Holding

Where the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 does not provide for extension of time or condonation of default, the court has no power to do so and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is inapplicable to defaults in depositing rent under Section 13(4).

Summary

The appeal concerned a landlord-tenant dispute under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The tenant failed to deposit the arrears of rent within the period prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act and sought condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not empower the court to extend the time for deposit or to condone a default, because the language is plain and mandatory; consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked. The Court emphasized that statutes must be interpreted according to their plain meaning and that a court cannot enlarge a legislature’s scheme. The appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order dismissing the condonation application was set aside.

Issues considered

Whether a court may condone delay in depositing rent under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.
Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to a default in depositing rent under the said Act.
Whether the word ‘shall’ in the Act creates a mandatory or directory obligation.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 3, s. 5
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950s. 13(4), s. 13(5)

Subjects

rent controlevictionlimitation actcondonation of delaystatutory interpretationmandatory vs directoryRajasthan Premises ActSection 13(4)Section 5 Limitation Act

Judgment

A NASfRUDDIN AND ORS.
v.
SITA RAM AGARWAL

JANUARY 28, 2003

B [V.N. KHARE, CJ., S.B. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.]
+
Rent Control and Eviction:

Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950-Section
C 13(4)-Default in deposit of rent-Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation
Act-Held: Not applicable since the Rent Act did not confer power on the
court to extend the period for depositing the rent or to condone the default- )(

Court can condone the default only when statute confers the power and not
otherwise-Further since the deposit ofrent does not require any application,
D provisions ofSection 5 of Limitation Act cannot be extended where the default
takes place in complying with an order under Section 13 (4)-Limitation Act,
1963, Section 5.

Interpretation of statutes-Scope of-Held: Court cannot enlarge the
scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain
E and unambiguous.

The question which arose for consideration in this appeal was
whether the delay in depositing the rent could be condoned under the
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and whether
the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable where
F there is default in depositing the rent within the stipulated time by the
tenant.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be
G invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case
the Court ~an iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the
fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the
language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract
words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot

H 634
NASlRUDDlN v. SIT A RAM 635

re~write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there A
exists a presun1ption that the legislature has not used any superfluous
words. It is well-settled that the real intention of the legislation must be
gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression
~shall or may' is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute
is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be B
found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well-settled that
when negative \Vords are used the courts will presume that the intention
of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character.
1648-B-DJ

1.2. It is well-settled principle that if an act is required to be C
performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would
ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to
perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to
be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. 1648-E-FJ

1.3. Wherever the Special Act provides for extension of time or D
condonation of default, the Court possesses the power therefor, but where
the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the
default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the Court does
not have the power to do so. In the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1950 in the absence of such provisions, the Court does E
not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent or to
condone the default in depositing the rent. Therefore, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable where there is a default in depositing
the rent by the tenant under Section 13(4) of the Act. It is true that the
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 does not
expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its F
terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent
by the tenant. 1649-A-DI

1.4. On perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is evident that
the question of its application would arise where any appeal or any G
application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant
or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not
making the appeal or application within such period. Section 13(4)
provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of
sub-section (I), the tenant shall on the first date of hearing or on or before
such date the Court may on the application fixed in this behalf or within H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A such time the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord in court
as determined under sub-section (3) from the date of such determination
or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended
by the Court. Thus, sub-section (4) itself provides for limitation of a sptcific
period within which the deposit has to be made, which cannot be exceeding
B three months as extended by this Court. The deposit by the tenant within
15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application,
the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default takes + ..
place in complying with an order under Section 13(4) of the Act. The
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having
C regard to section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of
the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute
a cause of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by a Court
of Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of
action. Failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant
D consequences are provided for under the statute. (649-F-H; (i50-A-D)

Shanti/a/ M Bhayani v. Shanti Bai, (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 578 and
Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesri v. Lakshmi Narain Gupta, (19851 3 SCR 825,
distinguished.

