Supreme Court of India
NATHI DEVIversusRADHA DEVI GUPTA
- Citation
- 2004 INSC 722
- Decided
- 17 December 2004
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- N SANTOSH HEGDE
Holding
Section 14D grants the right of immediate possession only to a widow who let out the premises herself or whose husband let out the premises; a widow who becomes landlord by transfer cannot invoke this provision.
Summary
The appellant, Nathi Devi, was a long‑term tenant of premises that the respondent, Radha Devi Gupta, purchased in 1982. The respondent, a widow, filed an eviction petition under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming immediate possession for her own residence. The key issue was whether Section 14D applies when the widow became landlord by purchase and the premises were not originally let out by her or her late husband. The Supreme Court examined the literal meaning of the phrase “let out by her, or by her husband” and the interplay with Section 14(6), which bars a transferee landlord from evicting a tenant within five years of acquisition. The Court held that Section 14D confers a right only on widows who themselves or whose husbands had let out the premises, and that a transferee widow cannot invoke it; the five‑year restriction also applies. Consequently, the eviction petition was dismissed and the appeal allowed.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to a widow who acquired the premises by purchase and not by letting them out herself or her husband.
- Whether the five‑year bar under Section 14(6) of the Act applies to a transferee widow seeking immediate possession.
- The proper interpretation of the phrase “let out by her, or by her husband” in Section 14D.
Legislation cited
- Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14, s. 14(1)(e), s. 14(6), s. 14A, s. 14B, s. 14C, s. 14D, s. 258(4), s. 25B
Subjects
Delhi Rent Control ActSection 14Dwidow landlordevictionimmediate possessionstatutory interpretationfive‑year restrictiontransfer of tenancylandlord‑tenant law
Judgment
NATHI DEVI A
v.
RADHA DEVI GUPTA
DECEMBER 17, 2004
B
[N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIAVA, B.P. SINGH,
H.K. SEMA AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :
Section 14D-Eviction-Right to immediate possession by a Widow- C
Pre existent tenant-Held, not available to transferee widow landlady.
Interpretation of Statutes :
Court-Interpretative function-To find out the true legislative intent-"- D
Every word used by the legislature be given effect to--Object and purport
of the Act must be given effect to.
Respondent after acquiring the tenanted premises filed eviction
petition under Section 14D of the Act claiming herself to be widow and
as such entitled to immediate possession. Appellant being the pre exist- E
ing tenant sought leave to defend which was refused. Noticing the
conflict in the views taken by the two benches of three learned judges
on reference of the word 'let out' whether to refer only to creation of
tenancy or it refers to mean, in the context of Section 14A, that even
a transferee landlord can invoke the said provision. F
Appellant contended that the premises in question had not been let
out either by the respondent or her late husband, the petition under
Section 14D, therefore, was not maintainable. The widow who applies
for eviction of the tenant in occupation of the premises must establish
that the premises were let out by her late husband or that the pre,mises G
were let out by her and that she requires the same for her own residence.
The language employed leaves no room for doubt that the widow open
whom a special right has been conferred to claim immediate possession
of premises after evicting the tenant must satisfy the condition that the
premises were let out by her or by her husband. Clearly, therefore, if H
1141
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. )'-
f
-<I
A this condition is not fulfilled Section 14D will not apply. It was also
contended that she never attorned nor paid rent to the respondent and,
. therefore, there did not exist landlord-tenant relationship between them .
The Respondent contended that for the application of Section 14D
it is not necessary that the premises must have been let out either by
B
the petitioning widow or by her husband. For the application of this
Section it is enough to prove that she was the landlord of the premises
and entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. The use of the words
"let out by him" only convey the idea that the premises must be owned
by her directly and the lease must be under her .directly.
c
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1.1. The provisions contained in Section 14A to 14D being
in the nature of exception to the main provision, they must be construed
strictly. Where the statute provides for an exemption from the rigours .
D
of a beneficial statute for tenants, the landlord with a view to obtain
immediate possession thereof must plead and prove the requirements
envisaged therein. In other words the conditions precedent contained
therein must be complied with. [1154-A-B]
E 1.2. Section 14D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek
immediate possession of the premises let out "by her, or by her hus-
band". The scheme ofthisSection appears to be that where the landlord
is alive and the premises have been let out by him, he only can make
an application for immediate possession of the premises for his own use.
F Only in the case of his death his dependant under Section 14-A, and his
widow under Section 14D can seek immediate possession of the premises.
