Holding

The denial of counsel to the detenu does not violate Articles 14 and 21 as section 11(4) bars such a right, but the State’s confirmation of detention was invalid because the record was not before it.

Summary

Inderjit alias Billa was detained under the Prevention of Black‑marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. He applied to the Advisory Board for legal representation, but the request was denied while the State was represented by a team of lawyers. The petition challenged whether this differential treatment violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and whether the confirmation of detention under section 12 was valid. The Court held that section 11(4) of the Act bars a detenu’s right to counsel before the Advisory Board, although the Board may permit it, so the denial was not per se arbitrary. However, the State Government failed to apply its mind to the Advisory Board’s report because the record was not before it, rendering the confirmation order invalid. Consequently, the detention order was quashed and the detenu was ordered to be released. The petition was allowed.

Issues considered

The denial of legal assistance to a detenu before the Advisory Board, while the State was represented, violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Whether section 11(4) of the Prevention of Black‑marketing Act precludes a detenu’s right to counsel.
Whether the State Government’s confirmation of detention under section 12 was valid in the absence of the Advisory Board’s record.

Legislation cited

Prevention of Black‑marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980s. 11(4), s. 12, s. 3

Subjects

preventive detentionright to counseladvisory board procedureArticle 14Article 21Article 22arbitrarinessprocedural fairnesssection 11(4)confirmation of detention

Judgment

718
A
NAND LAL BAJAJ
v.
THE ST ATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR,

B September 15, 1981

[A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]

Right to be defended by a lawyer-Advisory Board assisted by Public Prose-
cutor, two attorneys, District Legal Advisor and one Legal Assistant, but the
C detenu though prayed for assistance of a legal counsel in writing refused the sam~
Whether the refusal amounts to arbitrariness and unreasonableness off1ndiug
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution-Prevention of Black.marketing and Main-
tenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, section 11(4), scope of-
Confirmation of the detention order under section 12 of the Act without tM entire
report of the Advisory Board before them vitiates the detention.

D Inderjit alias Billa has been detained by an order dated June 1, 1981 passed
by the District Magistrate uader sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Prevention of
Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act,
1980 (PBMSECA). The detenu submitted his representation challenging the
ordef of detention on various grounds. He had a[so made a request in writing
that he be allowed the assistance of counsel during the hearing before the Advisory
Board, but the Government did not accede to his request in view of section 11 of
E the Act. On the contrary. at the time of hearing b~fore the Aavisory Board the
State was assisted by Public Prosecutor, two attorneys, a District Legal Advisor
and a Legal Assistant. Even at this stage, the detenu requested in writing for
aid of a counsel but the same was rejected. The State Government confirmed
the detention under section 12 of the Act. The father of the detenu, therefore,
challenges the order of confirmation of the detention by the State.

F AUowing the writ petition, the Court.

HELD 1:1. Under Article 22(3Xb) of the Constitution, the right to consult
and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice is denied to any person who
is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Sub-
section (3) of section 11 of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance
of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 is undoubtedly in conformity
G with Article 22(3) (b) of the Constitution. Normally, lawyers have no place in
the proceedings before the Advisory Board. [723 DJ

1:2. Upon the terms of sub-section (4) of section 11 of the Act the detenu
had no right to legal assistance in the proceedings before the Advisory Board
but it did not preclude the Board to allow such assistance to the detenu when it
H allowed the State to be represented by an array of lawyers. Smt. Kavlta v. The
State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1982) l SCR p. 138 is an authority for the proposi-
tion. that while there is no right under section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA ·Act to legal
NAND LAL V. PUNJAB 719

assistance to a detenu in the proceedings before the Advisory Board is entitled A
to make such a request to the Board and the Board is bound to consider such a
request when so made. [727 G-H, 728 A-BJ