Gopal Dass and Ors. v. Nathulal Baraya, AIR (1983) Raj. 222; Mis.
E B.P. Khemka Pvt. ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Anr., (1987) 2 SCC
407; Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama, 11989) Suppl. 2 SCR 336; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar
Mill Pvt. ltd. and Ors., (2002) 9 SCALE 102; Mis. Unique Butyle Tube
Industries Pvt. ltd v. V.P. Financial Corporation and Ors., (2002) 9 SCALE
F 778; Shyamacharan Sharma v. Dharamdas, AIR (1980) SC 587; Miss Santosh
Mehta v. Om Prakash and Ors., (1980) 3 SCR 325; Ram Murti v. Bholanath
and Ors., AIR (J.984) SC 1392; V.K. Verma v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 11964)
SC 1317; Shibu Chandra Dhar v. Pasupati Nath Auddya, (2002] 3 SCC 617;
Ganpat Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde, (197813SCR198; Mrs. Manju
Choudh01y and Anr. v. Dula! Kumar Chandra, AIR (1988) SC 602; E.
G Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by lrs. and Ors., (2003) I SCC 122; Shri
Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum
(Smt.) and Ors., 11994) 2 SCC 671; Mis J:Jyanta Cycle and Motor Mart,
Kanpur v. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR (1969) All 200; Hukumde,,v
Narain Yadav v. la/it Narain Mishra, (1974) 3 SCR 31; Kulamani Kar and
H Ors. v. Orissa land Reforms Tribunal-cum-Subordinate Judge, Cuttack and

'
NASIRUDDIN v. SITA RAM [V.N. KHARE. CJ.] 637

Ors.. AIR (1983) Orissa 63; The Commissioner o(Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, A
lllcknow v. Mis. Parson Tools and !'!ants, Kanpllr, AIR (1975) SC 1039;
State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Kartid Chandra Das and Ors., f1996J 5
SCC 342; Prem Raj v. Ram Charan. J1974J 3 SCR 494 and Mukri Copa/an
v. Cheppi/at Puthanpurayil Aboohacker, J19951 5 SCC 5, referred to.

Sutherland, Stal!llury Cons/ruction 3rd edition. Vol.3, p. l 07, referred B
to.
+
' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDJCTION Civil Appeal No. 5077 of
1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.1997 in SBCRP 570/94 of C
the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur.

Sushi! Kumar Jain, for the Appellant.

Aruneshwar Gupta, for the Respondent.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

As regards applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the
matter of default in deposit of rent as also interpretation of the word 'shall'
occurring in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950
(hereinafter referred to 'the Act', for the sake of brevity), a Division Bench E
of this Court by an order dated 21.3.2002 referred the matter to a three Judge
Bench observing :

"Looking to the impo11ance of the questions and the conflicting views
taken in the judgments of this Court, we deem it proper that the case
is heard by a Bench of three Judges." F
That is how the matter is before us.

Before adverting to the afore1nenti0ned questions, the factual 1natrix
involved in the matter 'may be noticed. The appellant herein is the landlord
ia respect of the suit premises and the respondent is a tenant therein. Allegedly, G
the respondent did not pay rent for the period 1.8.1986 to 31.1.1987 wherefor
upon service of the legal notice, a suit for possession and arrears of rent was
filed which was marked as Civil Suit No.824 of 1993.

