Holding

The Will conferred only a limited, non‑alienable right on Guruswamy, which could not mature into an absolute right for his widow under Section 14(1), rendering the sale deed void.

Summary

The appellant Muninanjappa claimed that a Will dated 1 June 1942 gave him and Guruswamy only a limited, non‑alienable life interest in a house, with absolute ownership only if a son was born. Guruswamy died without male issue and his widow Sevamma sold the property to respondents R. Manual and others. The trial court and Karnataka High Court held that Sevamma acquired absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and upheld the sale. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the construction of the Will and the scope of Section 14(1), emphasizing that where the Will expressly limits the beneficiary’s right to alienation, the right cannot mature into an absolute one unless the widow’s claim is based on a pre‑existing right of maintenance. The Court found that Sevamma had no such pre‑existing right and that Guruswamy’s interest was a restricted life interest, not a share in joint family property. Consequently, the sale deed was held invalid, the findings of the lower courts were set aside, and the suit in favour of the appellant was decreed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether the right granted to Guruswamy under the Will was a limited right.
Whether Guruswamy’s widow Sevamma could acquire an absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to alienate the property.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 13, s. 14(1), s. 14(2)
Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 112, s. 115

Subjects

Will constructionLimited life interestRight of alienationHindu Succession ActSection 14(1)Pre‑existing right of maintenanceWidow's inheritance rightsProperty sale validity

Judgment

MUNINANJAPPA AND ORS. A
v.
R. MANUAL AND ANR.

APRIL, 11, 200 I

[A.P. MISRA AND U.C. BANERJEE, J.l.] B

Hindu I.aw:

Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Section 14(1).

Female llindu-Pmpe1ty of-Rights in-Absolute or limited-Suit prop- c
erly bequeathed to plaintiff and his brother for enjoyment during their lifetime
tvithout any right of alienation-Will also stipulated that in case a son lvere
bon1 to them such son 1vould be a full 01vner1vith right of alienation-flo1veve1;
the brother died 1vithout any male issue-1Vidow had no pre-existing right of
'I
maintenance out of her husband's pITiperty-Thereafler, ividolv executed a sale D
deed in favour of the defendants-Validity of-Held: Both the bmther and his
lvidoiv held the prope1ty, irt trust, for delive1y to their son in case bani out of
their lVedlock-Such a lilnired right of the tvido1v can never mature into an
absolute right /Jy virtue of S. 14( I )-However, such a limited right can mature
into absolute right only 1fthe ivido\v has any pre-existing right of maintenance
out of her husband's pmperty-Thereafter, the widow has no right to alienate
E
the pmpe1ty in favour of the defendants-Hence, sale of property in.favour of
the defendants is not valid-Succession Act, 1925, Ss. 112 and 115.

Will-Construing of-Intention of testator-Determination of-Princi-
ples-Held: In construing a Will the intention ~ft he testator shoald be can-ied F
out-Thenfore, diffeirnt pa11s of the \Viii should be c~nstrued hmmonio11sly-
Cou1t may supply the missing words in a Will to implement the intention of the
testa101~But, where there is no ambiguity and the language of a Will is cleai;
C'ou11 should neither supplement the ivords nor read it down to give benefit to
either of the contesting parties.
G
The appellant-plaintifrs aunt had bequeatlted the suit property in
favour of both the appellant and his brother G, who was the son of the
second wife of the appellant's father. Under the Will the property was
bequeathed to the appellant and G for enjoying it during their lifetime
without any right of alienation. The Will also stipulated that in case a son H
1113
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A were born to them such son would be the full owner with a right of
alienation. However, G died without any male issue.

Subsequently, G's widow sold the suit property to respondents-de-
fendants through a registered sale deed. As a consequence of this the
respondents filed a petition for eviction of the appellant. The appellant,
B therefore, filed a suit for declaration that the sale deed executed by G's
widow in favour of the respondents was not binding on him, as she bad no
right to sell the same. The trial court decreed the suit. The High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that G's widow
had become an absolute owner of the suit property under Section 14(1) of
c the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the Will gave a
limited right to both the appellant and G; that if G himself had a limited
right it could not mature into full right in his favour or in favour of his
'vidow; and that G's widow had no right to execute the impugned sale
D deed.

