NANAKRAM ETC.versusKUNDALRAI ETC.

                                                                   839


                              NANAKRAK ETC.                              A
                                   v.
                             KIJNDAIBAI ETC.

                             APRIL 29, 1986

         [R.S. PATHAK, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]         B

           Landlord and tenant -        Central Provinces and Berar
    ~,Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949, clauses 22, 23,
   24, 28 and 30 read with section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 -
   Whether a lease concluded between a landlord and a tenant in
   contravention of clause 22 of the Rent Control Order can be
   assailed by the landlord as a void transaction in a proceeding        c
~' between the parties to the lease - Whether the Notification
 + under clause 30 retrospective - Concurrent findings of the
   Courts below cannot be interfered with under Article 136 of
   the Constitution.

             Under clause 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar       D
       Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 every landlord
       of a house situated in an area to which those provisions
       extend is required by the statute to give intimation of a
~ vacancy to the Deputy Collllissioner. Clause 22(1} declares that
       the landlord shall not let or occupy the house except in
       accordance with clause 23. Clause 22(2) provides that no          E
       person shall occupy a house except under an order under clause
       23(1) or clause 24 or on an assurance from the landlord that
       the house is being permitted to be occupied in accordance with
  ---1 clause 23(2). Clause 23 provides that the Deputy Comissioner
       msy, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the
       intimation of a vacancy, order the landlord to let the vacant     F
       house to any person holding an office of profit under th"
       Union or State Government or to a displaced person or to an
       evicted person and thereupon, notwithstanding any agreement to
,      the contrary, the landlord is obliged to let the house to such
       person and place him in possession thereof. If the landlord
       states that he needs the house for his own occupation he 1111St   G
       satisfy the Deputy Collllissioner in that behalf. The clause
1>.L provides further that if no order is passed and served upon
    r the landlord within the period mentioned in clause 23(1), it
        is open to the landlord to let the vacant house to any person.

                                                                         H
    840                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1986] 2 s.c.R.


A   Clause 28 empowers the Deputy Conmissioner to take or cause to
    be taken such steps and use or cause to be used such force, as )...."
    may be reasonably necessary for the purpose of securing
    compliance with, or for preventing or rectifying any contra-
    vention of, the Rent Control Order. Clause 30 empowers the
    State Government to exempt, by Notification in the official
    Gazette, any house or class of houses or any person or class
B   of persons from all or any of the provisions of the Rent
    Control Order. On October 24, 1968 a Notification was issued
    under clause 30 exempting from all the provisions of Chapteri
    Ill of the Rent Control Order any house used for a non-
    residential purpose, if it was constructed before January 1,
    1967.
c
          In both the Civil appeals the landlords moved
    applications before the Deputy Commissioner concerned to +
                                                                       1
    declare the tenancy lease entered into by them with their
    respective tenants as void in as D11ch they were created in
    violation of clauses 22 and 23 of Chapter III of the Rent
D   Control Order. The appellant-tenants who have lost their
    defence pleas have come up in appeals by special leave.

          Allowing the appeals, the Court,

            HEU>: 1. Nowhere does the Central Provinces and Berar      <
E   Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 which ls par1
    Eteria with the U.P. Act mandate that the Deputy Comissioner
    1111St eject a person who has entered into possession of a house
    in violation of clause 22. If upon a view of the circumstances
    prevailing then, the Deputy Connissioner takes no action in ).-
    the matter, there is no reason why the lease between the
F   landlord and the tenant, although inconsistent with clause 22,
    should not be binding as between the parties thereto. It is ·~
    not a void transaction. There is nothing in the Rent Control
    Order declaring it to be so. Now if the lease is not void then
    it is not open to either party to avoid the lease on the
    ground that it is inconsistent with clause 22. The parties
G   would be bound, as between them, to observe the conditions of
    the lease, and it cannot be assailed by either party in a
    proceeding between them. [849 C-E]

          !mrlldbar Agarw.1 aad Am:. v. State of U.P. & Ora.,
    [1975) 1 s.c.R. 575 followed.
H
                               NANAKRAM v. KUNDALRAI                   841


'-...(         Udboo Dus v. Prell Prakash and Anr. , A. I. R.       [ 1964)   A
         Allahabad l approved.