The learned Trial Judge in tenns of the provisions contained in Section
13(.1) of the Ac1 determined the provisional rent (ti_: Rs. 80 per month and by Tf
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A an order dated 9.9.1991 directed the respondent to deposit the arrears as also
current rent in court. Admittedly, the respondent did not deposit. the same
within the period specified therein. The appellant herein filed an application
purported. to be under Section 13(5) of the Act; whereafter on or about
9.11.1993 the respondent filed an application for condo11ation of delay. By
reason of an order dated 20.1.1994, the said application for condonation of
B delay was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that the same was not filed
within time. A revision application was thereafter filed by the respondent
questioning the legality or validity of the said order, inter alia, on the ground f.
that there is no law barring filing of an application for condonation of delay
after expiry of the period specified for deposit of rent.
c It appears that a Full Eench of the Rajasthan High Court in Gopa/ Dass
and Ors. v. Nathulal Baraya, AIR (1983) Raj. 222 had held that an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of deposit of rent in terms
of Section 13(4) of the Act was maintainable. The said decision was rendered
having regard to Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction)
D (Amendment) Act, 1975, in terms whereof Section 13-A was inserted whereby
and whereunder the court was obligated to determine the amount of arrears
of rent up to the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at
the rate of 6% per annum and cost of the suit allowable to the landlord and
direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not
E exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the court and on such payment
being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceedings were to be
disposed of as if the tenant has not committed any default.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court at the hearing of the revision
application filed by the respondent was, however, of the view that as the Full
F Bench in Gopal Dass 's case (supra) was concerned with interpretation of
Section 13-A(b) of the Act; the question as regards applicability of Section
5 of the Limitation Act in the matter arising under Section 13(4) of the said
Act requires consideration by a larger Bench, The learned Single Judge was
further of the view that the decision of the Full Bench in Gopal Dass 's case
G (supra) required reconsideration also on the question as to whether the court
has any power to extend the time beyond the period prescribed under Section
13(4) of the Act having regard to the fact that the said decision based on
various judgments of this Court relating to different Rent Control statutes of
various States which were not in pari materia with the provisions of the Act.

H Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said observations of the learned
NASIR UDDIN v. SIT A RAM [V.N. KHARE, CJ.] 639
. single judge, a Full Bench of five Judges was constituted. By' reason of the ·A
~-0- impugned judgment dated 17.12.1997, three Hon'ble Judges of the High
Corn1 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable where th·ere is
default in deposit of arrears of rent within specified period whereas two other
members of the Bench held to the contrary.
' The Full Bench was funher of the view that since the applicability of B
the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not expressly excluded by reason of the
provisions of the Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, I 963 would be
' applicable in a case where the tenant could not deposit the rent within the
time pursuant to the order passed under Section I3(3) of the Act. The Full
Bench also held that the word "shall" has to be interpreted as "may" and it C
is in the discretion of the Coun to condone the delay in default of payment/
deposit of rent within specified period.

In that view of the matter, the order rejecting the application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act was set aside and the revision petition filed
by the respondent was allowed. It is against the said judgment, the appellants D
have preferred this appeal.

Two questions which arise for our consideration are, firstly, that whether
the matter stands covered by the decision of this Coun in Mis. B.P. Khemka
Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Anr., [1987] 2 SCC 407; and,
secondly, whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is E
applicable where there is a default in depositing the rent within stipulated
time by the tenant.

Section 13( I )(a) of the Act enables a landlord to sue for a decree of
eviction in the event a tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent
f- due from him for six months. In terms of sub-section (3) of Section I3 which F
was substituted by Section 8(i) of the Rajasthan Act No.I4 of 1976 it is
obligatory on the coun to provisionally determine the amo"nt of rent wherefor
no application is required to be filed. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of the said Act
which are relevant for this appeal read thus :-

"(4) The tenant shall deposit in coun or pay to the landlord the G
amount determined by the coun under sub-section (3) within fifteen
days from the date of such determination, or within such funher time,
not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the coun. The
tenant shall also continue to deposit in coan or pay to the landlord,
month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period up to H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A which determination has b.een made, by the fifteenth of each
succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen
days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at wl1ich
the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3).

(5). If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in
B sub-section (4), on the date or within the time specified therein, the
court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and
shall proceed with the hearing of the suit." + r

A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions would show that in
terms of sub-section (4) of Section 13, a tenant is required to deposit the
C amount of rent determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen
days of the date of detennination or within such further time not exceeding
three months, as may be extended by the court.

