Holding

Section 127 imposes a six‑month bar that begins on the date the purchase notice is served; failure to act within that period causes the reservation to lapse, rendering any subsequent acquisition notification void.

Summary

The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay reserved a parcel of land for a recreation ground under the final development plan of 1967 but failed to acquire it within ten years. The trustees of the land served a purchase notice on 1 July 1977, which the corporation received on 4 July 1977. Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 provides that if no steps are taken within six months of such notice, the reservation lapses. The dispute centered on whether the six‑month period began on the date of service of the notice or on the date the corporation obtained information about the land, and whether the trustees had waived their right to contest the acquisition. The Supreme Court held that the six‑month period starts from the date the notice is served, the corporation failed to act within that time, the reservation therefore lapsed, and the subsequent acquisition notification under the Land Acquisition Act was void. No waiver or abandonment by the trustees was found, and the tenants’ delay did not bar their relief.

Issues considered

The commencement date of the six‑month period under s.127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
Effect of failure to act within the six‑month period on the reservation of land
Whether the trustees waived or abandoned their right to challenge the acquisition
Whether the tenants’ delay/laches bars relief under Art.226 of the Constitution
Whether the corporation’s request for information could extend the six‑month period

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 6, s. 9
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966s. 126, s. 127

Subjects

Section 127Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning ActLand Acquisition Actreservation lapsewaiverestoppelpublic purposemunicipal corporationtenants associationArt.226

Judgment

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY
A
v.
DR. HAKIMWADI TENANTS ASSOCIATION & ORS.

NOVEMBER 24, 1987

[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.] B
--;
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966: s. 127-
Limitation of six months-Failure to acquire land reserved for town
planning within statutory period of ten years-Purchase notice served
by owners-Limitation whether to reckon from date of notice.

' Practice and Procedure: Waiver-Requirements of-Where there
c
is no estoppel there is no waiver.

Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning
Act, 1966 provides that if any land reserved under the Act was not
acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final D
regional plan or final development plan came into force or if proceed·
ings for the acquisition of such land under that Act or under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 were not commenced within such period, the
owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the
appropriate authority to that dTect and if within six months from the
date of the service of such notice, the land was not acquired or no E

-- I
steps as aforesaid were commenced for its acquisition, the reservation
should be deemed to have lapsed.
/
The Planning Authority, the Municipal Corporation of Greater
~ Bombay, published a draft development plan reserving the land in
dispute for a recreation ground. The said plan was finalised and sane· F
tioned by the State Government on January 6, 1967. It came into
effect from February 7, 1967 and thereunder the land was again
reserved for recreation ground. No action having been taken for
acquisition of the land, the trustees of the land served a notice dated
July 1, 1977 on the Commissioner for Municipal Corporation either to
acquire the land or relea&e it from acquisition. The same was received G
by the latter on July 4, 1977.

On July 28, 1977 the Corporation's Executive Engineer asked
for information regarding the 01mership of the land and the particu-
lars of the tenants thereof from trustees-respondents Nos. 4·7, and
stated that the relevant date under s. 127 cf the Act would be the date H
21
)
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A upon which this information was received. The trustees by their
lawyer's letter dated August 3, 1977 conveyed that the period of six
months stipulated by s. 127 has to be computed from the date of the
receipt of the purchase notice by the Corporation, i.e. July 4, 1977
and stated that the Corporation had access to all the relevant records.
The requisite information was also provided therein. The Executive
13 Engineer wrote stating that the period of six months allowed by s. 127
of the Act would commence on August 4, 1977, the date when the
requisite information was furnished. Thereafter the Executive
Engineer by his letter dated November 2, 1977 inquired of the trustees
whether they were prepared to sell the property in question to which
the trustees quoted an overall rate of Rs.650 per square metre through
C their lawyer's reply dated November 18, 1977. They expressly stated I
that the offer was made without admitting the power and authority of
the appellant to acquire the land or to initiate the proceedings for
acquisition. Instead of accepting the same, the Executive Engineer by
his letter dated January 11, 1978 asked the respondents to disclose the
basis for the rate of Rs.650 per sq. metre. The Corporation had, in the
D meanwhile passed a resolution on January 10, 1978 for the acquisition
of the land and made an. application to the State Government dated
January 31, 1978 for taking necessary steps. The State Government
issued the requisite notification dated April 7, 1978 under s. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act 1894 for acquisition ofland.