               Wamn SbriniV88 Kini v. Batil.al llbagwandas & Co. • [ 1959)
         Supp. 2 S.C.R. 217 distinguished.

            2. Ex fade the terms of the Notification are                      B
      prospective only, There is nothing to suggest that they
    ~operate retrospectively also. It is true that they refer to
    r houses constructed before January 1, 1967, but that is by way
      of description only, in order to define the category of houses
      covered by the operation of the exemption conferred by the
      Notification. Words used ·merely to define the subject matter
      of the exemption should not be confused with the dimension of           c
      time during which the exemption operates. Therefore, the
    +Notification cannot be construed to be retrospective in
      operation and, therefore, the tenancy created in favour of the
      tenant in CA 5317 of 1983 with effect from October 1, 1968 is
      exempted from the operation of clause 22 of the Rent Control
      Order. (850 A-C; 849 G)                                                 D

           3. A concurrent finding of fact that a vacancy arose in
     November 1961 in Civil Appeal 1200 of 1979 and a tenancy was
 _ · created by the respondent landlord in favour of the
  ~appellant-tenant cannot be interfered with, wider Article 136
     of the Constitution, by the Supreme Court. (850 D)                       E

                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5317 of
         1983.

               From the Judgment and Order dated 22. ll.1982 of the
         Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1043 of 1982,                 F



,                                       WITH
                 Civil Appeal No. 1200(N) of 1979.

               From the Judgment and Order dated 1/2.3,1979 of the            G
         Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1043 of 1982.

               V.A. Bobde, Ms. A. Chauhan and A.K. Sanghi for the
         Appellants in C.A. No. 5317 of 1983,

                                                                              H
    842                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [19861 2 s.c.R.


A         M.N. Phadke, J.D. Jain and        V.N.   Phadke   for   the
                                                                        ).....~
    Respondent in C.A. No. 5317 of 1983.

          P.H. Parekh and Ms. Lata         Krishnamoorthy   for   the
    Appellant in C.A. No 1200 of 1979.

          M.N. Phadke, N.M. Ghatate and S.V. Deshpande for the
B   Respondent in C.A. No. 1200 of 1979.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          PAillAK J. These are two civil appeals by special leave.

c
    The question corrmon to these appeals is whether a lease
    concluded between a landlord and a tenant in contravention of
    clause 22 of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses
                                                                         1
    and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the+
    Rent Control Order') can be assailed by the landlord as a void
    transaction in a proceeding between the parties to the lease?

D         Civil Appeal No. 5317 of 1983 is concerned with a shop
    described as Block No. 5 in a non-residential building
    situated in Dharampeth, Nagpur. The respondent is the landlord
    and the appellant is the tenant. The building was constructed
    before January 1, 1967, and the appellant became a tenant from,L;-
    October 1, 1968.
E
          Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order provides that no
    landlord can determine a lease except with the previous
    written permission of th~ Controller, for which he must apply
    in writing to the Controller. Clause 13(3)(vi) provides that ~
    if after hearing the parties the Controller is satisfied that
F   the landlord needs the premises for hiimelf the Controller
    must grant the landlord permission to determine the lease. On -~
    January 19, 1980 the respondent petitioned the Controller for
    permission on the ground that he required the premises
    occupied by the appellant as his son wanted to co~nce
    business therein. ·
G
          It may be pointed out at this stage that clause 22 in
    Chapter III of the Rent Control Order requires :            ,,....

               "22(1) Every landlord of a house situate in an area
               to which this Chapter extends, shall -
H
                  NANAKRAM v. KUNDALRAI   [PATHAK, J.]         843


               (a) within seven days from the date of the             A
               extension of this chapter, if the house is vacant
               on such date; or

               (b) within seven days from the date on which the
               landlord becomes finally aware that the house will
               become vacant or available for occupation by           B
               himself or for other occupation on or about a
               specified date;

               give intimation of this fact to the Deputy
               Commissioner of the district in which the area is
               included or such other officer as may be specified
               by him, in the Form given in the Schedule appended     c
               to this Order, and shall not let or occupy the
               house except in accordance with clause 23.