It is not in dispute that by reason of 1976 Amendment, the following
D was specifically inserted :-

"With in such further time not exceeding 3 months as may be extended
by the Court or the words" or within such further time not exceeding
15 days as may be extended by the Court, at the monthly rate at
which the rent was determined by the Court under sub-section (3)"

E · ·· · The word 'shall', which is ordinarily imperative in nature, has been
used in sub-section (4) of Section 13. The power of the court has also been
limited to the extent that it can extend time for such deposit not exceeding
three months and so far as the deposit of monthly rent is concerned, by
fifteen days. The court's power, therefore, is restricted. In case tenant deposits
F · the provisional rent as determined by the Court within stipulated period the
tenant is relieved by the eviction decree. *·
In the aforementioned backdrop, the decision of this Com1 in Mis. B.P.
Khemka 's case (supra) may be noticed.

G M/s. B.P. Khemka (supra) arose out of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short 'the West Bengal Act'). In the said case the
tenant committed default in payment of arrears of rent and the landlord
brought a suit for eviction on the ground of default. While the suit was
pending; the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance No. 6
of 1967, which was replaced by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy
H (Amendment) Act 30 of 1969 came to be promulgated with effect from
NASIRUDDIN v. SITA RAM [V.N. KHARE, CJ.] 641

August 26, 1967. The Act gave a retrospective effect to the an1end1nents by A
providing that the a1nend1nents 111ade by Section 2 of the Ordinance shall
have effect in respect of all suits including appeals which were pending at the
date of co1n1nence1nent of the Ordinance. The an1endments inter alia enabled
tenants who were in default to apply to the court and pay the arrears of rent
in instalments and thereby avert their eviction. In pursuance thereof, the B
tenant deposited the rent. However, he subsequently committed default in
paying monthly rent. Consequently, the defence was struck off on the ground
that in paying the rent for the months of September, 1968 and March 1969,
there had been a delay of 44 days and 6 days respectively, which was in
contravention of Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Act.

In this context sub-sections (2A), (2B), (3) and (4) of Section 17 of the
c
West Bengal Act may be noticed which read as under:

"(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I) or sub-
section (2) on the application of the tenant the court, may, by order:

(a) extend the time specified in sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) for D
the deposit or payment of any amount referred to therein.
(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(2B) No applicat,ion for extension of time for the deposit or payment
of any amouot under clause (a) of sub-section (2A) shall be entertained E
unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified therefor in
sub-section (I) or sub-section (2);"

"(3) If a tenant fails to deposit, or pay any amount referred to in sub-
section (I) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or
within such extended time as may be allowed under clause (a) of sub- F
section (2-A), or fails to deposit or pay any instalment pennitted
under clause (b) of sub-section (2-A) within the time fixed therefor,
the court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be
struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.

(4) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section G
(I), sub-section (2), or sub-section (2-A) no decree or order for delivery
of possession of the premises ta the landlord on the ground of default
in payment of rent by the tenant shall be made by the court but the
court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord."

This Court in Mis. fl.P. Khemka's case (supra) while interpreting the H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2003] I S.C.R.

A provisions of sub-section (4) held that the proviso makes it clear that if the
subsequent default is for a period of 4 months within a period of 12 months,
the tenant can claim relief under the sub-section once again. Since the default
was less than 40 days, th is Court held that under the said proviso, the delay
could be condoned.

B In terms of clause (a) of sub·section (2A) of Section 17 of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 requisite power to extend the time for
deposit of.rent on an application made by the tenant is conferred in the court
in relation whereto there does not exist any restriction.

C It is beyond any cavil that the question as to whether the provision is
directory or mandatory would depend upon the language employed therein.
[See Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981 = [ 1989] Suppl. 2 SCR 336]. ),--

This Court in Bhavnagar University v. Politano Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd.
D and Ors., (2002) 9 SCALE I 02], has observed :-

"Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be
enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.
In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed
according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered
E or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision
from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally
irreconcilable with the rest of the statute"

[See also Mis Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. UP. Financial
Corporation and Ors., (2002) 9 SCALE 778.
F
It is also a well-settled principle of law that the decision on an
interpretation of one statute can be followed while interpreting another
provided both the statutes are in pari materia and they deal with identical
scheme.

