Holding

A suit for injunction based on a claim of title requires proof of ownership; the appellate court erred by granting relief without such proof, and the judgment was set aside.

Summary

The Municipal Committee of Jind appealed against a suit filed by Jagat Singh for a permanent injunction restraining the Committee from interfering with his claimed ownership and possession of five kanals of land. Jagat Singh relied solely on revenue records and a mutation entry, without producing a sale deed, to establish title. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of proof of title, but the first appellate court reversed the decision, granting injunction based only on alleged possession, without examining the title claim. The Supreme Court held that a suit for injunction based on title must first establish ownership, and that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides a summary remedy for dispossessed persons, cannot be invoked when the plaintiff claims ownership. Consequently, the appellate and High Court judgments were set aside and the trial court's dismissal restored.

Issues considered

Whether a suit for permanent injunction based on a claim of ownership and possession can be decided under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 without proof of title.
Whether the appellate court erred by not recording a finding on the plaintiff's title before granting injunction.
Whether a mutation entry in revenue records constitutes proof of title to immovable property.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 39
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6

Subjects

injunctionspecific relief actsection 6title of propertypossessionmutation entryland disputemunicipal corporationcivil proceduresummary remedy

Judgment

NAGAR PALIKA, JIND A
v.
JAGAT.SINGH, ADVOCATE

MARCH 28, 1995

[J.S. VERMA, N.P. SINGH AND K VENKATASWAMI, JJ.) B

...
. -...
,,•
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder 39--injunctioTt-Suit for injunc-
tion by pl{lintiff claiming ownership and possession of suit land-Court
granted injunction on the basis of possession without considering whether
plaintiff had title to the suit land-Cannot be granted without proof of title. c
Specific Relief Ac~ 1963-Section 6-Applicability of---Object of-f'ro-
vides speedy remedy to a person ousted from possession without due process
of /aw-Previous possession and dispossession must be pleaded:-Not ap-
plicable to suit for injunction based on title and possession.
D
... ', Mutation Entry-<:annot be a source of title.

The respondent filed a suit for injunction against the appellant
claiming ownership and possession of the suit land. The respondent failed
to produce any sale deed to establish his title over the suit land, but Instead E
relied on certain revenue entries. The suit was dismissed by the trial court
...J holding that the respondent had failed to prove that he was the owner of
the suit land and was in possession thereot

On appeal, the first appellate court reversed the finding of the Trial
"· court and decreed the suit holding that the material placed on record F
showed the possession of the respondent over the suit land. The appellate
court did not examine whether the respondent bad any title over the suit
land or not, while allowing the appeal on the basis of Its finding in respect
of possession of the respondent over the suit land. The appellate court held
that the respondent's title to the land had been admitted by the appellants.
G
The second appeal of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court
.J. in /imine. The review petition filed by the appellant was also dismissed by
the High Court.
=<'
Hence, the present appeal. H
9
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 3 S.C.R.

A Berore, this Court, the respondent, apart from other arguments, -r-
urged that the suit filed by the respondent can be considered as a suit for
possession and dispossession under Section 6 or the Specific Relier Act,
1963.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
B
HELD : 1. The first appellate court without considering the question

{,
whether the plalntlff·respondent had proved his title to the property in
dispute proceeded to examine whether the said respondent was in posses·
slon thereor. In a suit for ejectment based on title it was incumbent on the
part or the. first appellate court first to record a finding on the claim on
title to the suit land made on behatr or the respondent. The first appellate
,..
-
court committed a substantial error or law by decreeing the suit or the
respondent without recording a finding In respect or his claim or title over
the suit land. (17 ·G, C]

D Chhote Khan v. Mal Khan, AIR (1954) SC 575, Durga Singh v. Tholu, ~

AIR (1963) SC 361 and Vishwa Vijay v. Fakhrul Hassan, AIR (1976) SC
1485, distinguished.
>- "
2. The first appellate court never inquired or investigated that
question which was at issue saying that the title or the plaintiff-respondent
B was admitted by the appellant. This was a serious error or record. The title
and possession or the respondent had always been disputed by the appel· :..
lant rrom the stage or the written statement. (17-H, 18·AJ

3.1. Section 6 or the Specific Relier Act provides a summary remedy
F for a person who, being in possession Immovable property, is ousted
thererrom. In such circumstances, It Is possible that the person so dispos·
sessed may pursue summary and speedy remedy through the medium or
the Civil Court for restoration or possession. Disputed question of title are
to be decided by due process or law but the peaceful possession is to be
protected from a trespasser under Section 6 or the Specific Relier Act
G without regard to the question or the origin or the possession. Such suit
can be entertained and decreed, only where both the plaintiff and the
defendant have no title to the suit land, but as the plaintiff proves his prior
,.
possession, because or that he Is entitled to a decree for possession against
the defendant who dispossessed him. The plaint or such suit must aver
H only previous possession and dispossession by the defendant, otherwise
NAGARPALIKAv. JAGATSINGH[N.P.SINGH,J.) 11

than in due course of law. [15-G-H, 16-A] A
\ Perry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73 and Nair Service Society v. KC.
Alexander, AIR (1968) SC 1165, referred to.

