deliver to
the vendor a warranty in Form VI-A :
·o Provided that no warranty in such form shall be neces-
sary if the label on the article of food or the cash memo
delivered by the trader to the vendor in respect of that
article contains a warranty certifying that the food contained
in the package or container or mentioned in the cash memo
is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by
the vendor.
•
Explanation : The term 'trader' shall mean an importer,
manufacturer, wholesale dealer or an authorised agent of
such importer manufacturer or whoksale dealer."
Admittedly, there was no warranty in the prescribed form in the
instant case. The testimony of the two Food Inspectors, S. L. Mehra,
PW 1, and H. K. Bhanot, PW 3, no doubt show that they bought the
samples out of the sealed tins, but there is nothing to show that they
were tins bearing the manufacturer's label guaranteeing purity.
.. G Tu R. G. Pamanani v. The State of Maharashtra(') this Court after
distinguishing Andh~a Pradesh Grain & Seed Mercha1Its' case
observed:
"The reason why a warranty is required in both the cases
contemplated in section 19(2) (a) (i) and (ii) is that if

• warranty were not to be insisted upon by the statute and if If
vendor would be permitted to have a defence merely by stat-
(1) [1975) 2 S.C.R. 886.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. T. c. BHATIA (Sen, !.) 921

,fng that the vendor purchased the goods from a licensed A
·manufacturer, distributor or dealer adulterated or misbranded
.articles would be marketed by manufacturers, distributors,
.dealers as well as purchasers from them with impunity. That
is why a written warranty is enjoined in both the cases in
section 19(2)(a)(i) and (ii). Section 19(2j(a) of the Act
will provide a defence where a vendor purchase; articles of II
food from a licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer
with a written warranty in the prescribed form. Again, a
vendor 'shall not be deemed to have committed an offence
pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article
of food if he proves that he purchased the article from any
·manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a written warranty in
c
the prescribed form. These salutary provisions are designed
for the health of the nation. Therefore, a warranty is
·enjoined. No laxity should be permitted." (Emphasis
supplied).
That, in our opinion, really concludes the matter. In the instant D
·case, there is no proof that the samples were taken from tins bearing
the manufacturer's label guaranteeing purity of goods, nor is there
any such warranty in the invoice Ext. DW 3 /A. It is, however, urged
that the tins bore the imprint "Good''. There is nothing to sub-
stantiate this fact, and even if it were so, it is of little consequence. E
• The word 'Good' on which great emphasis is placed merely contains
a description of the goods. At the most it amounts to 'puffing of
·goods'. The word 'Good' is not a warranty as to quality. The respon-
·dent is, therefore, not protected under s. 19(2) of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954 read with r. 12A of the rules framed
•under the Act.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The order of acquittal of the respondent is set aside, and he is con-
·victed for having committed an offence punishable under s. 16(1) (a)
-read with s. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
\'. The contention that the respondent should be released on G
·probation of good conduct under s, 4 of the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958 cannot be accepted. The provisions of s. 20 AA inserted
'by Act 34 of 1976 intenlicts the Court from applying the proyisions
of that Act to a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adultera-
tion Act, 1954.
B
While we agree that adulteration of an article of food is a serious
anti-social offence which must be visited with exemplary puAfshment,
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.B.

A it will be rather harsh to pass a sentence of imprisonment in the facts
and circumstances of this case. Under s. 16 of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954, as in force at the material .time, the Court
had the discretion for special and adequate reasons under proviso to
sub-s. ( 1) not to pass a sentence of imprisonment. In the instant case,
the respondent is a man aged 75 years. The offence was committed on
• August 1, 1968 i.e., more than eleven years ago. The order of acquit-
tal was based on the decision of the Delhi High Court in DhanraJ's
case. The samples were taken from sealed tins. These are all mitigating
circumstances. We accordingly refrain .from passing' a substantive
sentence of imprisonment and instead sentence the respondent to the
period already undergone and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- or in
c default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
months.
V.D.K. Appeal allowed.