                (2) No person shall occupy any house in respect of
                which this chapter applies except under an order
                under sub-clause (1) of clause 23 or clause 24 or     D
                on an assurance from the landlord that the house is
                being permitted to be occupied in accordance with
                sub-clause (2) of clause 23."

-).- Clause 23 provides :
                                                                      E
                "23. (1) On receipt of the intimation in accordance
                with clause 22, the Deputy Commissioner may, within
                fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said
                intimation, order the landlord to let the vacant
                house to any person holding an office of profit
                under the Union or State Government or to a           F
                displaced person or to an evicted person and
                thereupon notwithstanding any agreement to the
                contrary, the landlord shall let the house to such
                person and place him in possession thereof
                immediately, if it is vacant or as soon as it
                becomes vacant :                                      G

                Provided that, if the landlord has, in the
                intimation given under clause 22, stated that he
                needs the house of his own occupation, the Deputy
                Commissioner shall if satisfied after due enquiry
                that the house is so needed, permit the landlord to   H
                occupy the same.
    844                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [1986] 2 S.C.R.

A
               (2) If no order is passed and served upon the
               landlord within the period specified in sub-clause
               (1), he shall be free to let the vacant house to
               any person."

    Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order empowers the State
    Government to exempt, by Notification in the Official Gazette,
B
    any house or class of houses or any person or class of persons
    from all or any of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. i.
    On October 24, 1968 a Notification was issued under the said
    clause 30 exempting from all the provisions of Chapter III of
    the Rent Control Order any house used for a non-residential
    purpose if it was constructed before January 1, 1967.
c
          On September 23, 1980 the respondent submitted in
    writing that the building comprising the premises in question    ~
    had been constructed for a non-residential purpose prior to
    January 1, 1967 and the appellant had entered into its
    tenancy from October 1, 1968, and, therefore as the tenancy
D
    had been created in violation of Chapter III of the Rent
    Control Order it was void and there was no valid relationship
    of landlord and tenant. The appellant filed his reply stating
    that Chapter III did not apply to buildings constructed
    before January 1, 1967 and, therefore, even if no intimation
    had been given as required by Chapter III the tenancy did not
E
    become void. On October 6, 1980 the Controller found that the
    premises had been constructed prior to January 1, 1967 and the
    appellant had become a tenant therein for a non-residential
    purpose from October 1, 1968 and that the premises were exempt
    from the provisions of Chapter III. He held that the
    respondent's petition for the grant of permission was main-
F
    tainable. As regards the respondent's submission that the
    tenancy was void he held that the plea was premature and could
    not be sustained without evidence being adduced on the record.
    Accordingly he directed the parties to lead evidence.
                                                                     lI



          Against the order of the Controller the respondent
G
    appealed, and the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal on
    February 17, 1981 holding that the Notification of exemption
    operated from October 24, 1968 and the tenancy· in favour of     ~
    the appellant had become void. He observed that at the time
    when the tenancy was created the provisions of Chapter III
    were in operation and there was uo exemption from such
H
                        NANAKRAM v. KUNDALRAI   [PATHAK, J.]          845

                                                                             A
            , operation. The appellant filed a review petition contending
      ~,,..i_ that the appeal filed by the respondent was not maintainable
              and could not be entertained by the Appellate Authority. He
              also questioned the findings on the merits rendered by the
              Appellate Authority in the appeal. The review petition was
              rejected on March 2, 1982.                                     B

                The appellant then filed a writ petition in the Bombay
        ~ High Court which was dismissed by its judgment and order dated
        r November 22, 1982. The High Court held that the appeal filed
          by the respondent was maintainable under clause 21(1) of the
...       Rent Control Order, that the exemption provided by the
          Notification of October 24, 1968 operated prospectively only,      c