E On Joly 17, 1978, respondent No. 1, the tenants' association,
filed a petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
for quashing the impugned notification. The High Court held that the
most crucial step was the application to be made by the Corporation to \
the State Government nnder s. 126(1) of the Act for acquisition of the :{
land within the period of six months commencing from July 4, 1977,
F the date of service of the purchase notice, and that upon the expiry of
the said period on January 3, 1978, the reservation of the land had
r
lapsed and it was released from such reservation. It took tile view that
all that was required was that the owner or the person interested in
the land must inform the Authority that the land reserved for any plan
under the Act had not been acquired by agreement within ten years y
G from the date on which plan came into force and the proceedings for
acquisition of such land under the Land Acquisition Act had not been
commenced within that period. Consequently it struck down the
impugned notification as invalid, null and void.

In the appeal to this Court by special leave it was contended that
ff there was waiver or abandonment of right by respondents Nos. 4-7,
MUNICIPAL CORP. BOMBAY v. H.T. ASSOCIATION 23
f.
the trustees, to question the validity of the acquisition proceedings, A
and that there was inordinate delay or laches on the part of respon-
dent No. 1 whi~b disentitled it to grant of relief under Art. 226 of the
Constitution.

Dismissing the appeal,
B
HELD: 1. Section 127 oJ the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966 is a fetter upon the power of eminent domain. By
enacting it the legislature bas 11truck a balance between the competing
claims of the interests of the general public as regards the rights of an
individual. [30B-C]

2. The condition pre-requisite for the running of time under 127
c
of the Act is the service of a valid purchase notice. In the instant case,
the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 was a valid notice. The appel-
lant having failed to take any steps for acquisition of the land within a
period of six months tberefrom the reservation of the land in the
development plan for a public purpose lapsed and consequently the D
impugned notification dated A11ril 7, 1978 issued by the State Govern-
ment under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act must be struck down as a
nullity. [29A-B; 3ID-FJ

3.1 The question whether the reservation has lapsed due to the
failure of the planning autboriity to take any steps within a period of E
six months of the date of service of the notice llf purchase as stipulated
by s. 127 is a mixed question of fact and law. A rule of universal
application cannot, therefore, he laid down. [28G-H]

In the instant case the High Court found that the planning
authority had failed to acquire the land reserved for the plan under F
the Act by agreement within ten years from the date on which the plan
came, into force and proceedings for acquisition of the land under the
Land Acquisition Act had not been commenced within the period of
six months from the receipt of notice from respondents Nos. 4 to 7, the
trustees. The Municipal Corporation had been assessing the trust
·{ properties to property tax and b;suing periodic bills and receipts there- G
for and obviously could not question the title or owne~ship of the
trust. Accordingly, it struck down the impugned notificatioo under
s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and declared tha~ the reservation of
the land under the development plan had lapsed. [28E, 29F, 28B]

3.2 There was no question of the period of six months being H
/

24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A reckoned from the date of receipt from respondents of the information
requisitioned. Section 127 of the Act does not contemplate an investi-
gation into the title by the officers of the Planning Authority, nor can •
the officers prevent the running of time if there is a ·valid notice. The
Executive Engineer of the appellant Corporation was not justified in
addressing the letter dated July 28, 1977 calling upon respondents
l3 Nos. 4·7, the trustees, to furnish information regarding their title and
ownership, and also to furnish particulars of the tenants, the nature of
user of the tenements and the total area occupied by them. The Corpo-
ration had the requisite information in their records. The Planning
Authority was the Municipal Corporation. The said letter was, there-
fore, just an attempt to prevent the running of time and was of little or
C no consequence. [29A, B-E]
' '-
.J....
4. In order to constitute waiver, there must he voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a right. The essence of a waiver is an
estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there is no waiver. Estoppel
and Waiver are questions of conduct and must necessarily be deter-
1:> mined lio the facts of each case. [34B]

In the instant case, respondents Nos. 4-7 had without admitting
that the appellant had the authority or power to initiate the proceed-
ings for acquisition, signified their willingness to sell the p~operty sub·
ject to certain terms. But the appellant did not accept the offer. On
E the contrary, the appellant took further steps for the acquisition of the
land by moving the State Government under s. 126(1) of the Act to
initiate acquisition proceedings by the issuance of a notification under
s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the
conduct of respondents Nos. 4·7 was such as warrants an inference of
relinquishment of a known existing legal right. [34B·D I
F
5. The tenants were not parties to the earlier proceedings. They
were, therefore, not disentitled from maintaining the writ petition.
The objection that there was undue delay in moving the High Court
cannot prevail. [34E·Fl

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4139
of 1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.6.1986 of the Bombay
High Court in Appeal No. 874 of 1983.