3.2. It is difficult to appreciate as to how the principle of Section 6
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can be applied in the facts and circumstan· B
ces of the present case. The respondent, who was the plaintiff, never alleged
that he had been dispossessed by the appellant-Municipal Committee. On
the other hand, he claimed to be the owner of the land in question and
asserted that be was In possession over the same. [16-G]

4. An order of mutation in the name of the respondent in the revenue C
records cannot be a source of title. [14-GJ

Ninnal Singh v. Lal Rudra Pratab, (1926) PC 100, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 290 of
~. D
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.8.87 of the Punjab &
-...!, Haryan~ High Court in R.P. No. 17-C of l987.

Kapil Sibal, L.K. Pandey and Raghunath V.N. with him for the
Appellant. E
U.N. Bachawat; S.K. Jain with him for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.P. SINGH, J. The Municipal Committee, Jind, has filed this appeal F
for setting aside the judgment of the Additional District Judge (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Court of Appeal') decreeing th~ suit filed on behalf of
the respondent, which had been dismissed by the Trial Court. The Second

- Appeal filed on behalf of the appellant, before the High Court was dis·
missed in /imine. Thereafter, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 562 of 1987
was filed before this Court, which was permitted to be withdrawn, to enable
the appellant to file a Review Petition before the High Court. That Review
G

Petition was dismissed by the High Court saying that no ground for review
had been made out.

The respondent filed the suit in question for injunction restraining H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995j 3 S.C.R.

A the appellant from interfering with the possession of respondent over 5
kanals of land, comprised in Khewat No. 134, Khatoni No. 155, rectangle
No. 173, Killa No. 27/1. The respondent claimed to he the owner of the
said land and asserted that he was in possession thereof.

The claim of the respondent was resisted on behalf of Municipal
B Committee saying that the said respondent was neither the owner of the
land in question nor he was in possession thereof. It was asserted that the
land being "gair-mumkin johar', in which the Municipal Committee had
already constructed a park, there was no question of the respondent
acquiring any right title interest in the same. According to the appellant,
C the said respondent had made some unauthorised encroachment over the
same because of which a statutory notice was given to him, which was
challenged by the said respondent in the suit in question.

The learned subordinate Judge on consideration of the materials on
D record came to the conclusion that the respondent had failed to prove that
he was the owner and was in possession of the suit land. On that finding
the suit was dismissed. The Court of Appeal, set-aside the finding recorded
by the Trial Court and decreed the suit of the respondent, saying that the
title of Prem Singh, who was alleged to be the predecessor in interest of
the respondent, had been established. It was also held that the appellant
E was .in possession of the suit property. The Second Appeal filed on behalf
of the appellant-Municipal Committee as already mentioned above was
dismissed. The Review Petition filed to recall the order of dismissal of the
Second Appeal was also dismissed in limine.

F It may be mentioned at the out-set that throughout the suit has been
treated to be a suit based on title and for confirmation of possession. The
learned counsel, appearing for the appellant- Municipal Committee,
pointed out that the Court of Appeal while decreeing the suit of the
respondent, committed a serious error of law when before examining the
question as to whether respondent had been able to establish his title over
G the suit land, it proceeded to consider only the materials on record in
support of the claim of the possession made on behalf of the respondent.
-
The Trial Court had examined the claim of the title made on behalf of the
respondent in detail and had recorded a finding that the said respondent
had failed to prove his title to the suit. Even the sale deed through which
H the said respondent claimed to have purchased the land in dispute had not
NAGAR PALIKA v. JAGAT SINGH [N.P. SINGH, J.) 13

been produced before the Court. An objection was taken on behalf of the A
appellant against that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, where
it has been stated that although the respondent had not produced the sale
deed through which he had acquired the title to the land in question but
that was of no consequence as that fact had been admitted by the
Municipal Committee. In this connection, reference was made to the
B
\\Titten statement filed on behalf of the Municipal Committee disputing the
title and possession of the respondent. Our attention was drawn to the
plaint, filed on behalf of the respondent, and the written statement filed on
behalf of the appellant. The respondent has simply stated in respect of his
title and possession in paragraph 1 of the plaint:
c
"That plaintiff is owner and in possession of the property details
of which are given in the head note of the plaint."

The head note of the plaint says:

'Suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from D
taking forcible possession of the land comprised in Khewat No.113
Khatoni No.155 Rect. No. 173 Killa No.27/1measuring5 kanals as
pr Jamabandi 1974-75 situated in the revenue estate of Jind and
further restraining the defendant from interferring into possession
of the plaintiff and further resll;aining the defendant from raising E
any construction on it'.