t         that therefore clause 22 in Chapter 111 was in operation at
          the time when the tenancy was entered into, and consequently
        * the Appellate Authority was justified in holding that as no
          intimation was given as ,contemplated by clause 22 the tenancy
          was invalid.
                                                                             D
                 In Civil Appeal No. 1200 of 1979 the respondent is the
           owner of a shop situated at Akola. He instituted a suit for
           possession of the ·shop alleging that it was first taken on
           lease by one Shamji Bhai in 1958 and during the next year it
    _ passed into the joint possession of Shamj i Bhai and the
      ;,lr appellant Kaku Bhai as tenants. Some time after November 1961     E
           the appellant Kaku Bhai alone continued in possession. The
           respondent contended that the lease in favour of Shamji Bhai
  >        in 1958 and thereafter to Kaku Bhai in 1961 were invalid and
           inoperative inas1111ch as they were entered in violation of
      "i clause 22 of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses
           and Rent Control Order, 1949 ('the Rent Control Order'), as no    F
           intimation was given that the premises had fallen vacant in
       -t  1958 when let out to Shamji Bhai nor in 1961 when let out to
 ~-        the appellant Kiku Bhai. Alleging that the appellant Kaku Bhai
           was in possession not as a tenant but as a mere licencee or a
           trespasser the respondent claimed possession and mesne
           profits.The appellant resisted the suit and inter alia pleaded    G
           that he was a tenant of the premises, and that having accepted
           him as tenant it was not open to the respondent to take the
      l., plea that the lease was void. The Trial Court held that the
   i.._1 lease in favour of Shamji Bhai and also the lease in favour of
           the appellant were void because intimation of the vacancy had
           not been com1111nicated to the statutory authority at the         R
    846                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [1986] 2 S,C,R.


    relevant time and, therefore, the appellant 111.1st be treated as
A   being in permissive possession as a licencee. The suit was ~­
    decreed. On appeal the Bombay High Court held that the lease
    in favour of Shamji Bhai and thereafter the lease in favour of
    the appellant were hit by clause 22(2) of the Rent Control
    Order and were, therefore, void. The appeal was dismissed.

           The point common to both the appeals is whether it is
B   open to a landlord in a proceeding for permission to terminate ~
    the tenancy and for possession of the premises to urge that 'T
    the lease between the parties is void inas111.1ch as it was
    entered in contravention of clause 22 of the Rent Control
    Order.

c          It is contended for the appellants in both the appeals
    that it is not open to the landlord to take such a plea
    because although the lease may not be binding on the
    Controller or the Deputy Commissioner it is operative as
    between the parties and cannot be questioned by either in a
    proceeding instituted by the one against the other. The
D   appellants rely on "1rlidhar Agarwal and Anr. v. State of U.P.
    and Ors., [1975] l S.C,R, 575. That was a case arising under
    the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
    (herein after referred to as 'the U.P. Rent Act'). The Court+
    was concerned with the question whether a suit filed by the
    appellants for recovery of possession, on the basis that the
E   tenancy created by the predecessor-in-interest of the
    appellants in favour of the respondent had expired, was
    maintainable in law inas111.1ch as it was instituted without
    obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate under ~
    s.3(1) of the U.P. Rent Act. The Trial Court decreed the suit,
    but on appeal the High Court reversed the decree holding that
F   the suit was not maintainable in view of section 3, and in the
    circumstances, it dismissed the suit. On appeal to this Court,
    the Court repelled the plea raised by the appellants-landlords
    that the respondent was not a tenant and held that, therefore,
    permission was necessary in order to maintain the suit. In
    taking that view this Court referred to 1ldboo Dass v. Prell
G   Prakash and Anr., A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 1, where a Full Bench
    of the Allahabad High Court had laid down that a lease made in
    violation of the provisions of s. 7(2) of the U.P. Rent Act
    would be valid between the parties and would create a
    relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it

H
                       NANAKRAM v. KUNDALRAI     [PATHAK, J. ]            847

                                                                                 A
    ._,...._ might not bind the Rent Control Officer. This Court did not
                doubt the correctness of the principle propounded in that case
                and held that the respondent before them was a tenant. Learned
                counsel for the respondent invited our attention to Waman
                Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bbagwandas & Co., [1959] Supp. 2
                S.C.R. 217. That was a case under the Bombay Hotel and Lodging   B
                Houses Rates Control Act, 1947. The appellant was a tenant of
                a shop. He let it out to sub-tenants. The respondent-landlord
           ~ brought a suit for ejectment aga,inst the appellant on the
                ground that s. 15 of the Bombay Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates
                Control Act, 1947 prohibited sub-letting and that as a land-
..,             lord he had a right to evict the tenant on that ground. When
                the matter came in appeal to this Court, the Court held that     C
         ,_. ·, even though the lease between the parties recognised sub-
                letting, as the suit was brought not for the enforcement of
                the agreement but to enforce the right of eviction flowing
                directly from an infraction of s.15 of the Act, the respondent
                was entitled to sue for ejectment.
                                                                                 D
              The provisions of clause 22 and clause 23 of Chapter Ill
       of the Rent Control Order have been extracted earlier. It is
       apparent that under clause 22(1) every landlord of a house
       situated in an area to which those provisions extend is
       required by the statute to give intimation of a vacancy to the
       Deputy Commissioner. Clause 22(1) further declares that the               E



-      landlord shall not let or occupy the house except in
       accordance with clause 23. Clause 22(2) provides that no
       person shall occupy a house except under an order under clause
       23(1) or clause 24 or on an assurance from the landlord that
     ~ the house is being permitted to be occupied in accordance with
       clause 23(2). Clause 23 provides that the Deputy Commissioner             F
       may, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the inti-
       mation of a vacancy, order the landlord to let the vacant
 -     house to any person holding an office of profit under the
       Union or State Government or to a displaced person or to an
       evicted person and thereupon, notiwithstanding any agreement
       to the contrary, the landlord is obliged to let the house to              G
       such person and place him in possession thereof. If the land-
       lord states that he needs the house for his own occupation he
       1111St satisfy the Deputy Commissioner in that behalf• The
       clause provides further that if no order is passed and served
       upon the landlord within the period mentioned in clause 23(1),
       it is open to the landlord to let the vacant house to any                 H
    848                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [19861 2 s.c.R.

A
    person. Clause 28 empowers the Deputy Conmissioner to take or
    cause to be taken such steps and use or cause to be used such
    force, as may be reasonably necessary for the purpose of
    securing compliance with, or for preventing or rectifying any
    contravention of, the Rent Control Order.

B         Now, in deci.ding ltlrlidbar Agarwal, (supra) this Court
    approved of the proposition of the law laid down by the
    Allahabad High Court in Uclhoo Dass, (supra). The High Court
    had the provisions of s. 7 and s. 7A of the U,P, Rent Act 1


c
    before it. Section 7 required the landlord to report to the
    District Magistrate if his house had fallen vacant or was
    about to fall vacant, and thereupon the District Magistrat'
    was empowered to direct the landlord to let the premises to a
                                                                        ..
    person specified in the order. The High Court dealt with the
    question whether a lease between the landlord and another
    person in violation of the order of the District Magistrate
    would be a valid lease as between the parties thereto. It held
D   that such a lease would be valid between the parties. It would
    not, however, be binding on the District Magistrate. That it
    would not be binding on the District Magistrate was evidenced
    by the power conferred upon him under s. 7A(l) of the U. P.
    Rent Act to take proceedings for the eviction of such tenant.
    Section 7A(l) provided that if the vacancy of an accommodation ·~
E   was not reported or a person occupied an accoumodation in


                                                                        -
    contravention of an order issued under s, 7(2) the District
    Magistrate could require him to show cause why he should not
    be evicted from it. If he failed to show cause the District
    Magistrate could direct him to vacate the accoumodation and if
    he failed to vacate the District Magistrate could use force to ~
F   evict him. The power conferred on the District Magistrate to
    take proceedings for the eviction of such tenant was discre-      ~.,,,
    tionary. It was open to the District Magistrate not to ~"'~
    exercise the power if there was undue delay or if for other
    good reason he found it inexpedient to do so. If he did not
    exercise the power conferred by s, 7A( l), the lease between
G   the landlord and the other person would continue to subsist
    and that other person would continue to enjoy the status of a
    tenant. It would be a valid lease. It could not be regarded as
    a void lease. In a case under the Rent Control Order, with 'f. _.
    which these appeals are concerned, the position appears to be
    materially similar. The landlord is prohibited by clause 22(1)
H   from occupying the house or granting a lease except in

                                                                          ..
                                                                         ,,
                  NANAKRAM v. KUNDALRAI   [PATHAK, J. ]         849

                                                                      A
   accordance with clause 23. There is a prohibition under clause
~ 22(2) on any other person seeking to occupy the house, except
   again in accordance with clause 23. In clause 23 it is the
   Deputy Commissioner who will order the landlord to let the
   vacant house to a person indicated by him, a person who falls
   in one of the categories specified in the clause or, if he is
                                                                      B
   satisfied, he may permit the landlord himself to occupy the
   house. As was the position under the U.P. Rent Act, so also
   under the Rent Control Order, the Deputy Commissioner has
 t power under clause 28 to take steps and use force for the
   purpose of securing compliance with, or for preventing or
   rectifying, any contravention of the Rent Control Order.
   Clause 28 speaks of a power conferred on the Deputy Commis-
   sioner in that behalf. Nowhere does the Rent Control Order
                                                                      c
   mandate that the Deputy Commissioner must eject a person who
   has entered into possession of a house in violation of clause
   22. If upon a view of the circumstances prevailing then the
   Deputy Commissioner takes no action in the matter, there is no
   reason why the lease between the landlord and the tenant,
                                                                      D
   although inconsistent with clause 22, should not be binding as
   between the parties thereto. It is not a void transaction.
   There is nothing in the Rent Control Order d'eclaring it to be
   so. Now if the lease is not void then it is not open to either
   party to avoid the lease on the ground that it is inconsistent
   with clause 22. The parties would be bound, as between them,
                                                                      E
   to observe the conditions of the lease, and it cannot be
   assailed by either party in a proceeding between them.

         On this view alone both the appeals must be allowed.

         In Civil Appeal No. 53t7 of 1983 an alternative point has
                                                                      F
    been raised on behalf of the appellant. It is urged that
    although the Notification dated October 24, 1961 exempts from
    the provisions of Chapter Ill of the Rent Control Order a
    house used for a non-residential purpose if it is constructed
    before January 1, 1967 the Notification must: be construed to
    be retrospective in operation, and that, therefore, the
                                                                      G
    tenancy created in favour of the appellant with effect from
    October 1, 1968 is exempted from the operation of clause 22 of
    the Rent Control Order. In other words, because of the
    exemption the tenancy could not be regarded as violating the
    provisions of clause 22 and no question could arise of the
    tenancy being void on that account. It' is not possible to        H
    850                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS         (1986) 2 s.c.R.

A
    accept the contention. Ex f acie the terms of the Notification
                                                                    .............   '
    are prospective only. There is nothing to suggest that they
    operate retrospectively also. It is true that they refer to
    houses constructed before January 1, 1967, but that is by way
    of description only, in order to define the category of houses
    covered by the operation of the exemption conferred by the
B   Notification. Words used merely to define the subject matter
    of the exemption should not be confused with the dimension of
    time during which the exemption operates. This point m.ist ~
    fail.                                                          "

         In Civil Appeal No. 1200 of 1979 another point raised on
c   behalf of the appellant is that no vacancy of the premises
    took place in 1961 when the appellant was in possession as a·
    tenant. The case is that the appellant was in joint possession
    with Shamji Bhai before that, and the tenancy continued on
    Shamji Bhai surrendering his tenancy rights in November 1961.
    The Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently held as a
D   finding of fact that a vacancy arose in November 1961 and a
    tenancy was created by the respondent in favour of the
    appellant on that occasion. We do not propose to interfere
    with the finding.

         In the result, on the view taken by us on the first point
E   in each of the two appeals, the appeals are allowed. In Civil
    Appeal No. 5317 of 1983, we set aside the appellate order
    dated February 17, 1981 of the Appellate Authority under the
    Rent Control Order and the judgment and order of the Bombay
    High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant insofar
    as they proceed on the finding that the lease is void. ,In
F   Civil Appeal No. 1200 of 1979 we set aside the judgment and
    decree of the Bombay High Court and dismiss the suit filed by
    the respondent. The paries in each appeal will bear their
    costs.



    S.R.                                                Appeals allowed.