H RP. Bhatt and D.N. Misra for the Appellant.
MUNICIPAL CORP. BOMBAY v. H.T. ASSOCIATION [SEN, J.) 25
j
L.C. Chogale, M.N, Shroff, K.M.M. Khan, R.F. Nariman, R. A
Karanjawala, Hardeep Singh, Mrs. Manek Karanjawala, S.V.
Deshpande, A.S. Bhasme 'and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Respon-
dents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SEN, J. By s. 127 the Maharashtra Jlegional & Town Planning
Act, 1966 enacts:

"127. If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any
purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not
acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on C
which a final Regional plan, or final Development plan
comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of
such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, are no1t commenced within such period, the
owner or any person interested in the land may serve
notice on the Planning Authority, Development Authority D
or as the case may be, Appropriate Authority to that
effect; and if within six months from the date of the
service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps
as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the reser-
vation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have
lapsed, and thereupon the land shall be deemed to be E
released from ;mch reservation', allotment or designation
and shall become available to the owner for the purpose
I of development or otherwise, permissible in the case of
adjacent land under the relevant plan."

The short point involved in this appeal by special leave from a F
judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated June
18, 1986, is whether the period of six months specified ins. 127 of the
Act is to be reckoned from the date of service of the purchase notice
dated July 1, 1977 by the owner on the Planning Authority i.e. the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay here, or the date on
~
which the requisite information of particulars furnished by the owner. G

The late Dr. Eruchshaw Jamshedji Hakim was the former
owner of a double-storeyed building situate on land admeasuring
3645.26 square metres bearing the cadastral survey no. 176 of
Tardeo, Bombay known as Dr. Hakimwadi. The property is located
at the junction of Falkland Road and Eruchshaw Hakim Road. It H
/
I

26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.

A consists of several structures housing 24 small-scale industries, 13
shops on the ground floor and 26 residential tenements on the first
floor, facing the Falkland Road. On the rear side of this building,
there are several structures housing about 24 small-scale industries.
The said Dr. Eruchshaw Jamshedji Hakim created a trust in respect
of the properties and respondents nos. 6-9 i.e. respondents nos. 4-7
B in the High Court, herein described as such are the present trustees
appointed under the deed. The Planning Authority published a draft
Development Plan in respect of 'D' ward where the property in dis-
pute is situate. In the Development Plan property of Dr. Eruchshaw
Jamshedji Hakim was reserved-for a recreation ground. The Deve-
lopment Plan was finalised and sanctioned by the State Government
C on January 6, 1967. The final development scheme came into effect
from February 7, 1967 and thereunder the land was again reserved
for recreation ground. No action having been taken for acquisition of
the land until January 1, 1977, the owners thereof i.e. the trustees
served a purchase notice dated July, 1, 1977 on the Commissioner for
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay either to acquire the same
D or release it from acquisition, and the same was received on July 4,
1977. On July 28, 1977 the Corporation's Executive Engineer wrote
to respondents nos. 4-7 and asked for information regarding the
ownership of the land and the particulars of the tenants thereof. The
letter stated that the relevant date under s. 127 of the Act would be
the date upon which this information was received. The trustees for
E the time being the landlords of the property known as Hakirnwadi by
their lawyer's letter dated August 3, 1977 conveyed that the date of
six months stipulated by s. 127 of the Act has to be computed from
the date of the receipt from them of the information required. \
Further, they stated that as the Planning Authority for Greater ~-
Bombay was the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, it had
F access to all the relevant records including the records pertaining to
cadastral sur*ey no. 176. It was also appointed out that the Corpora-
tion had been assessing them to property tax in respect of the said
property and issuing bills and receipts therefor and could not now
question their title to ownership of the property.

