Supreme Court of India
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAYversusBHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
- Citation
- 2002 INSC 175
- Decided
- 2 April 2002
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- DORAISWAMY RAJU
Holding
The signboards are ‘sky‑signs’ within the meaning of Section 328(3) and the High Court’s interpretation was erroneous.
Summary
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay instituted criminal proceedings against Bharat Petroleum for erecting signboards displaying the Shell trademark at its petrol pumps without obtaining permission under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The corporation relied on Sections 328, 328A and 471, alleging that the boards were ‘sky‑signs’ requiring a licence. The Bombay High Court, both single and division benches, held that the boards were neither an ‘advertisement’, ‘announcement’ nor a ‘direction’ and therefore fell outside the scope of the said provisions. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s construction was erroneous, emphasizing that the ordinary meaning of the three words and the purpose of the statute bring the signboards within the definition of ‘sky‑sign’ under Section 328(3). Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the writ petition dismissed, and the corporation was directed to issue a notice for licence‑fee arrears and to permit ratification of the installations, with the option to revive criminal proceedings on default. The judgment underscores a purposive approach to statutory interpretation over a hyper‑technical reading.
Issues considered
- Whether the signboards erected by Bharat Petroleum constitute a ‘sky‑sign’ within the meaning of Section 328(3) of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888
- Whether the words ‘advertisement’, ‘announcement’ and ‘direction’ in Section 328(3) should be given a narrow technical meaning or their ordinary/common meaning
- Whether the doctrines of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis are applicable to construe the three terms in the statute
- Whether criminal proceedings under Section 471 can be revived against the respondent
Legislation cited
- Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888s. 328, s. 328A, s. 471
Subjects
sky‑signadvertisementmunicipal corporationsignboardstatutory interpretationejusdem generisnoscitur a sociislicensingSection 328Section 471Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act
Judgment
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY
v.
BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
APRIL 2, 2002
B [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.]
Municipalitie_s:
Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888-Sections 328, 328(3) and
C 328A-Scope of-Erection ofsignboard-Whether covered by the provisions-
Courts below held not covered-On appeal-Held, covered since the
interpretation ofthe prov.is ions by courts below was defeating the very purpose
and a'im of the enactment-Section 471.
D Interpretation of Statutes-In construing the provisions of a statute or
the words ot language used, natural or ordinary meaning thereof should be
given effect to with reference to the context-Construction subserving the
purpose of the enactment must be adopted ,
Doctrines- 'Ejusdem generis' and 'Noscitur A Sociis ~-Mean_ing of-
E Discussed
Words and Phrases:
'Advertisement', 'Announcement' and 'Direction'-Meaning of in the
context of Section 328(3) of Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.
F Respondent erected a pole with sign boards displaying its registered
Trade mark projecting on the pavement at its various Petrol Pumps without
the permission of the appellant-Corporation. Permission was not taken on the
belief that the boards were not an advertisement requiring permission u/ss.
328- and 328A of Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. Appellant-
G Corporation initiated criminal proceedings against the respondent u/s 471 r/
w Ss. 328 and 328A of the Act. ,.,,,..
Respondent filed writ petition before High Court seeking directions
against the appellant-Corporation to withdraw or cancel the.complaints.
Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition holding that the
H 860
MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF GREATER BOMBAY v BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. 861
boards did not amount to 'advertisement' because the same was for the A
purpose of direction as to the location of the Petrol pump; the same also did
not amount to 'announcement' because mere imparting of an information
alone would not constitute an 'announcement' and that it also did not amount
to 'direction' because the same was merely a permissive or optional message
and anything which did not convey an imperative and mandatory message
would not mean a 'direction'. B
On appeal Division Bench of the High Court upheld the judgment of
Single Judge holding that the board did not amount to 'advertisement' since
there was no commercial exploitation underlying the same, and the words
'announcement' and 'direction' also partake the nautre of advertisement by C
virtue of Rule of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis because these words
were general in their sweep and followed the word 'advertisement'.
