Holding

A Hindu widow’s limited estate includes the right to alienate property for legal necessity, rendering the auction sale valid and binding on the reversioner, and the son is not the sole owner.

Summary

The widow Smt. Yenki borrowed Rs. 650 for family necessity after her husband's death and executed a promissory note. An award under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 created a charge on her property, which was later auctioned; the appellant purchased the land. The son (applicant) claimed he was the sole owner of the land as the heir of his father and contended that the auction sale was void. The trial court held that the widow, as heir, possessed a limited Hindu Women's Estate that includes the right to alienate property for legal necessity, making the sale valid and binding on the son as a reversioner. The High Court reversed this view, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reinstating the trial court’s decision and confirming that the sale was lawful and the son was not the sole owner.

Issues considered

Whether a Hindu widow can alienate her late husband's property for legal necessity under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937.
Whether the auction sale of the property under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 (Section 37) is valid and binding on the reversioner.
Whether the son’s claim of being the sole owner of the disputed land is sustainable in law.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 47, s. Order IX Rule 9
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937s. 3(2), s. 3(3)

Subjects

Hindu lawwidow's right to propertylegal necessityalienation of propertyreversionerBombay Agricultural Debtors Relief ActsuccessionHindu Women's Estate

Judgment

NARAYAN GOVIND HEGDE A
v.
KAMALAKARA SHIVARAMA HEGDE AND ANR.

OCTOBER 16, 2001

[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.] B

Hindu Law:

Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937-Section 3(2) and (3)-
Alienation of property by widow for legal necessity-Objection to-Plea that · . C
alienation not binding on the son as he was the sole owner of the property-
Held, widow. entitled. to full enjoyment of the estate .subject to the limited
interest known as Hindu Women's Estate, which includes right to alienate the
property.for legal necessity qfthefamily-Hence, the alienation binding on the
son-Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947-:Section 37-Civil Pro- ,
cedure Code, 1908-Section 47 and Order IX Rule 9. D
Respondent No. 3, mother of respondent No. 1, after death of her
husband and when respondent No.1 was in her womb, borrowed money•
from respondent No. 2 out of legal necessity, and executed promissory
note in his favour. Respondent No. 2, for recovery of the amount, ob- E
tained award against respondent No. 3, wherein charge was created over
the land in dispute. In execution of the award, the land was auctioned and
the same was purchased by the appellant • auction purchaser. Respondent
No.1 filed application under Section 37 of the Act read with Section 47
C.P.C. on the ground that he was the sole owner of the property after
death of his father and the auction sale was void as respondent No. 3, his , F
mother was not the owner of the property. The application was dismissed
on the ground that auction sale was binding on ilte applicant-respondent
No. 1 as the land was sold by his mother for legal necessity and because he
had not assailed the transaction on the ground of immorality or absence
of legal necessity. G

Appeal against the order of the trial court was allowed. Revision
petition by appellant-auction purchaser was dismissed by High Court.
Hence this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court H
185
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A . HELD : 1. The allegation of the appellant that he was the sole
owner of the disputed land is not sustainable in law. Widow succeeds as a
heir to her husband. The ownership o~ properties vests in her. She fully
represents the estate, the interest of reversioners therein being only spes
successionis. In the present case after the death of her husband, the widow,
B the opposite Party No. 3 succeeded to the property o(her husband and she
was entitled to full enjoyment of the estate subject to limited interest
known as Hindu Women's Estate. This right includes right to alienate.the
property for legal necessity of the family.

2. I~ tht: case in hand the disputed land.was sold for legal necessity.
c There is no averment or evidence to show that there was no legal neces-
sity. Therefore, the sale i~ question is binding on the appellant, who is a
reversioner.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2930 of 1984.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.2.84/1.3.84 of the Karnataka
High Court
. in
. C.R.P. No. 1992
.
of 1977.' ......
S.S. Javali and P.R. Ramasesh for the App~llant.
I ' , •

~E K.R. Nagaraja, R.S. Hegde for P.P. Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PHUKAN, J. In this appeal by special leave the appellant has assailed
the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Civil Revision
F Petition No. 1992 of 1977. The parties herein shall be referred to as arrayed
in the application filed under Section 37 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors
Relief Act, 1947 (foqhort 'the Act') read with Section 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure before the learne~ Munsif at Sirsi, Karnataka.

