Supreme Court of India
OM PARKASHversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 85
- Decided
- 8 February 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- V S SIRPURKAR
Holding
Explanation 1 to the first proviso of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 excludes periods of stay from the three‑year limitation, but the relief of a quashed Section 6 declaration is confined to the petitioners who obtained the order and does not extend to other land‑owners.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the validity of Section 6 declarations issued after Section 4 notifications for land acquisition in Delhi, where the notifications were dated November 1980 and the declarations were issued in 1985‑86. The appellants argued that the three‑year limitation for issuing a Section 6 declaration should be computed excluding periods of interim stay granted to other land‑owners, and that they should benefit from the quashing of declarations in other cases. The Court held that Explanation 1 to the first proviso of Section 6 indeed excludes stay periods when calculating the limitation, but the benefit of a quashed declaration is limited to the petitioners who obtained the order and cannot be extended to other land‑owners. Consequently, the appellants could not be rewarded for their own delay, and the appeals were dismissed with costs.
Issues considered
- The method of computing the three‑year limitation period for a Section 6 declaration when interim stays are in place.
- Whether a quashing of a Section 6 declaration in one case benefits other land‑owners who did not approach the court.
- Whether the period of stay should be excluded for all land‑owners irrespective of their participation in the stay proceedings.
- The effect of delay and laches on the appellants' claims.
Legislation cited
- Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 5A, s. 6, s. Explanation 1, s. first proviso
- Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
- Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Ordinance, 1967
Subjects
Land acquisitionSection 6 declarationLimitation periodStay orderQuashing of declarationLachesEquitable reliefComposite notificationExplanation 1First provisoSupreme Court of India
Judgment
[20_10] 2 S.C.R. 447
OM PARKASH A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1514 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 8, 2010
B
[V.S. SLRPURKAR AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: s. 6, First proviso,
Explanation I - Limitation for issuance of s. 6 declaration ,...
Computation of - Issuance of s.4 Notification - Order of stay C
in favour of land owners who preferred writ petitions before
High Court - On vacation of interim stay by virtue of dismissal
of writ petitions, authorities proceeded further and issued
notification under s. 6 - In case of some land owners, s. 6
declaration quashed - Appellants had not challenged the s. 4 o
notification - They filed writ petitions challenging s. 6
declaration which were dismissed - On appeal, held: Where
any order of stay is granted in favour of land owners, actual
period covered by order of stay should be excluded while
computing period of limitation for issuance of s. 6 notification E
- Thereafter, if declaration is quashed by any Court, it would
only enure to the benefit of those who had approached the
Court - The benefit would certainly not extend to them who
had not approached the Court - Thus the appellants cannot
be rewarded on account of their own lapse - After a long lapse
F
of time, it would not only be harsh but inequitable also to
quash the notifications so as to grant liberty to the appellants
to challenge same in accordance with law - Delay and /aches
- Equity.
On 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, notifications were G
issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for
acquisition of more than 50,000 bighas of land situated
in 1.3 different villages. Aggrieved land owners filed writ
447 H
448 ..SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A petitions· before High Court challenging the same. Interim
ord~.f of.
stay was granted. High court ultimately
dismJ~sed the writ petitions. The dismissal of writ petition
was not challenged and-it attained finality. Pursuant to the
S~ction 4:Notification, Sectibn 6 Notification was issued.
8 The appellants had not challenged the Section 4
Notification and so there was no order of stay passed by
any court in their favour i.e. there was no order of restraint
from issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
In case of spme of the land-owners, writ petitions
C challenging the Section 6 declaration/notification before
the High Court were allowed on 14.8.1988.
Appellants filed writ petitions before High Court
challenging the Section 6 declaration/notifications on the
ground that the Section 6 declaration was not issued
D within the period of three years from the date of issuance·
of Section 4 notifications which rendered the acquisition
illegal and void qua appellants' lands; that the stay order
granted in favour of other land owners, who had
challenged either the Section 4 notifications or the
E Section 6 declaration would not be applicable or
operative to the appellants' lands~ and that appellant
claimed parity with those land-owners who successfully
challenged the Section 6 declaration/notification before
the High Court. The writ petitions were dismissed by
F different orders passed by High Court. Hence these
appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Explanation 1 appended to first proviso of
G Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 makes it
crystal clear that where any order of stay has been
granted in favour of land owner, while computing the
period of limitation of three years for issuance of Section
6 notification, the actual period covered by such order of
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 449
stay should be excluded. On account of omission of the A
appellants, they cannot be granted dividend for .their own
defaults. The appellants ought to have been more careful,
cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed along with
those 73 petitions, which were ultimately allowed by the
High Court. Not having done so, they have to suffer the B
consequence of issuance of notifications under Section
4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
use of the word "any" in the explanation considerably
amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation
can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding c
is stayed. It may be complete stay of the operation of the
entire notification or may even be a partial stay - partial
in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of
whom it will operate. [Paras 76, 77, 86, 87] [479-D; 485-G-
H; 486-A-B] D
Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1987 Delhi 239,
approved.
Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India & Others 37 (1989)
DLT 150, referred to. E
2. Each of the notifications issued under Section 4
of the Act was composite in nature. The interim order of
stay was granted in many petitions. Thus, in the teeth of
such interim orders of stay during the period of stay,
F
respondents could not proceed further to issue
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act. The
language employed in the interim orders of stay was also
such that it had completely restrained the respondents
from proceeding further in the matter by issuing
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act. As G
soon as the interim stay came to be vacated by virtue of
the main order having been passed in the writ petition,
respondents, taking advantage of the period of stay
during which they were restrained from issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, proceeded further H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A and issued notification under Section 6 of the Act. [Paras
88 and 89) [486-E-H; 487-A-B]
3.1. It is true that language of Section 6 of the Act
implies that declarations can be issued piecemeal and it
is not necessary to issue one single declaration for whole
8
of the area which is covered under notification issued
under Section 4 of the Act. Parliament was aware of such
type of situation and that is whY\ such a right has been
carved out in favour of respondent-State. In many cases,
urgency clause may be invoked, therefore, the right of
C filing objections under Section 5A of the Act would not
arise. In some cases, even though objections might be
preferred under Section 5A of the Act, but, may not be
pressed in spite of knowledge of acquisition of land.
Some of the land owners may not prefer to file any
D objections at aH. In order to meet such type of exigencies
as may arise in the case, power has been given by the
Parliament to the Executive to issue declarations in
piecemeal under Section 6 of the Act, wherever it may be
feasible to implement the scheme. [Paras 90) [487-C-E]
E
3.2. In the case in hand, as many as four declarations
under Section 6 of the Act were issued from time to time.
Finally when declaration is quashed by any Court, it
would only enure to the benefit of those who had
. F approached the Court. It would certainly not extend the
benefit to t~ose who had not approached the Court or
who might have gone into slumber. At this long distance
of time, it would neither be proper nor legally justified to
grant that benefit to the appellants. If it is granted to even
G those who had not approached the court, then it would
frustrate the very purpose and scope of the Act. Final
quashment of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
by any Court, in some other matter, cannot be extended
to the benefit of the present.appellants. In any ·case, there
is no ground to rise to the occasion to do so, much less
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 451
to the benefits of the appellants. It is not a fit case to grant A
such inequitable reliefs to the appellants, after such a
. long delay. [Paras 91 and 93] [487-F-G; 488-B-C]
Munni Lal & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & . Ors. ILR
(1984) I Delhi 469, referred to.
B
3.3. Obviously, the appellants cannot be rewarded on
account of their own lapse as they should have been
vigilant enough to get their matters also listed along with
those in whose favour ultimately judgment wa~
pronounced. Looki"@ to the scheme of the Act, it is C
obvious that the appellants would certainly suffer the
consequence of the interim order passed in some other
matters preferred by other land owners challenging the
notifications but finally benefit thereof cannot be accrued
to the appellants as the same would obviously be o
confined to those petitioners only in whose favour orders
were passed. [Paras 94 and 95] (488-D-F]
4. First proviso appended to section 6 clearly
indicates that all actions which have taken place between E
the period, after commencement of Land Acquisition
(Amendment & Validation) Ordinance 1967 but before the
commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act
1984, would be saved. There is no dispute in these
matters that notifications under Section 4 of the Act were
issued on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, the period which is F
covered by the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act. The
excl.usion envisaged is available in respect of
notifications issued between the period commencing
from 29.1.1967 and 24.9.1984. [Paras 96 and 98] [488-G-
H; 489-A-B; 490-G] G
Chatro Devi v. Union of India & Ors. 137 (2007) DLT 14,
referred to.
5. Impugned orders passed by High Court from time
H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A to time would reveal that some have been dismissed
primarily on the ground of delay and laches. If the
appellants were under some bonafide mistake and had
not challenged the issuance of notifications or
declaration under Section 6 of the. Act within a
B reasonable time then on the ground that there was an
eclipse period during which they were not supposed to
take any legal action, would be of no help to them. Some
of the petitions have been filed either in the year 2000 or
subsequent thereto. Thus, the High Court was justified
C in not entertaining such petitions on the ground of delay
and laches .. Even though, they have tried to attempt to
explain the delay but such a long delay cannot be
condoned more so, when proceeding of acquisition was
initiated in the year 1980. Almost 30 years have already
passed by, but, no ·steps could be taken to formally
D complete the scheme so far. Thus, after such a long lapse
of time, it will not only be harsh but inequitable also to
quash the notifications so as to grant liberty to the
appellants to challenge same in accordance with law.
