NARENDRA & ORS.versusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

                              (2017] l 1 S.C.R. 540


A                            NARENDRA & ORS.
                                        v.
                   STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal Nos. I 0429-l 0430of2017)
B                            SEPTEMBER 11 . 2017
               [A. K. SIKIU AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.J
          land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.4(1), 6(1) and 28 - Fair
  compensation - Grant of- land uf the appellants acquired by the
c State - land Acquisition Officer determined the market value of the
  land at the rate of Rs.50 per sq. yds. - Unsatisfied with the value
  determined, appe//ams as well as other villagers sought reference
  u/s.18 of the Act -District Judge increased the rate of compensation
  10 Rs. 90 per sq. yd,, - Unsatisfied with increase in compensalion,
  appeals were filed - Appellants claimed that compensation be
D enhanced to Rs.115 per sq. yds. and some other land owners
  i/owever. claimed higher compensation - High Court found merit in
  the appeals filed by the others and raised compensation at the raze
  of Rs.297 per S<f. yds. - Howeve1; the High Court limited the
  compensation to Rs. I 15 per sq. yd,. of zhe present appellants
  because the appellants had demanded compensation at that rate
E
  only and had paid the court fees accordingly - On appeal, held:
   The mere fact that the compensation which was claimed by some of
  1he villagers was al lesser rate than lhe compensation which is
   ultimately determined to be fair compensation, should no/ be a
  ground to deny such persons appropriate and f£1ir compensalion
F on the grottn<I that 1he.v c/ain11.!<l co111pensativ11 at a lesser rate - Jn
  such cases. s1rict rule of pleadings are not be made applicable and
  rendering s11bsta11tial justice to the parties has to be the paramount
  consideratio11 - Once such a fair compensation is determined
  judicially, all land owners whose land was taken away by the same
  Notijicalion should become the beneficiary thereof- Not only it is
G
   an (l.lpect of good governance, j(1iling lo do so would ulso amount
   to discrimination h_v giving different treatment to the persons though
   identically situated - On technical ground,, like the one adopted
   hy the High Court in the impugned judgment, this fair treatment
   cannot be denied lo them - Simply because the appellants had paid
H
                                       540
          NARENDRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                             541


court fee on the claim at the rate of Rs.115/- sq. yds. could not be     A
the reason to deny the compensation at a higher rate - Appellants
directed to pay the difference in court fee after calculating the same
at the rate of Rs.2971- per sq. yds. - Judgment of the High Court set
aside.
      Administration of Justice - Justice delivetJ' system - Social      B
Justice - Discussed.
      T'Vi>rds and Phrases - 'Reflective Equilibrium' - Discussed.
      Allowing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1. The purpose and objective behind the s.28, Land          C
Acquisition Act, 1894 is salutary in nature. It is kept in mind that
those land owners who arc agriculturist in most of the cases, and
whose land is ac<1uircd for public purpose should get fair
compensation. Once a particular rate of compensation is judicially
determined, which becomes a fair compensation, benefit thereof
is to be given even to those who could not approach the court.           D
It is with this aim the aforesaid provision is incorporated by the
Legislature. The mere fact that the compensation which was
claimed by some or the villagers was at lesser rate than the
compensation which is ultimately determined to be fair
compensation, should not be a ground to deny such persons                E
appropriate and fair compensation on the ground that they claimed
compensation at a lesser rate. In such cases, strict rule of
pleadings arc not be made applicable and rendering substantial
justice to the parties has to be the paramount consideration. It
is to be kept in mind that in the matter of compulsory acquisition
or lands by the Government, the villagers whose land gets                F
acquired arc not willing parties. It was not their voluntary act to
sell of their land. They were compelled to give the land to the
State for public purpose. For this purpose, the consideration which
is to be paid to them is also not of their choice. On the contrary,
as per the scheme of the Act, the rate at which compensation             G
should he paid to the persons divested of their land is determined
by the Land Acquisition Collector. Scheme further provides that
 his detcrmina.tion is subject to judicial scrutiny in the form of
reference to the District Judge and appeal to the High Court etc.
 Jn order to ensure that the land owners are given proper
                                                                         H
542            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2017] l l S.C.R.