On behalfof the respondents it was contended that the interest of the
testatrix should be taken into account in construing a Will; that even if
words were missing in the Will the Court should supply the missing words
to subserve the intention of the testatrix; that even if G had a limited right,
E after his death, his \\idow's right in lieu of maintenance out of any estate of
her husband would mature into full right by virtue to Section 14(1) of the
Act and, therefore, G's widow was competent to execute the impugned sale
deed.

F The following arose before this Court :

(a) Whether the right given to G, the benefactor under the Will, was
....
a limited right?

(b) IfG had limited right, whether his widow could get absolute right
G under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to execute the
impugned sale deed in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2?

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. ltis well settled that while construing a Will the inten-
H tion of the testator should be carried out. Keeping this in view, different
MUNINANJAPPA v. R. MANUAL 1115
parts of the Will should he construed harmoniously. The Courts should A
" not reject any part of the Will as being a surplusage, as the testator
could not have intended to make any bequest in the Will as an exercise in
futility. In doing so, if necessary, the Court may read down the language of
a part of the Will to give full effect to the general words of the other part of
the Will. [1122-B-C]
B
Smt. Pramod Kumari Bhatia v. Om Prakash Bhati, [1980] 1 SCC 412,
relied on.

Raghbir Singh v. Budli Sing/~ Am (1978) Del. 86, approved.
c
1.2. But, in a given case, the court may supply the missing words and
in some other case the court may read the language of the Will in order to
implement the intention of a testator. However, where the language and the
words of a Will are clear, there is no ambiguity, which contd be understood
clearly without any doubt, then it would not be proper to either supple-
D
ment the words or read it down to give benefit to either of the contesting
parties. [1122-D]

1.3. In the present case, the language of the Will is clear and unam-
biguous. Thus to find out the intentions of the testatrix, no supplementing
or reading down any word is necessary. The testatrix bequeathed her E
property to her brother's sous, namely, one from the first wife i.e. the
plaintiff, and the other from the second wife i.e. G. To both she clearly
records in no uncertain words that they would have a limited right with no
right to alienate. She also clearly records that in case a son is born to them
they would get absolute right including right to alienate. [1122-E-F]
F
2.1. The limited right of G cannot be interpreted by any stretch of
language that the testatrix intended to give absolute right to G or to his
Widow. They were to bold the property for delivery to the son, in case,
born out of their wedlock. In no case the widow's right over the property
would mature into absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the G
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Her right could only mature as such, if
her claim could be based on any of her pre-existing rights including a
right in lieu of maintenance out of her husband's prop_erty. But in no
"' case would it mature into full right where the property is held by her
husband either in trust for the benefit of other or as limited and restricted H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A owner with no right to alienate. Hence even if the widow continued to
enjoy the property after the death of her husband, she held the property, at x
the most, in the same capacity as her husband but not to claim it towards
her right of maintenance. If the husband had any other property apart
from what was gifted by the testatrix, she could claim her above right
under Section 14(1) of the Act, but not over the property given to her
B
husband Gas a limited owner. (1123-B-D]

V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs., (1977] 3 SCC 99 and
Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad (Dead) by Lrs. v. Kothuri Venka/eswarlu (Dead)
by Lrs., [2000] 2 SCC 139, relied on.
c
2.2. By no stretch of interpretation it could be said G's widow was
possessed of the suit property in lieu of her any pre-existing right. When a
widow claims her right under Section 14(1) of the Act in the hand of either
coparcener or male issue of her deceased husband, it is because of her pre-
existing right of maintenance to the extent of her husband's share in a joint
D
family property. She cannot claim any such right out of the share of the
other coparcener in which there is no trace of her husband's share. So
when a limited right as spoken of with reference to the husband's right in
the joint Hindu family property, it only means limited to the extent of the
husband's share. (1124-C]
E
Ram Kali (Smt.) v. C/wudlzri Ajit Shankar, [1997] 9 SCC 613; Kalawatibai
v. Soiryaba~ (1991] 3 SCC 410 and N. Appaya Udayan v. Nallamma4 AIR
(1949) Mad. 24, held inapplicable.