[Paras 109 and 110) [494-G-H]
E
6. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act being·
composite one it would not be proper and legally
justifiable to quash the same more so when most of the
appellants had not filed any objections under Section SA
F of the Act. Thus, the declarations issued under Section
6 of the Act cannot be quashed. [Para 112] [495-D]
7. Unless the declarations issued by respondents on
as many as four dates, in the year 1985, are quashed in
toto, it cannot be said that respondents could not have
G proceeded further with regard to acquisition of those
lands for which the same has not been quashed earlier.
In other words, it has been held that for all remaining
lands for which neither the notifications under Section 4
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 453
nor declarations under Section 6 have been quashed, A
acquisition proceedings; notification/declaration issued
for remaining lands would continue to hold good and
respondents can proceed further. [Paras 113 and 114]
[495-E-G]
B
Abhey Ram (Dead by LRs) and Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 - relied on.
Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
(1990) 7 SCC 44; Oxford English School v. Government of C
Tamil Nadu and Others (1995) 5 SCC 206; Chatro Devi v.
Union of India & Ors. 137 (2007) DLT 14; Vishwas Nagar
Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association v. Under Secretary,
Delhi Administration (1990) 2 SCC 268; Star Wire (India) Ltd.
v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698; Swaika Properties
(P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695; Meera Sahni D
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177; Delhi
Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC
296; Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council and Others
1956 AC 376; F. Hoffmann- LA Roche and Co. A.G. and
Others v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 1975 AC E
29·5, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
ILR (1984) I Delhi 469 referred to Paras 5,54, 56,
88 F
AIR 1987 Delhi 239 approved Paras 20,
(1997) 5 sec 421 relied on Paras 20,
30, 32, 43, 61, 81,
83, 84, 105, 107, G
108, 111, 112
(1990) 1 sec 44 referred to Paras 21, 30, 36
(1995) s sec 20s referred to Para 30
H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A 37 (1989) DLT 150 referred to Para 34
(1999) 1 sec 44 referred to Para 36
137 (2007) DLT 14 referred to Paras 42, 102
(1990) 2 sec 268 referred to Para 64
B
(1996) 11 sec 698 referred to Para 64
(2008) 4 sec 695 referred to Para 64
(2008) 9 sec 111 referred to Para 65
c
(2000) 1 sec ·296 referred to Para 68
1956 AC 376 referred to Para 69
1975 AC 295 referred to Para 69
D 137 (2007) DLT 14 referred to Para 101
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1514 of 2010
E From the Judgment & Order dated25.11.2004 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition No. 346 of 1987.
WITH
C. A. ~~s. 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518, 1519, 1520, 1521, 1522,
F 1523, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530, 1531, 1532,
1533, 1534, 1535, 1536-38, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542, 1543,
1544, 1545, 1546, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1550, 1551, 1552, 1553,
1554, 1555, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, 1562, 1563,
1564, 1565, 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1571, 1572, 1573,
G 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580, 1581, 1582, 1583,
1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, 1593,
1594, 1595, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1601, 1602, 1603,
1604, 1605, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613,
1614, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1618, 1619, 1620 and 1621 of 2010.
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 455
P.P. Rao, Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, T. R. Andhyarjuna, P. S. A
Patwalia, M. R. Calla, P. N. Lekhi, Ravinder Sethi, Mukul
Rohtagi, S.S. Upadhya, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Dr. K.S. Sidhu, K.
N. Bhat, Mariarputham, Hiren Rawal, ASG.Ms. India Jaising,
ASG; M.K. Garg, Sumit Bansal, P.Tripathi, Ms. J. Mishra,
Jagdeep Kishore, Ms. Pallavi Mohan (for Ms. Manjula Gupta), B
Ms.- Meenakshi Lekhi, Lokesh Kumar, Vikas Mehta, Rohit Bhat,
Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra, Pradeep Misra, Ms. Daleep Kr.
Dhyani, Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal, Anish K.V., Dhruv Mehta,
Yashraj Singh Deora, Mohit Abraham (for M/s. K.L. Mehta &
Co.), Ms. S. Janani, Deepak Goel, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Vinayc
Bhasin, N.S. Vashisht,. Anurag Chawla, Arun k Sinha, Rakesh
Singh, Sumit Sinha, Dhruv Mehta, Om Prakash, T.S. Sabarish,
·Ms. Tanushree Mukherjee (for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co.), M.K.
Garg, Siddhartha Choudhary, Rahul Gupta, Ms. Reema
Sharma, Bhargava V. Desai,· M. Vashisht, Sameer Vashisht,
0
M.R. Shamshed, Amit Sibal, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Parmanand
Gaur, Mukesh Verma, Vivek Vishnoi, Arunabh Choudhary,
Anupam Lal Das, Kashi Vishveshwar, Raktim Gogoi, Arun K.
Sinha, Anandeshwar Gautum, AK.Sinha, Mukul Kumar, P.O.
Sharma, Mukul Gupta, M. A Chinnasamy, Jai Prakash, ~.S. E
Mann, Preetam Shah, Harbir Singh, K. Krishna Kumar,
Amarjeet Singh Bedi, Maldeep Sidhu, Samar Bansal, Ms.
Aparna Rohatgi Baldev Atreya, Ms . .Meenakshi Lekhi, AV.
Rangam, Buddy A Rangadhan, Puneet Sharma, S.S. Sharma,
Oharmeridra Kumar Sinha, N.S. Vashisht, Vishal Singh, Arun
K. Sinha, Rakesh Singh, Sumit Sinha, Ms. Kanchan Kaur F
Dhodi, Anandeshwar Gautram, Arun K. Sinha, Rakesh Singh,
Sumit Sinha, Vishal Singh, R.R. Jamwal, Balaji Srinivasa, Dr.
K.P.S. Dalal, Anil Karanwal, Krishna Pal Singh, Ms. S.adhna
Sandhu, Ms.Gargi Khanna, Ms. Anil Katiyar, Ms. Gunwant Dara,
Y.P. Mahajan, T.V. Ratnam, R.N. Keshwami, Ram Lal Roy, Rajiv _G
Garg, Ashish Garg, Annam-0.N .. Rao, Abhay Kumar, Rajesh
Anand, Saurabh Mehra, Ms. Maldeep Sidhu, Sanjay Poddar,
Ms. Rekha Pandey, N.S. Benipal, Sushma Suri, D.N.
Goburdhan, Ms. Asha G. Nair, Prabal -Bagchi, Ms. Rekha
P~~ey, Ms. Gargi Khanna, Mrs. Klran Bhardwaj, Ms. Gurmeet H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A Bawa, D.S. Mahra, Sanjeev Sahay, Balendu Shekhar, V.B.
Saharya (for M/s Saharya & Co.), V.K. Verma, Ms. Rachana
Srivastava, ·Sanjiv Sen, Praveen Swarup, Raj iv Kr. Pathak for
the appearing parties.
. The following judgment of the Court was delivered:
B
DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1. Permission to file Special Leave
Petitions is granted.
2. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed.
c 3. Leave granted.
4. For planned development of Delhi, Lt. Governor issued
notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 05.11.1980 and
D 25.11.1980 to acquire more than 50,000 bighas of land situated
in 13 different villages falling within Delhi.
5. The land owners, feeling aggrieved by the issuance of
the said notifications under Section 4 of the Act, filed writ
E petitions in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same on
variety of grounds. The said judgment rendered on 15.11.1983
in the case of Munni Lal & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
is reported in ILR (1984) I Delhi 469. After considering the
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners -
F Munni Lal & Ors., the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
came to the conclusion that the writ petitions challenging the
validity of the notifications dated 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980
issued under Section 4 of the Act, deserve to be dismissed
and accordingly were dismissed. We have been given to
G understand that against this judgment and order, no appeal was
filed and this judgment thus attained finality.
6. These appeals arise out of Judgment and Order passed
by Delhi High Court in Writ Petitions preferred by appellant and
other similarly situated appellants under Article 226 of the
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 457
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
Constitution of India, wherein challenge was primarily and A
basically to the declaration/notifications issued by Delhi
Administration under Section 6 of the Act.
7. The said petitions having been dismissed by different
Orders passed by Division Benches of Delhi High Court, these 8
appellants are before us challenging the same on variety of
grounds.
8. The cases have a long and chequered history. For the
sake of convenience, we are taking the facts of the civil appeal
arising out of SLF (C) No. 9389 of 2005, Om Prakash V.s. C ·
Union of India and Others as issue involved in these cases is
almost identical and common.
9. ·Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of the case
are mentioned hereinbelow. D
10. Notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued
on two different dates, viz., 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980.
11. Pursuant thereto, further declarations/notifications as
contemplated under Section 6 of the Act were issued on E
20.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986.
12. Admittedly, appellant and several such other appellants
are in possession as owners of different parcels of land situated
in 13 villages, within Delhi.
F
13. Notifications issued under Section 4 for planned
development of Delhi had a caveat that three types of land were
exempted from the purview of these notifications i.e government
land, land already notified under Section 4 or 6 of the Act or
land in respect of which lay-out plans/building plans were G·
sanctioned by Municipal Corporation of Delhi before
05. 11.1980.