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the signboard would
fall within the definition of'sky-sign' u/s 328 of the Act; and that High Court's
construction regarding the scope of Sections 328 and 328A and of the words D
'advertisement', 'announcement' and 'direction' did not constitute the correct
and proper interpretation.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. On consideration of the approach and methodology of the. E;
construction adopted by the High Court , it is evident that serious infirmity
was allowed to be crept into the process due to unwarranted and unjust
dissection of Section 328(3) of the Act and import into the words, meanings
totally uncalled for any beyond their context, defeating to a great .extent the
very purpose and aim of enactment of the provision by the legislature.
[868-EJ F
2. High Court adopted a hyper-technical approach with regard to the
meaning of the words 'Advertisement', 'Announcement' and 'Direction' used
in Section 328(3) of the Act In common parlance, 'Advertisement' means to
make publicly known an information by some device and to draw or attract G
attention of public/individual concerned to such information. It need not
necessarily be to sell only or solely for commercial exploitation. Likewise,
'Announcement' also normally means any and every effort or enterprise and
attempts made to make known a thing or the existence of a thing openly or
publicly. Similarly, the word 'direction' in the context of users of the road or
motorists on the road should invariably only mean, to show the way or path H
0
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.
A towards an object or point or indicate the route for a destination. A direction
in a particular context may even be an instruction simplicitor to guide and
need_ not always mean a command to obey or carry out implicitly only the
instruction. (869-D.;E-F]
B. 3. In construing the provisions of a statute or the words or language
used Court normally should give effect to the natural or ordinary meaning
of the words, keeping in view the subject matter with reference to which the
words are used, without ascribing to words used any absolute meaning as if
in vacuo or without reference to the context particularly when such normal ~- -..
or ordinary understanding or construction conforms to and is consistent with
C the purpose or object of the legislation. The principles of Ejusdem Generis/
Noscitur a sociis have no relevance to the case on hand and seem to have been
over deployed, unnecessarily underscoring the actual or real meaning of the
words in the context and purpose of their use in the statutory provision of
the Act The three words 'Advertisement', 'Announcement' and 'Direction'
required to be construed cannot be said to admit of any one particular
D meaning alone but capable of being understood by their general or interrelated
meaning suitable for the context [869-F-G-H; 870-A-B]
4. The facts of the case go to show tbat the respondent had no culpable
or guilty mind to violate or evade compliance and they seemed to· have
E entertained a genuine belief that they are not bound by the provisions
contained in Section 328/328A of the Act Therefore, instead of allowing the
restoration of the earlier launched criminal proceedings and/or before
allowing the appellant-Corporation to pursue further action under Sections
471 ofthe A.ct, appellant-Corf)oration is directed to issue an appropriate notice
intimating tiie respondent details as to the liability monetarily towards arrears
F of licence fees and to call upon the respondent not only to remit the same but
also. to make a formal application for ratification and approval of their
installations. [870-E-G)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5674 of
G t994.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.85 of the Bombay High Court -("
in A.No. 167i80 in M.P. No. 1380 of 1976.
Pallav Shishodia and D:N. Mishra for Mis. JBD and Co., for ~he
H Appellant.
0
MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF GREATER BOMBAY"- BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPN_ LTD_ [RAJU, J] 863
Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha and Ms. Anu Mehta, for S.K. Mehta, Adv/ A
Advs for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :
RAJU, J. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay who lost
before the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench qf the High Court, B
is the appellant herein against the judgment dated 30.8.8C. in-Appeal No.167
-
of 1980 whereunder the Division Bench, while ~f,firming the judgment of the
learned Single Judge, restrained the appell\l')t·corporation from taking any
__;, action against the respondent under Section 328 or 328A of the Mumbai
Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act") in regard to their sign boards of petroleum pumps.Jn order to appreciate C
the legal issues raised pertaining to the scope and purport of the statutory
provisions noticed supra, it becomes necessary not only to advert to the
nature of the activities of the respondent which are the subject-matter in issue
but also the conclusions arrived at in the judgment under challenge as well
as the reasons therefor.
