Holding

The respondent was a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the two Acts are complementary, not repugnant, so the High Court’s decision is affirmed.

Summary

The appellant, National Engineering Industries Ltd., dismissed Shri Kishan Bhageria, an internal auditor, after alleging unauthorised absence. Bhageria claimed salary arrears under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the employer contended that he was not a “workman” within the meaning of section 2(s). The Labour Court and later the Rajasthan High Court Division Bench held that his duties of reporting and checking did not amount to supervisory work and that he qualified as a workman, whereas a Single Judge had held otherwise. The Supreme Court examined whether an internal auditor who merely checks and reports is a workman and whether the Industrial Disputes Act or the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958, was repugnant. It held that the respondent was a workman, that the two statutes are complementary and not inconsistent, and that the limitation provision of the Rajasthan Act could not curtail rights under the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the High Court’s decision affirmed.

Issues considered

Whether an internal auditor who performs reporting and checking functions qualifies as a ‘workman’ under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 governs the dispute and whether the two statutes are repugnant.
Whether the limitation period under section 28A of the Rajasthan Act bars the employee’s claim.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2(s), s. 33C(2)
Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958s. 28A, s. 37

Subjects

workman definitionindustrial disputesinternal auditorsupervisory workrepugnancy of statuteslimitation periodRajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments ActIndustrial Disputes Actdismissalsalary claim

Judgment

NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LIMITED
v. A
SHRI SHRI KISHAN BHAGERIA & OTHERS

NOVEMBER 11, 1987

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, .JJ.) B

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Section 2(s)-'Workman'-who
is-Internal Auditor in Company-Not doing supervisory work-Only
checking up on behalf of employer-No independent authority or right
to take decision-Such employee held 'workman'-l.D. Act not
repugnant to Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act
1958. c
Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958: Sec-
tions 28A and 37-Whether repugnant to Industrial Disputes Act
1947-Employee's petition against dismissal-Dismissed on ground of
limitation-Relief through petition under l.D. Act 1947-Whether D
barred.

The 1st respondent was working in the appellant-company as ao
Internal Auditor on a monthly salary of Rs.1186-60P per month. The
appellant alleged that the respondent started absenting himself from
28th January, 1978 aod as such was not entitled to any salary for aoy E
period beyond the said date. The respondent was thereaf!er placed
under suspension on 30th March, 1978.

On 4th May, 1978 the respondent filed an application under
section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming a total sum

-r- of Rs.4746-40p on account of salary from !st January, 1978 to 30th
April, 1978. The appellant objected on the ground that the respondent
was not a 'workman'. On 9th November, 1978 there was an order
dismissing the respondent from service.
F

On 2nd January, 1979 the respondent filed an application under
section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments G
Act, 1958 which was dismissed on 31st July, 1979 on the ground of
limitation.

On the 2nd August, 1979 the Labour Court held that the respon-
dent was doing clerical duties and as such was a 'workman' under the
Industrial Disputes Act and he was entitled to Rs.2060-98p as salary H
985
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] I S.C.R.

from 9th March, 1978 to 30th April, 1978. There was also a reference
A
under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 8th August,
1960 arising out of the dismissal of the respondent. The appellant filed a
writ petition challenging this order.

All the aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of by a Single Judge
B of the High Court on 16th March, 1982 holding that the respondent was
not a 'workman'.

A Division Bench of the High Court, however reversed the afore-
said judgment and held that the respondent was a 'workman'. The two
writ petitions of the appellant were dismissed, while the writ petition of
j
the respondent was allowed.
c 1
Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the appellant appealed to this
Court. On the questions: (1) whether the respondent was a 'workman'
or not within the definition of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and (2) whether the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the Rajasthan
D Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 would apply.