14. It is not in dispute that initially appellants had not
challenged the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 2 S.C.R.
A by filing writ petitions or resorting to any other remedy in
accordance with law. '
15. Obviously, there could not have been any order of stay
passed by any court in their favour. In other words, there was
B no order of restraint from issuance of declaration under Section
6 of the Act.
16. According to the appellants, the Act provides that the
said declaration should have been issued within a period of
three years from the date of issuance of notifications under
C Section 4 of the Act, that is to say, positively on or before
24.11. 1983. But no such declaration having been issued on or
before 24.11.1983, i.e., within the statutory period of three
years, it is contended that acquisition is illegaVand void qua
appellants' lands. In the aforesaid appeal, last declaration under
D Section 6 of the Act was finally issued on 07.06.1985, which
according to the appellant, was clearly beyond statutory period .
of three years. Thus, whole proceedings of acquisition. should
be rendered illegal and void ab initio. Howe..ver, the last.
declaration was still issued on 26.2.1986. ·'
E
1.7. It has also been appellants' case that the stay order
granted in favour of the other land-owners, who had challenged
either the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act or the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, would not be applicable · · .
F or operative to the appellanls' land as obviously it would be· I
confined only to those who had approached the Court and were :
granted stay.
18. Like appellant, there were many such land-owners who
haa challenged the said declaration/notification issued under
G Section 6 of the Act before the High Court of Delhi and their
petitions having been allowed on 14.8.1988, appellant claimed
parity on the ground that due to some bona-fide mistake, the
appellant's petition which was filed in the year 1987 could .not
be listed along with batch matters but subsequently, appellant's
H petition came to be dismissed. Thus, for this reason he should
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 45.9
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
not be put to an irreparable loss of losing his land. A
19. Appellant's petition came up for hearing before
Division Bench of High Court of Delhi on 25.11.2004 and on
the said date following order of dismissal came to be passed:
· "We find .that the issue raised in the petition with B
regard to validity of the Declaration issued un~er Section
6 of the said Act, stands concluded against the petitioner
by the decision of the Apex Court in Abhey Ram.and Ors.
Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 (whiQ.h
approved the full Bench decision of this court in B.R. C
Gupta's case. AIR 1987 Delhi 239 on the issue that the
declaration under Section 6 was not beyond time) and
Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
(1990) 7 SCC 44, wherein their Lordships were pleased
to observe that those who had not filed objections under D
Section 5(A) of the said Act could not be allowed to
contend either that Section 5_enquiry was bad, or that
Section 6 Declaration must be struck down and that the
Section 4 notification would lapse. Admittedly, in the
present case, no objections have been filed by the E
petitioner under Section 5 (A) of the Act.
Consequently, the writ petition and application for interim
relief are dismissed and interim order dated 9.2.1987
stands vacated."
F
20. Perusal of the aforesaid order would make it abundantly
clear that while considering the appellant's petition, High Court
was of the opinion that in the light of the opinion expressed by
Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union oflndia reported
in AIR 1987 Delhi 239 (refered to as B.R.Gupta-1), affirmed by G
this Court in Abhey Ram (Dead by LRs) and Ors. Vs. Union
of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 decided on 22.04.1997,
holding therein that declaration issued under Section 6 was not
beyond time. ,
H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 21. Impugned order further shows that it placed reliance
on another judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 7 sec
44, Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
wherein it has been held that all those land-owners who had
not preferred objections under Section SA of the Act, could not
s be allowed to contend that either enquiry under Section SA of
the Act was bad or the declaration issued under Section 6 must
be struck down on the ground of limitation or consequently,
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act would stand
lapsed. Thus, the appellant's petition was not entertained and
c. ultimate!y came to be dismissed.
22. It has neither been disputed here nor before the High .
Court that some of the appellants herein and many similarly
situated land-owners had not preferred objections under Section
SA of the Act. There are other appeals, in which .objections
D were preferred but have been decided against them or even
though objections were preferred but were not pressed, on
account of subsequent developments that have taken place.
We would deal with those type of matters little later.
E 23. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for appellant
contended that in this batch of appeals, broadly three
categories can be formulated :
Category No. 1 - where land-owners had admittedly not
filed objections under Section SA of the Act, but essentially, the
F challenge was only to declaration issued under Section 6 of the
Act, being time-barred.
Category No. 2- even though land-owners had preferred
objections under Section SA of the Act, wherein an enquiry was
G held, but the same were rejected.
Category No. 3 - during the pendency of the objections
under Section SA of the Act, some of the land-owners had sold
their lands. Pursuant to the execution of said sale-deeds in
H favour of the vendees, they continued to press objections
'OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 461
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
preferred by their vendors but the same were also rejected. A
24. It has been fairly conceded by learned senior counsel
for appellant that he had neither challenged the notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act nor had preferred any
objection under Section 5A of the Act independently. Thus, B
obviously there could not have been any stay order granted in
his favour by any court. Therefore, ordinarily, the period of
limitation would be three years as contemplated under Section
6 of the Act (first proviso read with Explanation 1 appended
thereto).
c
25. To appreciate the aforesaid arguments, it is necessary
to und~rstand the true and correct import of Section 6 of the
Act, reproduced hereinbelow :
"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.- D
(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when
the appropriate Government is satisfied, after con$idering
the report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-sectio~ (2),
that any particular land is needed for public purpose or for
a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect E
under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or
of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and
different declarations may be made from time to time in
respect of different parcels of any land covered by the
same notification under section 4, sub-section (1 ),
F
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has
or have been made (wherever required) under Section
5A, sub-section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section G
(1 ),-
(i) published after the commencement of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance,
H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 1967 but before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after
the expiry ofthree year~ from the date of the publication
of the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land
B
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after
the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of
the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be
c made unless the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly
out of public revenues or some fund control!~ or managed
by a local authority.
D [Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods
referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in_ pursuance of the
notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is
stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.
E [Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be
awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds
of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such
compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid
out of public revenues.]
F
(2) Every declaration shaH be published in the Official
Gazette. [and in two daily newspapers circulaUng in the
locality in which the land is situated of which at least one
shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
G cause public notice of the substance of such declaration :
to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such
public, notice being hereinafter referred to as the date of
publication of the declaration), and such declaration shat!
· · · state] the district or other territorial-division in which the
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 463
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.J
land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its A
approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been
made of the land, the place where such plan may be
inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that
8
the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company,
as the case may be; and, after making such declaration
the appropriate Government may acquire the land in
manner hereinafter appearing."
26. It has strenuously been contended by learned senior C
counsel Shri P.P. Rao that even if appellant had not preferred
any objection under Section 5A of the Act, his right to challenge
issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act after the
stipulated period of limitation, cannot be taken away, especially
in the light of the provisions contained in Article 300A of the D
Constitution of India. It was also submitted by him that both
rights are independent and accordingly can be invoked
separately. He also submitted that language of Articles 21 and
· 300A of the Constitution is almost identical, thus, no person .
should be deprived of his property save by authority of law. E
27. We were also taken through Article 17 of Universal
Declaration of HumclmI
Rights, which safeguards the interest of
persons in properties. He, therefore, submitted that if the
property of the appellant is sought to be acquired in this fashion
then it would tantamount to violation of human rights as F
guaranteed under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration.
28. A further point has also been tried to be hammered
before us that Land Acquisition Act being expropriatory in
nature, its provisions deserve to be construed strictly and each G
and every step required to be taken by the respondents must
be strictly adhered to.
29. Lastly, it was submitted by him that in any case,
Government is not likely to suffer any loss, much less an H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A irreparable loss, even if the land owned, possessed and
occupied by the appellant is exempted from acquisition
whereas the appellant would suffer a greater loss and injury as
with long passage of time he has constructed his house, is
residing therein for long number of years and acquisition thereof
s would lead to serious consequences and would be disastrous
to him and other similarly situated land owners. In other words,
it has been contended that equitable justice is required to be
meted out to the appellant and this Court shall ensure that no
injustice is rendered to this appellant and other such hundreds
c of appellants.
30. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, learned senior
counsel for the appellant submitted that following questions of·
law would arise in this and the connected appeals:
D (i) Whether proposition of law propounded in Delhi
Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. (Supra),
(referred .to as No.1) has correctly been understood by the
Division Bench in the impugned order?
(ii) Whether the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram and
E
Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Supra) which approved the
Full Bench opinion of Delhi High Court in B.R. Gupta-I,
(Supra) has indirectly been over-ruled in the case of Oxford
English School Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and
Others (1995) 5 SCC 206?
F
(iii) If, that being the legal position, even though Abhey
Ram's case (supra) rendered by three learned Judges of
this Court, can still be interpreted to grant benefit to the
appellant as otherwise great injustice would be caused to
G appellant.
31. Shri P.N. Lekhi, learned senior counsel appearing for
some of the appellants has taken us through the history of the
Act and the various amendments which have been incorporated
H from time to time. He has also advanced the same arguments
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 465
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
as have been put forth by Mr. P.P. Rao, that the effect of stay A
order granted in other matter should not be logically and legally
made applicable to those who had not even approached the
Court, as it would always be an order of stay in personam and
not an order in rem.