A     compensation, the Act provides for 'fair compensation'. Once
      such a fair compensation is determined judicially, all land owners
      whose land was taken away by the same Notification should
      become the beneficiary thereof. Not only it is an aspect of good
      governance, failing to do so would also amount to discrimination
      by giving different treatment to the persons though identically
B
      situated. On technical grounds, like the one adopted by the High
      Court in the impugned judgment, this fair treatment cannot be
      denied to them. (Para 7](548-E-G; 549-A-B)
             2. No doubt the judicial system that prevails is based on
      adversarial form of adjudication. At the same time, recognising
c     the demerits and limitations of adversarial litigation, clements of
      social context adjudication are brought into the decision making
      process, particularly, when it comes to administering justice to
      the marginalised section of the society. [Para 8)[549-C-D)
         3. Justice is a core rnlue of any judicial system. It is the
D  ultimate aim in the decision making process. In post-traditional
   liberal democratic theories of justice, the background assumption
   is that all humans have equal value and should, therefore, be
   treated as equal, as well as by equal laws. This can be described
   as 'Reflective Equilibrium'. The method of Reflective Equilibrium
 E was lirst introduced by Nelson Goodman in 'Fact, Fiction and
   Forecast' (1955). However, it is John Rawls who elaborated this
   method of Rcflecth·e Equilibrium by introducing the concept of
   •Justice as Fairness'. While on the one hand, there is the doctrine
   of 'justice as fairness', as propounded by John Rawls and
   elaborated by various jurists thereafter in the field of law and
 F political philosophy, there is also the notion of 'Distributive
   Justice' propounded by Hume which aims at achieving a society
   producing maximum happiness or net satisfaction. When one
   combines Rawls's notion of 'Justice as Fairness' with the notions
   of 'Distributive Justice', to which Noble Laureate Prof. Amartya
 G Sen has also subscribed, one gets jurisprudential basis for
   achieving just results for doing justice to the weaker section of
   the society. (Para 11)[550-D-F]
            4. From the human rights perspective, persons belonging
      to the weaker sections arc disadvantaged people who are unable
H     to acquire and use their rights because of poverty, social or other
          NARENDRA v. STATE Of UTTAR PRADESH                             543