The use of the expression, "let out by him" in Section 14B and 14C and
the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" in Section 14D have
significance. [1158-E-F]
G ·l.3. Section 14D gives a right to file an application under that
provision only to a widow who had let out the premises or whose husband
had let out the premises. Consequently, if the premises had been let out
by someone else, Section 14D will not apply. By expressly providing that ~ (
the premises must be one let·out by her or by her husband, the legislature
has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision "premises
H
NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA 11.43
let out by any other person" even if in course of time the widow may A
have become its landlord. The expression. "let out by her, or by her
husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must,
therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion js
inescapable that the legislative intent was only to confer a special right
on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose B
husband h~d let the premises before his death, and which premises the
widow requires for her own use. [1158-G-H]
1.4. If a widow becomes a landlord in relation to the tenanted
premises, she in terms of section 14(6) of the Act, she cannot evict the
tenant before expiry of 5 years from the date of purchase Sections 14(6) C
and 140 of the Act, ifthe rule of harmonious construction is not applied,
would lead to an anomaly. Such an anomaly can be removed if the
negative test contained in Section 14(6) of the Act is applied in the
construction of Section 14D thereof, that is to say, as in terms of the
earlier provision a transferee landlord cannot evict a tenant before D
expiry of five years from the date of Purchase, Section 14D which
provides for immediate recovery of the tenanted premises would not be
applicable. (1160-B-C-O)
1.5. Section 140 uses the expression, "premises let out by her, or
by her husband" which are required by the widow for her own resi- E
dence. She may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the imme-
diate possession of "such premises". Such premises" obviously is relat-
able to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within
its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other
person. Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who p
or whose husband had let out the premises. [1160-G-H]
1.6. Section 140 insists that the premises must be one let out by her
or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a
tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of
Section 14D to evict a pre existing tenant. Therefore the reasoning in G
Surjit Singh Katra is preferable. [1161-A-B]
1. 7. Respondent was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section
14D of the Act, and remitting the matter to the Court to Additional Rent
Controller for granting leave to defend would be futile. [1161-E] H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, [1991] 2 SCC 87, approved.
Kanta Goyal v. B.P. Pathak and Ors., [1977] 2 SCC 814, distin-
guished.
B 2.1. The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true
legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must,
if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to
only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the
consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and
ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits
C of only one meaning no question of construction ofstatute arises, for the
Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or
that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving
effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one
construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any
D other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is
more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering
whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole
and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context
avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may
render the statute unconstitutional. (1149-E-F-G]
E
2.2. It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort
should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the
Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted
every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every
F part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes
redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling
reasons such as obvious drafting errors. It is well settled that literal
interpretation should be given to a statute ifthe same does not lead to an
absurdity. It is now well-settled that a statute should be read in a manner
· which would give. effect to all the words used in the Act and the provision
G is not rendered otiose. Such a construction is contemplated in law in view
of the well settled principle that endeavour should be made to give effect
to all the expressions used in statute. (1149-H; 1150-A-C; 1160-E-F]
State ofU.P. and Others v. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR (1963) SC 946;
H Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others, AIR (1954) SC 749; Kanai
NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [SINGH, J.) 1145
I )'
Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR (1957) SC 907; Nyadar Singh v. A
Union of India and Others, AIR (1988) SC 1979; JK. Cotton Spinning a,nd
Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State ofU.P., AIR (1961) SC 1170, Ghanshyqm
Das v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR (1964) SC 766
and Nasiruddin and Others v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577,
referred to. B
2.3. Even ifthere exists some ambiguity in the language or the same
is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves
the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case
the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (1150-H]
Swedish Match AB and Another v. Securities & Exchange Board, India
c
and Another, (2004) 7 Scale 158 and High Court of Gujarat and Another
v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others, (2003) 4 SCC 712,
relied upon.
2.4. When two provisions of the same statute become applicable in D
a given case a harmonious construction should be taken recourse to.
(1160-B)
Imdad Ali v. Keshav Chand and Others, (2003] 4 SCC 635 and .
Ba/want Singh and Others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Others, (2003) 3
sec 433, referred to. E
CIVIL APPELLATE JLTRISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 5027 of
1999.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.98 of the Delhi High Court .F
in C.R No. 70 of 1998.
Vinod Bhagat for the Appellant.