2.3. In the case of a husband's right in the joint family property, even
F
though limited, he has a right to seek partition or a right to transfer to the
extent of his share, which G could not enjoy in the restrictive right under
the Will. In other words, G could neither seek a right of partition nor
transfer his such right to any one else. [1125-F]

G 3. The Will grants toG a limited and restrictive right and in no case
does it mature into a full right. G's widow did not inherit the suit property
from her husband nor possessed it in lieu of maintenance. Hence, question
of its maturing into full right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession )..
Act does not arise. Thus, G's widow had no right to alienate the suit
H property and, therefore, the sale of the suit property in favour of respond-
MUNlNANJAPPA v. R. MANUAL [MISRA, J.] 1117

- ~
ents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be held to be valid. (1126-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9147 of 1996.
A

From the Judgment Order dated 19.6.95 of the. Kamataka High Court
in R.F.A. No. 42 of 1994.
B
Rajesh Mahale, Raghavendra Srivastava for R.C. Kolhi for the Appel-
Iants.
A

S.N. Bhat for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
MISRA, J. In spite of expertise io drafting a Will, the testators infusiog
his iotentions io it, the struggle for a claim under it remained unabated, the
tug of war between the two claimants under it has been the cause of issue
i before the courts from its very inception. The strong desire to succeed, even
for wrongful claims, has led such claimants to split and ioterpret, even simple D
words and clear iotentions ioto two possible interpretations. That is why court
has to exercise and ioterpret a Will with circumspection and caution io order
to give thrust to the true intentions of a testator.

This appeal also raises similar question of the interpretation of a Will
't- and consequently the right of a widow of a benefactor under the Will. The E
questions raised are :

(a) Whether the "right given to Guruswamy, the benefactor under
the Will dated !st June, 1942 was a limited right.

(b) If Guruswamy had a limited righ~ whether his widow Sevamma F
could get absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Ac~ 1956 to execute the impugned sale deed io
favour of respondent nos. I and 2.

In order to appreciate the controversiea and to answer the aforesaid two
questions, we are hereunder giviog short matrix of facts which are essential G
for the disposal of this appeal.

The following Genealogical Table showiog the relationship inter se
>'
between testatrix Poovamma and the beneficiaries tinder the Will is given as
under: H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Revalappa

