NEW DELHI MUNTCIPAL COMMITTEEversusALLIED MOTORS PVT LTD. AND ORS.

              NEW DELHI MUNTCIPAL COMMITTEE                                    A
                                     F.

              ALLIED MOTORS PVT LTD. AND ORS.

                           OCTOBER 17, 1995

        !MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.j
                                                                               B

     Punjab Mu11icipal Act, 1911: Sectiom 18/l(v) and 199.

       New Delhi Mu11icipal Commi1te<:-Bye-law.1~Adve1tisement Tax--Bye-
law !-Clause (a) of Bye-law 7 (as it stood p1ior lo 19.2.71)-Name              C
board-Exemptio11 from adve1tisemenl tax if displayed by trader on its own
prenlises and docs not contain any iteni of adve1tiscment-Conzpany canying
on sale purchase and repair of nzotor vehicles-Exhibition of neon signs on
its premises-Held not e11titled to exemption under Bye-law 7(a).

      Words & Phrases-'Name board'-Mea11ing of-Gause 7(a) of NDMC              D
Bye-laws.

     The appellant-Committee raised demand for advertisement tax
against the respondent-Company as the latter had exhibited neon signs on
its premises viz. 'Allied Motor Private Ltd.', 'Perkings', 'R.R', 'Bedford',
                                                                               E
'Lambretta', 'Burshane' and 'Gaskets'. The respondent-Company unsuc-
cessfully challenged the levy before a Single Judge of the High Court which
held that the Board displayed by the respondents were in the nature of
advertisements. However, the letters Patent Bench of the High Court
allowed the respondents' appeal by holding that the boards displayed by
the respondents' were purely name boards, containing no item of adver-         F
tisement except the trade name of the articles suggested to be offered for
sale, and therefore entitled to exemption from advertisement tax under
clause (a) of Bye-law 7.

      Allowing the appeal preferred by the New Delhi Municipal Commit-         G
tee and setting aside the impugned Judgment, this Court

      HELD : 1. The demand or advertisement tax is upheld. If the act
attracting taxation does not come \Vi thin the scope of 'advertisement' within
the meaning of Qye-law 1, the question of providing under Bye-law 7 any.
exemption from payment of tax on exempted advertisements does not arise. H
                                    427
    428                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   But if the act comes within the scope or advertisement, um1uestionably and
    undeniably, then alone can resort he had to Rye·lau· 7 to discover whether
    the advertisement is such as to which any exemption can he attracted. It is
    plain therefore, that it shall initially be an advertisement but would be
    exempted from taxation if' (i) it is displayed by a tr.1der, (ii) on his own
    pretnises, (iii) purely as a nan1e board as such and (iv) on purity n1ain~
B   tained by not containing any other item or advertisement. [432-D-EJ

          2. The expression 'na1ne board' is apparently a tern1 of art, tinding
    its way to the alleys of' law by subordinate legislation. It would be causing
    violence to the spirit of' Clause (a) of Bye-law 7, in splitting the expression
C   'name board' into two separate words i.e. name and board and depleting
    the provision of its intent. Even though under Clause (a) of Bye-law 7 two
    words, i.e., 'name' and 'board' are used in succession, what is intended to
    mean is that these go to make one word or a combined w.ord, in order to
    exempt advertisement by displaying of the name board by the trader on
    his own premises, provided the board is purely a name board and does
D   not contain any item of advertisement. Significantly, in the in-built proviso,
    the word 'name board' in its pristine purity, reflects something more than
    a board and in that manner distinctive. This adds to the analysis that the
    words 'name' and 'board' are not separate so as to be given separate
    meanings and then coalescing them up. The identifying name so displayed
E   pertains to the place or object, not to the name of the trade or the owner.
    A name board thus plays the part of the identifier, if the place/premises
    has a name, by display of such name. If by means of paint or structural
    signs an identifying name is engrafted over a building, as an identffying
     measure, then it is a name board because becoming a part of the premises·
     it makes the premises self introductory by name. (433-D-H, 434-A]
F
           The Random House Dictionmy of the English Language; Webster's
    T71ird New lntenzational Dictio11a1)i, referred to.