Sanjeev Sachdeva and Ms. Priya Puri for the Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. SINGH, J.: In this appeal by special leave appellant Nathi Devi
is the tenant while respondent Radha Devi Gupta is the landlord who filed
an application for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that she H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A required the premises for her bona fide personal need invoking the provi-
sions of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act') which, according to her, entitled her to immediate
possession of the premises in question being a widow landlady. The appel-
lant filed an affidavit and prayed for leave to defend on the ground that the
B petition raised many triable issues. The Additional Rent Controller, Delhi
by his judgment and order dated 12th November, 1997 after considering the
submissions urged before him came to the conclusion that the tenant had
failed to make out a case for grant of le'.lve to defend as she had failed to
raise any triable issue. He, therefore, allowed the petition under Section 14D
of the Act and passed an order of eviction.
c
The appellant then moved the High Court in C.R.No. 70/98 and C.M.No.
298/98 impugning the order of eviction passed by the Additional Rent
Controller, Delhi. The High Court concurred with the view of the Additional
Rent Controller and held that since the landlady was a widow, and the
D premises were required by her for her own resid~nce, the conditions for the
applicability of Section 140 of the Act were fulfilled and hence the learned
Additional Rent Controller committed no mistake in refusing leave to de-
fend to the appellant.
When this special leave petition came up for admission before a bench
E consisting of two learned judges of this Court, counsel for the appellant
relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union
of India, [ 1991] 2 SCC 87 which supported the contention of the appellant
that the landlady who acquired the tenanted premises in question by transfer,
could not avail of the remedy of eviction of a pre-existing tenant resorting
F to Section l 4D of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The learned judges doubted
the correctness of the decision, and since the decision in Surjit Singh Kalra
was by a bench consisting of three judges, the special leave petition was
directed to be placed before a three judge bench by order dated 26th April,
1999. Thereafter this Court granted special leave to appeal by order dated
10th September, 1999.
G
The appeal came up for hearing before a three judge bench of this
Court. The learned judges found that there was some conflict in the views
taken by two benches of three learned judges each. An observation in the 1~ (
judgment in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) suggested that the words "let out"
refer only to the creation of a tenancy. On the other hand, the judgment in
NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI Gl)PTA [SINGH, J.] 1147
Kanta Goyal v. B.P. Pathak and Ors., [1977] 2 SCC 814 interpreted the A
words "let out" in the context of Section 14A of the Act to mean that even
a transferee landlord could invoke the said provision. Noticing the conflict
in the views taken by two benches of three judges each, it was observed that
the appeal ought to be heard by a bench of five judges. The matter was
placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice who has placed this appeal for B
hearing before this bench.
Before adverting to the submissions urged at the bar we may notice
the relevant facts of the case shorn of unnecessary details.
According to the appellant her predecessor-in-interest was a monthly C
tenant of the suit premises since 1959-60 owned by one Parmanand Khemka,
. the landlord. Upon the death of the predecessor-in-interest of the appell:;i.nt,
the appellant became the tenant and regularly paid rent to the aforesaid
landlord Parmanand Khemka till April, 1982. Thereafter the landlord van-
ished from the scene and there was no one available to accept the rent on D
behalf of the landlord. More than 12 years later in the year 1994, the
appellant received a lawyer's notice from which it appeared that the re-
spondent claimed to be the owner of the suit premises, and that she required
the premises for her own use. The appellant replied to the said notice
denying that the respondent was the owner or landlord of the suit premises
and asserting that the appellant was residing in the premises for over 35 E
years paying a rent of Rs. 7 per month to the owner, Parmanand Khemka.
In September, 1994 respondent filed an Eviction Petition No. S-233/
1994 under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 claiming that
she was a widow and bona fide needed the premises for her own use. It was F
claimed that she had purchased the suit premises in the year 1982, and since
the accommodation available to the appellant was insufficient and unsuit-
able, she required the suit premises for her own use and occupation. She
narrated the inconveniences caused to her, including family differences,
while residing in the house left behind by her husband. In the circumstances .
she was compelled to shift to her own house, namely the suit premises, G
which she had purchased from the erstwhile owner in the year 1982.
-, The appellant applied under Section 258(4) of the Act for leave to
' ' defend. It was contended on her behalf that the eviction petition was not
maintainable under Section 14D of the Act since the premises in question H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A had not been let out either by the respondent or her late husband. It was
further asserted that the appellant had never attorned, nor paid rent to the
respondent and therefore, there did not exist landlord-tenant relationship ..