Smt. Kavila v. The State ~f Maharashtra & Orr., [1982) 1 SCR p. 138
distinguished.
B
2. The Advisory Board is entitled to devise its own procedure. The
functions of the Advisory Board are purely consultative. It i~ an independent
body constituted under section 9 or the Act consisting of a sitting judge as the
Chairman and not less than two other 1nembers, who may be sittinq: or retired
' judges of the High Court. It is e<pocted that the Advisory Board would set in
a fair and impartial manner in making a report whether or not there is, in its
opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of person. In coming to that conclu·
sion, the Board has to make an objective determination on the question as to
a
whether there was sufficient material on which the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority could be based. Under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the
Act, the Advisory Board may also call for such further information as it may
deem necessary for the appropriate Govt. or from the person '.concerned and if,
in any particular case, it considers essential to do so or if the person concerned
desires to be heard, shall hear him in person. Arbitrariness is the very antithesis D
of Article 14. The principle of rea<>on1bleness is aa essential element of equality
and the procedure contemplated :by Article 21 must answer th~ te5t ]of [reason·
ableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. The history of personal
liberty is largely the history of procedural safeguards. The need for observance
of procedural safeguards, particularly in cas.es of deprivation of life ~and liberty is.
therefore, of prime importance to the body politic. In the context of 'deprivation
of life and liberty' under Article 21, the 'pro:edurl!l est1blish:d by Jaw' carried
with it the inherent right to le~al assistance. The right to be heard before the
E
Advisory Board would be, in mlny ca~~~. of little availy it did not co.n,>reh,,n1
tho right to be heard by the counsel. [723 D.Q, 725 C-D,l.F,i726 B.C]

E.P. Royappa v. TamU Nadu, [197+) 2 SCR 348, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Fra11c.is Coralie Mullin v. The A.Jini11istrator, U11ion
Territory of Delhi and Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 516 at 531; reiterated. F

3. The State Government while-confirming the detention·order under section
12 of the Act has not only to peruse the report of the }Advisory Baird, but also
to apply its mind to the material on record. If the record itself was not before
the State Government, as is evident from the returns filed in reply to the 1writ
petition before this Court, it follows that the order passed1by the State Govern..
meat under section 12 of the Act was without due applicatio:I of. mind, which is G
a serious infirmity in the case which mikes the continued detention of the detenu
illegal. [728 B-D]

OBITER :- It is e.pected that Parliament while making a law regulate
the procedure before an Advisory" ,Board under Article 22(7) (c) of the Constitu- H
tion should provide the right to con-Sutt and be defended by a legal practitioner
of his choice. It is incomprehensible that a p:!rson co.n nitting a crim! s'loald
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] I S.C.R.

A have under Article 22(1) of the Constitution the right to consult and be defended
by a legal practitioner of his choice, but a person under preventive detention
more often than not for his political beliefs. should be deprived of this valuable
right. It cannot be denied that preventive detention is an anachronism in a
democratic society like ours. The detention of individuals without trial for any
length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideals of a
parliamentary system of government. In the nature of things. under the law as
B it exists, a person under preventive detention is not entitled to legal assistance.
The matter is essentially political and as such it is the concern of the statesmen
and, therefore, within the domain of the Legislature, and not Judiciary. [726 C·F]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 4975
of 1981.
c
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)· •
Kapil Sibal, Ramesh C. Pathak, Subhash Sharma. R. K.
Khindria and R. K. Randa for the Petitioner.

D 0. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SEN, J. This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
by one Nand Lal Bajaj for the issuance of a writ of habea< corpus
for the release of bis son, Inderjit @ Billa, who has been detained by
E
an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Ropar,
under s. 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of
Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter called 'the
Act'), on being satisfied that his detention was necessary with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the life of
F
the community.

Various grounds have been taken challenging the validity
of the order of detention, but it is not necessary for us to deal with
them all as the view that we take on one of them is sufficient to
dispose of the petition. The main contention !is that the procedure
G adopted by the Advisory Board in allowing legal assistance to the
State and denying such assistanc to the detenu was both arbitrary
and unreasonable and thus violative of Art. 21 read with Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
H
First as to the facts. On June l, 1981, the District Magistrate ,.,,,.. -
ramd an ore' er of c'etrnticn under sub·s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act on
NANO LAL v. PUNJAB (Sen, J.) 721

being satisfied that detention of Inderjit was necessary with a view A
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance ol supplies of commodities essential to the community,
and as required by sub-s. (3) thereof, made a report forthwith to
the State Government together with the grounds on which the order
of detention had been made and the State Government approved of
the same. The detenu was apprehended on June 11, 1981 and served B
with the order of detention together with the grounds and, in due
course, the detenu submitted his representation challenging the order
' of detention to the State Government. He made a request in writing
that he be allowed the assistance of counsel during the hearing
before the Advisory Board, but the Government did not accede to
his request. However. it appears that the detaining authority was c
represented by the State counsel at 1he hearing. The detenu there-
upon asked the Advisory Board that he may also be aforded an
opportunity for legal assistance. What transpired before the Advi-
sory Board can best be stated in the words of the petitioner. The
relevant averment in para 17 of the petition is as follows :
D
Before the commencement of these proceedings the
detenu requested the State Government in writing that he be
allowed assistance of counsel during the course of the
proceedings before the Advisory Board. The said request
was denied. The detenu to his utter surprise found that there E
he had to place his case before the Advisory Board without
assistance of counsel, the order of detention was defended by
State c1 unsel. The lawyers representing the State, during the
course of the proceedings before the Advisory Board included
the District Attorney and the Additional District Attorney
who were assisted by the District Legal Advisor and one F
legal assistant. The detenu had also requested to Advisory
Board verbally tha1 he be allowed the assistance of counsel
during the course of the proceedings...... (emphasis added)