constraints. They arc not in a position to approach the courts A
even whc•. their rights arc violated; they arc victimized or
deprived uf their legitimate due. Herc lies the importance of access .
to justice for socially and economically dbadvantagcd people.
When such people arc denied the basic right of survival and
access to justice, it further aggravates their poverty. Therefore, B
even in order to eliminate poverty, access to justice to the poor
sections of the society becomes imperative. In the instant case,
it is the poverty which compelled the appellants to restrict the
claim to Rs.115/- per sq. yard, as they were not in a position to
pay the court fee on a higher amount. (Para 12](550-G-H; 551-A-
B]                                                                       C
      5. It is the aforesaid weighty consideration which justify
award of compensation to the appellants at the rate of Rs.297/-
pcr square yards. Simply because the appellants had paid court
fee on the claim at the rate of Rs. HS/- square yards could not be
the reason to deny the compensation at a higher rate. This could         D
he taken care of by directing the appellants to pay the difference
in court fee after calculating the same at the rate of Rs.297/- per
square yards. Further, it is also directed that the appellants shall
make good in deficiency of court fee before the High Court.
[Paras 13, 16 and 17((551-B; 552-D-E[
                                                                         E
      Ashok Kumar and Another v. State of Hm:vana (2016)
      4 SCC 544 : [2016] 1 SCR 1084 - relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
     . [2016) 1 SCR 1084        relied on               Paras
                                                                         F
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
!0429-10430of2017.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 05.12.2014 and 07.l 0.2016
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal Defective
No. 451of1999 and Civil Misc. Review Application No. 19629 of2015.
                                                                         G
      Pradccp Kant. Sr. Adv., Divyanshu Sahay. Rohit Kumar Singh,
Advs. for the Appellants.
      Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv., Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay,
Adv. for the Respondents.
                                                                         H
544             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017J l l S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Cowt was delivered by
              A. K. SIKRI, J. I. A very limited, but pertinent, quest10n oflaw
      arises for consideration in these appeals. Land of the appellants was
      acquired by the Government ofUttar Pradesh vide Notification dated
      12th September. l 986 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
B     Act, l 894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It was followed by the
      declaration dated 24th February, 1988 issued under Section 6(1) of the
      Act. It may be mentioned that vide the aforesaid Notification, large tracts
      of land were acquired, belonging to various land owners/villagers of
      Village Makanpur Paragana Loni, Tehsil - Dadri, District Ghaziabad,
      Uttar Pradesh for planned development ofVaishali. After the acquisition
c     of this land, it was handed over to Ghaziabad Development Authority
      (for short, 'ODA') for development.
             2. The award dated 18th January, l 990 was passed by the Special
      Land Acquisition Officer determining the market value of the acquired
      land at the rate of Rs. 50 per square yard. The appellants as well as
D     other villagers were not satisfied with the rates so fixed and, therefore,
      sought the reference under Section 18 of the Act. Matter was referred
      to the Additional District Jml~e, Ghaziabad for determination of market
      value of the acquired land. Reference court, vide its judgment and order
      dated 19th April. l 999, increased the rate of compensation from Rs.50/
 E    - per sq. yards to Rs.90/- per square yards. Even this increase in the
      compensation was not to the satisfaction of the land owners. Various
      appeals came to be filed. Appeals were also filed by these appellants
      claiming that the compensation be enhanced to Rs. l 15/- per square
      yards. Some of the other land owners whose lands were acquired,
      however, had claimed higher compensation. The first batch of appeals
 F    filed by others was decided by the High Court by judgment dated 13th
      November, 2014. The High Court found merit in those appeals and fixed
      the compensation at the rntc of Rs.297/- per square yards. When the
      appeals of the appellants herein came up for hearing before the High
      Court. the High Court took n<>te of'ts earlier judgment and accepted the
G     fact that the land of the appell.ints was acquired by the same Notification
      vide which land of others was acquired wherein the High Court had
      awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards.
      Notwithstanding the same, insofar as the appellants are concerned. the
      High Cowt has limited the compensation to Rs.115/- rcr square yards
      because of the reasoning that the appellant had demanded compensation
 H
          NARENDRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                 545
                     [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

at that rate only and had paid the court fees also accordingly. Therefore,   A
opined the High Court, it was difficult to allow compensation at a rate
higher than the rate claimed by the appellants. ,
      3. In this backdrop, the question that falls for consideration is as
to whether the High Court was precluded from granting compensation
at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards which was the rate of               B
compensation awarded to other farmers of the said village whose lands
were acquired under the same Notification and were similarly situated.
       4. Before proceeding to discuss the aforesaid question, we may
mention that insofar as the order of the High Court fixing compensation
at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards is concerned, special leave         c
petition was filed by the GDA which was dismissed by this Court. Review
thereof was sought which was also dismissed. Even the curative petition
filed by the GDA came to be dismissed. Thus, the order of the High
Court granting compensation at the rate ofRs.297/- per square yards in
respect of these acquisition proceedings has attained finality.
                                                                             D
       5. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion
that the issue has already been settled by this Court in Ashok K11111ar
am/ Another vs. State ofHarya11a 1 wherein it is held that it is the duty
of the Court to award just and fair compensation taking into consideration
true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of claim made
by the land owner and there is no cap on the maximum rate of                 E
compensation that can be awarded by the court and the courts are not
restricted to awarding only that amount that has been claimed by the
land owners/applicants in their application before it. The relevant paras
of this judgment is quoted as under:
       "6. Prior to amendment Act 68 of 1984, the amount of                  F
       compensation that could be awarded by the Court was limited to
       the amount claimed by the applicant. Section 25 read as under-
       Section 25. Rules as to amount of compensation - (I) When the
       applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice
       given Under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the court         Cl
       shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount
       awarded by the Collector Under Section 11.
       (2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has
 '(2016) 4 sec 544
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546      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] l I S.C.R.



A     omitted w1li1vut sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to
      make such claim, the amount awarded by the court shall in no
      case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector.
      (3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be
      allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded
 B    to him by the court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the
      amount awarded by the Collector.
      The amended Section 25 reads as under:
         "Section 25. Amount of compensation awarded by Court not
         to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector- The
c        amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be
         less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section
         11 ."
      The amendment has come into effect on 24.09.1984.

