Supreme Court of India
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD.versusYADU SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 19
- Decided
- 7 January 2011
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- AFTAB ALAM
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the earlier decision in *Shivaji Dayanu Patil* conclusively determined that the explosion was an accident arising out of the use of the petrol tanker and, lacking any new material facts, that decision is binding on the Claims Tribunal, rendering the appeal untenable.
Summary
A petrol tanker collided with a truck on a highway, leaked petrol and, after a four‑hour interval, caught fire and exploded, killing 46 people who had gathered at the site. The victims' heirs filed claims for compensation under Section 110A (fault liability) and for no‑fault compensation under Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 against the tanker owner and its insurer, New India Assurance Company Ltd. The Claims Tribunal dismissed the Section 92A claims, holding the fire and explosion were not an accident arising out of the use of the vehicle, but the High Court set aside that order, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in *Shivaji Dayanu Patil & Anr. v. Vatscha/a Uttam More* which had held the explosion was an accident arising out of the use of the tanker. The insurer appealed, arguing that the earlier Supreme Court decision was interlocutory and not binding on the main Section 110A proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the earlier decision fully decided the issue of whether the explosion was an accident arising out of the use of the vehicle and, because no new material facts were presented, it was binding on the Claims Tribunal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the fire and explosion of the petrol tanker, occurring four hours after the collision, constitute an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
- Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in *Shivaji Dayanu Patil & Anr. v. Vatscha/a Uttam More* (a Section 92A application) is binding on the Claims Tribunal in the subsequent Section 110A proceedings.
- Whether the Claims Tribunal can depart from a superior court’s finding on the same factual issue in the absence of new material evidence.
Legislation cited
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 110A, s. 92A
Subjects
Motor vehicle accidentNo‑fault compensationSection 92ASection 110AClaims TribunalBinding precedentAccident arising out of useInsurance liability
Judgment
[2011] 1 S.C.R. 160
A NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
V.
YADU SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3744 of 2005)
JANUARY 07, 2011
B
[AFTAB ALAM AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - ss. 110A and 92A - Claim
for no-fault compensation uls 92A - Allowed by the Supreme
c Court holding that the fire and explosion of the petrol tanker
resulting in the death of victim was due to accident arising out
of the use of the motor vehicle, the petrol tanker -
Applications u/s. 110A - Dismissed by Claims Tribunal,
however allowed by the High Court holding that the order of
0 the Supreme Court uls 92A was conclusive on the issue - On
appeal held: On the basis of the evidences led by the
opposite party, no new points were raised before the Claims
Tribunal that can be said to have not been raised before the
Supreme Court u/s 92A - Decision rendered by the Supreme
E Court on an application u/s 92A was completely binding on
the Claims Tribunal - Claims Tribunal could not come to any
finding inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court.
There was a collision involving the petrol tanker and
the other truck resulting in leakage from the tanker. Few
F hours later, there was a fire and explosion resulting in the
death of 46 persons, who had assembled at the accident
site. The heirs and legal representatives of the victims
filed claim petitions for compensation under Section 110A
of the .Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 against the owner of the
G petrol tanker and the appellant, the insurer; and for no-
fault compensation under Section 92A of the Act. The
Claims Tribunal dismissed all the claim petitions filed
under Section 92A of the Act on the ground that the fire
and the explosion could not be said to be accident
.H 160
1
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. YADU 161
SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS.
arising out of the use of the petrol tanker and there was A
--{ a time gap of about four hours. The appeals were filed
before the High Court. One 'VU' whose son died in the
accident also filed a'n appeal. The Single Judge of the
High Court set aside the order pas~ed by the Claims
Tribunal. The Division Bench of the High Court upheld the B
order passed by the Single Judge. Aggrieved, the owner
of the tanker and the insurance company filed SLP and
the same was dismissed. The judgment was reported as
* Shivaji Dayanu Patil & Anr. vs. Vatschala Uttam More
where it was held that the fire and explosion of the petrol c
tanker in which son of 'VU' lost his life could be said to
have resulted from an accident arising out of the use of
the motor vehicle, petrol tanker, thus, allowed the claim
of no-fault compensation by and/or on behalf of the
victims. As regards the applications filed under Section D
11 OA of the Act, the Claims Tribunal dismissed all
applications. The High Court allowed the appeal holding
that the *Shivaji Dayanu Patifs case was conclusive on
the issue that the death of the victim, caused by the fire
and explosion of the petrol tanker, had resulted from an .E
accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle,
namely the petrol tanker. However, the High Court on a
. ""'\
prayer made by the appellant, granted them certificate to
appeal to this Court. Therefore, the appellant filed the
instant appeal.
F
Dismissing the appeal,. the Court
HELD: 1.1 On the basis of the evidences later on
adduced before the Tribunal in the main proceeding
under Section 11 OA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it G
.~ might be possible for the Claims Tribunal to arrive at a
finding at variance with the finding recorded by a superior
court on the same issue on an application under Section
92A of the Act. But the variant finding by the Tribunal
must be based on some material facts coming to light
H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R. ...
A from the evidences led before it that were not available
before the superior court while dealing with the t-
proceeding under Section 92A of the Act. However, in the
instant case, as correctly noted by the High Court, the
position is entirely different. [Para 13] [168-G-H; 169-A-B]
8
1.2 The evidences of the OWs adduced before the
Claims Tribunal, in particular the depositions of the owner
of the petrol tanker, who was examined himself as OW1
and the driver of the ill-fated petrol tanker who was
c examined as OW2 are examined and the judgment of the
Tribunal is perused. In the evidences of the OWs, there
was no new material fact that wasn't already before this
Court in *Shivaji Dayanu Patil, and on the basis of the
evidences led by the opposite party, no new points were
raised before the Claims Tribunal that can be said to have
D not been raised before this Court in *Shivaji Dayanu Patil.
[Para 15) [171-8-C)
1.3 In the facts and circumstances of the instant case,
the decision rendered in *Shivaji Dayanu Patil was
E completely binding on the Claims Tribunal and it was not
open to the Claims Tribunal to come to any finding
inconsistent with the said decision of this Court. [Para 16)
[172-A-B] y
*Shivaji Dayanu Patil and Anr. vs. Vatschala Uttam More
F (1991) 3 sec 530 - Relied on.
Case Law Reference:
(1991) 3 sec 530 Relied on Para 4
G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3744 of 2005.
From the Judgmrnt and Order dated 28.04.2005 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Application No.
H 1583 of 2005 in First Appeal No. 149 of 1999.
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. YADU 163
SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS.
Atul Nanda, (AC) , Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Ashok Kumar A
Singh, Sapam Biswajit Mietei, Surender Dutt Sharma, Punam
Kumari and Dr. Meera Agarwal for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AFTAB ALAM, J. 1. This is an appeal under Article 133 B
of the Constitution of India read with Order XV Rule 1 of the
Supreme ,Court Rules, 1966 on a certificate granted by the
Bombay High Court under Article 134A(b) of the Constitution.
The appellant is the insurance company and it seeks to assail
the judgment and order passed by the High Court in an appeal C
from a motor accident claim case. In order to properly
appreciate the issue in regard to which the High Court has.
granted the certificate to appeal, it would be useful to take note
of some basic facts of the case.
D
2. In the early hours of October 29, 1987 a petrol tanker
bearing registration no.MXL7461, was proceeding on National
Highway 4, coming from the Pune side and going towards
Bangalore. As it reached near village Kavathe, in the district
of Satara, Maharashtra, a truck, bearing registration E
no.MEH4197, laden with onions, was coming from the opposite
direction. At the point where the two vehicles crossed each
other, there was a pile of rubble on the left side of the road. As
the two vehicles crossed each other, the rear right side of the
petrol tanker was hit by the rear left side of the truck. As a result
F
of the impact, the p~trol tanker was thrown off the road and it
came to rest on its left side/ cleaner's side on the kutcha
ground, about 5 feet below the road. As a result of the collision
and the falling down of the petrol tanker on its side, petrol
started leaking from the tanker. The tanker driver was unable
to stop the leak even though he tried to tighten the lid. The G
accident took place at around 3:1 Sam. Shortly after the
accident, another tanker, coming from the Bombay side passed
by. In that tanker, apart from the·driver, there was also an officer
·of the Indian Oil Company. Both of them assured the driver of
H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.
A the fallen down tanker that they would report the accident at the
police station and asked him to wait near the place of the
accident. Later on, yet another tanker from Sangli arrived at the
spot and then the cleaner of the ill-fated tanker and the owner
of the Sang Ii tanker together went to village Kavathe in search
B of a telephone to inform the tanker owner about the accident.
After they came back from the village all of them, the driver and
the cleaner of the tanker that had met with accident and the
owner, the driver and the cleaner of the tanker coming from
Sangli waited near the accident site. At daybreak, the local
c people started collecting near the fallen down tanker and some
of them brought cans and tried to collect the petrol leaking out
from the tanker. The driver of the tanker tried to stop them from
collecting petrol or even going near the tanker, .explaining to
them that doing so would be risky and dangerous. No one,
0 however, listened to him and he was even manhandled. In the
melee, the petrol caught fire and there was a big explosion in
which 46 persons lost their lives.
3. The heirs and legal representatives of those people who
died at the accident site filed claim petitions for compensation
E under section 11 OA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the
MACT, Satara, against the owner of the petrol tanker and its
insurer, the present appellant. In all the cases, claims were also
made for payment of Rs.~ 5,000/- as no fault compensation y--
under section 92A of the Act. The owner of the tanker and the
F insurer (the respondents before the Tribunal) contested the
claim petitions filed by the applicants under section 92A of the
Act and questioned the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to
entertain such petitions on the ground that the fire and the
explosion causing the death of those who had assembled at
G the accident site could not be said to be an accident arising
out of the use of a motor vehicle. The Claims Tribunal upheld
the objection raised by the insurer and the owner of the petrol
tanker, and by a common order dated December 2, 1989,
dismissed all the claim petitions filed under section 92A of the
H Act on the ground that the fire and the explosion could not be
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. YADU 165
SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
said to be accident arising out of the use of the petrol tanker A
_ and hence, the provisions of section 92A of the Act were not
attracted. The Claims Tribunal pointed out that there was a time.
gap of about 4 hours between the tanker meeting with the road
accident and the fire and explosion of the tanker and there was
absolutely no connection between the road accident and the B
fire accident that took place about 4. hours later. The Claims
Ttribunal also observed that the local people were trying to steal
petrol from the petrol tanker and the fire and the explosion were
"""' the result of their attempt to steal the petrol leaking out from
the tanker. In other words, it was the people who had assembled c
at the accident site and some of whom eventually died as a
result of it who were responsible for causing the fire and
explosion accident and the later accident had no causal
connection with the earlier road accident of the tanker. The fire
and the explosion could not be said to be an accident arising D
).
out of the use of the tanker. Against the order of the Claims
Tribunal passed on December 2, 1989, appeals were filed
before the High Court. One such appeal was filed by Vatschala
Uttam More, whose son Deepak Uttam More was one of the
persons who died as a result of injuries caused by the fire and
E
explosion of the petrol tanker. A learned single judge of the High
Court allowed the appeal and by judgment dated February 5,
-~
1990, reversed the order passed by the Claims Tribunal.
Against the decision of the single judge, the owner of the petrol
tanker and the insurance company filed a Letters Patent Appeal
which was dismissed by a division bench of the High Court by F
judgment dated August 16, 1990.
4. The owner of the petrol tanker and the insurance
company then brought the matter to this court in SLP no.14822
~- of 1990 challenging the judgment and order of the High Court G
passed on August 16, 1990. The SLP was dismissed by this
court by judgment and order passed on July 17, 1991. In this
judgment, reported as Shivaji Dayanu Patil & Anr. vs.
Vatscha/a Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530 the Court
considered at length, the questions whether the fire and H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.
A explosion of the petrol tanker in which Deepak Uttam More lost
his life could be said to have resulted from an accident arising
out of the use of a motor vehicle, namely the petrol tanker. The
court answered the question in the affirmative, that is to say, in
favor of the claimant and against the insurer.
B
5. The judgment of this Court, thus, put an end to the
objections raised by the owner and the insurer of the petrol
tanker against the claim of no fault compensation by and/or on
behalf of the victims of the fire and explosion accident.
C 6. But next came the turn of the main applications filed
under section 11 OA of the Act. There were altogether 44 claim
applications in which, case no.168 of 1988 was treated as the
lead case. In the main claim cases too, the owner and the
insurer of the tanker inter alia raised the same objections as
D taken earlier against the claim of no fault compensation. In view
of the pleadings of the parties, the Claims Tribunal framed five
issues in which issue no.3, being relevant for the present, was
as follows:
"3. Whether sustaining of injuries was (sic) arising out of
E
use of the petrol tanker and was the result of negligence
on the part of the petrol tanker driver?"
7. On the basis of the evidences led bef9re it, the Claims
Tribunal answered the issue in the. negative and as a
F consequence dismissed all the claim eases by its judgment and
order dated July 31, 1997.
8. Against the judgment and order passed by the Claims
Tribunal, the applicant of MACP no.168 of 1988, preferred an
G appeal before the High Court (being First Appeal no.149 of
1999). (The other claimants whose claims were similarly
dismissed by the Claims Tribunal are also said to have
preferred their respective appeals before the High Court which
are pending awaiting the result of the present appeal before
H thisCourt).
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. YADU 167
SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
9. Before the High Court it was contended on behalf of the A
claimants that the question whether the death of the victims
resulted from an accident arising out of the use of the petrol
tanker was concluded by the decision of this Court in Shivaji
Dayanu Patil and any finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal
contrary to the decision of this Court was completely illegal and B
untenable. On the other hand, on behalf of the insurer and the
owner of the petrol tanker, it was argued that the decision of
_.. this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil was rendered on a claim for
' no-fault compensation under section 92A of the Act. It was, thus,
a judgment against an interlocutory order, before any evidences c
were recorded in the proceeding and, therefore, the decision
in Shivaji Dayanu Patil cannot be taken as binding and it was
open to the Claims Tribunal or the High Court to come to a
different finding on the basis of the evidences adduced in
course of the main proceeding. It was further argued, on behalf
D
of the insurer and the owner of the petrol tanker that an order
under section 92A is, in nature, an interim order that is passed
· withoutfollowing the formal procedure of recording evidence.
The decision of this Court in Shivaji. Dayanu Patil had not ·
decided the issue finally and,. .coh'Clusively and, hence, the
claimants could not dr,aw any benefit from it in the main E
proceeding under.I ,se'ction 11 OA of the Act based on the
principle of fault or negligence of the driver of the vehicle. The
--"i
High Court 'did not accept the arguments advanced on behalf
..of the owner and the insurer of the petrol tanker, but agreed
with the claimants that the decision of this Court in Shivaji F
Dayanu Patil was conclusive on the issue that the death of the
victim, caused-by the fire and explosion of the petrol tanker, had
resulted from an accid~nt arising out of the use of the motor
vehicle, namely, the petrol tanker and it was not open to the
~ Claims Tribunal to take a contrary view. It, accordingly, allowed G
the appeal and by judgment and order dated March 24, 2005,
set aside the judgment of thE} .~laims Tribunal and allowed the
claim petition with costs.
10. Though, having held against the insurer, the High Court, H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 1 S.C.R.
A on a prayer made before it, granted certificate to appeal to this
Court by order dated April 28, 2005,_ in the following terms: r-
"1. Heard advocates for the appellant and respondents.
The issue involved that is for the purpose of this leave to
go to the Supreme Court is, whether the order of the
8
Supreme Court under section 92A was for all purposes an
interim order or it concluded and decided the question as
to whether the vehicle i.e. the tanker was in use when
exploded. Though, I have held against the respondents,
looking to the question involved, certificate as prayed, is
c granted. No stay to the order of payment. Certified copy
expedited."
11. Mr. Ramesh Chandra Mishra appearing on behalf of
the appellant advanced the same arguments before us as were
D advanced before the High Court in support of the judgment
passed by the Claims Tribunal. Learned counsel submitted that
the decision of this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil was rendered
on an application under section 92A of the Act and, therefore,
any finding recorded in that decision would not be binding on
E the Claims Tribunal in the main proceeding under section 11 OA
of the Act th~t was to be decided on the basis of the evidences
adduced before the Tribunal.
',"--
12. On hearing Mr. Atul Nanda, the amicus curiae and Mr.
Ashok Kumar Singh, counsel appearing on behalf of the
F respondent, we are unable to accept the submissions made
by Mr. Ramesh Chandra Mishra and we are in complete
agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
13. In a given case, on the basis of the evidences later on
adduced. before it in the main proceeding under section 11 OA
G
of the Act, it may be possible for the Claims Tribunal to arrive
1
at a finding at variance with the finding recorded by a superior
court on the same issue on an application under section 92A
of the Act. But the variant finding by the tribunal must be based
H on some material facts coming to light from the evidences led
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. YADU 169
SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
before it that were not available before the superior court while A
dealing with the proceeding under section 92A of the Act. In
this case, however, as correctly noted by the High Court, the
position is entirely different. It is true that the case Shivaji
Dayanu Patil arose from the claim for no-fault compensation
under section 92A but all the material facts were already befor~ B
the court and all the contentions being raised now were
considered 'at length by this Court in that case. In Shivaji
-~ Dayanu Patil the Court took note of the relevant facts in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment. In paragraph 4 of the
judgment, the Court noted the three limbs of argument advanced c
by Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the owner
of the petrol tanker in support of the plea that the explosion and
fire in the petrol tanker could not be said to be an accident
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Paragraph 4 of the
judgment read~as under: D
"4. Shri G.L. Sanghi, the learned Counsel appearing for
the petitioners, has urged that in the instant case, it cannot
be said that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker
which occurred at about 7.15 A.M., i.e., nearly four and half
hours after the collision involving the petrol tanker and the E
other truck, was an accident arising out of the use of a
motor vehicle and therefore, the claim petition filed by the
--(
respondent could not be entertained under Section 92-A
of the Act. Shri Sanghi has made a three-fold submission
in this regard. In the first place, he has submitted that the F
petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle as defined in Section
2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion and fire
took place because at that time the petrol tanker was lying
turtle and was not capable of movement on the road. The
second submission of Shri Sanghi is that since before the G
~
explosion and fire the petrol tanker was lying immobile it
could not be said that the petrol tanker, even if it be
-~ assumed that it was a motor vehicle, was in use as a
I
motor vehicle at the time of the explosion and fire. Thirdly,
it has been submitted by Shri Sanghi that even if it is found H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.
A that the petrol tanker was in use as a motor vehicle at the r
~
~
time of the explosion and fire, there was no causal ~
relationship between the collision which took place
between the petrol tanker and the truck at about 3 A.M. -
and the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which took
B place about four and half hours later and it cannot,
therefore, be said that explosion and fire in the petrol tanker
was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle."
14. After having considered each of the 3 limbs of Mr. ~
Sanghi's arguments and having rejected all of them, the Court,
c in paragraph 37 of the~judgment, held and observed as follows: I-
"37. Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the
petrol tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor
vehicle? In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the
D present case, this question must be answered in the
affirmative. The High Court has found that the tanker in
question was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible
and volatile material and after the collision with the other
motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on
E the sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable
petrol and that there was grave risk of explosion and fire
from the petrol coming out of the tanker. In the light of the
aforesaid circumstances the learned Judges of the High ~-
Court have rightly concluded that the collision between the
F tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred earlier and
the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately
resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but
.related events and merely because there was interval of
about four to four and half hours between the said collision
and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it cannot be
G
necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation ~
between explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it must
.....
be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries ,.
which led to the death of Deepak Uttam More was due to
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. YADU 1r1
SAMBHAJI MORE & ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle viz. A
, -< the petrol tanker No. MKL 7461."
15. We have examined the evidences of the OWs
adduced before the Claims Tribunal, in particular the
depositions of Shivaji Patil, the owner of the petrol tanker, who 8
examined himself as OW1 and Dhonciirama Mali, the driver of
the ill-fated petrol tanker who was examined as OW2. We have
also gone through the judgment of the Tribunal. In the evidences
of the OWs, there was no new material fact that wasn't already
before this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil. And on the basis of C
the ev!dences led by the opposite party, no new points were
raised before the Claims Tribunal, that can be said to have not
been raised before this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil. The High
Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in observing in
paragraph 26 of the judgment coming under appeal as follows:
D
-
"... But whether the vehicle was in use or not was a
question before the Supreme Court and even after
evidence that aspect has not changed. Time at which the
' accident occurred, viz. catching the fire by the petrol has
remained the same. The circumstances preceding this E
particular point have also remained the same. The manner
in which the petrol tanker came near the spot and how it
was hit by a vehicle or truck coming from opposite
direction also remained the same even after evidence and
therefore when facts which were before the Supreme Court F
have not at all changed inspite of the full trial and evidence,
the judgment of the Supreme Court has to be accepted
and taken as a concluded judgment so far as the issue as
to whether the vehicle was "in use" or "arising out of the
use of the motor vehicle", fully and concluding. Secondly, G
questions before the Supreme Court was about the
interpretation of the words "arising out of use of motor
vehicle". The situation namely occurring explosion to the
petrol tanker has not changed so far as this particular
aspect is concerned .... "
H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.
A 16. In light of the discussions made above, it must be held
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
decision rendered in Shivaji Oayanu Patil was completely
binding on the Claims Tribunal and it was -not open to the
Claims Tribunal to come to any finding inconsistent with the
8 aforesaid decision of this Court. The issue framed by the High
Court is answered accordingly. There is no merit in the appeal
and it is, accordingly, di~missed with costs.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
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