Dismissing the appeals,

HELD: l.(a) Whether a person was performing supervisory or
managerial work is a question of fact. One must, therefore, look into Y
E the main work and that must be found out from the main duties.
A supervisor has to take some kind of decision on behalf of the
company. One who was reporting merely as to the affairs of the com-
pany and making assessment for the purpose of reporting is not
supervisor. [992A-B]

p (b) There is no controversy in the instant case, that the respon-
dent is not employed in any managerial or administrative capacity.
Distribution of work may easily be the work of a manager or an
administrator but "checking" the work so distributed or "keeping an
eye" over it is certainly supervision. A manager or administrator's
work may easily include superoision but that does not mean that
G supervision is the only function of a manager or an administrator.
Where there is a power of assigning duties and distribution of work
there is supervision. [990C, 99IA-B, 99!DI

Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal West Bengal and
others, A.I.R. 1958 Calcutta 273; All India Reserve Bank Employees
H Association v. Reserve Bank of India, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 25; Llyods Bank
NATIONAL ENGG. INDUSTRIES v. S.K. BHAGERIA 987

Ltd. v. Pannalal Gupta, [1961] 1 L.L.J. 18; Burmah Shell Oil Storage
& Distribution Co. of India. v. Burmah Shell Management Staff As- A
sociation & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 758; The Punjab Co-operative Bank
Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia (dead) through Lrs, [1975] 4 S.C.C. 696; Mahesh-
wari v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1983] 3 S.C.R. 949;'Ved Prakash
Gupta v. Mis. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., [1984] 2 S.C.C. 569 and
Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen, B
[1965] l L.L.J. 462 referred to.

(c) A checker on behalf of the management or employer is not a
snpervisor. [993E]

In the instant case, the nature of dnties performed by Respondent
No. 1 were mainly reporting and checking np on behalf of the manage- C
ment. A reporter or a checking clerk is not a supervisor. The res-
pondent does not appear to be doing any kind of supervisory work.
He was undoubtedly checking up on behalf of the employer but he
had no independent right or authority to take decision and his decision
did not bind the company. The Division Bench came to the conclusion D
that the respondent was a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2(s)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 taking into consideration the
evidence recorded before the Labour Court that the respondent is a
workman and not a supervisor. That conclusion on the appreciation of
evidence cannot be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitu-
tion. [993A-C] E

- 2.(a) In order to raise the question of repugnancy two conditions
must be fulfilled. The State law and the Union law must operate in
the same field and one must be repugnant or inconsistent with the

_r other. These are two cumulative conditions which are required to be
fulfilled. [99SE] F

Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, [1959]
Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 8 and Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and others v.
State of Bihar and others, [1983] 4 S.C.C. 45 at page 87 referred to.

(b) In this case there is a good deal of justification to hold that G
these laws, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and tbe Rajasthan Shops
and Commercial Establishments Act, 1985 tread on the same field and
both laws deal with the rights of a dismissed workman or employee. But
these two laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to each other. The
basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails the other cannot prevail.
That is not the position in this case. [995F -GI H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] I S.C.R.

A (c) The application under section 28A of the Rajasthan Act was
dismissed not on merits but on limitation. There is a period of limitation
provided under the Rajasthan Act and it may be extended for reason-
able cause. But there is no period of limitation as snch provided under
the Industrial Dispntes Act. Therefore, that will be curtailment of the
rights of the workmen or employees under the Industrial Disputes Act.
B In that situation section 37 declares that law should not be construed to
curtail any of the rights of the workmen. [996A-B]

(d) Social Welfare and labour welfare broadens from legislation ._
to legislation in India. It will be a well settled principle of interpretation
to proceed on that assumption and section 37 of the Rajasthan Act must '
be so construed. In no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to ,-;-- · ~
c curtail the rights of the workman to seek any relief or to go in for ·
adjudication in case of the termination of the employment. [9%C]

(e) There is, therefore, no conflict between the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establish·
D ments Act, 1985 and there is no question of repugnancy. These two Acts
are supplemental to each other. [994G-H; 996D]

3. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that Respon·
dent No. 1 was a 'workman' and in granting reliefon that basis. [996E]

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
Nos. 3521-3523of 1987.

From the Judgment and order dated 17.10.1986 of the Rajasthan
High Court in D.B. Civil Special (Writ) Appeals Nos. 27, 28 of 1983 and
224 of 1982.
-
F
Dr. Shankar Ghosh, N.C. Shah and Praveen Kumar for the~
Appellant.