:Briefly stated the facts are as follows :
G
The applicant before the learned Munsif, Kamalara is the son pf the
opposite party No. 3 vii. Smt. Yenki. Shri Ganpathi 9pposite party No. 2 lent
a sum of Rs. 650'to the opposite party No. 3, who executed a promissory note
in his favour. The opposite party No. 2 filed an application against Smt. Yenki,
H opposite party No. 3 under"the provisions of the Act and obtained an award
,NARAYAN GOVIND HEGDE v. KMtALAKARA SHIVARAMA HEGDE [~HUKAN, J.] 187 .
on 23.9.1948. By the award a charge was created over the properties mentioned A
in the aware! which included the prese~t disputed land. 1:he ~ward was put into
execution and the disputed suit land was auctioned. Shri Narayan, opposite
party No. 1 purchased it in court auction and to'ok possessi,on on 5.9.1956. The ,
father of the applicant died on 15.8.1946 and at that time the applicant was in
the womb of his mother, opposite party No. 3. The applicant was born on
B
25.3.1947. In 1959 the brother-in~law of the applicant filed a civil suit for
injunction restraining opposite party No. I from taking possession of the dis-
puted land on behalf of the applicant, as his next friend, which was dismissed
on the ground that the Civil Court had no power to go into legality or other
wise of the order passed under provisions of the Act. The appeal was .also 1

dismissed. In 1956, the said next friend filed an application under Section 37 c
of the Act which was dismissed as the learned counsel for the next friend
represented that he had no instruction. On attaining majority, the present
application was filed before the learned Munsif, which was dismissed. Being
aggrieved, an appeal was filed by the applicant, which was allowed and the
revision petition filed by the appellant was dismissed, by the impugned order, D
by the High Court and hence the present appeal.

We have heard Mr. S.S. Javali, learned senior counsel for the appellant
and Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, learned counsel for the respondents.

On perusal of the judgment of the learned Munsif, we find that the Court E
relying on the pleadings of the parties framed two questions for consideration
viz. whether the land was validly sold in auction under the Act and the
applicant was bound by the said sale and secondly, whether the application was
maintainable. Regarding the first question the Trial Court noted that the land ,
was sold for legal necessity as the amount was borrowed by his mother,
F
opposite party No. 3 for necessity of the family and as the applicant did not
assail the transaction on the ground of immorality or absence of any legal
necessity, the auction sale was binding on the applicant. Regarding
maintainability, the .Trial Court held that the application was not maintainable
as the order of dismissal of the application filed under Secti_on 37 of the Act
by the next friend of the applicant was dismissed and, ther~fore, mischief or G
order 9 of Rule 9 C.P.C. would come in play and the present application being
a fresh one was barred. The first Appellate Court did not notice that the sale
of the land was for legal necessity and in fact recorded ct finding viz. "there
is no allegation of legal necessity or benefit to the family so as to bind the other
family members namely applicant himself', which was contrary to the facts of H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the case. The High Court did not consider the fact that land was sold for legal
necessity.

Section 37 of the Act runs as follows :

"If, after an award is made under Section 32, the Court finds on an
B application made to it by any party or otherwise, that the debtor has
other property which was not disclosed to the Court when the award
was made, or that any property included in the award did not belong
to the debtor, the' Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, reopen the award and readjust the debts in accordance with
c the provisions ·of this Act.

Provided that where the Court is satisfied that the non-disclosure of
such property was in consequence of any fraud on the part· of the
debtor, the Court in revising the award shall not give the debtor the
benefit of Section 31."
D
On a plain reading of the Section we are of the view t_hat a Court can
.._
reopen and readjust the award only if anyone of the following two conditions
is satisfied, namely : ·

E 1. The debtor has other property which was not disclosed to the
Court when the award was made; or

2. Any property including the award did not really belong to
debtor.

F The proviso deprives the debtor the benefit of Section 31 where the non
disclosure of such property was in consequence of any fraud on the part of the
debtor.

