MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI AND OTHERSversusVIVEK V. GAWDE ETC. ETC.

                 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 843 : 2024 INSC 985

     Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others
                              v.
                  Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.
                 (Civil Appeal No(s). 14506-14523 of 2024)
                              13 December 2024
           [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       By way of the impugned order, whether the High Court exceeded
       its jurisdiction in framing points for determination by the Inquiry
       Officer acting in a quasi-judicial capacity under the Mumbai
       Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 with respect to the pending inquiry
       proceedings for eviction against the respondents; whether the
       order was passed by the Principal Judge as a persona designata,
       so as to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
       Constitution of India or whether the same was passed in the capacity
       of a judicial authority to be amenable to Article 227 jurisdiction.

                                   Headnotes†
       Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 – Chapter V-A –
       Constitution of India – Article 226, 227 – Proceedings pertaining
       to eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises –
       Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in framing
       points for determination by the Inquiry Officer directing that the
       proceedings be conducted in consonance with the principles
       of natural justice:
       Held: Yes – High Court exceeded the ambit of its writ and
       supervisory jurisdiction in framing points for determination in a
       summary proceeding, more so when the proceedings were at the
       embryonic stage of notice having been issued to the respondents –
       Having directed that the proceedings be conducted in consonance
       with the principles of natural justice, the High Court overstepped
       its limits and took unto itself a duty which the Act entrusts the
       statutory authority to exercise – High Court at best, could have
       moulded relief as deemed fit and proper, but in framing issues for
       the Inquiry Officer to determine, it went far beyond its domain by
       substituting its own wisdom for that of the civil court – Furthermore,

* Author
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       the proceedings for eviction can be continued by the Inquiry Officer
       by adhering to principles of natural justice, even in the absence
       of regulations being framed u/s.105H – s.105H does not place
       an embargo on the Inquiry Officer to proceed until regulations
       were framed – Much of the utility in ensuring that public premises
       are made free of unauthorised occupants would be lost on such
       technical pleas based raised and examined on a provision of law
       which is not imperative in terms – Impugned order entertaining writ
       petitions filed by the respondents which were not maintainable,
       set aside. [Paras 20, 22, 34, 35]

       Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 – s.105F – Constitution
       of India – Article 226, 227 – Proceedings pertaining to eviction
       of unauthorised occupants of public premises – Appeals filed
       by respondents under section 105F before the Principal Judge,
       City Civil Court against the order of the Inquiry Officer – Appeal
       held not maintainable – Writ petition filed by the respondents
       challenging the order of the Principal Judge – Maintainability:
       Held: Not maintainable – Writ petition of the respondents seeking
       quashing of the decision of a civil court by issuing a writ of certiorari
       was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed at the
       threshold with respect to its primary relief – An order of the civil
       court could only be challenged under Article 227 and not Article 226
       thereof – Appellate order under challenge before the High Court
       was rendered by a civil court, and it is trite that orders passed by
       a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article
       226 – Furthermore, the petition of the respondents also failed to
       merit the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory powers under
       Article 227 and should have been rejected. [Paras 15, 14, 18]

       Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 – Proceedings
       pertaining to eviction of unauthorised occupants of public
       premises – Inquiry Officer was an officer of the first appellant-
       Corporation – Eviction proceedings were challenged inter alia
       on the ground that institutional bias vitiated the proceedings –
       One of the points framed by the High Court for determination
       of the Inquiry Officer was as to whether the proceedings were
       vitiated by institutional bias as the same were being conducted
       by an officer of the first appellant:
       Held: If the officers have no personal interest in the lis, bias cannot
       be imputed, especially since, the officer is acting not in his capacity
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                                845

           Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                       Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

     as an executive official, but as a quasi-judicial authority – High
     Court in the impugned order already rendered a finding on the
     issue by holding that though the Inquiry Officer was an officer of
     the first appellant, in the inquiry proceedings, he is an independent
     quasi-judicial officer under the Act – It ought not to frame a point
     despite such determination. [Para 31]

                                Case Law Cited
     LIC v. Nandini J. Shah [2018] 2 SCR 277 : (2018) 15 SCC 356;
     Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [2015] 3 SCR 197 : (2015) 5 SCC
     423; Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala [2019] 17 SCR
     1089 : (2019) 20 SCC 143; Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim [1984]
     1 SCR 211 : (1983) 4 SCC 566; W.B. Central School Service
     Commission v. Abdul Halim [2019] 9 SCR 1089 : (2019) 18 SCC
     39; Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate [2019]
     12 SCR 532 : (2019) 10 SCC 738; Accountant and Secretarial
     Services (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 493 :
     (1988) 4 SCC 324; Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand (2004)
     11 SCC 625 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888; Limitation Act, 1963;
     Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

                               List of Keywords
     Eviction; Unauthorised occupants; Public premises; Proceedings
     for eviction; Inquiry Officer; Quasi-judicial authority; Executive
     official; Principles of natural justice, Absence of regulations; Writ
     and supervisory jurisdiction; Jurisdiction exceeded; Points for
     determination framed; Summary proceeding; Civil court; Writ of
     certiorari; Executive official Article 227, Article 226; Appellate order;
     Institutional bias.