Tapas Ray, S.K. Jain, Mrs. P. Jain and S. Atreya for the
Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. After hearing parties and after
considering the relevant documents, additional as well as original, we
grant leave to appeal in these matters. The appeals are disposed of by
H the judgment herein.
.,
NATJONALENGG. INDUSTRIES v. S.K. BHAGERIA [MUKHARJI, J.) 989

Since prior to 1st of January, 1978 the respondent No. 1 Shri A
Kishan Bhageria was working under the appellant-company as an
Internal Auditor on a monthly salary of Rs.1186.60 per month. The
appellant alleged that the respondent started absenting himself from
28. 1. 78 and as such was not entitled to any salary for any period
beyond 28. 1. 78 The said respondent was thereafter placed under
suspension on 30th of March, 1978. The respondent on 4th of May, B
1978 filed an application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial

- .)._

I
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act') claiming the total
sum of Rs.4,746.40 on account of salary from 1st of January, 1978 to
30th of April, 1978 at the rate of Rs.11,86.60 per month. The appellant
company objected. The main ground of objections was that the
respondent was not a workman. On or about 9th of November, 1978 C
there was an order dismissing the respondent from service. The
respondent thereafter on 2nd of January, 1979 filed an application
under section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops & Establishments Act, 1958
(hereinafter called 'the Rajasthan Act'). The said application was dis-
missed on 31st of July 1979 on the ground of limitation. The Labour
Court on 2nd of August, 1979 held that the respondent was doing D
clerical duties and as such was a workman under the Act and he was
entitled to Rs.2,060 as salary from 1.1.78 to 9.3. 78. The appellant filed
Writ Petition No. 765 of 1979 in the Rajasthan High Court against the
order of the Labour Court allowing the said salary. The respondent
also filed another writ petition being writ petition No. 1091of1979 for
declaration that he was entitled to receive Rs.2,066.98 as salary from E

-- 9.3.78 to 30.4.78. There was thereafter a reference under section 10 of
the Act on 8.8.80 arising out of the dismissal of the respondent. The
appellant filed another writ petition being Writ Petition No. 1623 of
1980 challenging the order of reference. All these aforesaid writ peti-
tions were disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan
High Court on 16.3.82 holding that the respondent was not a work- F
man. The other contentions urged before the leaned Single Judge were
not considered by the Division Bench in the view it took later on. On
17th of October, 1986 the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the
learned Single Judge and held that the respondent was a workman.
Two writ petitions of the appellant were dismissed and the writ peti-
tion of the respondent was allowed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders G
the appellant has come up in these appeals before this Court.

The main question which requires consideration in these appeals
is whether the respondent was a workman or not. For the determina-
tion of this question it is necessary to refer to section 2(s) of the Act
which defines "workman" and states that it means any person emp- H
r
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988) 1 S.C.R.

Joyed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
A
operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether
the terms of employment be express or implied, and includes any such
person who has been dismissed discharged or retrenched in connec-
tion with or as a consequence of any dispute. But sub-clause (iii) does
not include any person who is employed mainly in a managerial or
B administrative capacity and sub-clause (iv) does not include any
person who being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages .\-
exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per month or duties
attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him,
discharges functions mainly of a managerial nature. In View of the said
definition, we are concerned here with the question whether ihe
respondent was a workman as not being employed in any supervisory
c capacity. There is no controversy that the said respondent is not
employed in any managerial or administrative capacity.

In this case before we deal with the facts and the relevant autho-
rities of this Court it may be appropriate to refer to a decision of P.B.
D Mukharji, J. of the Calcutta High Court as the learned Chief Justice
then was in Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal
and others, A.LR. 1958 Calcutta 273. There the learned Judge
observed that whether a person was a workman within the definition of
the Industrial Disputes Act was the very foundation of the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Tribunal. The Court further observed that in order to
E determine the categories of service indicated by the use of different
words like "supervisory", "managerial", "administrative", it was
necessary not to import the notions of one into the interpretation of
the other. The words such as supervisory, managerial and administra-
tive are advisedly loose expressions with no rigid frontiers and too
much subtlety should not be used in trying to precisely define where
F supervision ends and management begins or administration starts. For
that would be theoretical and not practical. It has to be broadly
interpreted from a common sense point of view where tests will be
simple both in theory and in their application. The learned Judge
further observed that a supervisor need not be a manager or an
administrator and a supervisor can be a workman so long as he did not
G exceed the monetary limitation indicated in the section and a
supervisor irrespective of his salary is not a workman who has to dis-
charge functions mainly of managerial nature by reasons of the duties
attached to his office or of the powers vested in him. In that case the
learned Judge further held that a person in charge of a Department
could not ordinarily be a clerk even though he may not have power to
H take disciplinary action or even though he may have another superior
NATIONAL ENGG. INDUSTRIES v. S.K. BHAGERIA [MUKHARJI, J .J 991