D
The respondents are said to be successor-in-title of the company known
as Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company Limited carrying on
business inter alia as a distributor of petroleum products in various parts of
the country. We are concerned in this proceeding with the distribution of
petroleum products from various retail outlets of the respondents, known as E
petrol pumps in Bombay. Within the premises of those petrol pumps, it has
erected a pole with a metallic board projecting on the pavement, which board
displayed the symbol of a Shell, said to be the registered trade mark of the
respondent's predecessor. The height of the pole is said to be 18 ft. and the
diameter of the metallic board (on which appears the Shell symbol) is said
to be 6 ft. Across the symbol of the Shell appear the words 'Burmah-Shell' F
in letters of3" height. All the poles and the boards erected at the respondent's
petrol pump are said to be identical and most of them are illuminated at night
by a small light at the top. Though, prior to 1975 the respondent applied for
requisite permission under the Act for the erection of such sign boards at its
various petrol pumps, on the basis of subsequent advise said to have been G
obtained by them that those boards were not an advertisement requiring
permission under the provision of the Ad, noticed above, the respondent
addressed letters dated 30.1.75 and 19.3.75 intimating their stand to that
effect to the appellant-Corporation but the authorities of the Corporation by
their letter dated 29.9.75 insisted that the permission was necessary for
displaying such boards as they also constituted an announcement or direction. H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.
A Since in spite of the same, the respondent stuck to its stand and did not obtain
permission, the appellant-Corporation. launched criminal proceedings for
committing offence under Section 471 read with the provisions noticed above.
The respondent at this stage filed Miscellaneous Petition No.1380 of.
1976 seeking for appropriate writ directing the corporation to withdraw or
B cancel those complaints and to forebear. the corporation from taking any
action against the &spondent under Section 328 or 328A of the Act in respect
of the boards erected by them as referred to above.
On a consideration of the submissions of the respective parties, the
learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court by his judgment dated
C 15 ..2.80 sust11ined the claim of the respondent by accepting the stand taken
that the boards erected by the respondent do not amount to an advertisement
and what the respondent was doing by such erection of boards was merely
to give an indication or guidance to. the motorists and the general public
regarding the situation or location of their petrol pumps which are open all
D the 24 hours around. The learned Judge was of the view that since the motorist
knew whose products 'he wanted to buy and all that is informed by such
installation is of the location of the petrol pump, the signboards in question
cannot be said to be an advertisement or in the nature of an advertisement
and its function and purpose is to show the location of the respondent's petrol
station where one may or may not enter at his own choice. Repelling the
E stand taken for the appellant-Corporation that the projection of the boards
..~ over the pavement and their position, allgle and height of the b9ards and the
objectunderlying the same attracted Section 328,:it was held that they served
only as an information' to a motorist or· a member of the public even from
some distance as to the location of the petrol station more by way of a facility
p for the motorist and the public without any invitation for patronage of the
respondent's products. An earlier decision in the case of Mfs Glaxo
Laboratories (India) Limited came to be distinguished on the facts and held
to be not applicable to the case on hand. While construing the word
'announcement' it was held that a mere imparting of an information alone
will not constitute an 'announcement' and by the .mere indication and
G information provided in the case on hand to those interested as to the location
of the petrol pump, the respondent made no announce"tent within the meaning
of the said word used in the provision. Adverting to lh,e word 'Direction', it
was observed that anything, which does not convey an imperative and
mandatory message, cannot be construed to mean a 'direction'1 and that what
H was conveyed by the signboard in the case on hand was a message, permissive
MUNICIPALCORPN.OFGREATERBOMBAY 11. BHARATPETROLEUMCORPN. LTD. [RAJU,J.] 865
or optional for the motorist or a member of the public to avail of or not the A
services rendered at the Petrol Pump. The view thus expressed was that
providing an information does not constitute giving a direction to go to the
petrol stations by way of enforcing any obedience. It was, therefore, held to
be not a 'direction' and consequently the claim of the respondent came to be
upheld by the learned. Single Judge.
B
The Division Bench of the High Court, before which the matter was
pursued by the appellant-Corporation, substantially agreed with the conclusions
of the learned Single Judge, though a different approach was adopted as to
the interpretation placed on the word 'advertisement' in the statutory provision.