                              Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 14506-14523
     of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 19-07-2022 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay in WP Nos. 5983, 5984, 5985, 5986, 5993,
     5994, 5995, 5996, 5997, 5999, 6000, 6003, 6004, 6005, 6010, 6011,
     6067 and 6069 of 2022
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                                 Appearances for Parties
       Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv., Ashish Wad, Manoj Wad, Mrs. Tamali Wad,
       Ms. Swati Arya, Ms. Akriti Arya, Ms. Nishi Sangatani, M/s. J.S.
       Wad and Co, Advs. for the Appellants.
       Rajendra Pai, Sr. Adv., Aloukik Pai, Akshay Pai, Anand Dilip
       Landge, Mrs. Sangeeta S Pahune Patil, Sumit Kumar, Advs. for
       the Respondents.

                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                       Judgment

       Dipankar Datta, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The appellants are aggrieved by the common judgment and order
       dated 19th July, 20221 passed on a batch of writ petitions under
       Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a learned Judge of the
       High Court of Bombay.
3.     The operative part of the impugned order expedites proceedings
       for eviction pending before the Inquiry Officer under the Mumbai
       Municipal Corporation Act, 18882 against the respondents in the
       manner directed within 12 months. This direction could not have and
       has not left the appellants aggrieved; however, they are seriously
       aggrieved for an altogether different reason, i.e. the learned Judge
       has framed points for determination by the Inquiry Officer. According
       to the appellants, proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants
       of public premises are summary in nature where, upon a show cause
       notice being issued, the noticee is required to place his defence which
       the Inquiry Officer, as the delegate of the Municipal Commissioner,
       is required to consider, reasonably, and proceed to determine, in
       accordance with fair procedure, as to whether the noticee is indeed
       an unauthorised occupant. Also, the Inquiry Officer is under obligation
       to bear in mind the provisions in Chapter V-A of the Act titled ‘Power
       to Evict Persons from Corporation Premises’, which is a code in itself,




1    impugned order, hereafter
2    Act, hereafter
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                         847

          Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                      Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

     while so proceeding. In the present cases, the appellants submit,
     the learned Judge took upon himself the burden of framing points
     for determination and has, in effect, laid down a procedure which
     is not only contrary to the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act but
     in the process has nullified binding decisions of the High Court and
     this Court and thrown legal principles asunder, by acting entirely in
     excess of jurisdiction.
4.   Before proceeding further, it would be worthwhile to notice the basic
     facts triggering these appeals.
     4.1. The respondents are occupants and/or legal heirs of the original
          occupants who were allotted the subject premises on leave and
          license basis in the 1960s, owing to their employment with the
          appellants.
     4.2. In 2007, eviction proceedings were initiated against the
          respondents under the provisions of the Act. The respondents
          knocked the doors of the High Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction,
          seeking to convert their tenancy to permanent ownership on
          the basis of a resolution which had allegedly been passed by
          the Municipal Commissioner. The High Court firmly struck down
          such challenge by holding that the land belonged to the people
          and could not be the subject of State largesse, especially when
          the terms of the respective allotments categorically stated that
          the license would terminate upon the occupant’s retirement
          from municipal service. This Court, vide order dated 01st May,
          2017 dismissed the challenge to the order of the High Court
          refusing to nullify the eviction proceedings, thus, stamping its
          approval on initiation and continuation of such proceedings.
     4.3. Notices were issued to the respondents under section 105B(1)
          of the Act, directing them to vacate the premises which triggered
          the second round of litigation by the respondents. They assailed
          the same, inter alia, on the ground of breach of principles of
          natural justice. The High Court by its order dated 8th December,
          2021 allowed the challenge with a direction to the Inquiry Officer
          to decide the eviction proceedings de novo.
     4.4. It is the re-commencement of these inquiry proceedings which
          has ultimately resulted in the present round of litigation. Put on
          notice, the respondents wished the Inquiry Officer to decide two
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            primary contentions: (i) whether in the absence of regulations
            framed under section 105H of the Act, the proceedings should
            continue; and (ii) whether the Municipal Commissioner ought
            to refer the dispute to any independent forum for a decision
            in a just, fair and unbiased manner. By an order dated 21st
            March, 2022, the Inquiry Officer ruled against the respondents.
            Aggrieved thereby, the respondents presented an appeal before
            the Principal Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Mumbai
            under section 105F of the Act. The appellate authority by its
            order dated 4th May, 2022 refused to interfere and dismissed the
            appeals as not maintainable. Still aggrieved, the respondents, in
            yet another challenge, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court
            under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and assailed the
            eviction proceedings premised on the same points that were
            raised before the Inquiry Officer, i.e., (i) regulations not having
            been framed under section 105H of the Act, proper conduct of
            the proceedings cannot even be thought of; and (ii) institutional
            bias has vitiated the proceedings and the rule nemo debet esse
            judex in propria sua causa breached to the utter prejudice and
            detriment of the noticees, inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer being
            the delegate of the Municipal Commissioner would be unlikely
            to derogate from the authority’s decision to evict them.
5.     The High Court, in the impugned judgment, commenced with deciding
       the issue in favour of the appellants herein by holding that mere lack
       of regulations could not be a valid ground for keeping the proceedings
       in abeyance. It was further held that though the Inquiry Officer was
       an employee of the first appellant, he was acting in a quasi-judicial
       capacity under section 68 of the Act in an independent manner, and
       was thus duly authorized to conduct the inquiry proceedings and
       pass appropriate orders on the basis of evidence adduced.
6.     However, after holding that the Inquiry Officer was so authorised,
       the High Court, in an apparent volte face which is unexplainable,
       proceeded to frame the following 9 (nine) points for determination
       with respect to the pending inquiry proceedings:
            “Points for determination in the Inquiry proceedings before
            Respondent No. 2.
            A. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that the premises
            in the aforesaid 18 enquiries are Municipal staff quarters?
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          849

          Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                      Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

          B. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that upon
          retirement of the employees, their possession of the said
          premises in the aforesaid 18 enquiries has/had become
          unauthroized (sic, unauthorized)
          C. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that the
          proceedings under section 105B of the MMC Act, 1888 in
          the aforesaid 18 enquiries are within the period of limitation
          prescribed under Article 137 under the Schedule to the
          Indian Limitation Act, 1963?
          D. Whether the Opponents prove that the proceedings u/s
          105B in the aforesaid enquiries are barred by the law of
          limitation and are required to be dismissed under Section 3
          of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963?
          E. Whether the Applicant (MCGM) proves that the Enquiry
          Officer has the jurisdiction to try and decide the question
          raised by the Opponents relating to their continuation in
          possession of the enquiry premises u/s 53A of the Transfer
          of Property Act, 1882?
          F. Whether the Opponents prove that they are entitled to
          continue in possession of the premises in the aforesaid
          18 enquiries u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
          irrespective of the proceedings u/s 105B of the MMC Act,
          1888?
          G. Whether the Opponents prove that the proceedings
          u/s 105B are vitiated by “institutional bias” (Nemo judex in
          causa sua i.e., No one can be a judge in their own case)
          as the Enquiry Officer being a delegate of the Municipal
          Commissioner cannot decide the enquiry proceedings
          contrary to the stand of the Municipal Commissioner in
          his representation/notice dated 20/12/2007 sent to the
          Government of Maharashtra under the second proviso
          to section 64(3) of the MMC Act, 1888 for cancellation of
          the Improvement Committee Resolution No. 208 dated
          10/08/1989 and the Municipal Corporation Resolution
          No. 343 of 1989 dated 01/09/1989 or any other or
          further letter sent by the Municipal Commissioner to
          the Government of Maharashtra including letter dated
850                                                           [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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            16/09/2017 pursuant to the meeting dated 03/05/2017
            presided by the Chief Minister?
            H. Whether the Opponents prove that the State Government
            is a proper and necessary party to the proceedings
            u/s. 105B of the MMC Act, 1888 and the proceedings
            ought to be dismissed for its non-joinder?
            I. Whether the Opponents prove that the Enquiry Officer
            does not have powers to summarily decide the proceedings
            u/s. 105B of the MMC Act, 1888 without the regulations
            u/s. 105H prepared by the Municipal Commissioner?”
7.     The appellants have assailed the impugned order on the grounds
       that Chapter V-A of the Act being a complete code in itself, the High
       Court effectively granted a premium to the dilatory tactics being
       adopted by the respondents who are none else but unauthorised
       occupants of public premises.
8.     These appeals stem from the third round of litigation initiated by the
       respondents before the High Court and it is the second which has
       reached the Supreme Court. The proceedings, pertaining to eviction
       of unauthorised occupants despite having commenced a decade
       and a half back, on 28th January, 2009 to be precise, have not
       progressed much due to repeated forays made by the respondents
       questioning the jurisdiction of the Inquiry Officer to proceed against
       them. Assuming that this judgment terminates the third round of
       litigation, without there being a review, the Inquiry Officer has to
       resume proceedings from the stage of inquiry allowing the parties
       to lead evidence. Upon evidence being led by both parties, it is the
       appellants’ assertion that it would be for the Inquiry Officer to identify
       the contentious issues that arise for decision by him and by assigning
       reasons in support of the conclusions reached qua such issues,
       he is required to submit a report for consideration by the Municipal
       Commissioner. Even before the stage for leading evidence having
       matured, the appellants allege that the High Court has unnecessarily
       interfered and deflected the course of justice.
9.     On the contrary, the respondents have voiced in chorus that the
       approach of the High Court is one that sub-serves justice with a view
       to secure the precious right to life of the respondents by narrowing
       down the controversy so that the proceedings could be taken to
       its logical conclusion as early as possible. Mr. Pai, learned senior
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        851

            Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                        Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

     counsel for the respondents, however, has been fair in conceding
     certain points but having regard to the long pendency of the eviction
     proceedings, we do not wish to decide any point resting on such
     concession.
10. Having recorded thus, we now proceed to adjudicate the lis on merits.
11. We deem it fit to commence the discussion with an examination of
    the constitutional provisions invoked by the respondents before the
    High Court i.e. under Articles 226 and 227. Challenge was laid in
    the writ petitions to an order passed by the Principal Judge, City
    Civil Court, Mumbai, in appeals under section 105F of the Act. Such
    order held the respondents’ appeals to be not maintainable. In their
    writ petition, the respondents sought, inter alia, a writ of certiorari
    to quash the orders passed by the Principal Civil Judge and that of
    the Inquiry Officer. We shall first proceed to examine the challenge
    laid to the former.
12. A perusal of section 105F(1) would be of profit. It reads:
            105F. Appeals. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order
            of the Commissioner, made in respect of any corporation
            premises, under section 105B or section 105C, to an
            appellate officer who shall be the principal Judge of the
            City Civil Court of Bombay or, such other judicial officer
            in Brihan Mumbai of not less than ten years’ standing, as
            the principal Judge may designate in this behalf.
13. The question that arises is, whether the order was passed by the
    Principal Judge as a persona designata, so as to be amenable to writ
    jurisdiction under Article 226 or whether the same was passed in the
    capacity of a judicial authority for the same to be amenable to Article
    227 jurisdiction? This question has been emphatically answered by
    a 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in LIC v. Nandini J. Shah,3
    wherein this Court with respect to a similar provision of appeal in
    the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
    held that:
            “34. ***We are not called upon to consider the question
            as to whether the Estate Officer, while exercising powers
            invested in him, acts as a court or has the trappings of a


3   (2018) 15 SCC 356
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       court. The only question that we have attempted to answer
       is whether the appointment of the Appellate Officer referred
       to in Section 9 of the Act before whom an appeal shall
       lie, is in the capacity of persona designata or as a court.
       35. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 is the core provision to be
       kept in mind for answering the point in issue. It postulates
       that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate
       Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to
       who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified
       in the same provision. It predicates the District Judge of
       the district in which the public premises are situated or
       such other judicial officer in that district of not less than 10
       years’ standing as the District Judge to be designated for
       that purpose. The first part of the provision does suggest
       that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however,
       it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is
       persona designata. Something more is required to hold
       so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name
       as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely
       different. However, when the Appellate Officer is either the
       District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in
       that district possessing necessary qualification who could
       be designated by the District Judge, the question of such
       investiture of power of an appellate authority in the District
       Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards acquire
       the colour or for that matter trappings of persona designata.
       In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate
       Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State
       which is quite distinct from the executive power of the
       State. Secondly, the District Judge or designated judicial
       officer exercises judicial authority within his jurisdiction.
       Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to
       be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the
       fact of a pre-existing authority exercising judicial power
       of the State. Fourthly, the District Judge is the creature
       of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869,
       who presides over a District Court invariably consisting
       of more than one Judge in the district concerned. The
       District Court exercises original and appellate jurisdiction
       by virtue of Sections 7 and 8 respectively, of the 1869 Act
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                            853

          Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                      Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

          and is the principal court of original civil jurisdiction in the
          district within the meaning of CPC, as per Section 7 of
          that Act. As per Section 8 of the Act of 1869, the District
          Court is the court of appeal from all decrees and orders
          passed by the subordinate courts from which an appeal
          lies under any law for the time being in force.
          ***
          39. Indeed, the expression used in Section 9 is
          ‘Appellate Officer’ and not ‘appellate authority’ as has
          been used in Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities
          Act, 1955, considered by the Supreme Court in Thakur
          Das [Thakur Das v. State of M.P., (1978) 1 SCC 27 :
          1978 SCC (Cri) 21]. That, however, would neither make
          any difference nor undermine the status of the District
          Judge or the designated judicial officer so as to reckon
          their appointment as persona designata. The thrust of
          Section 9(1) is to provide for remedy of an appeal against
          the order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge
          who, undeniably, is a pre-existing authority and head of
          the judiciary within the district, discharging judicial power
          of the State including power to condone the delay in
          filing of the appeal and to grant interim relief during the
          pendency of the appeal. Though described as an Appellate
          Officer, the District Judge, for deciding an appeal under
          Section 9, can and is expected to exercise the powers
          of the civil court.
          ***
          59. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the
          respondents had resorted to remedy of writ petition under
          Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view
          of our conclusion that the order passed by the District
          Judge (in this case, Judge, the Bombay City Civil Court
          at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the
          subordinate court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily
          proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
          and not under Article 226.***”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
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14. In view of such binding decision, the inescapable conclusion
    presenting itself is that the appellate order under challenge before
    the High Court was rendered by a civil court, and it is trite that orders
    passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under
    Article 226 of the Constitution. This point in law has been decisively
    reiterated in the 3-Judge Bench decision in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi
    Nath.4 This Court, while holding that an order of the civil court could
    only be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution, and not
    Article 226 thereof, ruled that:
            “25.***All the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are
            subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision
            under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally
            conferred on all the High Courts. Broad principles of writ
            jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and
            a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without
            jurisdiction orders of tribunals or authorities or courts other
            than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for
            the High Courts to issue writs to the subordinate courts.
            Control of working of the subordinate courts in dealing
            with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate
            or revisional powers or power of superintendence under
            Article 227. Orders of the civil court stand on different
            footing from the orders of authorities or tribunals or
            courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or
            revisional jurisdiction is regulated by the statutes, power
            of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The
            expression “inferior court” is not referable to the judicial
            courts, as rightly observed in the referring order [Radhey
            Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616] in paras 26
            and 27 quoted above.
            ***
            27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil
            courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article
            226. We are also in agreement with the view [Radhey
            Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616] of the referring



4   (2015) 5 SCC 423
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                             855

            Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                        Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

            Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a
            private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of
            Article 227 is different from Article 226.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

15. Thus, the writ petition of the respondents seeking quashing of
    the decision of a civil court by issuing a writ of certiorari was not
    maintainable and ought to have been dismissed at the threshold
    with respect to its primary relief.
16. We now proceed to discuss, noticing that the petition of the
    respondents was also filed under Article 227, whether the High
    Court could have granted succour to the respondents by exercise
    of its powers under such article. It is well settled that the provision
    bestows the high courts with powers of administrative and judicial
    superintendence over subordinate courts. The test for exercise of
    such power was laid down in a 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision
    of this Court in Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala5 as
    follows:
            “85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article
            227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled
            law that this power of judicial superintendence must
            be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and
            tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal
            has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not
            interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction
            unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant
            violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be
            exercised ‘in the cloak of an appeal in disguise’.
            86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence
            and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227
            of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict
            interference to cases of patent error of law which go to
            the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or
            unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice,
            lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High



5   (2019) 20 SCC 143
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            Court does not re-assess or re-analyse the evidence and/
            or materials on record….The writ jurisdiction of the High
            Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate
            forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal
            in the eye of the law.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

17. Though adverted to before, a perusal of the grounds urged in the
    writ petition reveals two primary grounds of challenge which are
    interconnected – violation of principles of natural justice and that of
    institutional bias. The latter ground will be dealt with at a subsequent
    part of this judgment while the former does not appear to carry any
    merit.
18. It is not the respondents’ submission that they were not given an
    opportunity of being heard by the civil court. Such opportunity having
    been given, even if the conclusion arrived at by the civil court was
    erroneous, it could not be remedied by the High Court in exercise
    of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. As was held by
    this Court in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim,6 a mere wrong
    decision is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court
    under Article 227. Thus, the petition of the respondents also failed
    to merit the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory powers and
    should have been rejected in view of the same.
19. We now proceed to consider the second relief claimed in the writ
    petition of the respondents, i.e., the challenge laid to the order passed
    by the Inquiry Officer. It is well settled that decisions rendered by
    administrative authorities can be interfered with by high courts in
    exercise of Article 226 powers, however, sparingly. Recently, this
    Court in W.B. Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim7
    while considering the scope of interference under Article 226 in an
    administrative action held that:
            “31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court
            is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an