The leave was also sought on other grounds which, it is not necessary to
notice, as they are not relevant for the disposal of this appeal.
B
The Additional Rent Controller by his order dated 12th November,
1997 refused leave to defend holding that Section 14D of the Act applied
since the appellant was a widow and was in need of the premises for her
own use and occupation. It was not necessary for the application of Section
14D of the Act that the premises should be let out by her or by her late
C husband. She acquired the right of the landlord to evict by reason of
purchasing the premises in question. It negatived the contention of the
appellant that there did not exit landlord-tenant relationship. It was held that
the pleas raised by the appellant did not give rise to any triable issue
necessitating grant of leave to defend. The petition for eviction was accord-
D ingly allowed under Section 14D of the Act.
The High Court in revision has affirmed the findings of the Additional
Rent Controller. We find from the judgment of the High Court that it noticed
the judgment of this Court in Surjit Singh Katra (supra) and ultimately
concluded that the law is well settled that the only conditions which are
E required to be proved are - (a) that the landlady is a widow and (b) the
premises are required by her for her own residence. In the instant case both
the conditions were fulfilled and, therefore, leave to defend was rightly
refused.
F Counsel for the appellant has impugned the judgment and order of the
High Court contending that the decision of this Court in Surjit Singh Katra
(supra) fully covers the case of the appellant inasmuch as it holds that the
words "premises let out by him" in Section 14D clearly bring out the
legislative intent to confer a special right on a limited class of widows,
namely, the widows who themselves let out the premises, or the widows
G whose husbands let out the premises which are now required by her for her
own use. Counsel contended that Sections 14B to 14D deal with different
categories of classified landlords who have been conferred a right to recover
immediate possession of premises in certain circumstances. The language
of s~ ~tions l 4B to l 4D is unambiguous and the right to recover immediate ·-
. ( .
'"'ossession has been ensured by applying the summary procedure under
NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [SINGH, J.] 1149
Section 25B of the Act. For the application of Section 14D, counsel con- A
tended, the widow who applies for eviction of the tenant in occupation of
the premises must establish that the premises were let out by her late
husband or that the premises were let out by her and that she requires the
same for her own residence. The language employed leaves no room for
doubt that the widow upon whom a special right has be~n conferred to claim B
immediate possession of premises after evicting· the tenant must satisfy the
condition that the premises were let out by her or by her husband. Clearly,
therefore, if this condition is not fulfilled Section 14D will not apply.
On the other hand counsel for the respondent heavily relied on the
decision of this Court in Kanta Goel (supra) and submitted that for the C
application of Section 140 it is not necessary that the premises must have
been let out either by the petitioning widow or by her husband. For the
application of this Section it is enough to prove that she was the landlord
of the premises and entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. The use
of the words "let out by him" only convey the idea that the premises must D
be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly.
The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legis-
lative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the
words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. E
Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When
a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no
question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts
are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious
or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If F
the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be
open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the
ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must
look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the
meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or G
unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be
made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The
Courts alwavs presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for H
1150 S0PREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should
have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature
will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting
errors. [See: State ofU.P. and Others v. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR (1963)
SC 946; Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others, AIR(l 954) SC 749;
B Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR (1957) SC 907; Nyadar Singh
v. Union of India and Others, AIR (1988) SC 1979; J.K. Cotton Spinning
and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR (1961) S.C. 1170 and
Ghanshyam Das v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR ( 1964)
s.c. 766].
C It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute
if the same does not lead to an absurdity.
In Nasiruddin and Others v. Sita Ram Agarwal; (2003] 2 SCC 577 this
Court stated the law in the following terms :-
D
"37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked
when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case
the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture
of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention
when the language of provisiqn is plain and unambiguous. It cannot
E add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which
is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also n•:c-
essary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legis-
lature has not us~d any superfluous words. It is well settled that the
real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language
F used. It may be true that use of the expression "shall or may" is
not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is dir~c
tory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be
found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled
that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the
intention of the legislature was that the provisions should be man-·
G datory in character."
Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is
capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves the
object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case the
H doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (See: Swedish Match
NATIIl DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [SINGH, J.] 1151
•• AB and Another v. Securities & Exchange Board, India and Another, (2004) A
7 Scale 158).
In High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor
Panchayat and Others, [2003] 4 SCC 712 this Court held :-
"35. The Court while interpreting the provis10n of a statute, al- B
though, is not entitled to rewrite the statute itsel( is not debarred
from "ironing out the creases". The court should always make an
attempt to uphold the rules and interpret the same in such a manner
which would make it workable.