It was of the view that though the insignia such as the one in question tells C
the members of the public that what is sold at the petrol pump is not only the
petrol but the petrol of a particular company, there being nothing for the
consumer public to choose between petroleum products manufactured and
sold by different companies, the installation does not constitute an
advertisement within the meaning of the word as used in the statutory provision
in question in the absence of any commercial exploitation underlying the D
same; which, according to the Division Bench, is the normal purpose of an
advertisement. On the view that the primary or the dominant object of the
signboard in question is only to indicate to the consumer the place where the ·
product or service is available and to guide him to that place the sign will not
amount to an advertisement and the mere fact that incidentally it leads to the E
sale of the product or service is not enough to make it an advertisement. The
Division Bench was also of the view that since the words 'announcement'
and 'direction' are general in their sweep and follow the word 'advertisement'
which is particular in description and the three words are found in the company
of each other, both according to the Rule of ejusdem generis and noscitur a
sociis they only partake the nature of an advertisement, which, in the view F
of the Division Bench, as noticed earlier, the signboards in question do not
constitute to be such.
Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned counsel for the appellant-corporation,
while reiterating the stand taken before t1te High Court, contended that the
construction placed by the High Court cu the scope of Sections 328 and G
'
328A and, particularly the words 'adv~rtisement', 'announcement' and
... 'direction', does not constitute the correct ii.id proper interpretation and suffer
· from serious infirmities to warrant interfereQce in this appeal. The signboards
put up on a pole of a particular height <jisplaying the sign/emblem in a
manner following outside the pavement and: overhanging on the roads/streets H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
A so as to make it visible against the sky from some points renders it answerable
and fall within the definition of 'sky-sign', as defined under Section 328 of
the Act, Per contra, Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned courisel appearing for the
respondent, strenuously contended by adopting the reasoning of the judgments >
under challenge that having regard to the intent and object of the provision
B as well as scheme underlying the same, the signboards of the nature put up
by the respondent cannot be held to attract the provision of Section 328 or
328A of the Act. According to the learned counsel those prov.isions should
be construed as dealing with different fonns of advertisement or any message
in the nature.of an advertisement and not an 'announcement' or 'direction',
·simplicitor in the nature of merely an infonnation. It was also contended that
C the three wo~ds, noticed supra, were analogous to each other and must partake
the colour and character of an advertisement, the intention of the legislation
also being only to regulate 'sky-sign' in the nature of an advertisement and
not an 'announcement' or 'direction', simplicitor. Taking clue from the use
of the words 'Advertisement fees' in revised notification .made available by
the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, which contained the schedule
.D of. fees, the learned counsel for the respondent reiterated the stand that the
contemporaneous understanding by the authorities of the Corporation also
support the stand of the respondent that only advertisement or those in the
nature of advertisement alone that are attracted by the provision contained in
Sections 328 and 328A of the Act. This submission, in our view, only
E overlooks the use of both the words 'Adver.tisement' and 'Sky-sign'
simultaneously meaning, perhaps the multiple purpose and use of these words
- That apart, such notifications published with reference to the Head of
Accounts, to which the collections were to be credited to for budgetary
purposes, can be of no guide whatsoever in respect' of the construction to be
placed on these words.
F
Though, the relevant statutory provisions concerned are Section 328/
328A of the Act, the issues raised before us have to be considered and
decided mainly on the scope of the sub Section (3) of Section 328 ofthe Act,
which reads as follows:·
G "(3). If any sky-sign be erected, fixed or retained contrary to the
provisions of this section, or after pennission for the erection, fixing
or retention thereof for any p:riod shall have expired or become void,
the Commissioner may, by written notice, require the owner or
occupier of the land, building or structure, upon or over which the
H sky-sign is erected, fixed or retained, to take down and remove such
MUNICIPAL CORPN OF GREATER BOMBAY v. BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPN LTD. [R,VU. J ] 867
sky-sign. A
The expression "sky-sign" shall in this section 1nean any word, letter,
model, sign, device or representation in the nature of an advertisement,
announcement or direction, supported on or attached to any post,
pole, standard framework or other support wholly or in part upon or
over any land, building or structure which, or any part of which sky- B
sign, shall be visible against the sky from some point in any street
and includes all and every part of any such post, pole standard
framework or other support. The expression "sky-sign" shall also
include any balloon, parachute, or other similar device employed
wholly or in part for the purposes of any advertisement, announcement
or direction upon or over any land, building or structure or upon or C
over any street, but shall not include-
(a) any flagstaff, pole, vane o_r weathercock, unless adapted or used
wholly or in part for the purpose of any advertisement,
announcement or direction;
D
(b) any sign, or any board, frame or other contrivance securely fixed
to or on the top of the wall or parapet of any building or on the
cornice or blocking course of any wall, or to the ridge of a roof:
Provided that such board, frame or other contrivance be of one
continuous face and not open work, and do not extend in height E
more than three feet above any part of the wall, or parapet or
ridge to, against, or on which it is fixed or supported;
(c) any word, letter, model, sign, device or representation as aforesaid,
relating exclusively to the business of a railway company, and
place wholly upon or over any railway, railway station, yard, F
platform or station approach belonging to a railway company,
and so placed that.it cannot fall into any street or public place;
(d) any notice of land or buildings to be sold, or let, placed upon
- such land or buildings."