G The High Court relied upon the following decisions dealing with
respectively with the Rent Control Acts of the different States:

(i) AIR (1980) SC 587: [1980] 2 SCC 151 Shyamacharan Sharma
v. Dharamdas-dealing with the M.P. Accommodation Control
H Act.
NASIRUDDIN "·SITA RAM fV.N. KHARE. CJ.] 643

(ii) AIR 1980 SC 1664: [1980] 3 SCC 610 Miss Santosh Mehta v. A
Om Prakash and Ors., dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(iii) AIR ( 1984) SC 1932 : [ 1984] 3 SCC 111 Ram Murti v. Bholanath
and Ors., dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(iv) AIR (1985) SC 964: [1985] 3 SCC 53 Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesri
v. Lakshmi Narain Gupta dealing with the Bihar Building. B
(v) AIR (1987) SC 1010: [1987] 2 SCC 407 B.P. Khemka Pvt. ltd.
v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Ors., dealing with West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act.

The question, therefore, which would arise for our consideration is as C
to whether the respective State Acts on the basis whereupon the impugned
judgments of this Court had been rendered are analogous to the provisions
-.I. of the Act or not.

Jn Shyama Charan Sharma v. Dharmdas. AIR (I 980) SC 587 : [ 1980]
2 SCC 151, the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 D
(hereinafter referred to as "the M.P. Act") was in question. Sub-sections (I)
and (6) of Section 13 thereof are as follows :

"(!)On a suit or proceeding being instituted the landlord on any of
the ground referred to in section 12, the tenant shall, within one
month of the service of summons on him or within such further time E
as the court 1nay, on an application made to it, alloiti in this behalf,
deposit in the court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the
rate of rent at which it was paid for which the rent may have made
default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the
month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made; and F
shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the
15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that
rate.

(6) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this
section the court may order the defence against eviction to be struck G
out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit."

(Emphasis mine)

A bare perusal of the said provisions would clearly go to show that by
reason of the provisions of Section 13(1) of the M.P. Act, the Court has been
conferred power to extend the time for deposit of rent to any such fu11her H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A time, as it may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf. The power
of the cou11 under the M.P. Act is not restricted. However. discretion available
to the court under the Rajasthan Act, as noticed hereinbefore is limited.
Fm1hermore, in sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the M.P. Act, the word
'may' has been used which is directory; in contra-distinction with the word
B 'shall' employed in the Rajasthan Act.

The M.P. Act provides for the power of the court to extend the time in
the event sufficient cause therefor is shown which is absent in the Rajasthan
Act. Furthermore, in terms thereof once the rent has been determined, the
same has to be depQsited within the prescribed period wherefor there exists
C no provision for filing an application.

In Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and Ors., [ 1980] 3 SCR 325 :
(1980] 3 SCC 610 arid Ram Murti v. Bholanath and Ors., AIR (1984) SC
1392 : [I 984] 3 SCC I I I], this Court was concerned with the provision of
Section I 5 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which is in the following
D term:

(1) In any proceeding for the recovery of possE-ssion of any premises
on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (I)
of section 14, the controller shall after giving the parties an opportunity
of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the :»-·
E landlord or deposit with the controller within one month of the date
of the order, an. amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was
last paid for the period for which the arrears of rent were legally
recoverable from the tenant including the period subsequent thereto
up to the end of the moi1th previous to that in which payment or
deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month
by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rate of
rent.

(3) If in any proceedings referred to in subsection (I) or subsection
(2), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the
tenant, the Controller shall, within fifteen days of the date of first
G hearing of the proceedings fix an interim rent in relation to the premis~s
to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(I) or subsection (2), as the case may be, until the standard rent in
relation thereto is fixed having regard to the provisions of this act,
and the amount of arrears, if any, calculated on the basis of standar9
H rent shall be paid or deposited by the tenant within one month of the

\
NASIRlJDDIN v. SITA RAM [V.N. KHARE. CJ.] 645

date on such fi1rther til11e 1s the Controller n1ay a/lo·w in this behalf A
(7) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this
section the court n1ay order the defence against eviction to be struck
out and shall proceed \vith the hearing of the application.''