In answer to the rule nisi, the District Magistrate Ropar who is the
detaining authority, has filed a counter-affidavit by which he ex- G
plained the circumstances which led to the issue of the detention
order. In reply to para 17 of the petition, it isaverred :

In reply to para 17 of the petition it is stated that
section 11(4) of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and
H
Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act,
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (!982] l S.C,R.

A 1980 prohibited the assistance of a lawyer to the detenu
before the proceedings of Advisory Board, which are confi- r·
dential. However the Advisory Board is competent to
call any information from the appropriate Govt. as laid in
section II(!) of the Act.

8 It is thus manifest that there !was no traverse of the specific allega-
tion made by the petitioner that while the Advisory Board allowed
legal assistance to the detaining authority, there was denial of such ~

an opportnnity to the detenu. In substance, the District Magistrate ,' .
does not deal with the facts but states the law.

C Despite the order of this Court for the production of the file
containing the proceedings of the Advisory Board, all that was
shown to us was the report of the Advisory Board. We were in-
formed that the record was not with the State Government but with
the Board. It was represented that the Advisory Board does not
forward its records because they are confidential. In the absence of
D the record, there is no other alternative but to tproceed on the alle-
gations made by the petitioner. The report of the Board does
indicate that the Public Prosecutor who was present was questioned
on one of the aspects of the matter. It also records the presence
of two Additional District Attorneys.

E It is argued on behalf of the State that under sub-s. (4) of s. 11
of the Act the detenu was not entitled to any legal assistance before
the Advisory Board. The submission is that the proceedings of the
Board and its report except that part of the report in which the
opinion [of the Board is expressed, are confidential. Therefore,
lawyers have no place in the proceedings before the Advisory Board.
F
It is further argued (that the Advisory Board is entitled to
devise its own procedure. Our attention was drawn to sub-s. (!) of . ..
s. I! of the Act, and it is urged that the Advisory Board is entitled
· not only to look into the record and see whether there was any
material on which the order of detention could be passed under s. 3
G of the Act, but may also call for any such further information as it
may deem necessary. Sub-ss. (I) of the Act on which reliance has
been placed by the State are as follows :

I!. (I) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the
H materials placed before it and, after calling for such further
information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate
NANO LAL V. PUNJAB (Sen, J.) 723

Govern meat or from any person called for the purpose A
through the appropriate Government or from the person
concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it
essential so to do or if the jperson concerned desires to be
heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to
the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the
date of detention,of the person concerned. B

(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person
against whom a detention order has been made to appear
by any legal practitioner in any matter connected With the
reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceeding of the
Advisory Board, and its report, excepting that part of the c
report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is
specified, shall be confidential.

Under Art. 22(3) (b) of the Constitution, the right to consult and
be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice is denied to any
person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for
D
preventive detention. Sub-s. (4) of s. 11 of the Act is undoubtedly
in conformity with Art. 22(3) {b) of the Constitution. Normally,
lawyers have no place in the proceedings before the Advisory Board.
The functions of the Advisory Board are purely consultative. It is
an independent body constituted under s. 9 of the Act consisting of
a sitting Judge as the Chairman and not less than two other members
E
who may be sitting or retired judges of the High Court. It is
expected that the Advisory Board would act in a fair and impartial
manner in m·tking a report whether or not there is, in its opinion,
sufficient cause for the detention of a person. In coming to that
conclusion, the Board has to make an objective determination on F
,
the question as to whether there was sufficient material on which the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could be based.
Under sub-s. (l) of s. 11 of the Act, the Board is not only entitled
to look into the record and see whether there was any material on
which the order of detention could be passed under s. 3 of the Act,
but may also call for such further information as it may deem G
necessary from the appropriate Government or from the person
concerned and if, in any particular case, it considers essential to do
so or if the person concerned desires to be heard, shall hear him in
person. The Board is entitled to devise its own procedure.
H
It is the arbitrariness of the procedure adopted by the Advisory
Board that vitiates the impugned order of detention. There is no
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] I S.C.R.