No details have been stated in the plaint as to how the respondent became
the owner of the land in question and when he came in possession thereof.
On reading paragraph 1 along with 'head note' aforesaid, it appears that
the claim for title has been made on behalf of the respondent only on basis F
of Jamabandi for the year 1974-75 of the revenue estate of Jind. Inspite of
. our repeated querries to the counsel appearing for the respondent, no
explanation was furnished on behalf of the respondent, as to how in a suit

- based on title no details in respect of the acquisition of the title were stated
in the plaint. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Municipal
Committee in respect of the assertion made in paragraph 1 of the plaint,
it has been said:
G

'That para 1 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The plaintiff is
not in possession of the suit property. In fact suit property is
Gair-Mum-Kin Johar. Nagarpalika has converted it into park. Snit H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 3 S.C.R.

A property is of Nagarpalika, Jind and the plaintiff has no concern
with the suit property'.

The counsel appearing for the respondent, could not explain as to
:··, how in face of such clear denial of the title and possession of the respon-
g <lent by the Municipal Committee in its written statemen~ the Court of
Appeal proceeded on the assumption that the acquisition of the title
through the sale deed, which had not been produced before the Court, was
an admitted fact in the case and had never been questioned by the
Municipal Committee. According to us, when the Court of Appeal
proceeded to consider the evidence relating to the possession of the
C respondent after the alleged date of purchase by him through the sale deed
in question, which was never produced before the Court, the Court of
Appeal committed a grave error. It never applied its mind to the main
issue, in a suit based on title, whether the respondent had proved his title
to the suit property. It cannot be disputed that onus to prove his title to
D the property in question was on the said respondent It furth~r appears,
that on behalf of the appellant, it was pointed out before the Court of
Appeal that the said respondent was claiming the share of one of the
co-shares in the patti, but no co-sharer can convey title to a specific part
of joint property. However omitted to consider the basic issues in the case,
the Court of Appeal proceeded only to consider the revenue records from
E the year 1974-75 like jamabandhi for the year 1974-75 and Khasra G1Tdwari
pertaining to the year 1977-79.

The claim of the respondent was that he had purchased the suit land
through a sale deed in the year 1970. Thereafter he filed a suit on 17.4.1971
F for permanent injunction against the appellant. That suit was ultimately
withdrawn on 7.11.1977 with permission to file a fresh suit. Ultimately, the
suit with which we are concerned was filed on 23.8.1979. In this background
any reliance on enteries in the revenue records after 1971 was of not much
consequence and value, beca05e the respondent had already instituted the
earlier suit which was then pending. In any case, an order of mutation in
G the name of the respondent in the revenue records cannot be a source of
title. In the case of Nirman Singh v. Lal Rudra Pratab, (1926) PC 100, in
respect of mutation of names in revenue record, it was said :

"They are nothing of the kind as has been pointed out times
H innumerable by the Judicial Committee. They are much more in
NAGARPALIKAv. JAGATSINGH[N.P.SINGH,J.) 15

the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the state A
for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for
the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property
may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the
revenue for it will be paid.

It is little less than a travesty of judicial proceeding to regard B
the two orders of the Extra Commissioner of Bahraich and Mr.
., M.L. Ferrar, Deputy Commissioner, as judicial determinations
• expelling proprio vigore any individual from any proprietary right
or interest he claims in immovable property".
c
Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the respondent,
took a stand that even if the respondent had failed to prove his 4:jtle, the
suii filed on behalf of the responden~ should be treated as a suit based on
possession and dispossession in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963. (Once a suit has been filed by the respondent claiming to be the
D
owner and being in possession of the land in question, how that suit can
be treated as a suit based on possession and dispossession without refer-
\ ence to title? Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 says that if any
person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property other-
wise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may,
by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may E
be set up in such suit. Section 6 is a corresponding provision to Section 9
of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Section 9 of the earlier A~ which has
been retained with some changes in the Specific Relief A~ 1963 is based
on the principle that even a trespasser is entitled to protect his possession
~- except against a true owner and purports to protect a person in possession F
from being dispossessed except in due course of law. Section 6 provides a
summary remedy for a person who, being, in possession of immovable

- property is ousted therefrom. In such circumstances, it is possible that the
person so dispossessed may persue summary and speedy remedy through
the medium of the Civil Court for restoration of possession. It has been
said that this Section is a reproduction of provision of the Roman Law G
under which by an interdictum de vi a person wrongfully dispossessed from
.+ property could recover it by proving previous possession, without being
required to prove his title. Disputed questions of title are to be decided by
due process of law but the peaceful possession is to be protected from a
trespasser under Section 6 of the Act without regard to the question of the H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 3 S.C.R.