6   (1983) 4 SCC 566
7   (2019) 18 SCC 39
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                         857

          Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                      Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

          apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a
          decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the
          record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of
          the record or whether the error requires examination or
          argument to establish it. If an error has to be established
          by a process of reasoning, on points where there may
          reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an
          error on the face of the record, as held by this Court
          in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun
          Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde
          v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137] . If
          the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of
          two or more constructions and one construction has been
          adopted, the decision would not be open to interference
          by the writ court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of
          a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard
          thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly
          wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ court by
          issuance of writ of certiorari.
          32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide
          enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so
          arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
          have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck
          down by a writ court. If the decision cannot rationally be
          supported by the materials on record, the same may be
          regarded as perverse.
          33. However, the power of the Court to examine the
          reasonableness of an order of the authorities does
          not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the
          grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits
          of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision.
          The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or
          unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that
          no reasonable person could have taken, which has led
          to manifest injustice. The writ court does not interfere,
          because a decision is not perfect.’
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
858                                                           [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


20. The decision was approved by a further decision of this Court in
    Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate,8 wherein
    it was held that:
            “14. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review
            of an administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court
            comes to a conclusion that the decision-maker has not
            understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-
            making power or when it is found that the decision of the
            decision-maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the
            principle of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ or unless it is
            found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the
            decision-making process, it would not be permissible for
            the High Court to interfere in the decision-making process.
            It is also equally well settled that it is not permissible for
            the Court to examine the validity of the decision but this
            Court can examine only the correctness of the decision-
            making process.
            ***
            16. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High
            Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned
            is vitiated by an apparent error of law i.e. when the error
            is apparent on the face of the record and is self-evident.
            The High Court would be empowered to exercise the
            powers when it finds that the decision impugned is so
            arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would
            have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that the test is
            not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable
            but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable
            person could have taken. Not only this but such a decision
            must have led to manifest injustice.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

21. For the present, we keep aside the doctrine of merger. Once the
    appellate order of the Appellate Officer came into existence, the order
    of the Inquiry Officer merged in the former. It had no independent



8   (2019) 10 SCC 738
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                      859

          Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                      Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

     existence. Yet, we have perused the order of the Inquiry Officer
     and we wish to consider, at this point of time, whether the same
     warrants interdiction. A perusal thereof reveals a reasoned order,
     supported by judicial decisions, answering distinctly each and every
     contention raised by the noticees. What seems to be apparent is
     the absence of any of the telling circumstances, as laid down in
     the decisions above, which could have warranted interference by
     the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226;
     thus, on this count too, the respondents’ writ petition was liable to
     be dismissed.
22. In view of the discussion aforesaid, it is held that the High Court
    in the present case exceeded the ambit of both, its writ and
    supervisory, jurisdiction insofar as it proceeded to frame points
    for determination in a summary proceeding, more so when the
    proceedings were at the embryonic stage of notice having been
    issued to the respondents. Having directed that the proceedings
    be conducted in consonance with the principles of natural justice,
    the High Court overstepped its limits and took unto itself a duty
    which the Act entrusts the statutory authority to exercise. The High
    Court could, at best, have moulded relief as deemed fit and proper,
    but in framing issues for the Inquiry Officer to determine, the High
    Court went far beyond its domain by substituting its own wisdom
    for that of the civil court.
23. Now, it would be apt to examine the points of determination framed
    by the High Court and decide how far the same are justified on
    facts and in the circumstances and whether the same were, at all,
    necessary. The points can be classified into six categories, which
    we shall delineate and address hereunder.
24. The first two points framed by the High Court pertain to the status
    of the subject premises and the nature of occupation thereof by
    the residents. Determination of these issues stands barred by res
    judicata, a previous bench of the High Court having answered the
    same against the respondents vide judgment and order dated 06th
    January, 2017 by expressly holding that the allotments not having
    been made to the respondents independent of their identity as
    municipal servants, they could not stake any claim therein.
     This decision attained finality by the dismissal of the special leave
     petition by this Court vide order dated 01st May, 2017.
860                                                            [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                                 Supreme Court Reports