B
32. It is brought to our notice that he appears for all those
appellants, who are subsequent purchasers, after issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Sale Deeds in favour
of these appellants have been executed between the period
from 18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997, i.e., the period between the date C
of judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of
B.R. Gupta-I and the date of judgment of this Court in the case
of Abhey Ram (supra). According to him, this was the eclipse
period as in some of the matters, notifications under Section
4 were quashed on account of failure of Delhi Administration
to issue further declarations under Section 6 of the Act, within D
a period of three years from the date of issuance of notifications
under Section 4 of the Act. Since even thereafter, no steps were
taken by Delhi Administration to issue a fresh notification under
Section 4 of the Act, the subsequent purchasers were fully
justified in purchasing the lands from previous owners. Thus, E
all purchases by them between the aforesaid period would be
said to have been made during the eclipse period and
therefore, they should be called owners rather than subsequent
purchasers.
F
33. He has also put forth an argument that prior to coming
into force of Amendment Act of 1984, there was no exclusion
clause appended to Section 6, by way of an explanation and
therefore, exactly three years' period has to be computed
between the date of publication of notification under Section 4 G
of the Act and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act
for determining as to whether the same had been issued within
the aforesaid period or not. In other words, he has contended
that irrespective of the fact that there was any stay or there was
no stay, in either case, the period of three years should be H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 2 S.C.R.
A calculated from the actual date of publication of notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act till the date of publication of
notification under Section 6 of the Act.
34. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing·
B in some appeals contende.d that primarily petitions of th~se
appellants have been dismissed on the ground of laches. He
has contended that in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India & .
Othets reported in 37 (1989) DLT 150 [hereinafter referred to
as 'B.R. Gupta-II], notificatioi:i with regard to acquisition of
lands situated in 11 villages was quashed and in subsequent
C judgment, notification with regard to two more villages was
quashed. Therefore, there was no occasion on the part of these
appellants to have continued to prosecute their objections
preferred under Section SA of the Act.
D 35. According to him, from the year 1989 to 1997, there
was an absolute silence with regard to the acquisition, which
had initially commenced in the year 1980. Therefore, no prudent
man would have taken legal action during the aforesaid period.
He, therefore, contended that appellants were justified in not
E taking any action during the aforesaid period. ·only when fresh
proceedings commenced with regard to acquisition, appellants
were prompt enough to file writ petitions either in the year 2000 · ·
or 2002. Thus, delay having been explained properly, the
Division Bench has grossly erred in dismissing the same on
F the ground of laches.
36. Our attention has been drawn to the letter of Mrs. Gita
Sagar, Joint Secretary, (L & B) dated 31.3.1989 mentioning
therein that in the light of the Division Bench Judgment of Delhi
High Court in B.R. Gupta-II quashing the notifications issued
. G under Section 4 of the Act, nothing more was required to be
done and acquisition proceedings be dropped. This further
stood fortified vide subsequent circular issued by Delhi
Administration on 07.12.1999. According to him, thus the
appellants were entirely justified in not taking any action ..In other
H words, he contended that from the year 1990 to 1997, the·
I
i
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 467
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
judgment in the case of Delhi Administration Vs Gurdip Singh A
Uban reported in (1999) 7 SCC 44 held the field whereby
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was quashed and
no further action was taken by Delhi Administration.
37. Thus, any prudent man would be given to understand B
that nothing more was required to be done and therefore they
sat quiet over the matters. He,. therefore, contended that
dismissal of appellants' writ petitions on the ground of laches
was wholly unjustified and uncalled for, niore so, when the
reasons for the delay were fully assigned satisfactorily.
c
38. Arguments were advanced by him on the Doctrine of
'Legitimate Expectation'. He also contended that the right to
hold property as envisaged under the Constitution being
constitutional right conferred under Article 300A, cannot be
permitted to be taken away without authority of law. Even D
though, it is not a Fundamental Right nevertheless, it continues
to be a constitutional right, and such right was never taken away
from Article 14 of the Constitution.
39. It is further submitted by him that Sections 5A and 6 E
of the Act cannot be separated as the right envisaged under
Section 5A is a collective right and cannot be equated with
Section 6. It has also been argued on the "Doctrine of Public
Law'' to contend that there was no case for dismissal of the
petitions of these appellants on the ground of l~ches. According . F
to him, it would amount to discrimination to these appellants
vis-a-vis the other land-owners who have been extended the
benefit of quashment of notifications, thereby exempting their
lands from being acquired, therefore, the same cannot be
allowed to stand.
G
40. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for some other appellants contended that he is appearing for
those land-owners, who had actually filed their objections under
Section 5A of the Act and belong to village Shayoorpur. The
said petitions were filed in the year 1985. H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 41. However, unfortunately, when the said petitions were
heard on 3.3.200S, learned counsel for the appellants was
absent as a result whereof, the petitions came to be dismissed.
Thus, they were constrained to file review petitions but same
also came to be dismissed on 27.4.2006.
B
42. It has further been contended that on account of
difference of opinion between Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter
Kumar (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B.
Lokur on the question of import and interpretation of Section
SA of the Act, the matter was referred to Hon'ble Mr. Justice
C T.S. Thakur (as he then was). Hon'ble Mr.Justice Thakur agreed
with the views expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B.
Lokur. While concurring, he held that hearing as contemplated
under Section SA of the Act would mean an effective hearing
and it is not an empty formality and the provision thereof has
D to be strictly adhered to and principles .of naturaljustice have
to be followed. The said judgment titled Chatro Devi Vs Union
of/ndia & Ors. is reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14.
43. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, strenuously contended before us
E that in B.R. Gupta-I/, it was specifically held with regard "to land-
owners of Shayoorpur that the enquiry was bad and invalid: The
report as sent by Collector to the Lt. Governor and his
satisfaction thereon was also bad. If this was already held so
by Division Bench of the said Court then in subsequent orders
F passed by Division Bench, it could not have been over-ruled
by the said Bench, it being a coordinate Bench. It was also
contended by learned counsel that certain observations made
in B.R.Gupta (supra) and Abhey Ram (supra) would not
constitute ratio decidendi as they could, at best, be treated as
obiter which is not binding on this Court .
.G
44. It was reiterated by learned Senior Counsel that the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, having not been issued
within a period of three years from the date of issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act, the whole process has
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS. 469
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
been rendered redundant and has become non est. A
45. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for some other appellants submitted that he represents those
land-owners, whose lands are situated in village Chhatarpur but
their petitions have been dismissed· solely on the ground of 8
laches. According to him, they purchased the lands from
original owners some time in the month of April, 1985 but had·
filed the petitions in the High Court in the year 2004.
46. It has also been submitted by him that original owners,
that is the vendors of these appellants had already filed their C
objections under Section SA of the Act but the present
appellants did not prosecute the same any further. Thus,
obviously, they came to be dismissed. He further informed that
appellants still continue to be in possession of the lands, and
have already constructed· houses over the same, without any 0
permission or sanction, since at that time no permission/
sanction was required to be obtained either from Panchayat
or Municipal Corporation. ,
47. As regards !aches, it has been tried to be explained E
by contending that First Master Plan was published on 1.9.1962
but it lapsed in 1981. The second Master Plan was in force upto
2001. On account of serious confusion due to variety of
reasons, the land-owners were in a lurch as to what legal steps
are required to be taken due to the fact that Delhi Administration
F
itself had dropped further acquisition proceedings. He,
therefore, contended that when there was such a massive
confusion, not only amongst the litigating public but also
amongst the advocates representing them, thus, they were fully
justified in not taking up the issue earlier and their petitions
could not have been dismissed solely on the ground of delay G
or !aches when the same were sufficiently explained to the
Bench.
48. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel
appeared for Springdales Educational Society, whose land is H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A also situated in village Chhatarpur. According to him, appellant
is the original owner of the land having purchased it in the year
1966-1967. On coming to know about the acquisition
proceedings, appellant had filed objections under Section SA
of the Act within 30 days and had specifically sought an
B opportunity of hearing to it, which was not granted.
49. He contended that appellant is imparting rural
education to the residents of that area and the purpose for
which appellant's society has been set up is public charitable
purpose. Thus, when specific opportunity of hearing to support
C objections filed by it under Section SA of the Act was sought,
further declaration under Section 6 of the Act should not have
been issued till the objections were finally decided. He.
therefore, submitted that since notifications have been quashed
in respect of many villages, it is a fit case where notification
D as far as this appellant is conceroed, should also be quashed.
He has also pressed into service the legal maxim "actus curiae
neminem gravabit," meaning thereby that an act of the court
shall prejudice none. He also reiterated that there was total
confusion with regard to the action required to b~ taken by the
E land-owners. Thus, the petitions could not have been dismissed
on the ground of laches, more so, where equitable principles
are invoked, laches would not come into play and especially in
such type of cases, where there was no occasion for the
respondents to file counter affidavit.
F
SO. Almost identical arguments have been advanced by
Mr. Vikas, Mr. Y.P. Mahajan, Mr. R.N. Keshwani, Mr. Bhargava
V. Desai, Mr. Ravinder Singh, Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi, Mr.
Vikas Mehta, Mr. M.R. Shamshed, Mr.. N.S. Vasisth, appearing
G for the other Appellants.