A origin of the possession. Such suit can be entertained and decreed, only
where both the plaintiff and the defendant have no title to the suit land,
but as the plaintiff proves his prior possession, because of that he is entitled
to a decree for possession against the defendant who has disposed him.
The plaint of such a suit must aver only previous possession and dispos-
B session by the defendant, otherwise than in due course of law. In the case
of Perry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73, it was said :

"It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in
the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the
ordinruy rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all
c the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does
not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within
the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation
applicable to the case, his right is for ever estinguished and the
possessory owner acquires an absolute title."

D The aforesaid view was approved by this Court in the case of Nair Service
Society v. KC. Alexander, AIR (1968) SC 1165 = (1968) 3 SCR 163. This
Court said in connection with the plaintiff of that case that he being in
peaceful possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State
could evict him. It was further said that the action of the Society was a
E violent invasion over the possession of the plaintiff. It was pointed out :

"....... the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a
possessor suit under 'lie provisions of the Specific Relief Act in
which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12
years in which the question of title could be raised."
F
We fail to appreciate as to how the principle of Section 6 of Specific
Relief Act, 1963 can be applied in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. The respondent, who was the plaintiff, never alleged that he
had been dispossessed by the appellant-Municipal Committee. On the
G other hand, he claimed to be the owner of the land in question and asserted
that he was in possession over the same. He sought for permanent injunc-
tion restraining the appellant from interfering with his possession. Both the
-
parties led evidences in support of their respective claims including on the
question of title.

H It was pointed out, on behalf of the appellant, that in the records,
NAGAR PALIKA v. JAGATSINGH [N.P.SINGH,J.] 17

land including the portion which is in the dispute had been recorded as A
gair mumkin johar which means a public pond. The Trial Court referred
-\.
to all documentary evidences in support of the finding that the respondent
was attempting to encroach upon a portion of a public land, over which he
could not have acquired any title. The Court of Appeal, instead of finding
from the materials on record whether the respondent as plaintiff has
proved his title and subsisting settled possession in respect of the disputed
B
land, proceeded to record a finding on the claim of the possession of the
respondent, prim_arily on basis of the entry in the revenue records made in

-"''
the year 1974-75 and thereafter during the pendency of the first suit filed
on behalf of the respondent. The Court of Appeal committed a substantial
error of law by decreeing the suit of the respondent without recording a c
finding in respect of his claim of title over the suit land. We are of the view
that the High Court could not have dismissed the Second Appeal filed on
behalf of the appellant-Municipal Committee in limine.

On behalf of the respondent, reference was made to the case of D
Chhote Khan v. Mal Khan, AIR (1954) SC 575, where it was said by this
Court that entries in Jamabandhies fall within the purview of the record of
---< rights under Section 31 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and as such are
to be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Reference was also
made to the case of Durga Singh v. Tholu, AIR (1963) SC 361, where it
• was said that in an ejectment suit a finding by the District Judge on the E
question whether the defendants were the tenant of the plaintiff arrived at,
on the consideration of all evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by
the parties, was a finding of fact and could not have been set aside in
Second Appeal by the High Court. Reliance was also placed on the case
of Vishwa Vijay v.Fakhrul Hassan, AIR (1976) SC 1485, in which this Court F
. "' held that the finding of lower appellate court on the question whether
entries in revenue record were genuine or fraudulent was a question of
fact and could not be set aside in Second Appeal. It has already been
pointed out that the Court of Appeal without considering the question
whether the plaintiff- respondent had proved his title to the property in
dispute proceeded to examine whether the said respondent was in posses- G
sion thereof. In a suit for ejectment based on title it was incumbent on part
-I of the Court of Appeal first to record a finding on the claim of title to the
suit land made on behalf of the respondent. The Court of Appeal never
inquired or investigated that question which was at issue saying that the
title of the plaintiff-respondent was admitted by the appellant. This was a H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 3 S.C.R.

A serious error of record. The title and possession of the respondent had
always been disputed by the appellant from the stage of the written
statement. In this background, suit of the respondent could not have been
decreed merely on basis of entries in the revenue records during the
pendency of the earlier suit filed in the year 1971. As such the cases relied
upon on behalf of the respondent have no bearing on the facts of the
B present appeal. A substantial qu~stion of law was' involved in the Second
Appeal presented before the High Court against the judgment of the Court
of Appeal and the High Court ought to have interfered and set-aside the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.

C Accordingly, the appeal. is allowed. The judgment of the Court of
Appeal and the orders passed by the High Court are set aside. The
judgment of the Trial Court is restored. There is no question of injucting
the appellant from taking further steps in connection with the suit land over
which the respondent had neither title nor he was in possession thereof.
However, in the facts arid circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
D as to cost.
T.NA. Appeal allowed.

.....