officer above him. It was further observed that distribution of work A
may easily be the work of a manager or an administrator but "check-
ing" the work so distributed or "keeping an eye" over it is certainly
supervision. It is reiterated that a manager or administrator's work
may easily include supervision but that does not mean that supervision
is the only function of a manager or an administrator.
B
Bearing in mind the aforesaid indication, it would be necessary
to discuss some decisions of this Court. In All India Reserve Bank
Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, [1966] l S.C.R. 25,
'this Court dealing with certain types of employees observed "These
employees distribute work, detect faults, report for penalty, make
arrangements for filling vacancies, to mention only a few of the duties c
which are supervisory and not merely clerical." At page 46 of the
report Hidayatullah, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was observed
that the work in a Bank involved layer upon layer of checkers and
checking is hardly supervision but where there is a power of assigning
duties and distribution of work there is supervision, (emphasis •0
supplied). There the Court referred to a previous decision in L/yods
Bank Ltd. v. Pannalal Gupta, [1961] l L.L.J. 18, where the finding of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal was reversed because the legal infer-
ence from proved facts was wrongly drawn and it was reiterated that
before a clerk could claim a special allowance payable to a supervisor,
he must prove that he supervises the work of some others who are in a
E
sense below him. It was pointed out by Hidayatullah, J. that mere
checking of the work of others is not enough because this checking was
r a part of accounting and not of supervision and the work done in the
audit department of a bank was not supervision. (emphasis supplied).

In Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Co. of India. v. F
Burmah Shell Management Staff Association & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 758,
this Court observed that a workman must be held to be employed to do
that work which is the main work he is required to do, even though he
may be incidentally doing other types of work. Therefore, in determin-
ing which of the employees in the various categories are covered by the
definition of 'workman' one has to see what is the main or substantial G
work which he is employed to do. In The Punjab Co-operative Bank
Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia (dead) through Lrs., [1975] 4 S.C.C. 696 it was held
that the accountant was supposed to sign the salary bills of the staff
even while performing the duties of a clerk. That did not make the
respondent employed in a managerial or administrative capacity. The
workman was, therefore, in that context rightly held as a clerk. H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] I S.C.R.

In P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1983] 3
A S.C.R. 949 the question whether a person was performing supervisory
or managerial work was the question of fact to be decided bearing in
mind the correct principle. The principle therefore is, one must look
into the main work and that must be found out from the main duties. A
supervisor was one who could bind the company to take some kind of
B decision on behalf of the company. One who was reporting merely as to
the affairs of the company and making assessment for the purpose of .
reporting was not a supervisor. See in this connection Black's Law
Dictionary, Special Deluxe, Fifth Edition. At page 1290, "Supervisor't
has been described, inter alia, as follows:
,
~
"In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to
c
;~e:e:n.:::::ii::~.t~eans any individual having autho-
rity, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, '
~
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, '
D reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to \i,
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment."
\
E
Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Ved
Prakash Gupta v. Mis. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., [1984] 2 S.C.C.
569. There on facts a Security Inspector was held to be a workman. At
page 575 of the report this Court referred to the decision in Llyods
Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta, (supra) and also the observations of
F this Court in Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v.
Their Workmen, [ 1965] 1 L.L.J. 462. In that case the nature of the
duties performed by the appellant showed that the substantial part of
the work of the appellant consisted of looking after the security of the
factory and its property by deputing the watchmen working under him
to work at the factory gate or sending them to watch-towers or around
G the factory or to accompany visitors to the factory and making entries
in the visitors' register as regards the visitors and in the concerned
registers as regards materials entering into or going out of the premises
of the factory. There it was found that he had no power to appoint.