The learned counsel appearing on either side invited our attention, at G
considerable length, to the judgments of the High Court wherein the dictionary
- meaning of the words required to be construed came to be adverted to from
Encyclopedia Britannica and the Words and phrases: permanent edition of
West Publishing Company and it is unnecessary to repeat them once again,
herein. Reference has also been made to the portions of the judgments where H
'
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
A observations came to be made about the principles underlying the doctrine of
'Ejusd~m Generis and Noscitur A Sociis' and their relevance and application
to the ·case on hand. The principle underlying 'Noscitur A Sociis' is that, two
or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning when are coupled
together are to be understood as used in their cognate sense, taking, as it
B were, their colou.r fyom each other, that is, the more general is to be restricted
to a sense analogous to the less general. The principle underlying 'Ejusdem
Generis' is applied when the statutory provision concerned contains an
enumeration of specific words, the subject of the enumeration thereby ,-
constituting a class or category but which class or category is not exhausted
at the same time by the enumeration and the general term follows the·
C enumeration with no specific indication of any different legislative intention.
This rule which normally envisage word_s of general nature following specific
and particular words to be construed as limited to things which are of the
same nature as those specified, also requires to be applied with _great caution
and not pushed too far so as to unduly or unnecessarily limit general and
comprehensive words to dwarf size. Dehors the doctrine or maxim concerned
D useful in the matter of construction of a statute or its provisions the intent of
the legislature cannot altogether be ignored and a construction which really
· subserves the purpose of the enactment must only be adopted than one which
will defeat it and thereby ensure in the process that no part of the provision
is rendered surplus or otiose.
E On a careful consideration of the approach and methodology of the
construction adopted by the High .Court, we are of the view that serious
infirmity was allowed to be crept into the process due to unwarranted and
unjust dissection of Section 328 {3) of the Act and import into the words
meanings totally uncalled for and beyond their context, defeating to a great
F extent the very purpose and aim of enactment of the provision by the
legislature. The statutory definition of the expression 'sky-sign' ordains it to
mean, any word, letter, model, sign, device or representation in the nature of
an 'advertisement', 'announcement' or 'direction', supported on or attached
to any of the things specified upon or over any land or building or structure
G in a manner visible against the sky from some point in any street and to be
also inclusive of all and every part of such pole, post, standard frame work
or other support. It is also stipulated therein to include any balloon, parachute
or other similar device employed wholly or in part for the purpose of any
advertisement, announcement or direction upon or over any land, building or
structure or upon or over any street. The main and salutary purpose of Section
H 328/328A is to regulate the installationkonstruction of signboards of the
0
MUNICIPAL CORPN OF GREATER BllMBA Y v SHA.RAT PETROLEUM CORPN_ LID (RAJU, J J 869
nature defined and envisaged therein to keep road margins and space above A
such margins not indiscriminately meddled with so as to affect the free
movement and free flow of traffic, preserve the ecology and environment by
averting and regulation to the extent required, ensuring, in public interest,
adverse physiological and psychological impacts either directly or indirectly
due to the use of neon lights/illuminations used for the installations. The
provision for licensing is incidental and necessarily required to properly and B
effectively enforce the regulations and the levy and collection of fee also
ultimately seem to achieve the same purpose. The statutory provisions seem
to have been thus enacted with a laudable public purpose and the definition
is also not only inclusive in nature but the enumeration of the various nature
of fixtures, the manner and methods adopted therefor, as also the obvious and C
ostensible object of such fixtures/installations found specified therein, under
the scheme of things, are found to be with the intention of making the
provision an all inclusive one to cover or rope in all possible things and not
to operate in a manner to bring about any limitation on their scope, and that
too to render the very provision otiose, redundant and meaningless.