0     7. The pre-amended provision put a cap on the maximum: the
      compensation by court should not be beyond the amount claimed.
      The amendment in 1984, on the contrary.put a cap on the minimum;
      compensation cannot be less that what was awarded by th, Land
      Acquisition Collector. The cap on maximum having been expressly
      omitted. and the cap that is put is only on minimum, it is clear that
 E    the amount of compensation that a court can award is no longer
      restricted to the amount claimed by the applicant. It is the duty of
      the Court to award just and fair comrensation taking into
      consideration the true market value and other relevant factors,
      irrespective of the claim made by the owner.
 F    8. xxx xxx xxx
      9. In Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [( 1985)
      3 SCC 737], this Cou11 held that there may be situations where
      the amount higher than claimed may be awarded to the claimant.
      The Court obscrvcd-
 G       "3 .... It must be remembered that this was not a dispute
         between two private citizens where it would be quite just and
         legitimate to confi : the claimant to the claim made by him
         and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed
         though even in such a case there may be situations where an
 H
   NARENDRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                547
              [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

  amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant A
  as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot
  ofan account. Here was a claim made by the Appellants against
  the State Government for compensation for acquisition of their
  land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the
  Appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of B
  the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the
  learned single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value
  of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land
  Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is
  no reason why the Appellants should have been denied the
  benefit of payment of the market value so determined. To deny C
  this benefit to the Appellants would tantamount to permitting
  the State Government to acquire the land of the Appellants on
  payment of less than the true market value. There may be
  ca· . , where, as for instance, under' agrarian reform legislation,
  the holder ofland may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice D
  with a view to eliminating concentration ofland in the hands of
  a few and bringing about its equitabl · distribution, be deprived
  ofl.md which is not being personally cultivated by him or which
  is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little
  compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is
  acquired underthe LandAcquisitionAct, 1894. it would not be E
  fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment
  of the true market value when the law, in so many terms,
  declares that he shall be raid such market value ....
I 0. In Krishi Ulpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal ((2000) 7
SCC 756], this Court held that under the amended provisions of       F
Section 25 of the Act, the Court can grant a higher compensation
than claimed by the applicant in his plcadings-
11. Further, in Bhimasha v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and
Ors. [(2008) l 0 SCC 797], a three-Judge bench reiterated the
principle in Bhag Singh (supra) and rejected the contention that a   G
higher compensation than claimed by the owner in his pleadings
cannot be awarded by the Court.. ...
                                            (Emphasis supplied)"
6. Matter can be looked into from another angle as well, viz., in
                                                                     H
548            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] I I S.C.R.



A     the light of the spint contained in Section 28A of the Act. This provision
      reads as under:
            "(I) Wherein an award under this Part, the Court allows to the
            applicant any amount of compensation m excess of the amount
            awarded by the Collector under Section IL the persons interested
 B          in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section
            4, sub-section ( l) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the
            Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an
            application to the Collector under Section 18. by written application
            to the Collector within three months from the date of the award
            of the court require that the amount of compensation payable to
c           them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of
            compensation awarded by the court. ..... "
            It transpires from the bare reading of the aforesaid provision that
      even in the absence of exemplars and other evidence, higher
      compensation can be allowed for others whose land was acquired under
D     the same Notification.
              7. The purpose and objective behind the aforesaid provision is
      salutary in nature. 1t is kept in mind that those land owners who arc
      agriculturist in most of the cases, and whose land is acquired for public
      purpose should get fair compensation. Once a particular rate of
 E    compensation is judicially determined. whi.ch becomes a fair
      compensation, benefit thereof is to be given even to those who could not
      approach the court. It is with this aim the aforesaid provision is
      incorporated by the Legislature. Once we keep the aforesaid purpose in
      mind, the mere fact that the compensation which was claimed by some
 F    of the villagers was at lesser rate than the compensation which is
      ultimately determined to be fair compensation, should not be a ground to
      deny such persons appropriate and fair compensation on the ground that
      they claimed compensation at a lesser rate. In such cases, strict rule of
      pleadings arc not be made applicable and rendering substantial justice to
      the parties has to be the paramount consideration. It is to be kept in mind
 G    that in the matter of compulsory acquisition oflands by the Government,
      the villagers whose land gets acquired arc not willing parties. It was not
      their voluntary act to sell of their land. They were compelled to give the
      land to the State for public purpose. For this purpose, the consideration
      which is to be paid to them is also not of their choice. On the contrary, as
      per the scheme of the Act, the rate at which compensation should be
 H
           NARENDRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                     549
                      [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