Muniyamma = Lakshmaiah = ·Vellamma Poovamma
(First Wife) (Second Wife) Textatrix·
B
.....
Muninanjappa Guruswarny=Sevamma(widow)
(Plaintifi) (Defendant no. 3)
. '
The suit was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants for declaration that the
c sale deed execnted by defendant no. 3 Sevamma, widow of a,;;,,.warny in
favour of defendant-respondent nos.l and 2is not binding on them as she
had no right to" sell the same, hence defendant nos. 1 and 2 cannot derive
any right, title or interest over the suit property by virtue of the said sale deed.
Poovamma was the original owner of the suit propercy which is not in dispute. +
D. ·The plaintiffs lost his father Lakshmaiah. the_ brother of Poovamma-when he
. was four years old ·and was lookedafter · by Poo".amma. Guruswarny the
· brother of plaintiff born from the' second wife·alsojcame nnder the care of .
. Poovamma. Defendant no.3 Sevamma is the widow of Guruswarny. The case
of plaintiffs-appellants is, nnder the aforesaid registered Will dated 1st June,
1942 Poovarnnia bequeathed the suit property in favour of both plaintiff and
E Guruswarny. Under the Will none of the legatees; the benefactor nnder the
Will gets any right to alienate any part of the suit property hence Gu.-uswarny
and his widow Sevamma. could at best have life interest without any right
of alienation. Thus the property bequeathed, after the death of both, namely,
Guruswamy and his widow Sevamma reverts back to the plaintiff. 1n spite
F of this limited right, Sevamma sold !his property to defendant nos. 1 and 2
(reSi>olldent nos. 1 and 2 ~ this CoUrt) on 4th September, 1980 through a
registered sale deed. As a consequence of this respondent nos. 1 and 2 filed
petition for plaintiff's evictioll. This led to the filing of the present suit by
the plaintiffs-appellant as aforesaid. The case set up by respondent nos.· 1 and ·
2 is that after the death of Guruswarny his widow Sevamma became absolute
G
owner by virtue of Sections 13 and 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and hence .
alienation of this property, through fue said sale deed is valid: Defendant
no. 3 Sevamma supported the case of respondent nos. i and 2 and further
said tliat after the death of her husband she wa8 in possession of the suit
property, which wa8 ill lieu ~f her 'right of maintenance, thus by virtue of
H: Sections 13 and 14 of the Hindu s,;ccession kt she became abwlute owner
MUNINANJAPPA v. R. MANUAL [MISRA, J.] 1119
after her husband's death on 23rd August, 1970. ' A
"' · The trial court came to the conclusion, ,:.,hile interpreting° the aforesaid
Will, that the suit property was bequeathed to Guruswamy for enjoying it
during his life time without auy right of alienation. In case a son is born to.
him, such son would be the full owner, with a right of alienation. However,
Guruswamy died without auy male issue. Thus the. question which came for B
consideration was, whether after the death of Guruswamy, his widow could
succeed to this property in lieu of maintenaJ:lce, which could mature into full
owner under the Hindu Successio~ Act, if not, whether the impugned sale
deed would be void aud this property would reverts back to the plaintiff
(Muninanjappa) the only sUIViving heir. The trial court concluded that the c
. testatrix intention under. the Will was to bequeath the suit property to the
hrauch of Guruswamy exclusively though with life interest to Guruswamy.
The reason for this is because of the absence of recording in the Will after
the death of Guruswamy aud his widow, the suit property would revert back
to the plaintiff. The trial court finally concluded that the.branch of Guruswamy
aud of plaintiff's would become absolute owner of the suit property be- D
queathed to them. Thus the widow being the only h~ir of the Guruswamy
braoch would succeed to the said property under S<ftion 8 of the Hindu
Succession Act as she. falls Under class I category of the schedul~. It further
held. Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act has no application. Thus the
sale deed in qiiesti~n cannot be held to be illegal, so dismissed the plaintiff's E
suit Aggrieved by this the plaintiff-apPellaut filed appeal before the High
Court which was also dismissed in which it is held :

"As far as the first aspect of the matter is concerned. I need to
observe that the learned trial Judge has relied on the provisions of S.
14 of the Hindu Succession Act Admittedly the property was not F
inherited by Sevamma in h_er own right. What was contended on her
behalf was that on the death of· her husband. she was the sole
sUIViving· heir of Guruswamy aud that consequently the ·property
which constituted his estate devolved on her but the supportive reason
for this was that being the wife of Gum5wamy she had the absolute G
right of claiming maintenance aud that by virtue of the proviso to s.
14 on the ground. principally that she was entitled to maintenance,
the ·property did come. to her.

.•...The respondents' learned advocate has seriously contested
this position because he points out that by virtu:.of operation of .H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A S. 14, regardless of provisions of S. 14 (2) that on the facts of the
present case, Sevamma had become the absolute owner. I have
already held that it is impossible to read into the will any limitation
--
vis-a-vis the alienation of this property and under these circumstances,
the provisions of S. 14 (2) would not come into operation. Under
these circumstances for very good reasons the legislatnre has pro-
B
vided that a Hindu wife will acquire absolute rights in respect of the .
property of her husband. When the law uses the word 'absolute', it
envisages the freedom or liberty to deal with those properties in
whatever manner the holder deems fit.. ..

c To my mind, the wordings in the Will are unambiguous and are
quite clear. They do not create any doubt whatsoever in my mind and
it is very clear also in law that on the death of Guruswamy, his wife
did acquire an absolute right in respect of the disputed property."