C·
36. It is also a well-settled principle of law that an attempt should
be made to give effect to each and every word employed in a statute
and such interpretation which would render a particular provision
redundant or otiose should be avoided."
Delhi Rent Control Act primarily is a legislation meant for protection D
of the tenants from their eviction from the tenanted premise. Section 14
occurring in Chapter III of the Act provides for control of eviction of
tenants. It puts an embargo as regard recovery of possession of any premises
at the instance of the landlord unless the Controller satisfies himself as
regards existence of any of the grounds specifically referred to in the proviso E
appended thereto. Clause (e) appended to the proviso enables a landlord to
file a suit for eviction on the ground that the premises let out for residential
purposes are required bona fide by him for occupation as a residence for
himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, ifhe is the owner
thereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that
the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential F
accommodation. An embargo has been placed on a transferee landlord to
recover possession from the tenant by sub-section (6) of Section 14 of the
Act which is in· the following terms :-
• "(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no
application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall
G
lie under sub-section (1 ), on the ground specified in clause (e) of
the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years have elapsed from
the date of the acquisition."
Sections 14B to 14D were inserted in the Act of 1958 by Act 57 of H
•
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A 1988 which came into force w.e.f. 1st December, 1988. The aforesaid
provisions are reproduced below for ready reference :-
"14B. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue
to members of the armed forces, etc.- (I) Where the landlord -
B (a) is a released or retired person from any armed forces and the
premises let out by him are required for his own residence ;
,
or
(b) is a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been
C killed in action and the premises let out by such member are
required for the residence of the family of such member,
such person or, as the case may be, the dependent may, within one
year from the date of his release or retirement from such armed
D forces or, as the case may be, the date of death of such member,
or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of
the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later,
apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of
such premises.
E
(2) Where the landlord is a member of any of the armed forc·~s
and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his
retirement and the premises let out by him are required for his own
residence after his retirement, he may, at any time, within a period
of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller
F
for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(3) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) has let out more than one premises; it shall be open to
him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only
G one of the premises chosen by him.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "armed forces"
means an armed fnrce of the Union constituted under an Act of
,.- r 1:.-
Parliament and includes a member of the police force constituted
under Section 3 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (34 of 1978).
H
... NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA (SINGH, J.]
14C. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to
1153
A
accrue to Central Government and Delhi Administration employ-
ees.- (1) Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Central
Government or of the Delhi Administration, and the premises let
out by him are required for his O\\'.n residence, such employee may,
within one year from the date of his retirement or within a period B
of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent
Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, apply to the
Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(2) Where the landlord is an employee of the Central Govern~
ment or of the Delhi Administration and has a period of less than c
one year preceding the date of his retirement and
the premises let out by him are required by him for his own
residence after his retirement, he may, at any time, within a period
of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller
for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. D
(3) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to
him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only
one of the premises chosen by him.
E
14D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to
accrue to a widow.- (I) Where the landlord is a widow and the
premises let out by her, or by her husband are required by her for
her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering
the immediate possession of such premises. F
(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (I) has let
out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an
application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the
premises chosen by her.
G
Sections 14A to 14D carve out an exception to Section I4(l)(e) of the
Act. The said provisions envisage recovery of immediate possession of the
tenanted premises by (i) the members of Armed Forces, (ii) the Central
Government and Delhi Administration employees who have retired or who
would be retiring and (iii) where the landlord is a widow. All the aforemen- H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A tioned provisions refer to the immediate necessity of the landlord. •••
The provisions contained in Section 14A to 14D being in the nature
of exception to the main provision, they must be construed strictly.
B Where the statute provides for an exemption from the rigours of a
beneficial statute for tenants, the landlord with a view to obtain immediate
possession thereof must plead and prove the requirements envirnged therein.
In other words the conditions precedent contained therein must be complied
with.
C In Kanta Goel (supra) the appellant was a tenant of premises which
was a portion on the first floor of the building under the father of the
respondent, who was the owner of the premises. After his death, the property
devolved upon his three sons and a daughter who were respondents in the
appeals. The first respondent, who was in occupation of premises allotted
D to him by the Government was required by the Government to vacate those
premises and consequently he was compelled to take proceeding under
Section 14A of the Act against the tenant of the other portion of the first
floor. That tenant was evicted and he came in possession of that portion of
the premises on the first floor of the building which he had kept vacant.