S1. In addition, they have also raised the ground that all
the subsequent purchasers have purchased the lands after fully
complying with the provisions contained in Section S of Delhi
Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, which mandate upon
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 471
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
the land-owners of Delhi to seek permission from the competent A
authority that the said land is not under orders of acquisition.
They also contended that srnce permission was granted by the
competent authority for sale and transfer of their land, it would
automatically mean that the land was free from clutches of
acquisition, otherwise no permission in this regard would have B
been granted to them.
52. Learned counsel appearing for respondents Shri Hiren
Ra~al, ASG, Ms.Indira Jaising, ASG, Mr. D.N. Goburdhan and
Ms. '<;3ita Luthra opposed the prayer of the appellants and
contended that matters have now been settled by long catena C
of cases either by High Court or by this Court, ever since the
notifications were issued in the year 1980. Thus, it is too late
in the day for the appellants to challenge the same on any other
grounds.
D
53. Learned ASG for respondent No.1, Union of India, Mr.
H.S. Rawal has taken us through the aims and objects of
Amending Act No. 13 of 1967 and Amending Act No. 68 of
1984, primarily to bring to our notice the purpose and reasons
for bringing various amendments in the original Land E
Acquisition Act 1894. He submitted that vide Amending Act No.
13 of 1967, amending provisions thereof came into operation
with effect from 12.4.1967.
- 54. It has been submitted that the challenge by land owners
to the issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act stood F
concluded in favour of the respondents by a Division Bench
Judgment in the matter of Munni Lal (supra). Argument was,
therefore, advanced that the said judgment has already attained
finality as the aggrieved party had not challenged the same by
filing any further appeal in the Supreme Court. Thus, it should G
be deemed that the notifications issued under Section 4 of the
Act by respondents were legal, valid and beyond the pale of
judicial review as the lands are acquired for public purpose;
55. It has been contended by him that generally the H
;, .
4 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A objections preferred under Section 5A of the Act were on a
cyclostat format raising the same grounds against acquisition,
still, full and complete hearing on the said objections was
afforded to them by Land Acquisition Collector as contemplated
under the Act.
B
56. He has brought to our notice that in Munni Lal (supra),
the Divi!?ion Bench of Delhi High Court had passed an interim
order of stay on 18.3.1981, reproduced herein below:-
"Case for 27.4.1981 ·in the meanwhile, respondent Nos. 1
c and 2 are restrained from issuing· any decla~ation under
Section 6 of the Act."
57. In the light of the aforesaid interim blanket order of stay
passed by Delhi High Court, learned counsel for respondents
0 contended that the hands of the respondents were tied by the
said order and they could not have proceeded further to issue
any declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The words used in
the interim order were "any declaration" which completely
restrained them from proceeding further in this direction. It was
E also contended that the aforesaid order came to be confirmed·
on 4.5.1981. Similar interim orders thereafter came to be
passed in various other writ petitions preferred by land-owners.
In the light of tHe various interim orders p~ssed by Delhi High
Court from time to time, the respondents could not have issued
further declaration under Section 6. of the Act, otherwise they
F would have exposed themselves for committing contempt of the
Court .
. 58. It was then contended that all objections preferred by
land-owners under Section 5A of the Act were considered
G between the period from 8.5.1985 to 13.6.1985. After hearing
arguments on the objections, along with the report of the Land
Acquisition Collector, the same were forwarded to Lt. Governor
of Delhi between the period from 13.5.1985 to 22.6.1985. Lt.
Governor then examined the o1bjections together with reports
H enclosed therewith prepared by Land Acquisition Collector and
OM PARKASH v. UNtON OF INDIA AND ORS: 473
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
.gave his approval for acquisition of the land. In other wort:s, it A
has been contended that the provisions of the Act have fully
been complied with and there has not been any violation
thereof.
59. He has further brought to our notice that ·
8
W.P.(C)No.2850 of 1985 was filed in the High Court of Delhi
challenging the .same issue with regard to period of limitation
prescribed between issuance of notification under Section 4
and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act, which came
to be dismissed by Division Bench on 25.11.1985. Pursuant
0
to the said order, respondents had taken possession of part
of the land sought to be acquired vide order dated 14.7.1987.
60. It has not been disputed before us that Mrs. Gita Sagar
had written a letter on 31.3.1989 mentioning therein that on
account of several developments and judgment of the High D
Court of ·Delhi in B.R.Gupta-11 the acquisition proceedings are
being dropped. It was followed by another circular issued by
respondent on 07 .12.1999 but it has been contended before
us that they Vt!ere not addressed to any of the appellants or land
owners whose lands were sought to be acquired and by no E
stretch of imagination it could be said that all further
proceedings of acquisition of land were dropped. However, in
our opinion, critical reading thereof makes it abundantly clear
the proceedings were dropped pursuant to the judgment in the
case of the B.R. Gupta-I/. Consequently, the benefit of the said F
communication can be extended qua the petitioners who had
approached the High Court and not to all other land owners.
61. Coming to the question of delay and laches in filing
the petitions by various petitioners in the High Court, it has been
contended that as a matter of fact, cause of action for filing the G
petitions had accrued to them in the year 1985, when on four
different dates, declaration under Section 6 of the Act was
issued. Therefore, it was necessary on the part of the appellants
to have explained the delay ·from 1985 onwards. He thus,
H
474 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A contended that it is to be explained in three stages viz:
(i) from 1985 till B.R. Gupta-II came to be decided on
18.11.1988;
(ii) from the period from 18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997 when
B Abhey Ram (supra) c~me to 'be decided and finally,
(iii) post Abhey Ram's case, till the fillng of the petitions.
62. It has been contended that unless the appellants are
C able to successfully overcome the first hurdle frorri the year
1985 till 1988, the question of their explaining delay and laches
for the second or third stage would not arise.
63. Apart from the above, it has also been strenuously
contended before us that perusal of each and every petition
D filed by the appellants would show that there has been no
concrete foundation in the pleadings explaining delay and
laches. According to respondents, it was incumbent on the part
of the appellants to have specifically pleaded as to why they
could not approach the Court earlier and to haveexplained the
E laches. Since this onus, which lay heavily on the appellants was
not discharged and their petitions having been dismissed on
this ground, the question of meeting the same by the
respondents by way of their counter did not arise.
F 64. It was thereafter contended that in all the matters,
awards have been passed between the period from 19.5.1987
to 17.6.1987 pertaining to all the 13 villages and money had
also been deposited. Once awards have been passed, in the
light of various judgments of this Court, it was neither justified
nor legally competent on the part of the appellants to have
G challenged the declaration issued under the Act on the ground
of limitation or on any other ground. To buttress this ground,
learned counsel for respondents have placed reliance on the
following judgments :
H (1) Vi sh was Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 475
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
Association Vs. Under Secretary, Delhi A
Administration reported in (1990) 2 SCC 268;
(2) Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana (1996)
11 sec 698; and
(3) Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan B
(2008) 4 sec 695.
65. It was then submitted that as regards grant of
permission was concerned, the same has not been issued by
the competent authority as prescribed under the Delhi Land c
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Therefore, advantage
thereof cannot be taken by the appellants. To put forth further
arguments in this regard, reliance has been placed on a recent
judgment of this Court reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 Meera
Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi. It has been brought to our D
notice that NOCs produced before this Court for perusal, would
.show that the same have been issued under the seal and
signature of Tehsildar and not by the competent authority as
defined under Delhi Land (F\estriction~ on Transfer) Act, 1972. "
Therefore, no advantage thereof could be claimed by the E
appellants, who are subsequent purchasers from original
owners.
66. To contend further in this regard, we have been taken
.through the affidavit of Shri U.P. Singh, OSD (Litigation),
Building Department of Government of NCT, Delhi . in which it F
has categorically been mentioned with regard to the alleged
NOC that the same is of no consequence as it has not been
issued by the competent authority as contemplated under the _
said Act. It has been contended that the said NOC cann-ot be
construed as a valid permission to the subsequent purchasers G
in the light of provisions of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on
Transfer) Act, 1972.
67. Additionally, it has been argued that in any case, the
said NOC issued by Tehsildar is of no consequence because H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A Tehsildar was not the competent authority althe relevant point
of time. In the wake of this categorical _denial of valid NOC
possessed by subsequent purchasers, it has been contended
that even grant of alleged NOC would not carry the appellants'
case further to their advantage.
B
68. It rs emphasised by him 'that in the light of judgment of
this Court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Ul5an & Ors.
(2000) 7 SCC 296 known as Gurdip Singh Uban-11, all points
having already- beeR considered, no fresh look is requir-ed By
this Court. More so, when each and every point argued,
C hammered an_d contended by the appellants has already been
decided against them. It was also submitted by him that in the
name of unfair treatment, matters which stood closed either by
several judgments of this Court or of Delhi High Court and also
keeping in mind that land acquisition proceedings were
D initiated in.the year 1980, nothing more is required to be done
and the appeals deserve to be dismissed.
69. Learned ASG, Ms. Indira Jaising, appearing for Delhi
Development Authority argued on the similar lines, which have
E already been advanced by Mr. H.S Rawal. In addition, she has
contended that once notification under Section 4 of the Act is
issued, the same never dies or becomes in~ffective unless i~
is specifically revoked as required under the Act in accordaflce
with law. To substantiate this contention, learned Counsel has
F placed reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. She
has also placed reliance on two judgments of House of Lords
titled Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council and Others
reported in 1956 AC 376 and F. Hoffmann- LA Roche and Co.