Aggrieved by this the appellant has filed the present appeal.
D
Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits,
in interpreting a Will; intention of testatrix should be taken into account and
thus if the said Will is construed properly, it would reveal that testatrix' s
brother Lakshmaiah had two wives - one Muniyamma and other Yellamma.
Plaintiff was born from the first wife Muniyamma while Guruswamy was
E born from the second wife Yellamma. Since at the time of the execution of
the said Will both plaintiff and Guruswamy were young, hence limited right
was given to them by dividing the suit property half and half - one going
to the branch of the son born from the first wife and second going to the
branch of son born from the second wife. This clearly reveals testatrix
F intended the property to go to two branches absolutely specially in the
absence of any reference in the Will that the property would revert to the
other branch where no son is born. Thus the right of the said two brothers
even if limited would rnatnre into absolute right if this intention of the
testatrix is read into the Will. He further submits, in any case, even if
Guruswamy had a limited right, after bis death his widow having right in lieu
G
of maintenance out of any estate of her husband it would mature into full
right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

On the other hand Mr. Rajesh Mahale, advocate appearing for the
appellant submits that the said Will gives limited right to both the brothers,
H namely, the plaintiff and Guruswamy and it is only when a son is born to

_:_:_
MUNINANJAPPA v. R. MANUAL (MISRA, J.] 1121

- them, such son is to acquire the absolute right of his branch. Further if
Guruswamy himself had a limited right it cannot mature into full right either
in his favour or in favour of his widow. In any case, at the most the widow
may continue to enjoy this limited right until a son is born out of her wedlock
with Guruswamy, but in no case this limited right could be construed to be
A

in lieu of maintenance or any of her pre-existing right. Hence the judgment
B
of both the trial court and the appellate court holding the widow Sevamma
having full right is not sustainable in the eyes of law and liable to be set aside.
He also referred to Sections 112 and 115 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
The submission is, Section 112 spells ou~ when a bequest is made to a person
not in existence till testator's death then such bequest to such person is void
to that extent. In the present case admittedly at the time of death of testatrix c
no son was born to Guruswamy hence the second bequest in favour of son
of Guruswamy is void. However, by virtue of Section 115.• if bequest is made
to a class of person and even if for some it is inoperative viz. those falling
under Section 112, then such bequest would be void only in regard to such
persons and not in regard to the remaining class of persons.
D
Learned counsel for the respondent construes the Will to mean that
intention of the testatrix was that the two branches, one out of 1st wife and
other out of 2nd wife of Lakshmaiah become absolute owner. Submission is,
even if words in the Will are missing, the court should supply these missing
words to subserve the intentions of the testator. For this, reliance is placed E
l- in Smt. Pramod Kumari Bhatia v. Om Prakash Bhati and Ors., [1980] 1 SCC
412, which holds while constituting a Will, the court could supply the missing
words to carry out the intention of the testator. In order to appreciate this,
the relevant portion of the Will is quoted hereunder:

"After my death the schedule item one house shall go to F
Guruswamy, the 4 years old minor son of my above said deceased
elder brother, Lakshmaiah through his second wife Yellamma and also
to the male child to be born to Yellamma who is presently carrying.

My adopted son, the said Muninanjappa shall only enjoy the
G
schedule one item house and he shall not have any right to alienate
it by way of either sale, gift or mortgage. His male children may enjoy
the same as they desire. The schedule item two house may be enjoyed
hy the said Yellarnma' s son Guruswamy and the male child to be born
to Yellarnma and they shall not have any right to alienate the same
by way of sale, gif~ mortgage etc. Their male children shall have H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A every right to enjoy the same as they desire. The said Yellamma shall
have the right to reside in the said house alongwith the minor children
during her life time."

Reliance is also placed in Raghbir Singh and Ors. v. Budh Singh and
Ors., AIR (1978) Delhi 86. In this case also the Court held, while construing
B a Will the intention of the Testator should be carried out. It further held,
keeping this in view, different parts of the Will should be construed harmo-
niously. The Courts should not reject any part of the Will being a surplusage.
As the testator could not have intended to make any bequest in the Will as
an exercise in futility. It further held, in doing so, if necessary, the Court may
c read down the language of a part of the Will to give full effect to the general
words of the other part of the Will.

The principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions cannot be disputed.
This will depend on the facts of each case and the language of the Will. It
may be,-in a given case the court may supply the missing words and in some
D other the court may read down the language of the Will in order to implement
the intention of a testator. However, where the language and the words of a
Will are clear, there is no ambiguity which could be understood clearly
without any doubt then it would not be proper to either supplement the words
or read it down to give benefit to either of the contesting parties. In the
present case we find that the language of the Will is clear and unambiguous.
E
Thus to find out intentions of the testatrix, no supplementing or reading down
any word is necessary. The testatrix bequeathed her property to her brother's
sons, namely, one from first wife, plaintiff and other to Guruswamy, from the
second wife. To both she clearly records in no uncertain words that they
would have limited right with no right to alienate. She also clearly records
F in case son is born to them they would get absolute right including right to
alienate. Tne language in the Will is :

"After my death the schedule item one (which is item No.2 in the
schedule to the plaint) house shall go to Guruswami ......... , My
adopted son, the said Muninanjappa (Plaintiff) shall only enjoy the
G schedule one item house and he shall not have any right to alienate
.......... His male child may enjoy the same as they desire. The schedule
item two, house may be enjoyed by the said ........ Guruswamy and the
male child to be born to Yellamma and they shall not have any right
to alienate ....... The male child shall have every right to enjoy the same
H as they desire."
MUNJNANJAPPA v. R. MANUAL [MISRA, J.] 1123
The aforesaid language in the Will are clear that the testatrix intended A
to give limited right to both plaintiff and Guruswami and absolute right only
to the sons born to them. If that be so, the only point which requires our
consideration, is what right Sevarnma widow of Guruswamy gets after the
death of Guruswamy? We have no hesitation to hold that the limited right
of Guruswamy cannot be interpreted by any stretch of language that testatrix
B
intended to give absolute right to Guruswamy or to his widow. They were
to hold the property for delivery to the son, in case, born out of their wedlock.
In no case Sevarnma' s right over the property would mature into absolute
right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Her right could
only mature as such, if her claim could be based on any of her pre-existing
right including right in lieu of maintenance out of her husband's property. c
But in no case it would mature where the property is held by her husband
either in trust for the benefit of other or as limited and restricted owner with
no right to alienate. Hence even if Sevarnma continued to enjoy the property
after the death of her husband, she held the property at the most, in the same
capacity as her husband but not to claim it towards her right of maintenance.
D
If husband had any other property apart from what was gifted by Poovarnma,
she could claim her above right under Section 14(1) but not over the property
given to her husband Guruswamy as a limited owner. The High Court fen
into error while construing Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act by
extending its width so wide which spins over its permissible boundary when
it held, a Hindu wife win acquire absolute right in the property of her husband E
and then applying it to the facts of this case. It seems High Court was not
appraised with the settled law, in respect of the field of Section 14(1) as
declared by this Court as far back as in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy
(Dead) by Lrs., [1977] 3 SCC 99 and also reiterated in Velamuri Venkata
Sivaprasad (Dead) by Lrs., v. Kothuri Venka!eswarlu (tkad) by Lrs. & Ors., F
[2000] 2 sec 139, which holds benefit to a female could be given under
Section 14 (1) where her claim is based on her pre-existing right over her
husband's property. V. Tulasamma & Ors. (supra) holds Section 14 (2) is in
the nature of a proviso to Section 14 (1). Section 14 (1) applies to property
granted to a female Hindu by virtue of a pre-existing right of maintenance.
The decision while carrying out the field of Section 14 (2) held:
G

" ... Sub-section (2) mnst be confmed to cases where property is
acquired by a Hindu female for the first time as a grant, without any
pre existing right.. .... ., the terms of which prescribes a restricted estate
in the property.......Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A female at a paitition or in lieu of maintenance, it is by virtue of a pre-
existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope
of sub-section (2), but within the scope of sub-section (l)."

Applying the said principle, it has to be seen whether Severnma is
possessed of the property of her deceased husband based on her pre-existing
B right or is holding such property under any instrument prescribing restrictive
estate in such property. By no stretch of interpretation it could be said,
Sevarnma was possessed of the suit property in lieu of her any pre-existing
right. When a widow claims her right under sub-section (1) of Section 14 in
the hand of either coparcener or male issue of her deceased husband, it is
c because of her pre-existing right of maintenance to the extent of her husband
share in a joint family property. She cannot claim any such right out of the
share of other coparcener in which there is no trace of her husband's share.
So when limited right as spoken with reference to the husband right in joint
Hindu f=ilyproperty, it only means limited to the extent of husband's share.