Thereafter he proceeded against the other tenant on the first floor of the
E building again under Section 14A of the Act. The first respondent claimed
that he had become the sole owner of the first floor under the Will of his
father and he was, therefore, entitled to evict the appellant. The tenant/
appellant contested the petition on various grounds. He contended, inter
alia, that the premises were not in the first respondent's name and had not
F been let out by him and that Section 14A could not be used twice over for
eviction of tenants from more than one premises. Dealing with these sub-
missions the Court held :- .,...
"The scheme of the statute is plain and has been earlier explained
by this Court with special reference to Sections 14A and 258. The
G Government servant who owns his house, lets it out profitably and
occupies at lesser rent official quarters has to quit but, for that very
purposes to be fulfilled, must be put in quick possession of his
premises. The legislative project and_ purpose turn not on niceties
of little verbal ism but on the actualities of rugged realism, and so,
H the construction of Section l 4A(l) must be illumined by the goal,
NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [SINGH, J.] 1155
• though guided by the word. We have, therefore, no hesitation in
holding that Section 14A(l) is available as a ground, ifthe premise::.
A
are owned by him as inherited from his propositus in whose name
the property stood. 'In his name' and 'let out by him', read in the
spirit of the provision and without violence to the words of the
section, clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned B
by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, which is
the case where he, as heir, steps into his father's shoes who owned
the building in his own name and let it out himself. He represents
the former owner and lessor and squarely falls within Section 14A.
The accent on 'name' is to pre-empt the common class of benaml
evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominal ism. Refusing the C
rule of ritualism we accept the reality of the ownership and land-
lordism as the touchstone.
D
The admitted fact is that on the same ground of the government's
order to vacate, the first respondent had evicted a dwelling house
on the first floor and is keeping it vacant. He is again using the same
order to vacate passed by the government to evict the appellant's
dwelling house. This is obviously contrary to the intendment of
Section 14A and is interdicted by the proviso to Section 14A(l). E
It is true that when an officer is sought to be evicted by the
government from its premises he has to be rehabilitated in his own
house by an accelerated remedial procedure provided by Section
14A read with Section 25B of the Act. But this emergency provi-
sion available merely to put the government servant back into his p
own residential accommodation cannot be used as a weapon for
evicting several tenants if he has many houses let out to various
persons. The object of Section 14A is fulfilled once the landlord
recovers immediate possession of his premises from one of his
tenants. The right is exhausted thereby and is not available for
continual applications for eviction against all other tenants holding G
under him."
, -, We may, however, notice that in Kanta Goel (supra) the matter was
ultimately compromised which was recorded in the judgment itself, and the
tenant agreed to handover possession of the suit premises and instead H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A occupy the adjacent three room apartment which was lying vacant after
respondent No. I had obtained an order of eviction against its tenant. It thus
appears that having regard to the fact that the parties had entered into a
compromise, it was really not necessary for the Court to decide the aforesaid
question of law that arose in the matter. In any event the Court found that
B the landlord had exhausted his right by evicting another tenant, and could
not invoke the provision for evicting another tenant. This has led the
appellant to contend that the observations of this Court in Kanta Goel
(supra) are at best obiter dicta and cannot be given the same status as a
binding precedent.
C In this case, however, since we are called upon to interpret the pro-
visions of Section 14D of the Act, and since earlier a two judge Bench had
doubted the correctness of the view in Surjit Singh Katra (supra), we would
rather decide the question that arises before us, keeping in view the reasons
given in Kanta Goel (supra) as well as Surjit Singh Katra (supra). It is worth
D noticing that in Surjit Singh Katra (supra) the earlier judgment of this Court
in Kanta Goel (supra) has not been referred.
This takes us to the decision of this Court in Surjit Singh Katra (supra)
which considered the question with regard to landlord's right to evict the
..:
tenant under Section l 4B of the Act and the corresponding right of the tenant
E to resist the eviction proceeding. As noticed earlier Section 14B confers
certain rights on persons belonging to armed forces to recover immediate
possession of the premises from their tenants for their own occupation.