A.G. and Others Vs. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
G reported in 1975 AC 295, in this regard.
70. She has further submitted that in view of three earlier
judgments of this Court, it has been held that Explanation 1
appended to first proviso to Section 6 would apply squarely to
the facts of the case therefore, it is neither legally permissible
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 477
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
nor warranted to take a different view. A
71. Coming to the question of legitimate expectation, it was
contended that no advantage of noting on the files or inter se
circulars issued by Departments can be.taken by the parties.
It was also submitted that the letter of Mrs. Gita Sagar as also 8 ·
the Circular issued thereafter would show that none was
· addressed to any of the appellants and the same had died their
own natural death, on which appellants cannot build up their
cases invoking the doctrine of 'Legitimate Expectation'. She
has also submitted that as the cause of action had actually C
accrued to the appellants in the year 198S unless they are able
to successfully show to this Court and reasonably explain the
delay caused in filing the writ petitions in the High Court, the
Hig~ Court was fully justified in dismissing the same on the.
ground of delay and laches.
D·
72. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, several
authorities have been cited by her but in nutshell they are the
same which have already been cited by the learned counsel
for other side. Nevertheless, we would deal with the same in
the latter part of the judgment E
73. Ms. Gita Luthra and Mr. D.N.Goburdhan, learned
Counsel appearing for Govt. of NCT of Delhi reiterated the
same grounds which have already been argued and advanced
by Mr. Rawal and Ms. Indira Jaising. Additionally, it has been
F
· contended. that in some of the matters, objections under
Section SA of the Act were not filed, yet they got the benefit,
when 73 petitions came to be disposed of, in batch matters
by Delhi High Court. It has also been brought to our notice that
at a much later stage, appellants had· sought permission to
amend their petitions by raising a ground under Section SA of G
the Act but the Court was constrained to reject the same. Mr.
D.N. Goburdhan contended that delay in approaching the Court
in filing a petition under Articles 226-227 cannot be condoned
unless the same is reasonably a~d satisfactorily explained and
H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A that the Court must be fully satisfied with regard to the plausible
explanation of not being able to reach the Court earlier.
74. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgment
of this Court wherein it has been held that even delay of 17
B months could not be condoned and was not found to be
reasonable by this Court. With all these arguments having been
advanced by learned Counsel for respondents, their contentions
have come to an end.
75. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions advanced
C by the parties, we proceed to decide the matter as under.
76. Explanation 1 appended to first proviso of Section 6
of the Acl, as reproduced hereinabove, makes it crystal clear
that where any order of stay has been granted in favour of land
0 owner, while computing the period of limitation of three years
for issuance of Section 6 notification, the act.ual period covered
by such order of stay should be excluded. fn other words, the
period of three years would automatically get extended by that
much of period during which stay was in operation. The
E question which, therefore, arises for our consideration is
whether even in those cases where there has been no stay
order granted or passed in favour of the land owners, the period
of limitation would be three years from the date of issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act or it would be rn.ore on
F account of stay order granted in other matter in which such
appellants were not parties.
77. On account of difference Of opinion between two
Benches of High Court of Delhi, matter was referred to a Full
Bench, referred to as B.R. Gupta-I, the only question posed
G before it for opinion was with regard to effect of grant of stay,
where chaltenge is to the issuance of notification under Section
4 of the Act vis-a-vis other land owners who had not challenged
it. After eonsidering the ambit, scope and nature of stay granted
especially in land acquisition matters, Full Bench has expressed
H its opinion in paragraphs 26 to 31, reproduced hereinbelow :
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 479
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
"26. Learned counsel for the petitioners is to some extent A
right in his contention that broad as the above observations
are, these cases are slightly different in that they all dealt
with the effect of the operation of stay order only vis-a-vis
one of the parties to the litigation in which the stay order
is passed. But we are of opinion that these decisions are B
of guidance as to the proper approach to such a question.
In the first place, they show that a stay of execution of a
decree can be pleaded as a ground for conclusion of the
period of stay even by a judgment-debtor who did not seek
the stay. To that extent, the insistence by the petitioners that c
the exclusion can operate only against the party who
obtained the stay order would not be correct. Secondly,
these decisions show that the prohibition on action need
not be the direct effect of a stay order of a court. Thus, in
the present cases, even if in terms the court be held not 0
to have stayed a declaration in other cases, such was the
indirect effect of the stay order in these cases. Thirdly, they
lay down that we should not interpret a provision of this type
rigidly but should give it an interpretation that gives effect
to the object of the legislature.
E
27. We, therefore, think that, in proceeding to
interpret the scope of the explanation, we should keep in
mind the nature of the proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act and the nature of the proceedings in wtiich
stay orders are obtained. So far as the first of these F
aspects is concerned, while it is possible for the
Government to issue notifications under S. 4 in respect of
each plot of land sought to be acquired, it is not feasible
or practicable to do so, particularly in the context of the
purpose of many of the acquisitions at the present day. It G
is common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as many other
capital cities, vast extents are being acquired for 'planned
development' or public projects. The acquisition is
generally part of an integrated scheme pr plan and, though,
technically speaking, there can be no objection to H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A individual ptots being processed under Ss. SA, 6, 9, 12,
etc., particularly after the amendment of 1967, the purpose
of acquisition demands that at least substantial blocks of
land should be dealt with together at least upto the stage
of the declaration under S.6. To give an example, if a large
B extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a
canal, fhe scheme itself cannot be put into operation unless
the whole land can be eventually made available. If even
one of the land owners anywhere. along the line applies to
court and gets a stay of the operation of the notification
c under S. 4, in practical terms, the whole scheme of
acquisition will fall through. It is of no consolation to say
that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by
the scheme. To compel the Government to proceed
against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the
explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no
D
stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste of
public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single
owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the
S.4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme
Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the
E
government will have to retrace the steps they may have
taken in respect of other lands. (See: Shenoy Vs.
Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1985 SC 621 and Gauraya
Vs. Thakur, AIR 1986 SC 1440). Assuming that where
such final order is by a High Court the position is not free
F from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the
quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party
who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile,
for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the
acquisition against the others, they would come up with
G similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other
words, in many of the present day notifications, the
acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or
quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the
whole. This aspect should not be lost sight ~f.
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 481
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
28. It is true that the object of having contiguity of all plots A
sought to be acquired may fail for various reasons. For
instance, there may be items of properties exempt from
acquisition in between. Again, it may happen that a
particular person may have been able to stave off
acquisition of his land for one reason or other, particularly B
since dates. of declarations under S.6, awards and taking
of possession may vary from plot to plot. Moreover, it is
not in all cases that the object of acquisition needs a
number of contiguous plots and may be workable even
without some of the intervening lands. However, in c
considering a question of interpretation, one should not go
only by one particular situation but must consider all
eventualities to the extent possible. It is only on a broad
perspective of the scheme of present day acquisitions-in
large measure that we say that any hurdle in regard to any 0
one plot of land can hold up an entire acquisition, all
promptness and expedition on the part of the Government
notwithstanding.
29. It was sought to be urged that the interpretation sought
to be placed by the respondent would result in equating E
an interim order with a final judgment and th·e final judgment
in a land acquisition case to a judgment in rem and inthis
context reference was made to S.41, Evidence Act,· and
to a passage in Woodroffe on Evidence (14th Edition,
Vol.2) at page 1225. We do ·not think this analogy is F
correct. If the final order can operate to the benefit of all
the parties, there is no reason why the interim order cannot
also affect them. Moreover, we are considering the nature
and effect of an injunction passed by the court against one
of the parties thereto who has to act in the same capacity G
not only in the acquisition of the plot of land the owner of
which has obtained a stay order buf in all proceedings
consequent on or in pursuance of the same notification that
is challenged in that petition.
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A 30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay
orders are obtained are also very different from the old
pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect.
Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and
it is now settled law that in this type of proceeding, the
B principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any
public spirited person can challenge the validity of
proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when
he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter: it
is a public interest liUgation which affects wider interests.
c The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing
personal to the particular landholder but are, more often
than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of
the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed
before us raise practically the same contentions just as the
previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications
D
under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept
the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such
petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners
and their lands would virtually provide persons with
common interests with a second innings. If the initial
E
challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and if for some
reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a
ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of
petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the
impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for
F which the acquisition is intended.
31. We have, therefore, to give full effect to the language
of the section and the stay orders in question, in the above
context and background. The use of the word "any" in the
G explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows
clearly that the explanation can be invoked in any case if
some action or proceeding is stayed. It may be complete
stay of the operation of the entire notification or may even
be a partial stay - partial in degree or in regard to persons
H or lands in respect of whom it will operate. The words used
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 483
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there A
is no justification whatever to confine its terms and
operation only to the cases in which the stay order is
actually obtained."
78. In the light of the aforesaid opinion having been
8
expressed by Full Bench, the original Writ Petition of the
Petitioner-Balak Ram was placed before a Division Bench for
its disposal in accordance with law.