In the present application under Section 37 of the Act the only allegation
made was that the applicant being the sole owner of disputed property after the
G death of his father the auction sale of the disputed property for satisfaction of
the award was illegal and void and not binding on him and in other words Smt:
Yenki, opposite party No. 3, against whom the award was made, was not the
owner of the disputed land.

H The ext.. P-5 is a document, which was filed in the original proceeding
NARAYAN GOVIND HEGDE v. KAMALAKARA SHIVARAMA HEGDE [PHUKAN, J.] 189
under the Act on the basis of which award was made. In ext. P-5, in column A
4 under the heading-'full particulars of original loan and other loans ~nd
interest charged thereon' - the following particulars were furnished, namely;

"The Debtor obtained of Rs. 650 on 1-11-46 for family neces~ity
and executed a pro-note agreeing to pay interest on the principal at
B
Rs. 12-8-0 per cent and to pay the principal and interest together on
demand either to me or to my authority but has failed to pay anything
either towards principal or interest. Hence pray for direction for p~y
ment of Rs. 707 i.e., Rs. 650 being the principal and Rs. 57.00 being
interest at the rate of Rs. 12-8-0."(emphasis supplied)
c
Thus, in the proceeding under which award was made it was disclosed
that opposite party No. 3 obtained the loan of Rs. 650 on 1-11-46 for family
necessity and executed a pro-note. Therefore, the disputed property was sold
for legal necessity and this has attained finality. Moreover, the applicant has
I

not pleaded that the amount was not for legal necessity. The applicant has not D
also assailed this transaction on the ground of immorality or the absence of
legal necessity. There is a clear finding of the learned Trial Court that the
opposite party No. 3 did not take the loan for the purpose of any luxury and
that as the debt incurred was for legal necessity it was binding on the
applicant.
E
The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the Hindu
Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 are relevant for our present purpose and
are quoted below :

"3 (2). When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than F
the Dayabhag school or by customary law dies having at the time. of
his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), have in the property the
same interest as he himself had.

(3). Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of
G
this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's
estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claim-
ing partition as a male owner."

In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan
'
Dubey and others, [1962] 2 SCR 558=AIRI H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
'
A (1962) SC 83, a four Judge Bench of this Court laid down the following ratio
regarding right of a Hindu. widow in dealing with properties of her late hus-
band, which are extracted below :.

"When a widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the. ownership in the
·. · properties, both legal and beneficial, vests in: her. She fully represents
B
the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein· being ·only spes
successionis. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of
the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is true that she cannot
alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the
estate, but this restriction on her powers is riot one imposed for the
c benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to
Hindu law."

Court further held that :

D "Where, however, there is necessity for a transfer, the restriCtion
imposed by Hindu law ·on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and
the widow as owner has got the fullest discretion to decide what form
the alienation should assume. Her powers in this regard ai-e, as held in
a series of decisions beginning with Hunooman Persaud v. Mussrinuit
E Babooee Mandraj Koonweree, 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC) those of the
manager of an infant's estate or the manager of a joint Hindu family".

Thus the settled position of law is that the widow succeeds as a heir to
her husband. The ownership of properties vests in her. She fully represe~ts the
estate, the interest of reversioners therein being only spes successionis. In the
F
case in hand after the death of her husband, .the widow-Smt. Yenki, the
opposite party No. 3 succeeded to the property of her husband and she was
entitled to full enjoyment of the estate subject to. limited interest known as
Hindu Women's Estates. This right includes right to alienate the property for.
legal necessity of the family. Therefore, the allegation of the applicant that.he
G was the sole owner of the disputed land is not sustainable in law.

In the case in hand the disputed land was sold for legal necessity.In the
present application there is no averment or evidence to show that there was no
legal necessity, therefore, we hold that the sale in question is binding on the
H applicant, who is a reversioner.
NARAYAN GOVIND HEGDE v. KAMALAKARA SHIV ARAMA HEGDE [PHOKAN, J.] 191
We find merit in the present appeal and accordingly it is allowed by A
setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the first
appellate court and the judgment of the Munsif is restored.

In, the facts and circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own
costs.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.