Under Section 14B a released or 'retired person from any armed forces or
a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action,_
p can recover immediate possession of the premises if an application is made
within one year from the date of release or retirement or the date of death,
as the case may be, seeking recovery of immediate possession of such
premises for his own residence or for the residence of the family of such ·
member, as the case may be. Sub-section (3) of Section 14B further provides
that in case the landlord has let out more than one premises, he can apply
G under sub-section (I) of Section 14B in respect of only one of the premises
chosen by him. An argument was raised before this Court that-.-since the
Amending Act 57 of 1988 which carved out a class of.classified landlords
did not make corresponding amendments particularly to sub-sections (4) and
(5) of Section 25B, the tenant's ..right
,. to contest the application for eviction
H on the grounds specifie9 in Section 14(l)(e) cannot be denied even as
NATH! DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [SINGH, J.] 1157
against the classified landlords falling under Section 148 to 14D of the Act. A
The submission was rejected as its acct!ptance wguld practically obliterate
the purpose and object of classification of laruitords under Sections 1481 to
14D who were carved out from the general category of landlords. It was
noticed that the remedy under section 14(1 )( e) is available only to the
landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under B
Sections 148 to 140. The classified landlords have been conferred with
certain rights which are different from and independent of rights und~r
Section 14(1 )( e) of the Act. It was noticed that the two provisions are
different in many respects. Comparing the two provisions the Court ob-
served as follows :-
c
"Under Section 148 the right to evict the tenant is available to two
categories of persons : (i) The person who has let out the premises
'ind, (ii) the dependent of a member of any armed forces who had
let out the premises but killed in action. In the former case, the
premises must be required for his own residence and in the latter, D
for the residence of the family of such member. It may be noted
that Section 14(l)(e) requires that the premises should have beeµ
let for residential purpose but the landlord who seeks eviction need
not be the person who has let out. But Section 148 narrows down
such right. It is he who has let out alone could <::vi ct or the dependent
of the person who has let out but since killed in action. Secondly, E
Section 148 uses the expression "the premises let out by him"
unlike the expression used in Section 14(l)(e) "the premises let out
for residential purposes". The definition of"premises" under sub-
section (2)(i) means "any building or part of a building which is
or intended to be let, separately for use as a residence or for F
commercial use or for any other purpose ...... ". It is clear that
Section 148 does not require that the premises should have been,
let out for residential purposes and the purpose ofletting out seems
to be irrelevant. But he who has let out alone could seek eviction
of his tenant or the dependent of a member of any armed forces
who had let out but since killed in action. Section 148 also provides G
the period of limitation for claiming possession of such premises,
but no such limitation is provided under Section 14(1 )(e). Sub-
section (3) of Section 148 imposes fm1her restriction on the land-
lord who is having more than one premises. Such a landlord cannot
ask for possession of more than one of the premises but he can H
I 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
1
A choose any one of the premises which he had let out. Here again
we find that there is no such restriction to a landlord covered under
Section I 4(1 )( e) provided the requirement of the landlord is bona
fide and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommo-
dation. Section 14(1)(e) does not preclude the landlord from seek-
ing eviction of more than one premises provided he establishes the
B
need." _J
The observations in the aforesaid judgments no doubt support the case
of the appellant. This Court did clearly lay down that the expression, "the
premises let out by him" in Section 14B of the Act did mean that it is he
c who has let out alone could evict, and in case the landlord had been killed
in action h!s dependant could seek immediate eviction of the premises let .
out by such person. It is noticeable that the expression, " premises let out
by him" is used in Section 14B and 14C, but the expression, in Section 14D
is "premises let out by her, or by her husband." Section 14B contemplates
D two situations, firstly, where the landlord is a released or retired person from
any armed forses and secondly, where he was killed in action. In case the
landlord was killed in action a right has been given to his dependant within
one year of the death of the landlord, to apply to the Controller for recov-
ering the immediate possession of the premises. Section 14C confers a right
on a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Admin-
E istration who requires the premises let out by him for his own residence.
Section l 4D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate
possession of the prernises let out "by her, or by her husband". The scheme
of these Sections appears to be that where the landlord is alive and the
premises have been let out by him, he only can make an application for
>-
F immediate possession of the premises for his own use. Only in the case of
his death his dependant under Section 14-A, <'.nd his widow under Section
14D can seek immediate possession of the premises. The use of the expres-
sion, "let out by him" in Section 14B and 14C and the expression, "let out
by her, or by her husband" in Section 14D have significance. If it was
unnecessary in the scheme of these Sections as to who had actually let out
G the premises, the legislature wo11ld not have used the term "let out by him"
or "let out by her, or by her husband". In interpreting a provision one cannot
assume that the words employed by the legislature are redundant. Section
14D gives a right to file an application under that provision only to a widow ?-1
who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises.