79. Division Bench of the High Court on 14.8.1988,
pronounced only the operative part of the judgment, to the effect C
that further acquisition proceedings in all the said writ petitions
stood quashed, reasons were to follow. The reasons in respect
of the aforesaid operative part of the order were supplied in a
judgment referred to as B.R. Gupta-II.
D
80. The Division Bench while allowing the petitions
recorded the concession made by the Senior Advocate Mr.
R.K. Anand, to the effect that he was unable to support the
declaration in view of the lack of opportunity of hearing granted
by Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5A of the Act to
the land owners. The concession so given is recorded in para E
7 of the judgment. The Court also examined the matter
independent of the concession and quashed the entire
notification on many grounds. Thus, all the 73 Writ Petitions filed
by land owners came to be allowed and the acquisition
proceedings were dropped. F
81. Against the order passed in writ petitions by Delhi High
Court in B.R. Gupta-II, the matter travelled to this Court in Abhey
Ram (supra).
G
82. This Court after considering previous judgments on the
controversy involved in the matter held as under in paras 1O,
11 and 12 reproduced herein below :
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A "10. The question then arises is whether the quashing of
the declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the
other matters would enure the benefit to the appellants
also. Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned
counsel is attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult
B to give acceptance, to the contention of Mr. Sachar. When
the Division Bench e~pressly limited the controversy to the
quashing of the declaration qua the writ petitioners before
the Bench, necessary consequences would be that the
declaration published under Section 6 should stand
c upheld.
11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was
rendered, the petition of the appellants stood dismissed
and the appellants had filed the special leave petition in
this court. If it were a case entirely relating to section 6
D declaration as has been quashed by the High court,
necessarily that would enure the benefit to others also,
though they did not file any petition, except to those whose
lands were taken possession of and were vested in the
State under Sections 16 and 17 (2) of the Act free from
E all encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division Bench
confined the controversy to the quashing of the declaration
under Section 6 in respect of the persons qua the writ
petitioners before the Division ~ench. Therefore, the
benefit of the quashing of the declaration under Section 6
F by the division Bench does not ensure to the appellants.
12. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the
effect of such a quashing in Delhi Development Authority
v. Sudan Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430. But, unfortunately, in
that case the operative part of the judgment referred to
G
earlier has not been brought to the notice of this Court.
Therefore, the ratio therein has no application to the facts
in this case: It is also true that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed
Nendo/iya Vs. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 531,this
Court had also. obseryed that it would ensure the benefit
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 48S
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
to those petitioners. A
In view of the fact that the notification under Section
4 (1) is a composite one and equally the declaration under
Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration
under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as B
if the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen
that the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice
issued under Section SA"
. 83. In fact, after the pronouncement of the judgment in
Abhey Ram (supra) rendered by three learned Judges of this C
Court, nothing survives in these Appeals, but looking to the
vehement arguments advanced by learned senior counsel Mr.
P.P. Rao, we have once again examined the wtiole controversy
in the light of his arguments.
D
84. Even though judicial propriety and discipline create
legal hurdles and impediments, in coming to a different
conclusion than what has already been arrived at by three
learned Judges of this Court in Abhey Ram (supra), but looking
to the arguments advanced, we proceed to decide it. E
85. It has been submitted before us by Mr. P.P. Rao that
admittedly, appellants represented by him, had not preferred
any objections under Section SA of the Act, thus, in any case,
they could not have been precluded from challenging the
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act being barred by F
limitation. According to him, two issues being entirely different
and separate they could not have been clubbed together so as
.. to non-suit th~ appellants.
86. Even though t.he arguments advanced by learned G
·counsel for the appellants appear to be attractive, but, on
deeper scanning of the same we are of the opinion that on
account of omission of the appeUants, they cannot be granted
dividend for their own defaults. The appellants should have
been more careful, cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 2 S.C.R.
A along with those 73 petitions, which were ultimately allowed by
. the High Court. Not having done so, the appellants have
obviously to suffer the consequence of issuance of notifications
under Section 4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the
Act.
B
87. Perusal of the opinion of Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I
would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word
'any' in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act
which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of
C land owners to be automatically extended to all those land
owners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issu~d
under Section 4 of the Act, irrespecti\te of the fact whether there
was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands.
The logic assigned by Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof
have been reproduced hereinabove, appear to be reasonable,
D apt, legal and proper.
88. It is also worth mentioning that each of the notifications
issued under Section 4 of the Act was composite in nature. The
interim order of stay granted in one of the matters, i.e., Munni
E Lal (supra) and confirmed subsequently have been reproduced
hereinabove. We have also been given to understand that
similar orders of stay were passed in many other petitions.
Thus, in the teeth of such interim orders of stay, as reproduced
hereinabove, we are of the opinion that during the period of
F stay respondents could not have proceeded further to' issue
declaration/notification under Section 6 'of the Act. As soon as
the interim stay came to be vacated by virtue of the main: order
having been passed in the writ petition,\respondents, taking
advantage of the period of stay during which they were
G restrained from issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the
Act, proceeded further and issued notification under Section 6
of the Act.
89. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted..
in one of the matters of the land owners would put complete
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 487
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue A
notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said
notification during the period when the stay was operative, then
obviously they may have been hauled up for committing
contempt of court. The language employed in the interim orders
of stay is also such that it had completely restrained the B
respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act.
90. No doubt, it is true that language of Section 6 of the
Act implies that declarations can be issued piecemeal and it C
is not necessary to issue one single declaration for whole of
the_ area which is covered under notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act. Parliament was aware of such type of
situation and that is why such a right has been carved out in
favour of respondent-State. In many cases, urgency clause may
be invoked, therefore, the right of filing objections under D
Section SA of the Act would not arise. In some cases, even
though objections might be preferred under Section SA. of the
Act, but, may not be pressed in spite of knowledge of
acquisition of land. Some of the land owners may not prefer to
file any objections at all. In order to meet such type of E
exigencies as may arise in the case, power has been given
by the Parliament to the Executive to issue declarations in
piecemeal under Section 6 of the Act, wherever it may be
feasible to implement the scheme.
F {
91. The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in
the case in hand as many as four declarations under Section
6 of the Act were issued from time to time. Finally when
declaration is quashed by any Court, it would only enure to the
benefit of those who had approached the Court. It would G
certainly not extend the benefit to those who had not
approached the Court or who might have gone into slumber.
92. To us, this appears to be the scheme of the Act and
that was the intention of the Parliament. : h-1t being so. ::;r!1ei1'e
H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A of the Act as has been legislated, has to be given full effect to.
93. We find no ground to grant the same reliefs to those
appellants to whom on earlier occasions, same relief was
granted. At this long distance of time, it would neither be proper
nor legally justified to grant that benefit to the appellants. If it is
8
granted to even those who had not approached the court, then
it would frustrate the very purpose and scope of the Act. In the
light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that final
quashment of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act by any
Court, in some other matter, cannot be extended to the benefit
C of the present appellants. In any case, there is no ground for
us, to rise to the occasion to do so, much less to the benefits
of the appellants. In our considered opinion, it is not a fit case
where situation or circumstances call upon us to rise to the
occasion and to grant such inequitable reliefs to the appellants,
D after such a long aelay.
94. Obviously, the appellants cannot be rewarded on
account of their own lapse as they should have been vigilant
enough to get their matters also listed along with those in whose
E favour ultimately judgment was pronounced.
95. Looking to the scheme of the Act, it is obvious that the
appellants would certainly suffer the consequence of the interim
order passed in some other matters preferred by other land
owners challenging the notifications but finally benefit thereof
F cannot be accrued to the appellants as the same would
obviously be confined to those petitioners only in whose favour
orders were passed.
96. The arguments advanced by Mr. P.N. Lekhi appear to
G be attractive at the first instance, but, after going through closer
and deeper scrutiny of the first proviso appended to Section 6
of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that certain period
has been saved. First proviso clearly indicates that all actions
which have taken place between the period, after
H commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation)
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 489
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
Ordinance 1967 but' before the commencement of Land A
Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, would be saved. There is
no dispute in these matters that notifications under Section 4
of the Act were issued on 05.11.1980 and ·25.11.1980, the
period which is covered by the first proviso to Section 6 of the
Act. Thus, this ground sought to be advanced by Mr. Lekhi as B
well as Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, cannot be accepted and is decided
against them.
97. In fact, this _aspect of the matter has been dealt with
elaborately in the opinion expressed by Full' Bench in the case C
of B.R. Gupta-I. The proviso, according to Full Bench opinion,
is very elaborate and made Explanation 1 applicable to the
computation of any of the periods referred to in first proviso. In
the said judgment, four situations have been carved out.
Situation No.(ii) would cover the present case which deals with
notification issued under Section 4 after 28.1.1967 but before D
25.9.1981. Relevant portion of paragraph 11 thereof is
reproduced hereunder :
"If the object of the legislature had been to confer the
benefit of the explanation only to situations (iii) and (iv), it E
could have enacted the proviso as indicated earlier and
\
~'
added an explanation that, in computing the period of
limitation, periods covered by stay orders would be
excluded. The legislature need not have at all referred to
situation (ii) above. But the Legislature also wanted to F
make it clear that the explanation would apply in respect
of notifications under S.4 issued prior to 25-9-1981 as
well. In doing so, the provision could well have taken into
account even S.4 notifications issued prior to 29-1- 1967
for it was quite conceivable that, though the two year period G
for following these up with declaration under S.6 had
elapsed by 28-1-1969, the failure to make a S.6
declaration may have been the consequence of a stay
order from a court. But the Legislature decided to exclude
this category from the provision for extension in the H
490 SUPREME ·COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
,,
A explanation, and decided to confine itself to all notifications
under S.4 made after 29-1-1967. This is very important
and the manner in which cl.(a) of the proviso is worded so
as to cover afl notifications after 29-1-1967 and before 24-
9-1984 precludes the contention urged on behalf of the
B . , petitioners seeking to limit the operation of the
explanation. This contention is that the amendments of
1984 can at best only affect cases in which the three year
period prescribed in 1967 had not expired by 24-9-1984.