G It was further said that as regards the number of tenants, the
inspection registers maintained by the Corporation's Assessment
Department, upon which the assessment of the rateable value of the -1.
various tenements was based, bear ample testimony. It was next
stated that the property was partly residential, partly commercial and
partly meant for storage. The trustees went on to say that they were
H not aware of any rule framed under the Act whereby the Planning
MUNICIPAL CORP. BOMBAY v. H.T. ASSOCIATION [SEN, J.I 27

I Authority could make an inquiry at that stage without taking a deci- A
sion on the material question and thereby attempt to extend the time
limit of six months stipulated in s. 127. The said letter was received
by the Executive Engineer on August 16, 1977 and presumably the
information required was furnished on August 16, 1977. The Execu-
tive Engineer wrote to respondents nos. 4-7 stating that the period of
six months allowea by s. 127 of the Act would accordingly commence B
on August 4, 1977, the date when the requisite information was
furnished. Next, the Executive Engineer by his letter dated Novem-
ber 2, 1977 intimated respondents nos. 4-7 that the Municipal Corpo-
ration had accorded sanction to initiate acquisition proceedings in
respect of the property in question under the Land Acquisition Act.
Thereafter, the Corporation passed a resolution dated January 10, C
1978 for the acquisition of the land and made an application to the
State Government dated January 31, 1978 for taking necessary steps.
The State Government being satisfied that the land was required for
a public purpose issued the requisite notification dated April 7, 1978
under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the
land. On July 17, 1978 respondent no. 1 Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants D
Association filed a petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for quashing the :impugned notification.

A learned Single Judge (Pendse, J.) by his judgment dated
September 21, 1983 allowed the writ petition on the ground that the
Planning Authority having taken no steps for acquisition of land E
under s. 126( 1) of the Act read with s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
within 10 years from -the date on which the final Development Plan
came into force, the acquisition proceedings commenced by the State
Government under sub-s. (2) of s. 126 at the instance- of the Planning
Authority were not valid inasmuch as the isillance of the impugned
notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for the reserva- F
tion of the property under th1: final Development Plan for a recrea-
tion ground was not within the period of six months as-required
under s. 127. According to the learned Single Judge, the period of six
months prescribed under s. 127 of the Act begin to run on the date of
service of the purchase notice on the Corporation and therefore the
Corporation had to take steps to acquire the property before January G
4, 1978. The Corporation not having taken any steps till the expiry of
the period of six months, the resolution dated January 10, 1978 pas-
sed to acquire the property and the consequent notification dated
April 7, 1978 were invalid and of no legal consequence. In other
words, he held that the commencement of the statutory period of six
months. was not dependent upon the directions issued by the officers H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A of the Planning Authority, nor could the officers extend the period \_
fixed under s. 127. As regards the practice prevalent in the Corpora-
tion to compute the period of six months from the date of receipt of
the information sought, he held that it was wholly unwarranted and
entirely illegal. He accordingly struck down the impugned notifica-
tion under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and declared that the
B reservation of the land under the Development Plan had lapsed and it
was open to the tenants of the property to claim that due to the lapse
of reservation, the Planning Authority and the State Government had

-
no jurisdiction to acquire the land in exercise of the powers under
s. 126 of the Act. ·~r"

C Aggrieved, the appellant carried an appeal to a Division Bench
under s. 15 of the Letters Patent. Bharucha, J. speaking for himself
and Desai, J. upheld the view of the learned Single Judge and held
that the most crucial step was the application to be made by the
Corporation to the State Government under s. 126( 1) of the Act for
acquisition of the land, it ought to have been taken within the period
D of six months commencing from July 4, 1977, the date of service of
the purchase notice. That decision proceeds upon the view that the
details of ownership or particulars of tenants are not required to be
furnished in the purchase notice served by the owner or any person
interested in the land. All that is required is that the owner or the
person interested in the land must inform the authority that the land-
Ji'. reserved for any plan under the Act had not been acquired by agree-
ment within 10 years from the date on which the plan came into force
and that proceedings for acquisition of such land under the Land
Acquisition Act had not been commenced within that period. It was
accordingly held that the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 served by
-
respondents nos. 4-7, the trustees, was a valid notice under s. 127 of
F the Act and therefore the period of six months specified in s. 127
commenced running from July 4, 1977, the date of service, and came
to an end on January 4, 1978. That being so, it was held that upon
the expiry of the period of six months on January 3, 1978, the reser-
vation of the land for recreation ground lapsed and it was released
from such reservation.