(Emphasis mine) B
Yet again Section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act confers power upon
the court to extend the time for deposit of rent to any such period, as it may
• in this behalf deem fit. Furthermore, even in sub-section (7) of Section 15 the
word 'may' has been used. We may notice that under sub-section (5) of
Section 13 of the old Act the word 'shall' has been used and construing the C
said provision, this Court in V.K. Verma v. Radhey Shyam, AIR (1964) SC
1317], noticed :

" ..... the change of words from "the court shall order the defence
against ejectment to be struck out" to the words "the controller may
order the defence against eviction to be stuck out" is clearly deliberate D
modification in law in favour of the tenant. Under the old act the
court had no option but to strike out the defence if failure to pay or
deposit the rent is proved; under the new act the controller who takes
the place of the court has a discretion in the matter; so that in proper
cases he may refuse to strike out the defence."
E
(Emphasis mine)

In Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesri v. Lakshmi Narain Gupta, [! 985] 3 SCR
825 : (1985] 3 SCC 53, this Court was concerned with interpretation of
Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act,
1947 (hereinafrer referred to 'Bihar Act of 1947') which was in the following
F
term

"11-A. Deposit of rent by tenants in suits for ejectment !fin a suit for
recovery of possession the tenant contests the suit, as regards claim
for ejectment, the landlord may make an application at any stage of G
the suit for order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent at a
rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any; and
the court, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, may
make an order for deposit of rent at such rate as may be determined
month by month and the arrears of rent, if any, and on failure of the
tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A the order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day
.' of the next following month, the court shall order the defence against
-~-
ejectment to be struck out and the tenant to be placed in the same
position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment. The landlord
may also apply for permission to withdraw the deposited rent without
prejudice to his right to claim decree for ejectment and the court may
B permit him to do so. The court may further order the recovery of cost
of suit and such other compensation as may be determined by it from
the tenant."

The said provision of the Bihar Act of 1947 did not contain any negative
C provision as is there in the present Act. Furthermore, even under the said
provision an application was required to be filed which is not the case in this
appeal. For that reasons the decision in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesri (supra) is
distinguishable and has no application to the present case.

We may further notice that in Shibu Chandra Dhar v. Pasupati Nath
D Auddya, [2002] 3 SCC 617], which also arose out of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, it was held that under sub-section (2A) of Section 17 of the
Act, the Court has a power to extend the period for depositing the rent in the
event of default by the tenant to deposit the rent within a stipulated time. This
Court further held that if a Court has no power to extend the time, then in v-
cases of small default beyond the reason of the tenant, the time cannot be
E extended
(Emphasis mine)

It is interesting to note that in Ganpat Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu
Shinde, [1978] 3 SCR 198: [1978] 2 SCC 573, this Court while interpreting
F similar provisions occurring in Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent, Hotel,
Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Bombay Rent Act") held :

"Section 12(3 )(b) does not create any discretionary jurisdiction in the
Court, it provides protection to the tenant on certain conditions and
G these conditions have to be strictly observed by the tenant who seeks
the benefit of the section. If the statutory provisions do not go far
enough to relieve the hardship of the tenant the remedy lies with the
legislature, it is not in the hands of the Court."

Thus under the Bombay Rent Act only on certain grounds the Court can
H exercise its discretionary power and not on other grounds.
NASIRUDDIN v. SITA RAM [V.N. KHARE. CJ.] 647
Yet again in Jtlrs. Manju Choudha1J1 and Anr. v. Dula/ K111nar Chandra, A
AIR (1988) SC 60~, this Court interpreting the provision of Section 15 of the
Bihar Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Ordinance I 982 being
Ordinance No.63 of I 982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bihar Rent Ordinance,
1982'), held :