25. The third and fourth points touch upon the aspect as to whether the
    proceedings initiated under section 105B of the Act are barred by
    limitation. Reference has been made by the High Court to section 3 of
    the Limitation Act, 1963.9 We are at a loss to comprehend as to how
    section 3, scope whereof is relatable to proceedings like suits, appeals
    and applications before judicial fora, could have been attracted to
    eviction proceedings before the Inquiry Officer which, though obliging
    the Inquiry Officer to discharge quasi-judicial functions in course
    thereof, yet, are basically administrative in character. Additionally, in
    referring to Article 137 , the High Court ignored and/or overlooked the
    Preamble of the Limitation Act and the heading of the Third Division
    under the Schedule read with sections 2(j) and section 3.
26. The fifth and sixth points framed by the High Court pertain to the
    right of the respondents to remain in possession by virtue of section
    53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is alleged that the first
    appellant instead of resuming possession of the subject premises
    had retained the retirement benefits of the respondents as monetary
    consideration for converting the nature of possession from that of a
    licensee to that of an owner. We leave this point open for the Inquiry
    Officer to determine, if at all the respondents raise the same before
    him, bearing in mind the fact that such point is not in the nature of
    a demurrer which could be raised for nipping the proceedings in the
    bud for lack of jurisdiction and, thus, had not been examined in the
    previous round of litigation.
27. The seventh point raises the issue as to whether the proceedings are
    vitiated by institutional bias insofar as the same are being conducted
    by an officer of the first appellant. The answer to this issue is squarely
    covered by the decision of this Court in Accountant and Secretarial
    Services (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,10 wherein the question which
    fell for consideration was whether the appointment of an officer of
    a nationalised bank, in proceedings pertaining to eviction from the
    premises of the very same bank, would violate Article 14 of the
    Constitution. This Court, while upholding such appointment, held that:
               “32. Dr Chitale, while initially formulating his contentions,
               outlined an argument that the provision in the 1971 Act


9    Limitation Act, hereafter
10   (1988) 4 SCC 324
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                            861

             Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                         Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

             appointing one of the officers of the respondent Bank as the
             Inquiry Officer is violative of Article 14. We do not see any
             substance in this contention. In the very nature of things,
             only an officer or appointee of the government, statutory
             authority or corporation can be thought of for implementing
             the provisions of the Act. That apart, personal bias cannot
             necessarily be attributed to such officer either in favour of
             the bank or against any occupant who is being proceeded
             against, merely because he happens to be such officer.
             Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Act provides for an
             appeal to an independent judicial officer against orders
             passed by the Inquiry Officer. These provisions do not,
             therefore, suffer from any infirmity. …”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

28. This decision was affirmed by this Court in Delhi Financial Corpn.
    v. Rajiv Anand,11 wherein this Court further explained that:
             “14. Thus, the authorities disclose that mere appointment
             of an officer of the corporation does not by itself bring
             into play the doctrine that ‘no man can be a judge in his
             own cause’. For that doctrine to come into play it must be
             shown that the officer concerned has a personal bias or
             a personal interest or has personally acted in the matter
             concerned and/or has already taken a decision one way
             or the other which he may be interested in supporting.”
29. Reference to the decision of this Court in Hyderabad Vanaspathi
    Ltd. v. A.P. SEB12 would also be of profit, wherein the 3-Judge Bench
    was tasked with examining whether adjudication of malpractice and
    electricity pilferage cases by officers of the very electricity board
    against whom the wrong has been committed would constitute bias.
    While negativing such challenge, this Court held that:
             “43. The principle ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ will not apply
             in this case as the officers have no personal lis with the
             consumers. As pointed out by learned Senior Counsel



11   (2004) 11 SCC 625
12   (1998) 4 SCC 470
862                                                             [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


             for the Board, they are similar to income tax or sales tax
             officials. There is nothing wrong in their adjudicating the
             matter especially when the consumers may be represented
             by an advocate and the formula for making provisional
             assessment is fixed in the clause itself. …”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)

30. The discussion would be incomplete without a reference to the
    7-Judge Constitution Bench decision in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P)
    Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay13 cited by Mr. Mehta,
    learned senior counsel for the appellants, wherein this Court while
    upholding the constitutional validity of Chapter V-A of the Act held that:
             “47. If we examine the question before us in the light of
             these general observations, it will be apparent that the
             special procedure set out in Chapter VA of the Municipal
             Act is not substantially more drastic and prejudicial than
             the ordinary procedure of a civil suit. The initial authority to
             determine the liability to eviction is no doubt the Municipal
             Commissioner who is the chief executive officer of the
             Municipal Corporation and who may not be possessed
             of any legal training but Section 68 of the Municipal Act
             provides that this function may be discharged by any
             Municipal officer whom the Municipal Commissioner may
             generally or specially empower in writing in that behalf
             and the Municipal Commissioner can, therefore, authorise
             a Deputy Municipal Commissioner attached to the Legal
             Department of the Municipal Corporation, who would be an
             officer trained in law, to discharge this function and indeed
             we have no doubt that the Municipal Commissioner, if he is
             himself not trained in law, would do so. The determination
             of the liability to eviction would, therefore, really in practice
             be made by a Municipal officer having proper and adequate
             legal training. Then again, the occupant against whom
             the special procedure is set in motion would have a right
             to file his written statement and produce documents and
             he would also be entitled to examine and cross-examine
             witnesses. The Municipal Commissioner or other officer