H Consequently, ifthe premises had been let out by someone else, Section I 4D
\
NATHI DEVl v. RADHA DEVI GCJPTA (SINGH, J.] 1159
"' A
will no(apply. As pointed out in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) the expression
used in Section 14B is "the premises let out by him", unlike the expression
used in Section 14 (1) (e) where the legislature employed the expression "the
premises let out for residential purposes". Thus in the case of a landlord
belonging to the general category it was immaterial whether the premises
was let out by him or by someone else, as long as he was the landlord .of
B
the premises at the time of making an application seeking eviction of the
tenant. But the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" conveys a
different meaning altogether. The widow's right to recover immediate
possession of the premises arises only if the premises were let out by her
or by her husband, and not by anyone else. It appears to us that the
legislature has purposely employed a different expression in Section 14D c
as also in Section l4B and 14C. We are here concerned with an application
filed under Section 14D which specifies in clear terms that a widow can
invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or if her husband
had let out the premises. If, as observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expres-
sion, "the premises let out by him" has been used only to convey the idea D
that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under
him directly, and not that he had himselflet out the premises, the legislature
would not have then used the expression "let out by her, or by her husband."
The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which
was let out by the widow or by her husband implies that the provision would
not apply to a premises let out by any other person. If the intention of the E
legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use
of the words "the premises let out by her, or by her husband" would have
been unnecessary and the Section would have simply read as follows:-
"Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are required by F
her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for
recovering the immediate possession of such premises."
By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by
her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the
said provision "premises let out by any other person" even if in course of G
time the widow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the
provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression
; -~
expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, "let out by her, or
by her husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We
must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
1
A is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right
on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose
husband had let the premises before his death, and which premises the
widow requires for her own use.
If a widow becomes a landlord in relation to the tenanted premises, she
B
in terms of Section 14(6) of the Act cannot evict the tenant before expiry
}
of 5 years from the date of purchase, as noticed hereinbefore. When two
provisions of the same statute become applicable in a given case a harmo-
nious construction should be taken recourse to. (See : Imdad Ali v. Keshav
Chand and Others, [2003] .:1 SCC 635 para 7 and Ba/want Singh and Others
c v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Others, [2003] 3 SCC 433).
Sections 14(6) and l4D of the Act, ifthe rule of harmonious construe•
tion is not applied, would lead to an anomaly. Such an anomaly can be
removed ifthe negative test contained in Section 14(6) of the Act is applied
D in the construction of Section l 4D thereof, that is to say, as in terms of the
earlier provision a transferee landlord cannot evict a tenant before expiry
of five years from the date of purchase, Section 14D which provides for
immediate recovery of the tenanted- premises would not be applicable.
Furthermore, it is now well-settled that a statute should be read in a
E manner which would give effect to all the words used in the Act and in the
event the decision of this Court in Kanta Goel (supra) is read in a manner
suggested, the expressions "let out by her or by her husband" and "such·
premises" in Section 14D would be otiose. Such a construction is not
contemplated in law in view of the well settled principle that endeavour
F should be made to give effect to all the expressions used in a statute.
There is another aspect of the matter. Section 14D uses the expression, ~
"premises let out by her, or by her husband" which are required by the
widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Reni Controller for
recovering the immediate possession of "such premises". "Such premises"
G obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot
take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by
any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on
behalfofthe appellant that Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz.
_,._- f
a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention
H was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow
NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [SINGH, J.] 1161
is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and A
the expressions, "let out by her or by her husband" and "such premises" in
Section 14D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error
in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the
application of Section l 4D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises
are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, B
in our view, Section 14D insists that the premises must be one let out by
her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted
premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D
to evict a preexisting tenant.
We, therefore, prefer the reasoning in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) which C
took the same view. Kanta Gael's case really was decided on another point,
since it was held that the application of the landlord was not maintainable
to evict another tenant on the same grounri, after he had already evicted a
tenant on the same ground from another premises. Moreover, in Kanta Goel
the parties had entered into a compromise and a decision on this point was, D
therefore, not necessary.
Since we have held that the respondent was not entitled to invoke the
provisions of Section l 4D of the Act, it would be futile to remit the matter
to the Court of Additional Rent Controller for granting leave to defend. We
therefore, aliow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High E
Court as well as that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi and c'.ismiss
the application filed by the respondent under Section 14D of the Act.
B.K. Appeals allowed .
.
-..._
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