paid to the peb. '"s divested of their land is determined by the Land             A
Acquisition Collector. Scheme further provides that his determination is
subject to judicial scrutiny in the form ofrefcrence to the District Judge
and appeal to the High Court etc. ln order to ensure that the land owners
are given proper compensation, the Act provides for •fair compensation'.
Once such a fair compensation is determined judicially, all land owners
                                                                                  B
whose land was taken away by the same Notification should become
the beneficiary thereof. Not only it is an aspect of good governance,
failing to do so would also amount to discrimination by giving different
treatment to the persons though identically situated. On technical grounds,
like the one adopted by the High Court in the impugned judgment, this
fair treatment cannot be denied to them.                                          c
       8. No doubt the judicial system that prevails is based on adversarial
form of adjudication. At the same time, recognising the demerits and
limitations of adversarial litigation, clements of social context adjudication
are brought into the decision making process, particularly, when it comes
to administering justice to the marginalised section of the society.              D
       9. History demonstrates that various forms of conflict resolution
have been institutionalized from time to time. Presently, in almost all civil
societies, disputes are resolved through courts, though the judicial system
maybe different in different jurisdictions. Traditionally, our justice delivery
system is adversarial in nature. Of late, capabilities and method of this         E
adversarial justice system arc questioned and a feeling of disillusionment
and frustration is witnessed among the people. After all, what is the
purpose of having a judicial mechanism - it is to advance justice. Warren
Burger once said:
       "The obligation of the legal profession is ... to serve as healers of      F
       human conflict...(wc) should provide mechanisms that can
       produce an acceptable result in shortest possible time, with the
       least possible expense and with a mi 11imum of stress on the
       participants. That is what justice is all about."
       10. Prof. (Dr.) N.R. Madhava Menon explains the meaning and                G
contour of social justice ad; udication as the application of equality
jurisprudence evolved by the Parliament and the Supreme Court in myriad
situations presented before courts where unequal parties arc pitted in
adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense
equal justice. Apart from the socio-economic inequalities accentuating
                                                                                  H
550             SUPREME COURT Rt,l'ORTS                         [2U17J II S.C.R.


A     the disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process
      itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation,
      the Court has to be not only sen,itive to the inequalities of parties involved
      but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not
      to result in miscarriage ofjusticc. The Courts, in such situations, generally
      invoke the principle of fairness and equality which arc essential for
B
      dispensingJ ustice. Purposive interpretation is given to subserve the ends
      of justice particularly when the cases of vulnerable groups arc decided.
      The Court has to keep in mind the 'problem solving approach' by adopting
      therapeutic approaches to the maximum extent the law permits rather
      than 'just deciding' cases, thereby bridging the gap between law and
c     life, between law and justice. Tli-· notion of access to justice is to be
      taken in a broader sense. The objective is to render justice to the needy
      and that means fair solutions to the conflict thereby providing real access
      to.'justicc'.
             11. Justice is a core value ofany judicial system. It is the ultimate
D     aim in the decision making process. In post-traditional liberal democratic
      theories of justice, the background assumption is that all humans have
      equal value and should, therefore, be treated as equal, as well as by
      equal laws. This can be described as 'Reflective Equilibrium'. The method
      of Reflective Equilibrium was first introduced by Nelson Goodman in
      'Fact, Fiction and Forecast'(l955). However, it is John Rawls who
 E    elaborated this method of Reflective Equilibrium by introducing the
      concept of 'Justice as Fairness'. While on the one hand, we have the
      doctrine of 'justice as ji1irness ', as propounded by John Rawls and
      elaborated by various jurists thereafter in the field of law and political
      philosophy, we also have the notion of 'Distributive Justice 'propounded
 F    by Hume which aims at achieving a society producing maximum happiness
      or net satisfaction. When we combine Rawls's notion of 'Justice as
      Fairness' with the notions of 'Distributive Justice·, to which Noble
      Laureate Prof. Arnartya Sen has also subscribed, we get jurisprudential
      basis for achicvingjust results for doing justice to the weaker section of
      the society.
 G
             12. From the human rights perspective, persons belonging to the
      weaker sections are disadvantaged people who are unable to acquire
      and use their rights because of poverty, social or other constraints. They
      are not in a position to approach the courts even when their rights are
      violated; they are victimized or deprived of their legitimate due. Herc
 H
            NNlENDRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                               551
                       [A. K. SIKRI, J.J