D
Coming to the ordinary meaning of the words noticed by the High
• Court, 'Advertisement', 'Announcement' and 'Direction' used in the statutory
provision under consideration, we find the High Court to have adopted a
hyper-technical approach, altogether. In common parlance, 'advertisement'
means to make publicly known an information by some device and to draw
or attract attention of public/individual concerned to such information. It E
need not necessarily be to sell only or solely for commercial exploitation.
Likewise, 'announcement' also normally means any and every effort or
enterprise and attempts made to make known a thing or the existence of a
thing openly or publicly. Similarly, the word 'direction' in the context of
users of the road or motorists on the road should invariably only mean, to F
show the way or path towards an objett or point or indicate the route for a
destination. A direction in a particular context may even be an instruction
simplicitor to guide and need not always mean a command to obey or carry
out implicitly only the instruction. In construing the provisions of a statute
or the words or language used, it has been always considered essential for the
Court normally to give effect to the natural or ordinary meaning of the G
words, keeping in view the subject matter with reference to which the words
-
are used, without ascribing to words used any absolute meaning as if in
vacuo or without reference to the context, particularly when such normal or
ordinary understanding or construction conforms to and is consistent with the
purpose or object of the legislation. The principles of Ejusdem Generis/ H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.
A Noscitur a sociis have no relevance to the case on hand and seem to have
been over deployed, unnecessarily underscoring the actual or real meaning of
the words in the context and purpose of their use in the statutory provision
of the Act.
The indication given above by emphasis supplied to some of the words
B used in the provision in question as well as the words 'in the nature of an
advertisement, announcement or direction would go to show that it is not a
must to be that but is enough if its 'in the nature of that which is specified.
The three words required to be construed cannot be said to admit of any one
particular meaning alone but capable of being understood by their general or
C interrelated meaning suitable for the context. Consequently, we are not
persuaded to affix our seal of approval to the manner and method of
construction adopted by the High Court - both the learned Single Judge and
the Division Bench. In view of the above, we allow this appeal. The judgment
under challenge cannot be sustained and while setting aside the same, we
order the dismissal of Misc. Writ Petition No.1380 of 1976 filed by the
D respondent in the High Court.
The consequences of our allowing the appeal and ordering the dismissal
of the writ petition filed by the respondent would result in the restoration of
the proceedings instituted before the Criminal Court for prosecuting the
respondent under Section 4 71 of the Act or with a liberty to institute or
E pursue the same further. The fact that the respon\ient succeeded before the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench would at any rate go to show
that the respondent' had no culpable or guilty mind to violate or evade
compliance and that the respondent seems to have entertained a genuine
belief that they are not bound by the provisions contained in Section 328/
F 328A of the Act. Therefore, instead of allowing the restoration of the earlier
launched criminal proceedings and/or before allowing the appellant-
Corporation to pursue further action under Section 471 of the Act, taking
into account the fact that the respondent is a public authority, which seemed
to have seen vindicating its rights genuinely, we consider it just and proper
to direct the appellant-Corporation to issue an appropriate notice intimaiing
G the respondent details as to the liability monetarily towards arrears of licence
fees and to call upon the respondent not only to remit the same but also to
make a formal application for ratification and approval of their installations
within 30 days from the date of service of such notice by the appellant-
Corporation on the respondent and thereafter pass orders determining the
H sum payable (the arrears of license fee alone) and intimate the sum so fixe~
MUNICIPAL CORPN OF GREATER BOMBAY~. BHARAT PETROLEUM CQRPN LTD {RAJU, J] 87 J
to the respondent. The respondent shall remit the sum so determined within A
two months from the date of such intimation. On respondent making
compliance with such directions of the appellant-Corporation pursuant to the
liberty granted by us now, the appellant-Corporation will not pursue the
prosecution of the respondent. Per contra, if the respondent commits any
default or _contravention of such directions, the proceedings already initiated B
against the respondent would revive and the appellant-Corporation shall be
at liberty to take all such action as is permissible in law pursuant to our
judgment, and as the circumstances may warrant to enforce the provisions of
the Act against the respondent. No costs.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
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