According to the plain reading of s. 127 of the Act, it is
manifest that the question whether the reservation has lapsed due to
the failure of the Planning Authority to take any steps within a period
of six months of the date of service of the notice of purchase as
stipulated by s. 126, is a mixed quastion of fact and law. It would
H therefore be difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to lay down a rule
MUNICIPAL CORP, BOMBAY v. H.T. ASSOCIATION [SEN, J.] 29

of universal application. It cannot be posited that the period of six A
months would necessarily begin to run from the date of service of a
purchase notice under s. 127 of the Act. The condition pre-requisite
for the running of time under s. 127 is the service of a v'\lid purchase
notice. It is needless to stress that the Corporation must prima facie
be satisfied that the notice served was by the owner of the affected
land or any person interested in the land. But, at the same time, s. B
127 of the Act does not contemplate an investigation into title by the
officers of the Planning Authority, nor can the officers prevent the

~-
running of time if there is a valid notice. Viewed in that perspective,
the High Court rightly held that the Executive Engineer of the
Municipal Corporation was not justified in addressing the letter dated
., July 29, 1977 by which he required respondents nos. 4-7, the trustees,
to furnish information.regarding their title and ownership, and also to
c
furnish particulars of the tenants, the nature and user of the tene-
ments and the total area occupied by them at present. The Corpora-
tion had the requisite information in their records. The High Court
was therefore right in reaching the conclusion that it did. In the pre-
sent case, the Planning Authority was the Municipal Corporation of D
' Greater Bombay. It cannot be doubted that the Municipal Corpora-
lion has access to all land records including the records pertaining to
cadastral survey no. 176 of Tardeo. We are inclined to the view that
the aforesaid letter dated July 28, 1977 addressed by the Executive
Engineer was just as attempt to prevent the running of time and was
of little or no consequence. As was rightly pointed out by respon- E
dents nos. 4-7 in their reply dated August 3, 1977, there was no ques-
tion of the period of six months being reckoned from the date of the
) receipt from them of the information requisitioned. The Municipal
Corporation had been assessing the trust properties to preperty tax
\ and issuing periodic bills and receipts therefor and obviously could
'
not question the title or ownership of the trust. We are informed that F
the building being situate on Falkland Road, the occupants are
mostly dancing girls and this is in the knowledge of the Corporation
authorities. The rateable value of each tenement would also be
known by an inspection of the assessment registers. We must accord-
ingly uphold the finding arrived at by the High Court that the appel-
y
Ian! having failed to take any steps, namely, of making an application G
to the State Government for acquiring the land under the Land
~
Acquisition Act within a period of six months from the date of
service of the purchase notice, the impugned notification issued by
the State Government under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act making
the requisite declaration that such land was required for a public
purpose i.e. for a recreation ground was invalid, null and void. H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A While the contention of learned counsel appearing for the
appellant that the words 'six months from the date of service of such
notice' in s. 127 of the Act were not susceptible of a literal construc-
tion, must be accepted, it must be borne in mind that the period of
six months provided by s. 127 upon the expiry of which the reserva-
tion of the land under a Development Pian lapses, is a valuable safe-
B guard to the citizen against arbitrary and irrational executive action.
Section 127 of the Act is a fetter upon the power of eminent domain.
By enacting s. 127 the legislature has struck a balance between the
competing claims of the interests of the general public as regards the
rights of an individual. An analysis of s. 126 would reveal that after
publication of a draft regional plan, a development or any other plan
C or town planning scheme, any land is required or reserved for any of ,..
the public purposes specified therein, the Planning Authority,
Development Authority or as the case may be, any Appropriate
Authority may, except as provided in s. 113A, at any time acquire
the land either by agreement or make an application to the State
Government for acquisition of such land under the Land Acquisition
D Act, 1894. Sub-s. (2) thereof provides that the State Government
may on receipt of the applications contemplated by s. 126(\) or if the '
Government (except in cases falling under s. 49 and except as pro-
vided in s. 113A) is itself of opinion that any land included in any
such plan is needed for any public purpose, it may make a declaration
to that effect in the final gazette, in the manner provided in s. 6 of
g the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said land. The rule is sub-
ject to an exception. Proviso to s. 126(2) interdicts that no such
declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years from the
date of publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or ,
any other plan. Sub-s. (3) deals with the procedure to be followed for
acquisition of the land covered by a declaration under s. 6 of the
F Land Acquisition Act. Sub-s. (4) is of some relevance and reads- as
follows:
"(4). If a declaration is not made within the period refer-
red to in sub-section (2) or having been made, the afore-
said period expired on the commencement of the Maha-
rashtra Regional and Town Planning {Amendment) Act, "
G 1970, the State Government may make a fresh declaration
for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, in the manner provided by sub-sections {2) and (3)
of this section, subject to the modification that the market
value of the land shall be market value at the date of
declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring the
Ii land afresh."
MUNICIPAL CORP. BOMBAY v. H.T. ASSOCIATION [SEN, l.I 31