denying the fact that while the Advisory Board disallowed the
detenu's request for legal assistance, it allowed the detaining
authority to be represented by counsel. It appears that the Advisory
Board blindly applied the provisions of sub· s. (4) of s. 11 of the
Act to the case of the detenu failing to appreciate that it could not
allow legal assistance to the detaining authority and deny the same
B to the detenu. The Advisory Board is expected to act in a manner
which is just and fair to both the parties. The report of the Board
placed before us shows that the detenu exercised his right to recall
some of the witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination. We
are informed that the hearing before the Advisory Board went on
for 4 to 5 days and there were as many as 11 witnesses cross-
c examined by the detenu. It cannot be, as is suggested by the counsel
for the State, that the lawyers representing the State Government
did not participate in the proceedings. On the contrary, the report
itself shows that the Public Prosecutor was called upon to explain
some aspects of the case. If the matter was so intricate, the Advi-
sory Board should have ensured that both the parties had equal
D opportunity to place their respective cases. It appears that the
dice was loaded against the detenu in that whereas he had to go
without legal assistance, the State Government had the benefit of
an array of lawyers.

The expression 'procedure established by law' in the context
E of deprivation of life and liberty under Art. 21 was interpreted in
.Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(') and the interpretation so put
has been treated as involving an enlargement of the right conferred
by Art. 21 of the Constitution. As limited to the procedure, the
judges were agreed that the procedure must be reasonable and fair
and not arbitrary or capncious. For, if the procedure was arbitrary,
F it would violate Art. 14 since Art. 14 is not consistent with any
arbitrary power.(2) In interpreting the expression 'procedure estab-
lished by law' in Art. 21 with reference to Art. 14 of the Constitu-
tion, Bhagwati, J., observed(') :

We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the
G majority in E.P. Royappa v T.N.(') namely, that 'from a
positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to the rule of
Jaw in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice

(l) [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.
H (2) H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law oflndia, 2nd Edn. Vol. 3 pp. 1940-41.
(3) [1978] 2 S.C.R 621 at 674.
C4) [197412 s.c.R. 348.
NAND LAL v. PUNJAB (Sen, J.) 725

of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is A
implicit in it that it is unequal b~th according to political
logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Art. 14'. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action
and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The princi-
ple of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophi·
cally, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrari· 8
ness pervades Article ; 4 like a brooding omnipresence and
the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the
.' test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with
Article 14. It must be 'right and just and fair' and not
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it lwould be no

- procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would
not be satisfied.
c
Arbitrariness is the very antithesis of Art. 14. The principle of
reasonableness is an essential element of equality and the procedure
_, contemplated by Art. 21 must answer the test· of reasonableness in
order to be in conformity with Art. 14. D
Among the concurring opinions, Krishna Iyer, J., although
he generally agreed with Bhagwati, J., goes a step forward by
observing(') :

Procedural safeguards are the indispensable essence of
liberty. In fact, the history of procedural safeguards and
E
the right to a hearing has a human-right ring. In India,
because of poverty and illiteracy, the people are unable to
protect and defend their rights: observance of fundmental
rights is not regarded as good politics and their trans-
gression as bad politics.
F
In short, the history of personal liberty is largely the history of
procedural safeguards. The need for observance of procedural
safeguards, particularly in cases of deprivation of life and liberty is,
therefore, of prime importance to the body politic. In Francis
Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and
Ors.(') the inter-relation between Arts. 21 and 14 of the Constitution G
• was brought out by Bhagwati, J. in these words :

The right of detenu to consult a legal adviser of his
choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence
H
llJ [1;78J 2 S.C.R. 621 at 723.
(2) [1981] 2 S.C.R. 516 at 531.
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] l S.C.R.