"Section 13 of the Act stipulates that if in a suit for recovery of B
pos.;ession of any building the tenant contests the suit as regards the
claim for ejectment, the landlord may move an application at any
stage of the suit for an order on the tenant to deposit rent month by
month at the rate at which it was last paid and also subject to the law
of limitation, the arrears of rent, if any, and the court after giving an C
opportunity to the parties to be heard may make an order to deposit
the rent month by month at such rates as to be determined and the
arrears, both before and after the institution of the suit, if any, and
thereafter provides "on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of
rent within 15 days of the next following month the court shall order
the defence against the ejectment to be struck off'. Therefore, there D
is a duty cast on the court to strike out the defence ifthere is a failure
of the tenant to deposit arrears of rent within 15 days. In this case,
both the trial court as well as the High Court have found that there
- ., was, in fact, a delay to pay the arrears of rent within 15 days. In that
view of the matter it is not possible to interfere with the order of the E
High Court."

ln the said case there was delay of about four to five days in depositing
the rent allegedly on the ground of bank strike but the defence against the
eviction was struck off.

In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the F
court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh
consequences arising therefrom. In £. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by
Lrs. and Ors., [2003] I SCC 122, a Division Bench of this Court observed:

" ....... The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the G
tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred
on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on
the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable
consideration has no place in such matters"

It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Control Act is a welfare H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 1 S.C.R.

A legislation not entirely beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the
benefit of landlord. See: Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum (Smt.) and Ors .. [ 1994] 2 SCC 671. In that
view of the. matter, balance has to be struck while interpreting the provisions
of the Rent Act.

B The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the
same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the Court can iron
out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge
the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain
and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something
C into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to detennihe that there exists a ptesumption that the legislature has
I
not used any superfluoµs words. It is well-settled that the real intention of the
legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use
of the expression 'shall or may' is not decisive for arriving at a finding as
to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature
D must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well-settled
that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention
of the legislature was that. the provisions are mandatory in character.

Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of.
It is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a
E private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory
but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within
a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences
therefor are specified. In Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd edition,
Vol.3 at p.107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals
F should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the
opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p.
I 09, it is pointed out that often the question as· to whether a mandatory or
directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be
determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow
f
·non-compliance with the provision.
G
At p.111 it is stated as follows :

"As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no
consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been
collsidered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. ~ut
H this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means
NASIRUDDIN v. SITA RAM fV.N. KHARE, CJ.J 649
conclusive." A
Thus, on analysis of the aforesaid t\vO decisions \Ve find that \Vherever
the special Act provides. for extension of lin1e or con donation of default, the
Court possesses the power therefor. but \vhere the statute does not provide
either for extension of ti1ne or to condone the default in depositing the rent
within the stipulated period, the Court does not have the power to do so. B

In that view of the matter it must be held that in absence of such
' provisions in the present Act the Court did not have the power to either
extend the period to deposit the rent or to condone the default in depositing
the rent.
c
Coming to the second question, we are of the view that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable where there is a default in depositing
the rent by the tenant under Section 13(4) of the Act.

It is true that Rajasthan Act does not expressly exclude the application D
of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its terms is not applicable to wherever
there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus:

"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. Any appeal or E
any application, other than an application under any of the provisions
of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted
after the prescribed period. if the appellant or the applicant satisfied
the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period."
F
On perusal of the said Section it is evident that the question of application
of Section 5 would arise where any appeal or any application may be admitted
after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the com1
that he had sufficient cause for not making the appeal or application within
such period. Section 13(4) provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground G
set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (I), the tenant shall on the first date of
hearing or on or before such date, the Court may on the application fixed in
this behalf or within such time the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the
landlord in court as determined under'sub-section (3) from the date of such
detern1ination or \Vithin such further ti1ne not exceeding three months as may
be extended by the Cou1t. Thus, sub-section (4) itself provides for limitation H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2003] I S.C.R.

A of a specific period within which the deposit has to be made, which cannot
be exceeding three months as extended by this Court.
'
The matter may be examined from another angle. The deposit by the
tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application,
B therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default
takes place in complying with an order under sub-section ( 4) of Section 13
of the Act.

The provisions of Section 5 c,f the Limitation Act must be construed
C having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry
of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute
a cause of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by a Court of
Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action.
Failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences
are provided for under the statute. The court can condone che default only
D when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. In that
view of the matter we have no other option but to hold that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the instant case.