13   (1974) 2 SCC 402
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        863

           Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                       Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

          holding the inquiry is given the power to summon and
          enforce the attendance of witnesses and examine them
          on oath and also require the discovery and production of
          documents. The occupant is also entitled to appear at the
          inquiry by advocate, attorney or pleader. Thus, in effect
          and substance the same procedure which is followed in a
          civil court is made available in the proceeding before the
          Municipal Commissioner or other officer holding the inquiry.
          Then there is also a right of appeal against the decision of
          the Municipal Commissioner or other officer and this right
          of appeal is to a senior and highly experienced judicial
          officer and not to a mere executive authority. The appeal
          lies to the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or such
          other judicial officer in Greater Bombay of not less than
          ten years standing as the principal Judge may designate
          in that behalf and it is an appeal both on law and fact.
          It is true that a revision application against the appellate
          order is excluded, but if the judicial officer invested with
          appellate power has failed to exercise his jurisdiction or
          acted in excess of his jurisdiction or committed an error
          of law apparent on the face of the record or the decision
          given by him has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice,
          it is always open to the aggrieved party to bring it up
          before the High Court for examination under Article 226
          or Article 227. The ultimate decision is, therefore, by a
          judicial officer trained in the art and skill of law and not
          by an executive officer. …”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

31. In view of the above authorities, it is clear as crystal that if the
    officers have no personal interest in the lis, bias cannot be imputed;
    especially since, the officer is acting not in his capacity as an
    executive official, but as a quasi-judicial authority. The issue, thus,
    does not survive for determination by the Inquiry Officer. It is apposite
    to note that the High Court, in paragraph 13 of the impugned
    order had already rendered a finding on the issue by holding that
    though the Inquiry Officer was an officer of the first appellant, in
    the inquiry proceedings, he is an independent quasi-judicial officer
    under the Act. To frame a point despite such determination is plainly
    incomprehensible.
864                                                        [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


32. The eighth point raises the issue of impleading the State Government
    in the proceedings under section 105B of the Act. The legality of the
    proceedings have already been held against the respondents, and
    the subject premises admittedly being that of the first appellant, the
    question of impleading the State Government is superfluous.
33. The ninth point examined by the High Court as regards the Inquiry
    Officer’s competence to proceed with the inquiry in the absence of
    regulations having been framed under section 105H of the Act, yet
    again, compels us to take a critical view. The High Court framed an
    issue, the answer to which was given by it in paragraph 13 of the
    impugned order wherein it has been held that mere non-framing of
    regulations would not entitle the respondents to keep the proceedings
    in abeyance, and the proceedings would thus continue, in compliance
    with the principles of natural justice. Further, section 105H of the
    Act was examined to observe that it was not mandatory for the
    first appellant to frame regulations, since the provision stated that
    the Commissioner “may” make regulations for taking possession of
    premises of the first appellant.
34. We hold that even in the absence of regulations being framed under
    section 105H of the Act, the proceedings for eviction can be continued
    by the Inquiry Officer by adhering to principles of natural justice. The
    said provision cannot be construed as placing an embargo on the
    Inquiry Officer to proceed until regulations were framed. Much of the
    utility in ensuring that public premises are made free of unauthorised
    occupants would be lost on such technical pleas based raised and
    examined on a provision of law which is not imperative in terms.
    All that is required, as held above, is adherence to natural justice
    principles wherever applicable.
35. The impugned order entertaining writ petitions which were not
    maintainable in the form they were presented did not warrant the High
    Court to exercise jurisdiction by framing points for determination by the
    Inquiry Officer. For the foregoing reasons, the same is indefensible;
    it has to be and is, accordingly, set aside. The civil appeals stand
    allowed. The Inquiry Officer is directed to allow both parties to lead
    evidence and raise whatever points are available in defence, except
    to the extent determined by judicial orders previously. Such officer
    would proceed to independently notice contentions and issues
    arising for his decision on the basis of evidence led and the defence
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                     865

             Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v.
                         Vivek V. Gawde Etc. Etc.

     raised by the respondents, and decide the claims in consonance
     with principles of natural justice. The Inquiry Officer is encouraged
     to proceed with expedition.
36. There shall be no order as to costs.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey