Supreme Court of India
NAND KISHOREversusYASHPAL SINGH
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 932
- Decided
- 21 July 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- TARUN CHATTERJEE
Holding
A conversion of a residential premises to non‑residential use without the Rent Controller's written permission violates the mandatory Section 11, and the landlord may evict the tenant under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) notwithstanding any mutual agreement.
Summary
The landlord (Nano Kishore) leased a portion of his residential house in Chandigarh to the tenant (Yashpal Singh) for residential use in April 1994, but the tenant began using the premises for commercial activities in December 1994 without the landlord's consent or permission from the Rent Controller. The landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, alleging a breach of Section 11 which prohibits conversion of residential premises to non‑residential use without written permission. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition, but the Appellate Authority allowed it; the High Court later set aside that order, prompting the landlord to seek special leave. The Supreme Court examined the statutory provisions and prior judgments, holding that conversion without permission is a mandatory violation of Section 11 and that the landlord may still seek eviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) even if the parties had mutually agreed to the commercial use. The Court further clarified that Section 19's penalty provision does not preclude eviction when Section 11 is breached. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, the Appellate Authority's order restored, and the eviction petition allowed.
Issues considered
- The premises, situated in a residential area and building, can be used for commercial purposes with the landlord's consent under Section 11 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and the Development and Regulation Act.
- If a residential premises is let out for commercial purposes by mutual agreement, can the landlord still seek eviction of the tenant under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act?
Legislation cited
- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 11, s. 13(2)(ii)(b), s. 19
Subjects
Residential buildingConversion to commercial useEvictionSection 11Section 13Section 19Rent controlLandlord-tenant disputePunjab rent law
Judgment
.,
[2009) 10 S.C.R. 1201
~
NANO KISHORE A
v.
YASHPAL SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 4578 of 2009)
JULY 21, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - ss. 11,
13(2)(ii)(b) & 19 - Conversion of residential building into non-
residential building - Premises situated in residential area c
and in a residential building - Landlord inducted tenant at the
initial stage in the premises for residential purposes but later
on converted tenancy for commercial use without permission
of Rent Controller - Eviction application - Maintainability of
~
~ - Held: Eviction application is to be allowed - Even if D
residential premises is let out for commercial purpose by
mutual agreement between landlord and tenant, landlord can
still seek eviction of tenant.
,, The questions which arose for consideration in this
E
appeal are whether the premises which is situated in a
..., residential area and in a residential building can be used
for commercial purposes even by consent of the
appellant-landlord in view of section 11 of East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and the provisions of
the Development and Regulation Act; and that if the F
residential premises is let out for commercial purposes,
by a mutual agreement between the landlord and the
tenant, ·can the landlord still seek eviction of the tenant
on the ground that using of such residential premises for
commercial purposes entails the tenant to be evicted G
from the premises.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
1201 H
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 10 S.C.R.
A HELD: 1.1. The landlord cannot per•nit a tenant to
use the premises which is situated in a residential area
for commercial purposes as it would be violative of
Section 11 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 which is mandatory in nature. If the residential
B premises is let out for commercial purposes, by a mutual
agreement between the landlord and the tenant, the
landlord can still seek eviction of the tenant on the ground
that using of such residential premises for commercial
purposes entails the tenant to be evicted from the
c demised premises. [Paras 6 and 10] (1206-F-G; 1028-A-
B]
1.2. A reading of the impugned judgment of the High
Court would clearly show that the judgment of the High
Court was based only on the ground that the building
D was let out for commercial purposes from the time of
induction of the respondent-tenant in the demised
premises and the respondent had been using the same
as such since the inception of the tenancy and,
therefore, the provision of section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act
E could not be attracted because the respondent had not
used the demised premises for a purpose other than that
for which it was leased out to him and accordingly, no ,..
order of eviction could be passed against the respondent.
[Para 17] (1210-H; 1211-A-C]
F
1.3. From the admission of the respondent, it is
evidently clear that the demised premises is situated in
a residential area and the building in which the demised
premises is situated is also a residential building and he
G had also not taken any permission from the Rent
Controller for carrying on commercial activities. Such
being the position, the production of the Rent-Note to find
out the purpose for which the tenancy was created shall
not be decisive. (Para 24] (1213-G-H; 1214-A-B]
H 1.4. It is clear from the admission of the respondent
NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH 1203
himself that the appellant can resume the demised A
. premises at any time because of carrying on the
commercial activity and that the demised premises is in
a residential. area and also in a residential building. In\ the
eviction application as well as in evidence, it was the case
.of the appellant that in the month of April, 1994, the B
respondent was inducted for residential use and the
commercial activities were started by him in the month
of December, 1994 onwards. Thus, the respondent was
inducted in the demised premises at the initial stage for
residential use and not for commercial purposes but the c
respondent converted the tenancy later on from
residential to commercial use. In view of the findings, the
respondent clearly violated the provisions of section
13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. [Paras 25, 26 and 28] [1214-B-C;
1214-E-F; 1215-B] D
1.5. Looking at the object of the Act and the
provisions made, and considering the fact that the Act is
a beneficial legislation not only for the tenant but also for
the landlord, it can safely be inferred that both the
sections namely, secti9n ~ 3 and section 19 can be E
applied when there is a violation of section 11. Therefore,
.. reading of section 13 and section 1-9 together, the tenant ·
or the landlord ca!' be punished with fine under section
19 of the Act and at the same time the tenant can be
evicted under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act if the F
conditions laid down in the said sections are satisfied.
That apart if violation of section 11 of the Act results in
fine under section 19 of the Act, in that case the tenants
who have violated the provisions of section 11 of the Act
could get away from eviction only by paying fine that may G
be imposed upon the tenants. If this can be accepted, the
purpose and object of the Act for which this Act was
introduced would be frustrated as the residential area
would be converted into commercial-cum-residential area
or vice-vers,a, which was not the intention of the H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A Legislature and therefore, it cannot be said that for
violation of section 11 of the Act, the only remedy
available was under section 19 of the Act i.e. imposition
of fine. The appellant had successfully made out a case
for eviction of the respondent on the ground mentioned.
B The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside
and that of the Appellate Authority is restored and the
application for eviction filed by the appellant is allowed.
[Paras 30 and 31) (1216-C-G]
C Vinod Kumar Arora vs. Surjit Kaur 1987 (3) SCC 711;
Kamal Arora vs. Amar Singh and Ors. (1986) Suppl. SCC
481, relied on.
Sudarshan Kumari vs. Anand Kumar Khemka 1985 (2)
RCJ 590 and Ms. Kam/a Khanna vs. Lal Chand Pa/ta 1989
D (2) RCR 67, approved.
Rajinder Singh vs. Jatinder Dev Nanda 1999 (9) SCC
18; Rai Chand Jain vs. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla 1991 (1)
sec 422, referred to.
E Case Law Reference:
1987 (3) sec 111 Relied on Para 8
1986) Suppl. sec 481 Relied on Para 9
F 1985 (2) RCJ 590 Referred to Para 15
1989 (2) RCR 67 Approved Para 15
1999 (9) sec 18 Referred to Para 19
1991 (1) sec 422 Referred to Para 19
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4578 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 01.11.2006 of the High
H Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.
NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH 1205
4735 of 2001. A
Puneet Bali, Hittan Nehra and Kamaldeep Gulati for the
Appellants.
V.C. Mahajan, Rishi Malhotra and Prem Malhotra for the
Respondents. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
./
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order c
dated 1st of November, 2006 pas~ed in Civil Revision Case
No. 4735 of 2001 by the.High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh wherein the High Court had allowed the revision
petition and set aside the judgment passed by the Appellate
... Authority, Chandigarh which had set aside the judgment and D
order of the Rent Controller, Chandigarh rejecting the
application for eviction filed by the landlord/appellant
(hereinafter referred to as the 'appellant')
"'
3. The appellant, who had purchased the House No. 189, E
'"". Sector 11-A, Chandigarh (which is in a residential area) in an
auction in 1990, raised a ·construction on that plot which is 500
" Sq. Yds. (hereinafter referred to as "the demised premises").
As the appellant has settled in U.K., his father Shri Mange Ram,
who is a permanent resident of India, had inducted the
F
respondent as a tenant in a part of the residential premises for
residential use in the month of April, 1994. The tenant/
respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent'),
according to the :appellant, without the consent and permission
of the appellant, started commercial activities in the demised
premises from December 1994. The appellant filed an G
; ..,.
application under Section 1.3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for
eviction of the respondent from the demised premises on the
ground that although the demised premises was let out for
residential purposes, the respondent had, without the consent H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A and permission of the appellant, started using it for commercial
use. The eviction application was dismissed by the Rent
Controller, Chandigarh, against which an appeal was taken ·
before the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, which was allowed
by its order dated 14th of August, 2001. Against this order of
B the Appellate Authority, the respondent filed a revision petition
before the High Court and by the impugned Judgment of the
High Court, the eviction petition of the appellant was dismissed
and the order of the Rent Controller, Chandigarh was restored.
4. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has filed this Special
C Leave Petition, which on grant of leave, was heard in presence
of the learned counsel for the parties.
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and examined the impugned judgment as well as the
D judgment of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller, ..
Chandigarh and other materials on record.
6. The questions that need to be decided in the present
appeal are whether :
E (i) the demised premises which is situated in a
residential area and in a residential building can be
used for commercial purposes even by consent of
the appellant in view of Section 11 of the Act and
the provisions of the Development and Regulation
F Act; and
(ii) if the residential premises is let out for commercial
purposes, by a mutual agreement between the
landlord and the tenant, can the landlord still seek
G eviction of the tenant on the ground that using of
such residential premises for commercial purposes "-
entails the tenant to be evicted from the demised
premises?
7. Before we deal with question No.1 as posed herein
-
H earlier, let us first decide the question No.2.
- NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH
[fARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
1207
_,. 8. In our view, this question must be decided in favour of A
the appellant. In Vinod Kumar Arora vs. Surjit Kaur [1987 (3)
SCC 711], this Court has dealt with this question. At page 719,
this court observed that -
"Even if the landlord and tenant had converted a
B
residential building into a non residential one by mutual
consent, it would still be violative of Section 11 of the East
Punjab Rent Restriction Act and, therefore, the landlord
cannot be barred from seeking recovery of possession
of the leased building for his residential needs. We are
therefore, of the view that the findings of the Rent Controller
c
and the Appellate Authority about the appellant having
taken' the hall on lease only for running a clinic and that he
had not changed the user of the premises have been
rendered without reference to the pleadings and without
examining the legality of the appellant's contentions in the D
light of Section 11 of the Act. We do not, therefore, think
· the High Court has committed any error in law in ignoring
the findings rendered by the statutory authorities about the
purpose for which the hall had been taken on lease."
(Emphasis supplied). E
9. Again in Kamal Arora vs. Amar Singh & Ors. [1986
Suppl. SCC 481] this Court in paragraph 3 observed as follows:
"The High Court after examining the provisions of the
Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, F
1951 read with Section 11 of the Rent Act helcfthat statutEl
prohibits conversion of residential building into non-
residential by act inter vivos. It was said that the landlord
and the tenant by their mutual consent cannot convert a
...... _, residential building into a non-residential building G
because that would be violative of the provision of
)
Section 11. And it is admitted that building is situated in
a sector falling within the residential zone." (Emphasis
supplied)
H
1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
--
A 10. In view of the above two decisions of this Court and
after considering the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, it must
be held that the landlord cannot permit a tenant to use the
premises which is situated in a residential area for commercial
purposes as it would be violative of Section 11 of the Act which
B is mandatory in nature. Accordingly, we are of the view that
question No. 2 must be answered in favour of the appellant.
11. Let us now come back to question No.1 formulated
earlier.
C 12. Before we deal with this question, we may refer to the
relevant provisions of the Act. Section 13(2)(ii){b) and Section
11 of the Act are such sections which would be required to be
considered first to decide this appeal. Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of
the Act runs as under:-
D
13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply
to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the
Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied-
E (i) x x x x x x x x x x
(ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act
without the written consent of the landlord-
(a) xx xx xx xx xx
F
(b) used the building or rented land for a purpose other
than that for which it has been leased,
(iii) x x x x x x x x x x.
G
(iv) xx xx xx xx xx
(v) x xx x x x x x xx. ,
.....
The Controller may make an order directing the
H tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or
NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH 1209
• [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall A
--+
make an order rejecting the application:
Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a
reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of
the building or rented land and may extend such time so B
as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.
Section 11 of the Act runs as under :-
"Conversation of a residential building into a non-
residential building - c
No person shall convert a residential building into a
non-residential building except with the permission in
writing of the Controller."
13. From a bare reading of the provision under Section D
13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, it would be evident that if a tenanted
premises is let out for residential purposes, but is being used
other than that for which it has been leased out, i.e., for
commercial purposes, the tenant is liable for eviction from the
tenanted premises. In the application for eviction the appellant E
pleaded that the demised premises was let out to the
... respondent for a period of 11 months in the month of April, 1994
at a monthly rental of Rs.1000/- for residential use. Therefore,
the appellant pleaded that since the purpose for which the
demised premises was let out was violated as it was brought F
into commercial use, the respondent was liable for eviction
under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act from the demised
premises.
14. The eviction application was hotly contested by the
G
respond~nt by filing a written objection in which the respondent
disputed ·the very purpose of tenancy for which the tenancy was
'. taken. The respondent, inter alia, made out a case in his
defence that the eviction application filed by the appellant under
Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act was not maintainable as the
demised premises was let out for commercial purposes from H
1210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A the very inception of the tenancy and, accordingly, the use of
--
the demised premises for commercial purposes from the very
inception of the tenancy even in a residential building and also
in a residential area can not give any right to the landlord to
get an order of eviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act and
B in view ofthe above, the respondent contended that the eviction
application filed by the appellant must be rejected.
~5. In support of their respective case before the Rent
Controller, parties adduced evidence and went into trial. As
noted herein earlier, the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, by its
c judgment and order rejected the eviction application on the
ground that since the appellant had not appeared in the witness
box to support the contents of the eviction application an
adverse inference must be drawn against him for non-
production of the Rent Note, no order for eviction could be
D passed against the respondent. As noted herein earlier, this
order of the Rent Controller was reversed by the Appellate
Authority, Chandigarh, inter alia, on the findings that non-
production of "Rent Note" and non-appearance of the landlord/
appellant in the witness box could not be taken to be a ground
E for rejecting the eviction application. Relying on two decisions
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, namely, Sudarshan
Kumari vs. Anand Kumar Khemka [1985 (2) RCJ 590] and
Ms. Kam/a Khanna vs. Lal Chand Pa/ta 1989 (2) RCR 67,
the Appellate Authority held that even if the building was let out
F for commercial purposes, still the respondent could not be
allowed to continue to occupy the demised premises for
commercial purposes in a residential area and also in a
residential building in view of the provisions of the Development
and Regulation Act and Section 11 of the Act.
G
16. As noted herein earlier, the High Court, in Revision,
had set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and restored ~
the order of the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, rejecting the -
application for eviction filed by the appellant.
H 17. A reading of the impugned judgment of the High Court
- NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH
[T'ARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
would c1early show that th~ judgmenkof the High Court was
1211
A
based only on the ground that the building was let out for
commercial purposes from the time of induction of the
respondent in the demised premises and the respondent had
been using the same as such since the inception of the tenancy
and, therefore, the provision of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act B
could not be attracted because the respondent had not used
the demised premises for a purpose other than that for which
j it was leased out to him and accordingly, no order of eviction
could be passed against the respondent.
18. Before we proceed further, as noted herein earlier, we C
may keep it on record that neither the appellant nor the
respondent had brought the "Rent Note" on record, on the basis
of which, the Court could straight away determine and adjudge
the purpose for which the demised premises was let out.
/ D
19. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant.
in the first instance, contended that in fact the respondent was
inducted as a tenant in respect of the demised premises for
residential use as the appellant could not induct him for
commercial use in view of Section 11 of the Act as well as in E
view of the bar imposed under the Development and Regulation
Act. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that even if the respondent was inducted as a tenant
in respect of the demised premises for commercial purposes
in a residential area and in a residential building, still in view F
of Section 11 of the Act and also the relevant provisions of the
Development and Regulation Act, the tenant was liable to be
evicted from the demised premises, as it satisfied the
conditions for eviction enumerated in Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the
Act. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on a G
decision of this Court in the case of Rajinder Singh vs. Jatinder
Dev Nanda [1999 (9) SCC 18] and also on the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Vinod Kumar Arora vs. Surjit Kaur
[1987 (3) sec 711], Kamal Arora VS. Amar Singh & Ors. [1986
Suppl. SCC 481] and Rai Chand Jain vs. Miss Chandra Kanta H
1212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 10 S.C.R.
A Khosla [1991 (1) SCC 422]. Relying on these decisions, it
was, therefore, contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the High Court was in error in rejecting the eviction
application of the appellant.
20. The submissions so made by the learned counsel for
8
the appellant were seriously contested by Mr. V. C. Mahajan,
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
After taking us to Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act as well as
Sections 11 and 19 of the Act, the learned senior counsel
C contended that if there was any violation of Section 11 of the
Act either by the landlord or by the tenant, the Act only
empowers the authority to impose fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees on the landlord or the tenant as the case
may be. In this connection, attention was drawn to Section 19
of the Act, which runs as under:-
0
"Section 19 of the Act confers powers of the authority
'
to impose penalties - if any person contravenes any of the
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 9, sub-section (1)
of Section 10, Section 11 or Section 18, he shall be
E punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees. (emphasis supplied).
21. Relying on Section 19 of the Act, Mr. Mahajan has,
therefore, contended that when statute confers only the power
F to impose penalty for contravention of Section 11, it cannot be
held that for such contravention the tenant can be evicted by
the landlord under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. So far as the
decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are
concerned, Mr. Mahajan appearing on behalf of the respondent
sought to contend that those decisions were clearly
G distinguishable on facts. Accordingly, Mr. Mahajan contended
that the High Court was not in error in rejecting the eviction ...
application. Finally, Mr. Mahajan submitted that this was not a
fit case to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High
Court in the exercise of discretionary power under Article 136
H of the Constitution.
NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH 1213
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
22. We have carefully examined the rival submissions of A
the learned counsel for the parties, as noted hereinabove. After
examining the respective submissions, we are of the
considered opinion that this appeal must succeed. Reasons
are as follows:
B
23. Before we deal with the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties, as noted hereinabove, let us first decide
an allied question that has cropped up during the arguments.
This question is whether the tenant was inducted in the demised
premises for residential use or for commercial use or was he
inducted for residential use but he converted such tenancy to C
be used for commercial use at a later date. To answer this
question appropriately, we have to look into Section 11 of the
Act and the materials on record, We have already quoted this
section earlier. It is quite clear from a bare reading of Section
11 of the Act that a tenant or a landlord would not be permitted D
to convert a residential premises situated in a residential area
for a commercial use. In this connection an admission made
by the respondent in his evidence would be necessary to be
extracted:-
E
"It is correct that demised premises are situated in
the residential vicinity. It is incorrect to suggest that I have
not taken any permission from my landlady to carry on
the commercial activity. It is correct that I have not taken
any permission from the Rent Controller for carrying on F
the commercial activity. It is correct that the demised
premises can be resumed at any time because of
carrying on the commercial activity. "(Emphasis supplied).
24. From the above admission of the respondent, it is
evidently clear that the demised premises is situated in a G
residential area and the building in which the demised premises
is situated is also a residential building and he had also not
taken any permission from the Rent Controller for carrying on
commercial activities and that the demised premises can be
resumed at any time because of carrying on commercial H
1214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A. activity. Such being the position, it can be safely concluded
that the demised premises being in a residential area and in
a residential building in which the commercial activity was being
carried out by the respondent without the permission of the Rent
Controller, the production of the Rent-Note to find out the
B purpose for which the tenancy was created shall not be
decisive.
25. It is also clear from such admission of the respondent
himself that the appellant can resume the demised premises
at any time because of carrying on the commercial activity and
C that the demised premises is in a residential area and also in
a residential building. That apart, Section 11 of the Act clearly
prohibits a landlord or a tenant to convert the purpose of tenancy
without the permission of the Rent Controller.
D 26. Such being the position, we must conclude that the
respondent was inducted by the appellant at the initial stage in
the demised premises for residential purposes but later on
converted the tenancy for commercial use. In the eviction
application as well as in evidence, it was the case of the
E appellant that in the month of April, 1994, the respondent was
inducted for residential use and the commercial activities were
started by him in the month of December, 1994 onwards. In
view of our discussions made hereinabove, we must hold that
the respondent was inducted in the demised premises for
F residential use and not for commercial purposes but the
respondent converted the tenancy later on from residential to
commercial use.
27. For this purpose, we may safely rely on the observation
of this Court in Rajinder Singh's Case (Supra) as under :-
G
"Section 11 of the Act prohibits an owner and occupier of
the premises to convert a residential building into a non-
residential building except with the permission in writing
by the Controller. Therefore, a residential premises could
H not be used for non-residential purpose, namely, for
NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH 1215
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
running a school. In view thereof, we are of the opinion that A
the judgment of the High Court suffers from serious infirmity
and deserves to be set aside." [Emphasis supplied)
28. In view of the findings made hereinabove, we are in
agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for the
8
appellant that the respondent had clearly violated the provisions
of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.
29. At this stage, we may deal with the submission of Mr.
Mahajan, learned senior counsel for the respondent. As noted
hereinabove, Mr. Mahajan, argued that in view of Section 19 C
of the Act, which clearly says that the Court or the Rent
Controller is conferred with power to impose penalty for violation
of the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and since the Act is
a beneficial legislation and benefits the tenant, it would be
difficult to conceive that for the same offence, a tenant can also D
be evicted from the demised premises. In our view, this
submission of Mr. Mahajan has no substance. Section 11
speaks about conversion of a residential building into a non-
residential building and also prohibits an owner or an occupier
to convert the residential building into a non residential building. E
30. Section 13 speaks about the ground on the basis of
which a tenant can be evicted. In our view, the scope of
Sections 11 and 13 are quite different. From a reading of
Section 19 of the Act, it is clear that Section 19 gives an
additional right to the authorities to impose penalty if a person F
has contravened the provisions of Section 11 of the Act.
Therefore, it would not be difficult to hold that Section 13 gives
only a right to a landlord to bring action against a tenant who
has used the demised premises for a purpose other than for
which it was leased out, whereas for conversion of residential G
premises into a commercial premises would also entail a tenant
to be punished with fine under Section 19 of the Act. That apart,
from a bare reading of the Act and object for which the Act was
introduced and also after looking into the scope and on
consideration of the entire provisions of the Act, it cannot be H
1216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A said that for violation of Section 11 of the Act, that is to say, a
person uses a particular premises which can only be used for
residential purposes but is being used for other purposes which
entails imposition of penalty under Section 19 of the Act, would
not mean that Section 13(2)(ii)(b) and Section 19 cannot go
s hand in hdnd. Therefore, the only question that re.mains to be
seen is whether a person who has converted the purpose for
which the premises was let out without the permission of the
Rent Controller, can be punished only with fine under Section
19 or can he also be evicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the
c Act. Looking at the object of the Act and the provisions made
therein, and considering the fact that the Act is a beneficial
legislation not only for the tenant but also for the landlord, it can
safely be inferred that both the sections namely, Section 13 and
Section 19 can be applied when there is a violation of
Section11. Therefore, in our view, reading of Section 13 and
0
Section 19 together, we can safely come to the conclusion that
the tenant or the landlord can be punished with fine under
Section 19 of the Act and at the same time the tenant can be
evicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act if the conditions
laid down in the said sections are satisfied. That apart if
E violation of Section. 11 of the Act results in fine under Section
19 of the Act, in that case the tenants who have violated the
provisions of Section 11 of the Act could get away from eviction
only by paying fine that may be imposed upon them [tenants].
If this can be accepted, the purpose and object of the Act for
F which this Act was introduced would be frustrated as the
residential area would be converted into commercial-cum-
residential area or vice-versa, which was not the intention of
the Legislature and therefore, it cannot be said that for violation
of Section 11 of the Act, the only remedy available was under
G Section 19 of the Act i.e. imposition of fine. In view of our
discussions made herein above, we are of the view that the
appellant had successfully made out a case for eviction of the
respondent on the ground mentioned herein above.
31. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of
H
NANO KISHORE v. YASHPAL SINGH 1217
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
the High Court is set aside and that of the Appellate Authority A
is restored and the application for eviction filed by the appellant
is thus allowed.
32. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case, we grant six months time to the respondent to vacate the
8
premises subject to filing\ of a usual undertaking in this Court
within a month from this date.
33. The appeal is thus allowed. There will be no order as
to costs.
c
N.J. Appeal allowed.
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