D Lea!Iled counsel for the respondent referred to N Appavu Udayan and
Anr. v. Nallammal, AIR (1949) Madras 24. In this case, it is held that even
father-in-law has a moral obligation to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law
out of his self-acquired property and on his death this liability passes on to
his heirs. This case has no application to the facts in the present case. We
are in the present case not called upon to decide any claim of the daughter-
E
in-law over the property of her father-in-law and further in the said case
father-in-law was the absolute owner being self-acquired property. In the
present case her husband's right to the suit property is limited and restricted
in its enjoyment under the said Will, thus no right on the widow could be
conferred more than what her hus0and possessed. He also referred to Ram
F Kali (Smt.) v. Choudhri Ajit Shankar and Ors., [1997] 9 SCC 613. This case
also has no application, as the property acquired by the widow under Will
was in lieu of maintenance allowance. Widow in this case was given the right
to reside in the house during her lifetime and was debarred from alienating
the same. However, widow was in possession of the house when the Hindu
G Succession Act ca!Ile into force. The Court held that she held the property
in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. As a consequence her
limited estate enlarged into an absolute estate.

Next reference was made Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai and Ors., [1991] 3
sec 410. This was a case where the Hindu widow alienate the entire property
H inherited by her from her husband by executing a gift deed. This was a case
MUNINANJAPPA v. R. MANUAL [MISRA, J.] 1125
where the question was, whether a widow possessed of the property in A
question being the limited owner could she mature her right under Section
14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Reliance is placed on the following lines:

"No actual division of share had taken place, yet the court held
that it was property 'possessed' by her on the date the Act came into
force. In Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, it was held that a widow was B
. full owner in Joint Hindu family property as she became entitled to
the interest which her husband had by virtue of Hindu Women Right
to Property Act. The court ruled that even though a male was subject
to restrictions qua alienation on his interest in joint Hindu family
property, but a wi\iow acquiring an interest by virtue of the Act did C
not suffer such restriction. V. Tulsamma v. Shesha Reddy and Bai Vajia
v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, were cases where the widow was 'pos-
sessed' of the property in lieu of maintenance, and therefore, she was
held to be full owner".

This was a case of joint Hindu family property where husband had a D
right in the property being member of the joint Hindu family, even though
limited, which is distinguishable from the limited right which testatrix granted
to Guruswamy. In the aforesaid case husband's limited right is referred as
limited to the extent of his share, but there existed in the property the right
of the husband indepeudently to the extent of his share while right to
E
Guruswami in the suit property, he had no other right except what is conferred
under the Will, which restricts it for its enjoyment only bnt no independent
right to transfer. Distinguishing featnre between these two types of limited
rights is, in the case of husband's right in the joint family property, even
though limited, has a right to seek partition or right to transfer to the extent
of his share which Guniswami could not enjoy in the restrictive right under F
the said Will. In other words, Guruswamy conld neither seek right of partition
nor transfer his such right to any one else.

We find in the case before us trial court held lhal Sevanrrna became
• absolute owner by virtue of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act which
has no legs to stand, both on facts and law. We have already recorded
G
Gnruswamy has a limited and restrictive right, no absolute right. His widow
on the facts of this case cannot be treated to be class I heir under the said
Act. Hence both the courts below fell into error in holding that Sevamma
became absolute owner. Accordingly, the fmding of both the trial court and
the appellate court are unsustainable in law. H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A In view of the aforesaid findings we answer the first question by
holding that the Will dated !st June, 1942, grants Guruswarny limited and )I.
restrictive right in no case to matnre into full right.

As a consequence of this we answer the second question by holding
that Sevamma did not inherit the suit property from her husband nor
B possessed it in lieu of maintenance hence question of maturing it into full
right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act does not arise. Thus
we hold Sevarnma had no right to alienate the suit property, thus sale of the
suit property in favonr of respondent nos. 1 and 2 can not be held to be valid.
Thus for these reasons and findings, we set aside the findings and the
C judgment of both of the trial comt and the High Court and decree the suit
of the plaintiff. Costs on the parties.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed.

•