In Mis. Jayanta Cycle aad Motor Mart, Kanpur v. Assistant
Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR (1969) All. 200, V.G. Oak, CJ observed :
E
"Delay may be condoned if a party makes delay in filing an appeal
or moving an application, but no such situation arose in the present
case. The petitioner made delay in depositing the admitted tax. The
appeal itself was filed within time. The Assistant Commissioner rightly
held that there was no room to give the appellant the benefit of
F
Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act."

Pathak, J., (as he then was) observed :

"Section 5 is not attracted when the question arises whether the delay
in depositing the admicted tax should be condoned. It seems to me
G
that the application made by the Petitioner for C?ndonation of delay
in depositing the entire amount of admitted tax is not maintainable
under Section 5 of Limitation Act."

In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. La/it Narain Mishra. [1974) 3 SCR 31,
H P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
NASTRUDDIN v. SIT A RAM [V.N. KHARE. C.1.) 651

govern an election petition. The said decision has been follo\ved in Kulan1ani A
Kar and Ors. v. Orissa Land Refor111s Tribunal-c111n-Subordinate Judge,
Cuuack and Ors., AIR (1983) Orissa 63.

In The Commissioner of Sales Tax, VIiar Pradesh, Lucknow v. Mis
'
' Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, AIR (1975) SC 1039 ~ [1975] 4 SCC 22,
this Court upon referring to various decisions observed : B

• ." "Thus the principle that emerges is that if the Legislature in a special
statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular
' application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period
on sufficient ~ause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum,
only upto a specified time-limit and no further, ·then the tribunal C
concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application
filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute,
by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due
diligence any prior proceedings on the analogy of Section 14(2) of
the Limitation Act." D
In State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Kartick Chandra Das and Ors.,
[ \ 996] 5 SCC 342, this Court observed :

"In consequence, by operation of Section 29(2) read with Section 3
of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law E
under Section 19 of the Contempt vf Courts Act and limitation in
filing Letters Patent appeal stands attracted. In consequence, Sections
4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands attracted to Letters Patent appeal
insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded
either by special or local law. Since the rules made on the appellate
side, either for entertaining the appeals under clause 15 of the Letters F
Patent or appeals arising under the contempt of courts, had not
expressly excluded, Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes
applicable. We hold that Section 5 to the Limitation Act does apply
to the appeals filed against the order of the learned Single Judge for
the enforcement by way of a contempt. The High Court, therefore, G
was not right in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
apply. The delay stands condoned. Since the High Court had not
dealt with the matter on merits, we decline of express any opinion on
merits. The case stands remitted to the Division Bench for decision
on merits."
H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] I S.C.R:

A Furthermore, for constituting an application within the meaning of the
said provision. there should be some request. [See Prem Raj v. Ram Charan,
[1974] 3 SCR 494 : AIR 1974 SC 968.

Mr. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the respondent. however, placed
reliance upon a decision of this Court in Mukri Copafun v. Cheppilat
B Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, [1995] 5 sec 5. Therein this Court was concerned
with extension of period of limitation in a case wherein an appeal was to be
preferred before an appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1965. As for preferring an appeal a period of limitation
is prescribed, it was held that Section 5 of the Act was a;Jpli<:able and,
C therefore, the <mid ciecision i~ of no help to the respondent:

Similarly in Shanti/al M. Bhayani v. Shanti Bai, [ 1995] Supp. 4 SCC
578], this Coun was concerned with the question as to whether the provision
of Section 5 of the Act would be applicable to an appeal filed before the
appellate authority fonctioning under the T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent
D Control) Act, 1960.

The question which arose for c011sideration therein was wl~ether the
appellate authority was a court or a persona designata. Having regard to the
provisions of contained in sub-section (2) of Section 29, it was held that the
Limitation Act, 1963 applies. Such is not the case here and, therefore, the
E said decision is distinguishable.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the judgment of the
High Court cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment
under challenge.

F The appeal is allowed. Ther·e shall be no order as to costs.

N.J. Appeal allowed.

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