The conjoint effect of sub-ss. (I), (2) and (4) of s. 126 is that if A
no declaration is made within the period referred to in sub-s. (2), that
is to say, before the expiry of three years from the date of publication
of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan, the
compensation payable to the owner of the land for such acquisition,
in that event, shall be the market value on the date of the fresh decla-
ration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act i.e. the market value B
not at the date of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisi-
tion Act but the market value at the date of declaration under s. 6.
That is one of the safeguards provided under the Act.
I
:--.- Another safeguard provided is the one under s. 127 of the Act.
It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition that the period of C
six months would always be,gin to run from the date of service of
notice. The Corporation is entitled to be satisfied that the purchase
notice under s. 127 of the Act has been served by the owner or any
person interested in the land. If there is no such notice by the owner
or any person, there is no question of the reservation, allotment or
designation of the land under a development plan of having lapsed. It D
a fortiori follows that in the absence of a valid notice under s. 127,
there is no question 9f the land becoming available to the owner for
the purpose of development or otherwise. In the present case, these
considerations do not arise. We must hold in agreement with the
High Court that the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 served by
respondents nos. 4-7 was valid notice and therefore the failure of the E
appellant to take any steps for the acquisition of the land within the
period of six months therefrnm, the reservation of the land in the
j Development Plan for a recreation ground lapsed and consequently,
the impugned notification dated April 7, 1978 under s. 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act issued by the State Government must be struck down
as a nullity. F

Section 127 of the Act is a part of the law for acquisition of
lal)ds required for public purposes, namely, for implementation of
schemes of town planning. The statutory bar created bys. 127 provid-
ing that reservation of land under a development scheme shall lapse
if no steps are taken for acquisition of land within a. period of six G
months from the date of service of the purchase notice, is an integral
part of the machinery created by which acquisition of land takes
place. The word 'aforesaid' in the collocation of the words 'no steps
as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition' obviously refer to the
steps contemplated by s. 126( 1). The effect of a declaration by the
State Government under sub-s. (2) thereof, if it is satisfied that the H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
J
A land is required for the implementation of a regional plan, develop-
ment plan or any other town planning scheme, followed by the re-
qui$ite declaration to that effect in the official gazette, in the manner
provided by s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, is to freeze the prices
of the lands affected. The Act lays down the principles of fixation by
providing firstly, by the proviso to s. 126(2) that no such declaration
B under sub-s. (2) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the
date of publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or
any other plan, secondly, by enacting sub-s. (4) of s. 126 that if a '
'
declaration is not made within the period referred to in sub-s. (2), the
State Government may make a fresh declaration but, in that event,
the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of
C the declaration undr s. 6 and not the market value at the date of the
notification under s. 4, and thirdly, by s. 127 that if any land
reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose in any development
plan is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on
which a final regional plan or development plan comes into force or if
proceedings for the acquisition of such land under the Land Acquisi-
D tion Act are not commenced within such period, such land shall be
deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designa-
tion and become available to the owner for the purpose of develop-
ment on the failure of the Appropriate Authority to initiate any steps
for its acquisition within a period of six months from the date of
service of a notice by the owner or any person interested in the land.
E It cannot be doubted that a period of 10 years is long enough. The
Development or the Planning Authority must take recourse to
acquisition with some amount of promptitude in order that the com-
pensation paid to the expropriated owner bears a just relation to the
real val.ue of the land as otherwise, the compensation paid for the
acquisition would be wholly illusory. Such fetter on statutory powers
F is in the interest of the general public and the conditions subject to
which they can be exercised must be strictly followed.