A in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release from
preventive detention or filing a writ petition or prosecuting
/'
any claim or proceeding, civil or criminal, is obviously
included in the right to live with human dignity and is also
part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived
of this right nor can this right of the detenu be Interfered
B with except in accordance with reasonable, fair and just
procedure established by a valid law.
,
It is increasingly felt that in the context of 'deprivation of life and ••
liberty' under Art. 21, the 'procedure established by law' carried
with it the inherent right to legal assistance. Apart from authority
c it is easy to appreciate that in overwhelming majority of cases a
detenu can do nothing to help himself before the Advisory Board.
The right to be heard before the Advisory Board would be, in many
-
cases, of little avail if it did not ·Comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel. It is expected that Parliament while making a law
to regulate the procedure before an Advisory Board under Art. 22 \-
D (7) (c) of the Constitution should provide the right to consult and
be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. It is incompre-
hensible that a person committing a crime should have under
Art. 22(1) of the Constitution the right to consult and be defended
by a legal practitioner of his choice, but a person under preventive
detention, more often than not for his political beliefs, should be
E deprived of this valuable right. It cannot be denied that preventive
detention is an anachronism in a democratic society like ours. The
detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however
short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideals of a parliamentary
system of government. In the nature of things, under the law as it
exists, a person under preventive detention is not entitled to legal
F assistance. However. we think it is futile for us to attempt to '
project our personal views in a matter which lies in the realm of
decision-making of Parliament. The matter is essentially political
and as such it is the concern of the statesman and, therefore, within
the domain of the Legislature, and not the Judiciary.

G In Smt. Kavita v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors (1) the
Court recently had an occasion to deal with s. 8 of the Conservation
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,
1974, which is in pari materia with sub-s. (4) of s. 11 of Act. The
Court speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed :
H
(I) [1982) I S.C.R. 138.
NAND LAL v. PUNJAB (Sen, J.) 727

It is true that while s. 8 (e) disentitles a detenu from A
claiming as of right to be represented by a lawyer, it does
not disentitle him fro111 making a request for the services
of a lawyer.

The learned Judge emphasised that "as often than not adequate legal
assistance may be essential for the protection of the Fundamental
Right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution and the right to be heard given to a detenu by s. 8 (e),
COFEPOSA Act" and observed that this valuable right may be
jeopardized and reduced to mere nothing with adequate legal assis-
tance, in the light of the intricacies of the problems involved and
other relevant factors. He then went on to say whether or not c
legal assistance shoulcl be afforded by the Advisory Board must
necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case and observed :

Therefore, where a detenu makes a request for legal
assistance, his request would have to be considered on its D
own merit in each individual case. In the present case,
the Government merely informed the detenu that he had no
statutory right to be represented by a lawyer before the
Advisory Board. Since it was for the Advisory Board and
not for the Government to afford legal assistance to the
detenu the latter, when he was produced before the Avisory E
Board, could have, if he was so minded, made a request to
the Advisory Board for permission to be represented by a
lawyer.

In that case, there was no denial of procedural fairness which is a F
part of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 of the
Constitution, since no such request was made by the detenu before
the Advisory Board. The decision in Kavita's case (supra) is,
however, an authority for the proposition that while there is no
right under s. 8 (e) of the COFEPOSA Act to legal assistance to a
detenu in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, he is entitled G
to make such a request to the B)ard and the Board is bound to
consider such a request when so made. In the present case, the
. detenu made such a request, but in the absence of the record of the
Advisory Board, it is not possible to infer whether the request was
considered. Even if it was denied, as the petitioner himself alleges, H
there was no rational basis for a differential treatment. There is no
denial of the fact that while the detenu was not afforded legal assis-
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] I S.C.R

A tance, the detaining authority was allowed to be represented by
counsel. It is quite clear upon the terms of sub·s. (4) of s. 11 of the
Act 11,at the detenu bad no right to legal _assistance in the proceedings
before the Advisory Board, but >'.it did not preclude the Board to
allow such assistance to detenu, when it allowed the State to be
B represented by an array of lawyers.

The matter can be viewed from another angle. We were infor-
med that the Advisory Board did not forward the record of its
proceeding to the State Government. If that be so, then procedure
c adopted was not in consonance:with the procedure established by law.
The State Government w bile confirming the detention order under
s. 12 of the Act has not only to peruse the report of the Advisory
Board, but also to apply its mind to the material on record itself was
not before the State Government, it follows that the order passed
by the State Government under s. 12 of the Act was without due
D application of mind. This is a serious infirmity in the ca<e which
\
makes the continued detention of the detenu illegal.

We refrain from expressing any opinion on the other grounds
raised. It appears to us prima facie that the grounds for detention
set out the facts with sufficient degree of particularity and that they
E did furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority. It seems to us that the order of detention
cannot also be challenged that the grounds furnished were vague or
indefinite or lacking in particulars or were not adequate or sufficient
for the satisfaction of the detainiag authority, or, for that matter,
for !ht making of an effective representation.
F
For the reasons stated above, the order of detention passed by
the District Magistrate, Ropar dated June I, 1981 is quashed and
we direct that the detenu Inderjit alias Billa be set at liberty
forthwith.

V.D. K. Petition allowed.