          3. The case of the respondents being that they use neon lights to
G display the names of com1nodities they sell would fall since those adver-
    tisements cannot be called name-boards or even as identifying the name
    of' any object in which the trader was doing his business that being barely
    descriptive of the commodity. It would be more apt to say that the name
    board relates to the object and not to the subject. This marked distinction
H   takes out the case of the respondents from seeking exemption under
           N.D.M.C. v. ALLIED MOTORS PVT. LTD. [PUNCHHl,J.]                   429

Clause (a) of Bye Law 7. (434-C)                                                     A
        CIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1985 of
1982.

     From the .I udgment and Order dated 28.5.81 of the Delhi High
Court in L.P.A. No. 121 of 1973.                                                     B

        B. Sen, R.K. Maheshwari and Vineet Maheshwari for the Appellant.

        S. Ganesh, and Ashok Sagar for JBD & Co. for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                   c
      PUNCHHI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated May 21, 1981 of the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 121 of 1973, upturning the
decision of a learned Single Judge, as a result of which Civil Writ Petition         D
No. 653-D of 1963 stands allowed, and sequally the demand of advertise-
ment Tax quashed.

      The appellant is the New Delhi Municipal Committee. In exercise of
its powers under the provisions of sections 188(v) and 199 of the Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911, the committee appellant, after following the statutory          E
procedure, framed Bye-laws, providing for the control and regulation of
advertisements, which inter a/ia provided as follows :

          "Bye-laws

          1. Every person \Vho erects, exhibits, fixes, paints, carries or retains   F
          upon or over any land, building, wall, scores, boarding, structure
          or vehicle any advertisement within the limits of the New Delhi
          Municipal Committee and as mentioned in the Chief
          Commissioner's notification No. F.3(56)/56-LSG dated the 23rd
          .January 1958, shall be liable to pay advertisement tax on the same        G
          according to the schedule of rates appended to the said notifica-
          tion. This schedule of rates is reproduced in Appendix 'A' to these
          Bye-laws.

          2. No person shall fix up, erect or exhibit any advertisement without
          paying the entire amount of tax due in advance.                            H.
    430                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         3. xxxxxxx

          4. xxxxxxx

          5. xxxxxxx

B         6. xxxxxxx

          7. The Tm< shall not be payable on the following categories of
          advertisement :

          (Before 19.2.1971)               (After 19.2.71)
c         (a) Name boards displayed by     Name boards displayed by the
          the traders on their own pre-    traders on their own premises
          mises provided the board is      provided they do not contain
          purely a name board and it       any item of advertisement other
          does not contain any item of     than the name of the trade that
          advertisement.                   may be carried out at the
D                                          premises.                            ••
          (b) xxxxxxx

          (c) xxxxxxx
E         (d) xxxxxxx

          (e) Advertisement which relates to the trade, profession or busi-
          ness carried on within the land or building upon or over which
          such advertisement is exhibited or to any sale or letting of such
F         land or building or any effects therein or any sale, entertainment
          or meeting to be held on or upon or in the same.

          (6) Provided that exemption under this item shall apply only to
          one board displayed by the owner or his agent.

G         (f) Advertisement which relates to the name of the land or building
          upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited or to the name
          of the owner or occupier of such land or building.

          (g) xxxxxxx

H         (h) xxxxxxx
              N.D.M.C. v. ALLIED MOTORS PVT. LTD. IPUNCHHl,J.]                 431

              EXPLANATION - The word 'advertisement' means any word,                  A
              letter, model, sign, placard, notice, device or representation,
             whether illuminated or not, in the nature of and employed wholly
             or in post for the purpose of advertisen1ent, announcement or
             dircction. 1'

           The writ-petitioners before the High Court are the respondents             B
     herein. The first respondent M/s. Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd. carries on
     business of sale, purchase and repairs etc. of motor cars, Lambretta
     Scooters, and truck chasis and also deals in the sale of Burshane Gas. The
     second respondent is its Managing Director. The third respondent is an
     Association of Traders having their business place in the territorial area of
     the Committee. The Respondent No.1 exhibits eight neon signs boards on           c
     its premises, those being :

              1. Allied Motors, Private Ltd." Board being of a particular size

              2. "Perkings" Board being of a particular size
                                                                                      D
              3. "Perkings''

              4. 11 R.R.u

             5. "Bedford"

             6. "Lambretta11
                                                                                      E

              7. ' Burshanen
                 1




              8. "Gaskets"

     In view of exhibition of _these neon-signs, the appellant-Committee raised       F
     a demand against the said respondents for payment of advertisement tax.
     Feeling agi,>rievcd, the respondents moved the High Court of Delhi by way
     of a writ petition challenging the in1position of tax on a variety of ground5.
     A learned Single Judge, who got to grips with the matter posed three
                                                                                      G
,,   questions for detern1ination, out of whom two relating to the con-
     stitutionality of the measure do not survive as they stand dropped, for they
     were answered against the writ-petitioners by the learned Single Judge and
     those were not raised again before the Letters Patent Bench. The third
     question was as follows :

             "Whether the Boards displayed by the petitioners are not "adver-         H
    432                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995J SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A           tisement" boards but merely sign-boards of the items in which the
            petitioners deal"

           Holding that the boards displayed by the respondents were in the
    nature of advertisements the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ
    petition. Before the Letters Patent Bench the third question got subsided
B   and then came to the forefront claim of the respondents for exemption
    under clauses (a) of Bye Law 7. The Letters Patent Bench accepted the
    appeal on the interpretation given by it to clause (a) of Bye-Law 7 to the
    effect that the boards displayed by the respondents were purely
    nameboards, containing no item of advertisement except the trade name
c   of the articles suggested to be offered for sale. This has given rise to this
    appeal by the Committee as the respondents now stand absolved from
    payment of tax.

          Before we garner our minds to discover how certain advertisements
D are exempted from taxation, it needs to be priorly accepted that those
  would be advertisements, as covered and conceived of by Bye-law 1. If the
  act attracting taxation does not come within the scope of 'advertisement'
  within the meaning of Bye-law 1, the question of providing under Bye-law
  7 any exemption from payment of tax on exempted advertisements does
  not arise. But if the act comes within the scope of advertisement, unques-
E tionably   and undeniably, then alone can resort be had to Bye-law 7 to
  discover whether the advertisement is such a one to which any exemption
  can be attracted. It is in this light that we see that Clause (a) of Bye-law
  7, provides that tax shall not be payable on nameboard displayed by the
  traders on their own premises, provided the board is purely a nameboard
  and it does not contain any item of advertisement. It is plain therefore, that
F it shall initially be an advertisement but would be exempted from taxation
  if (1) is displayed by a trader, (ii) on his own premises, (iii) purely as a
  name board as such and (iv) on purity maintained by not containing any
  other item of advertisement. That is the pre- amended Bye-law with which
  we are instantly concerned. In contrast Clause (f) specifically takes out
G advertisements which relate to tlze name of the land or building upon or over
  which the advertisement is exhibited or relating to the name of the owner or
  occupier of such land or building. By process of contrast and exclusion,
  advertisements so exhibited, which relate to the name of the land or
  building or to the name of its owner or occupier is a category apart and
  distinct from advertisement by means of nameboards. Even distinct are the
H advertisements, as conceived of in Clause (e) of Bye-law 7, which relate to
        N.D.M.C. v. ALLIED MOTORS PVT. LTD. [PUNCHIILJ.]              433

the trade, profession or business carried on within the land or building A
upon or over which such advertisement is exhibited or to any sale or letting
of such land or building or any effects therein or any sale, entcrtain1ncnt
or meeting to be held on or upon or in the same; provided that exemption
under this item shall apply only to one hoard displayed by the owner or
his agent.
                                                                             B
       Such being the state of Bye-laws, we would be causing violence to
the spirit of Clause (a) of Bye-law 7, in ·splitting the expression "nameboard"
into two separate words, i.e. name and board and depleting the provision
of its intent. Apparently this is a term of art, finding its way to the alleys
of law by subordinate legislation. Necessarily, we need to seek help from
English dictionaries and cannot go by just impressions. According to The c
Random House Dictionary of the English language, the expression
"nameboard" (perhaps hyphenated) means a sign-board that identifies a
place or object; it is a name painted, stenciled, etc. on something, as on
the side of a ship. (Name + Board). According to Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, the word "name board" (as one word) is meant as D
an identifying signboard (as for a station, a shop or a ship); also an
identifying name displayed (as on the side of a ship) other than on a board.
The nameboard (be it called a single word, or combination of two words,
or an expression) thus has in the English diction a distinct meaning which
cannot be mutilated by splitting the same into lwo separate words of .'name'
and 'board', discovering their individual meanings and then tying them up. E
It would rather be safe to rely on the aforesaid two dictionary meanings to
deduce that even though under Clause (a) of Bye- law 7 two words, i.e.,
'name' and 'board' are used in succession, what is intended to mean is ·that
these go to make one word or a combined word, in order to exeinpt
advertisement by displaying of the name-board by the trader on his O\Vn
premises, provided the board is purely a name-board and does not contain F
any item of advertisement. Significantly, in the in-built proviso, the word
 name-board in i.ts pristine purity, reflects something more than a boar~
11          11



and in that manner distinctive. This adds lo our analysis that the words .
'name' and 'board' are not separate so as to be given separate meanings
and then coalescing them up. Rather, in our view the name-board is one G
word, as recognised separately, on its own strength, in the dictionaries. And
according lo those dictionaries, the identifying name so displayed pertains
to the place or object not to the name of the trade or the owner. A
name-board thus plays the part of the identifier, if the place premises has
a name, by display of such name. To demonstrate and clarify it further, we
                                                                            H
    434                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   say that if by mens of paint or structural signs an identifying name is
    engrafted over a huilding, as an identifying n1easure, then it is a name
    board. Because becon1ing a part of the premises it makes the premises self
    introductory by name.

          The case of the respondents being that they use neon-lights to display
B the names of commodities they sell woul<l fall since those advertisements
    cannot be called name-boards or even as identifying the name of any object
    in which the trader was doing his business that being barely descriptive of
    the commodity. It would be more apt to say that the name-board relates
    to the object and not to the subject. This marked distinction takes out the
c   case of the respondents from seeking exemption under Clause (a) of
    Bye-law 7. The Division Bench of the High Court apparently was misled
    to discover separate meaning of the word 'name' and then of the wore.I
    'board whcreafter to put then into a combination, assigning a meaning to
    'name-board' as if covering trade description of commodities offered for ,.
D sale and granted relief to the respondents on that basis. This in our view
    was a wrong approach leading the Judgment to be vulnerable.


          The respondents did not claim any exemption under Clause (e) of
    Bye-law 7. The said provision has been adverted to earlier in passing. It is
    to be seen that advertisements as relating to the trade profession or
E   business carried on within the land or building upon or over which such
    advertisement is put are to be exempted. Equally exemption is claimable
    for such advertisements relating to any sale or letting of such land or
    building or any effects therein. Like-wise advertisements relating to any
    entertainment or meeting to be held on or upon or in the same is to be
F   exempted; provided that exemption is valid to the owner or agent for one
    board. Thus advertisement which has nexus with the trade profession or
    business would qualify for exemption if relating to the named activities. The
    respondents succeeded before the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court
    only on the basis of clause (a) of Bye-law 7. The bench when called upon
    by the present appellant to give favourable interpretation to clause (a) of
G   Bye-laws 7 on the basis of clause (e) observed that it appears to them that
    clause (e) would apply to those advertisements which relate (only) to the
    trade, profession or business or something more than mere name boards.
    The respondents herein (the appellants there-at) did not build their case
    on the envil of clause (e) of Bye-law 7 and any attempt herein, in the
H   absence of the views of the High Court, would negate proper handling. We
         N.D.M.C. v. ALLIED MOTORS PVT. LTD. (PUNCHHI, J.J               435

would therefore leave the matter at that. This course is all the more A
necessary when there is an amendment in clause (a) of Bye-law 7 effective
from 19-2-1971 whereunder a name-boards remains as such displayable by
the traders on their own premises provided they do not add any item of
advcrti.,ement thereto other than the name of the trade that may be carried
out at the premises. But, as said before, we are concerned with the period
prior to that requiring us not to give a positive opinion.
                                                                               B

      For the foregoing reasons we are of the considered view that the
judgment and order of the Latter Patent Bench deserves to be set aside.
We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the same dismissing the civil
writ petition of respondents 1 to 3, upholding the demand of advertisement     C
tax. Parties to bear their own costs throughout.

T.N.A.                                                       Appeal allowed.