There still remain the other two points raised, namely, (i)
There was waiver or abandonment of right by respondents nos. 4-7,
the trustees, to question the validity of the acquisition proceedings;
G and (ii) There was inordinate delay or !aches on the part of respon-
dent no. 1 which disentitled it to grant of relief undr Art. 226 of the
Constitution. We findit difficult to give effect to these contentions.

In order to deal with these questions, a few facts are to be
stated. The Executive Engineer of the Municipal Corporation by his
H letter dated November 2, 1977 addressed to the lawyer acting on be-
MUNICIPAL CORP. BOMBAY v. H.T. ASSOCIATION [SEN, J.] 33
'
half of respondents nos. 4-7, the trustees, to inquire whether they A
were prepared to sell the property in question situate at Cadastral
Survey no. 176 of Taradeo. In response thereto, respondents nos. 4-7
through their lawyer's reply dated November 18, 1977 intimated that
they were prepared to consider the sale of the property in its existing
condition with all the structures tenanted or otherwise at an overall
rate of Rs.650 per square metre. This response was without prejudice B
and they expressly stated that the offer was made wi_thout admitting
the power and authority of the appellant to acquire the land or to
initiate the proceedings for acquisition. Instead of accepting the
same, the Executive Engineer by his letter dated January 11, 1978
wanted respondents nos. 4-7 to disclose the basis upon which they
claimed price at the rate of Rs.650 per square metre. While keeping C
respondents nos. 4-7 in suspense, the Municipal Corporation had in
the meanwhile on January 10, 1978 passed a Resolution that neces-
sary steps be taken to move the State Government for acquisition of
the land and thereafter actually moved the Government by their
letter dated January 31, 1978 to make the requisite declaration under
s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 i.e. the property in question D
was needed for, public purpose viz. a recreation ground under the
Development Plan. The State Government accordingly on April 7,
1978 on being satisfied that the property was needed issued the
requisite impugned notification under s. 6 of the Act. Thereafter, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer on January 18, 1979 issued a
general notice under s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act and the same E
was published at .the site and also issued individual notices to the
persons interested. The hearing was fixed for February 26, 1979. On
) February 22, 1979 i.e. four days before the hearing some of the
/
). tenants approached the Special Land Acquisition Officer and applied
for three months' adjournment and accordingly the bearing was
adjourned to April 24, 1979. However, no claims for compensation F
were filed. Nobody remained present at the hearing. Accordingly,
the Special Land Acquisition Officer was constrained to issue fresh
notices under s. 9 on May 25, 1981. Thereafter, the Municipal Corpo-
ration on the elate fixed applied to the Special Land Acquisition
Officer to keep the proceedings in abeyance at the behest of some of
the tenants who had applied to the Corporation for three months' G
time. In the circumstances, respondents nos. 4-7 moved the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of
mandamus requiring the Special Land Acquisition Officer to make an
award. On January 20, 1981, the learned Government Advocate gave
an undertaking before the High Court that the Special Land Acquisi-
tion Officer would declare the award within a period of six months H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
J
A and mak~ payment of compensation within eight months. In view of
this, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as not pressed.
I

On these facts, it cannot be said that there was any waiver or \
abandonment of rights by respondents nos. 4-7. In order to constitute
\I
waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
B right. The essence of a waiver is an estoppel and where there is no
estoppel, there is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are questions of
conduct and must necessarily be determined on the facts of each case.
In the present case, respondents nos. 4-7 had without admitting that
the appellant had the authority or power to initiate the proceedings
for acquisition, signified their willingness to sell the property subject
c to certain terms. But the appellant did not accept the offer. On the
contrary, the appellant took further steps for the acquisition of the
land by moving the State Government under s. 126(1) of the Act to
initiate acquisition proceedings by the issuance of a notification under
s. 6 of the land Acquisition Act. In view of this, it can~ot be said that
the conduct of respondents nos. 4-7 was such as warrants an inference
D of relinquishment by a known existing legal right.

There is no question of estoppel, waiver or abandonment.
There is no specific plea of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, much
less a plea of abandonment of right. That apart, the question of
waiver really does not arise in the case. Admittedly, the tenants were
E not parties to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no ques-
tion of waiver of rights by respondents nos. 4-7 not would this disen-
title the tenants from maintaining the writ petition. The objection
that there was undue delay in moving the High Court cannot prevail.
The reservation has lapsed, acquisition upon such reservation is bad
and the delay in filing the petition, such as it is, can make no diffe-
F rence to this position in law.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.