lies the importance of access to jw;tice for socially and economically A
disadvantaged people. When such people are denied the basic right of
survival and access to justice, it further aggravates their poverty.
Therefore, even in order to eliminate poverty, access to justice to the
poor sections of the society becomes imperative. In the instant case, it is
the poverty which compelled the appellants to restrict the claim to Rs.115/ B
- per sq. yard, as they were not in a position to pay the court fee on a
higher amount.
      13. It is the aforesaid weighty consideration which justify award
of compensation to the appellants at the rate of Ri;.297/- per square
yards. Though, the aforesaid reasons arc enough to allow the appeals, in
the present case, there is yet another additional circumstance which         C
justifies this outcome.
       14. This Court in Civil Appeal No. 1506-1517of2016 tit!cdPardccp
Kumar etc. etc. v. NOIDA which pertains to subsequent acquisition
proceeding in the same vilh1ge Makanpur, but falling under NOIDA, h;id
on 16th February, 2016 set aside the order passed by the High Court of       D
Judicature at Allahabad and remanded the matter back to the High Court
for reconsideration in view of the judgments passed by the coordinate
benches of the same High Court in Kashi Ram's case as well as other
cases. The High Court, after the remand vidc its judgment dated 11"
April, 2016 in First Appeal No. 522 of2009 titled, Pardeep Kumar and         E
Others vs. State of U.P. & Anr. awarded the same enhanced
compensation at the rate of Rs. 297/- per sq. Yard even in the same
case also. The High Court while awarding the compensation at the same
rate held:
      "27. Therefore, one of the questions which needs to be examined        F
      by us is, can the appellants be denied the same rate of
      compensation only because the filed by them before the reference
      court did not disclose the rate which they seek now in terms of
      the judgment of the High Court in the case of Ghaziabad
      Development Authority (supra). Kanshi Ram case.
                                                                             G
      xxx               xxx               xxx
      29. It is settled law that the compensation under the Act, 1894
      had to be fair and just. Fairness requires that all those similarly
      situated are treated similarly. Technicalities qua rate as per
      exemplars filed by poor farmers, who arc illiterate, has to be given   H
552             SJ!PREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017) 11 S.C.R.


A            only such importance as may not defeat their right of fair and just
             compensation qua compulsory acquisition ofland holdings.
         ,
             30. The determination of acquisition at the rate ofRs.297/- per
             square yard in the case of Gha.riabad Development Authority
             (supra) Kashi Ram case has therefore, to be taken as the fair
B            rate determined for the land situated in the village Makanpur with
             regard to the notification issued on 12th September, 1986 as well
             as under Notification dated 15th March, 1988."
             15. The High Court, in the process, also took aid of Section 28 of
      the Act. Thus. even those villagers whose land was acquired subsequently,
c     arc given compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards.
      Depriving this rutc to the appellants herein would be nothing but travesty
      ofjustice.
              16. Simply because the appellants had paid court fee on the claim
      at the rntc of Rs.115/- square yards could not be the reason to deny the
D     compensation at a higher rate. This could be taken care of by directing
      the appellants to pay the difference in court fee after calculating the
      same at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards.
             17. In fine, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and these
      appeals arc allowed holding that appellants arc also entitled to
E     compensation ut the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards. The difference
      in compensation along with other statutory benefits under the Act shall
      be calculated and paid to the appellants within a period of three months
      from today. It is also dircotcd that the appellants shall make good in
      deficiency of court fee before the High Court. Appellants shall also be
      entitled to costs of these appeals.
F

      Ankit Gyan                                                  Appi:als allowed.