In the instant case the evidence have been summarised by the
H Division Bench. Reference may be made to pages 65, 73, 80, 84 to 94,
NATIONALENGG. JNDUSTRIESv. S.K. BHAGERIA [MUKHARJl,J.J 993

95, 96 and 97 of the Paper Book which indicate the nature of duties
A
performed by the respondent No. 1 herein. His duties were mainly,
reporting and checking up on behalf of the management. A reporter or
a checking clerk is not a supervisor. The respondent herein does not
appear to us doing any kind of supervisory work. He was undoubtedly
checking up on behalf of the employer but he had no independent right
or authority to take decision and his decision did not bind the com- B
1. pany. In that view of the matter keeping the correct principle of law in

-
' mind the Division Bench has come to the conclusion taking into con-
sideration the evidence recorded before the Labour Court that the
respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That conclusion arrived
fat in the manner indicated above cannot, in our opinion, be interfered
~

~
I ,. with under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is not necessary for our c
present purpose to set out in extenso the evidence on record as discus-
sed by the Division Bench. Our attention was, however, drawn by the
counsel for the respondent to certain correspondence, for instance the
letter at page 65 of the paper book bearing the date 14th of May, 1976
where the respondent reported that certain materials were lying in
stores dept!. in absence of any decision. It was further reiterated that D
on inspection of the pieces that those pieces were found cracked.
Similarly, our attention was drawn to several other letters and we have
perused these letters. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench .
was right that these letters only indicated that the report was being
made of the checking done by the respondent. A checker on behalf of
the management or employer is not a supervisor. E

In the aforesaid view of the matter the conclusion of the Division
Bench that respondent No. 1 is a workman has to be sustained. We do
so accordingly.

The next question that arises in this case is whether Act would p
apply or the Rajasthan Act would apply. In this connection section
28A of the Rajasthan Act is material. It enjoins that no employer shall
dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has been
in such employment continuously for a period of not less than 6
months except for a reasonable cause and after giving such employee
at least one month's prior notice or on paying him one month's wages G
in lieu of such notice. Sub-section (2) of section 28A gives every emp-
loyee, so dismissed or discharged, right to make a complaint in writing
in the prescribed manner to a prescribed authority within 30 days of
the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge. Sub-section (3) of
section 28A provides that the prescribed authority shall cause a notice
to be served on the employer relating to the said complaint, record H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 1 S.C.R.

briefly the evidence produced by the parties, hear them and make such )I""
.
A
enquiry as it might consider necessary and thereafter pass orders in
writing giving reasons therefor. Section 37 of the Rajasthan Act reads
as follows:

"37. Saving of certain rights and privileges.-Nothing in
B this Act shall affect any rights or privileges which an
employee in any establishment is entitled to on the date
this Act comes into force under any other law, contract,
custom or usage applicable to such establishment or any :.-
award, settlement or agreement binding on the employer
and the employee in such establishment, if such rights or
c privileges are more favourable to him than those to which ·-j"- ··~
he would be entitled under this Act."

It has to be borne in mind that section 2A of the Act was
amended to permit individual workman to ask for a reference in the
case of individual dispute. This amendment was assented to by the
D President on 1st of December, 1965. The Rajasthan Act received the
assent of the President on 14th of July, 1958. On 8th March, 1972
Chapter 6A including section 28A was inserted in the Rajasthan Act.
Therefore the material provision of the Rajasthan Act is the subse-
quent law. Under Article 254(2) of the Constitution if there was any
law by the State which had been reserved for the assent of the Presi-
E dent and has received the assent of the President, the State law would
prevail in that State even if there is an earlier law by the Parliament on
a subject in the Concurrent List. It appears that both of these Acts
tread the same field and if there was any conflict with each other, then
section 28A of Rajasthan Act would apply being a later law. We find,
however, that there is no conflict. The learned Single Judge of the
F Rajasthan High Court in Poonam Talkies, Dausa v. The Presiding
Officer, Labour Court, Jaipur, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1206185
decided on 9 .6.1986) so. That decision has been upheld by the Division
Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ Appeal No. 23 Jl86. The
Division Bench of the High Court in the instant appeal relying on the
said decision held that there was no scope for any repugnancy. It
G appears to us that it cannot be said that these two Acts do not tread the
same field. Both these Acts deal with the rights of the workman or
employee to get redressal and damages in case of dismissal or dis-

-
charge, but there is no repugnancy because there is no conflict bet-
ween these two Acts, in pith and substance. There is no inconsistency
between these two acts. These two Acts, in our opinion, are supple-
H mental to each other.
NATIONAL ENGG. INDUSTRIES v. S.K. BHAGERIA [MUKHARJJ, J.) 995

In Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, [1959]
A
Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 8, Subba Rao, J., as the learned Chief Justice then
was observed that the result of the authorities indicated was as follows:
'""
"Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Edition,
p. 303, refers to three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy:
B
1. There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of
the competing statutes;

2. Though there may be no direct conflict, a State
law may be inoperative because the Common-
wealth Code is intended to be a complete exhaus-
tive code; and c
3. Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may
arise when both State and Commonwealth seek to
exercise their powers over the same subject
matter." D

Quoting the aforesaid observations, this Court in M's. Hoechst
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and others v. State of Bihar and others, [ 1983 I 4
S.C.C. 45 at page 87 where A.P. Sen, J. exhaustively dealt with the
principles of repugnancy and observed that one of the occasions where
inconsistency or repugnancy arose was when on the same subject E
matter, one law would be repugnant to the other. Therefore, in order

-- to raise a question of repugnancy two conditions must be fulfilled. The
State law and the Union law must operate on the same field and one
must be repugnant or inconsistent with the other. These are two condi-
tions which are required to be fulfilled. These are cumulative condi-
tions. Therefore, these laws must tread on the same field and these F
must be repugnant or inconsistent with each other. In our opinion, in
this case there is a good deal of justification to hold that these laws, the
Industrial Disputes Act and the Rajasthan Act tread on the same field
and both laws deal with the rights of dismissed workman or employee.
But these two laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to each other.
'· The basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails the other cannot G
prevail. That is not the position in this case. Learned counsel on behalf
of the appellant, however, contended that in this case, there had been
an application as indicated above under section 28A of the Rajasthan
Act and which was dismissed on ground of limitation. Sree Shankar
Ghosh tried to submit that there would be inconsistency or repugnancy
between the two decisions, one given on limitation and the other if any H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1988] I S.C.R.
A relief is given under the Act. We are unable to accept this position,
because the application under Section 28A of the Rajasthan Act was
dismissed not on merit but on limitation. There is a period of limita-
tion provided under the Rajasthan Act of six months and it may be
extended for reasonable cause. But there is no period of limitation as
B such provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, that will
be curtailment of the rights of the workmen or employees under the
Industrial Disputes Act. In the situation section 37 declares that law
should not be construed to curtail any of the rights of the workmen. As
Poet Tennyson observed-"freedom broadens from precedent to pre-
cedent" so also it is correct to state that social welfare and labour
welfare broadens from legislation to legislation in India. It will be a
C well-settled principle of interpretation to proceed on that assumption
and section 37 of the Rajasthan Act must be so construed. Therefore
in no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to curtail the rights of
the workman to seek. any relief or to go in for an adjudication in case of
the termination of the employment. If that is the position in view of
D the provisions 6 months' time in section 28A of the Rajasthan Act has
to be ignored and that cannot have any binding effect inasmuch as it
curtails the rights of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act
and that Act must prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between
the two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy.
Y•v
E The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the respon-
dent was a workman and in granting relief on that basis. Before we
conclude we note that our attention was drawn to certain observations
of this Court that interference by the High Court in these matters at
the initial stage protracts adjudication and defeats justice. Reference
was made to certain observations in P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn. &
Ors., (supra). But as mentioned hereinbefore in this case, the interfer-
F
ence was made by the High Court not at the initial stage.

In the premises, we are of the opinion that the High Court was
right in the view it took. These appeals, therefore, fail and are accord-
ingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The
G reference before the Tribunal should proceed as expeditiously as
possible.

N.V.K. Appeals dismissed.