In other words, the argument is that only cases covered by
c notifications under SA issued after 25-9-1981 can be
affected by the amendments and have the benefit of the
extended period contemplated in the explanation. This
contention is clearly unacceptable. It runs counter to the
entire scheme of the proviso (which specifically takes in
r all the period after 29-1-1967) and the explanation (which
D
is specifically made applicable to both the clauses of the
proviso). We are, therefore, of opinion that the language
and intendment of the provision are clear and
unambiguous and that the period of exclusion mentioned
in the explanation should be taken into account in the
E cases of all notifications issued after 29-1-1967 whether
or not the period otherwise limited under the proviso for a
follow-up declaration under S.6 in respect thereof had
expired or not. We, therefore, reject the contention urged
on behalf of the petitioners." · '
F
98. Thus, considering the matter in the light of the opinion
expressed by Full Bench as also with the plain reading of the
first proviso and explanation (i) the following opinion can be
s-afely deduced and the aforesaid conclusion would be
G !inescapable that the exclusion envisaged is available in respect
of notifications issued between the period commencing from
29.1.1967 and 24.9.1984.
99. As mentioned hereinabove, in Chatro Devi-I both the
learned Judges dismissed the writ petition in respect of th,e
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 491
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
cases where Land Acquisition Collector was the same who had A
heard the arguments then prepared the report and also in
respect of those who had not preferred any objections under
Section 5A of the Act. The decision of Division Bench of Delhi
High Court in 8.R. Gupta-II (supra) was held to be incorrect and
acquisition proceedings were upheld in respect of aforesaid B
cases. However, difference of opinion was confined only with
regard to import and interpretation of Section 5A of the Act as
to what would constitute 'hearing'.
100. Primarily, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar (as
he then was) was of the opinion that even if matters have been C
heard by 'A' and decided by 'B', it would amount to sufficient
compliance of Section 5A of the Act but Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Madan B. Lokur was of the view that if a matter is heard by 'A'
obviously it has to be decided by him only and if it has been
decided by 'B' then the same would amount to miscarriage of D
justice ?nd obviously would lead to violation of principles of
natural justice.
101. Only to this limited extent, with regard to interpretation
of Section SA of the Act, matter was referred to third learned E
Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur, (as he then was). In his
separate judgment, Hon'ble Mr.Justice Thakur concurred with
the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan 8. Lokur titled
Chatro Devi Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 137 (2007)
DLT 14 known as Chatro Devi-II. F
102. We have.been given to understand that, feeling
aggrieved by the majority opinion as expressed by two learned
Judges in the matter of Chatro Devi II, the Union of India had
filed 39 Special Leave Petitions in this Court wherein leave has
been granted and appeals are now pending disposal in G
accordance with law.
103. At the first instance, we thought of getting those
matters also listed before us for hearing so that once for all,
the dispute pertaining to the r.c/ifications isr.11ed in the yPar H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 1980 would come to an end, but we have been informed that
many of the respondents have not yet been served and some
matters cannot be listed on account of technical defaults. We
also requested learned counsel appearing for appellants to
appear for those respondents but they showed their inability in
B doing so as the respondents of those appeals are not the
same, who are appellants before us.
104. Thus, in this judgment, we are not considering the
ambit, scope and interpretation of Section SA of the Act and
have specifically left it open, to be decided in the said 39
C appeals.
1OS. It has not been disputed before us that after the
opinion was expressed by Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I all the
connected 73 writ petitions came to be heard by Division
D Bench in B.R. Gupta-II. All the said petitions were allowed and
the reliefs as claimed by them were granted vide order dated
18.11.1988. The question whether stay granted to some of the
land owners prohibiting the authorities from publication of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act would be applicable to
E others also, who had not obtained stay in that behalf came to
be considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case
of Abhey Ram (supra). In paragraph (9) thereof it has been held
as under:-
"9 ...... The words 'stay of the action or proceeding' h~ve
F been widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any
type of the orders passed by this Court would be an
inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed
further. When the action of conducting an enquiry under
G Section SA was put in issue and the declaration under
Section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court
holds that enquiry under Section SA was properly
conducted and the declaration published under Section 6
was valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed
H further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 493
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
in respect of some would be applicable to others also who A
had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned
with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to
Section SA enquiry and consideration of objections as it
was not challenged by the respondent Union ..... "
B
Further in the same judgment, in paragraph 12 it has been
held as under :
"12 .......... In view of the fact that the notification under
Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the
declaration under Section 6 is also a composite one, C
unless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in tote,
it does not operate as if the entire declaration requires to
be quashed. It is seen that the appellants had not filed any
objections to the notice issued under Section SA."
D
106. To satisfy ourselves with regard to the aforesaid
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants, we
have gone through the record and find that Land Acquisition
Collector had heard the objections and thereafter had forwarded
the same to Lt. Governor for his opinion. The dates from which
E
the objections were heard have already been given
hereinabove. Similarly, the manner in which the same were
dealt with by Lt. Governor has also been scrutinized. We do
not find any infirmity or illegality in the procedure adopted in the
same. We are of the considered opinion that there has been
F
full, complete and strict compliance of the provisions contained
in the Act by the respondents.
107. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is not
necessary for us to consider the judgment of this Court in the
case of Oxford English School (supra). This was a judgment G
by two learned Judges of this Court whereas the judgment in
the case of Abhey Ram (supra) is by three learned Judges of
this Court. Secondly, the question as to whether an order of stay
passed in one case would be applicable to other similarly
situated persons who had not been granted stay was not directly H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A in issue in Oxford School Case (supra) decided by this Court.
The question in the said case was primarily with regard to the
period of limitation of three years within which a declaration
under Section 6 is required to be made.
108. In the light of the foregoing discussion, more so,
8
keeping in mind the ratio of which stood concluded by a
judgment of Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the
case of Abhey Ram (supra), we are of the opinion that it is not
a fit case where we are called upon to come to a different
conclusion that subsequent declaration issued under Section
C 6 was beyond the period of limitation. Fact situation does not
warrant us to do so.
109. Impugned orders passed by High Court from time to
time would reveal that some have been dismissed primarily on
D the ground of delay and ,laches. We have gone through the said
orders critically and find that if the appellants were under some
bonafide mistake and had not challenged the issuance of
notifications or declaration under Section 6 of the Act within a
reasonable time then on the ground that there was an eclipse
E period during which they were not supposed to take any legal
action, would be of no help to them. For that they have to thank
their own stars. Some of the petitions have been filed either in
the year 2000 or subsequent thereto. Thus, the High Court was
justified in not entertaining such petitions on the ground of delay
F and laches. Even though, they have tried to attempt to explain
the..delay but such a long delay· cannot be condoned more so,
when proceeding of acquisition was initiated in the year 1980.
110. It may be recalled that notifications were issued in the
year 1980. Almost 30 years have already passed by, but, no
G steps could be taken to formally complete the scheme so far.
Thus, after such a long lapse of time, it will not only be harsh
but inequitable also to quash the notifications so as to grant
liberty to the appellants to challenge same in accordance with
law.
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 495
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
111. The contention that in the cases of Abhey Ram and A
Gurdip Singh Uban, admittedly, no objections were preferred
under Section 5A of the Act, therefore, the appellants' cases
stood on a higher pedestal than those which were considered
in the aforesaid two cases also has no merits. It was also
submitted that the so called satisfaction of Lt. Governor was B
not legally tenable as admittedly no records were sent to him
by the Land Acquisition Collector after deciding the objections
filed by the appella~ts along with his report. We have already
mentioned above that there has been application of mind by
the Lt. Governor to the facts of the case. c
112. As has been mentioned above and held by this Court
in Abhey Ram (supra) that notification under Section 4(1) of
the Act being composite one it would not be proper and legally
justifiable to quash the same more so when most of the
appellants had not filed any objections under Section 5A of the D
Act. Thus, the declarations issued under Section 6 of the Act
cannot be quashed.
113. The clear ratio of the aforesaid passage of this Court
is that unless the declarations issued by respondents on as
many as four dates, as mentioned hereinabove, in the year E
1985, are quashed in toto, it cannot be said that respondents
could not have proceeded further with regard to acquisition of
those lands for which the same has not been quashed earlier..
114. In other words, it has been held that for all remaining
lands for which neither the notifications under Section 4 nor F
declarations under Section 6 have been quashed, acquisition
proceedings, notification/declaration issued for remaining lands
would continue to hold good and respondents can proceed
further.
G
115. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the
opinion that appeals have no merit and substance. The same
are hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fees Rs. 10,000/-
in each case.
D.G.· Appeals dismissed. ,:~
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