Holding

The State Government can validly extend the joining time, and such extension does not alter the inter‑se merit‑based seniority already fixed by the Service Commission, so the appellant remains senior to the respondent.

Summary

The appellant and respondent were selected by the Andhra Pradesh Service Commission for the post of Road Transport Officer in 1987. The appointment order gave 60 days to join, but the appellant, then employed by the Central Government, obtained a 20‑day extension from the State Government and joined within the extended period. Seniority lists prepared thereafter consistently placed the appellant above the respondent, a position never contested for over a decade. The respondent later argued before the Administrative Tribunal and the High Court that only the Service Commission could extend the joining time and that the appellant’s late joining should deprive him of seniority. The Supreme Court held that the State Government possesses an enabling power to extend the joining period, and such extension does not disturb the inter‑se merit‑based seniority fixed by the Commission; consequently, the appellant remains senior and the High Court’s order is set aside.

Issues considered

The State Government’s authority to extend the time for joining duty of candidates selected by the State Service Commission
Whether an extension beyond the statutory 60‑day period affects the seniority ranking fixed by the Service Commission
Whether a respondent can challenge the seniority order after a long lapse of time
Whether Government Order 822/1967 bars seniority for a candidate who joins after the prescribed period

Subjects

seniorityappointment orderextension of timeservice lawState Service Commissionadministrative tribunalwrit petitioninter se rankinggovernment power

Judgment

'(
P. SRINIVAS A
v.
M. RADHAKRISHNA MURTHY AND ORS.

JANUARY 30, 2004
--
(DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASA Y AT, JJ.] B

Service Law:

Seniority-Appoi111ment Order issued to selected candidates by State
Sen,ice Commission granting 60 days time to join duzv-Re~pondent no. J C
joined duty within 60 days-Appellant sought extension of lime to join duty
which was granted-Appellant 11·as placed senior to respondent no. l on the
basis of merit which H'as never questioned by respondent no./ for over a
decade-Respondent no. J challenging seniority of the appellant before Tribunal
by contending that State Government had no power to grant extension of time D
which vested with State Service Commission-Tribunal dismissed the petition--
High Court allowed the petition-Correctness of-Held, not correct-State
Government had enabling power to grant extension of time which has been
delegated to State Se111ice Commission-Respondent no. I cannot challenge
seniority of the appellant belatedly.
E
Appellant and respondent no. I were among the successful candidates
selected by the State Service Commission to the post of Road Transport
Officer in the year 1987. The Commission issued appointment orders to
the selected candidates granting 60 days time to join duty. The appellant,
who was previously working in Central Government, sought extension of
time as per the terms of the appointment order. The State Government F
extended the joining time of the appellant by 20 days. The appellant joined
the duty before the date. After regularisation of the services of the selected
candidates, seniority lists were periodically prepared where the appellant
was shown as senior to respondent no.I. In 1997, the appellant and
respondent no.I were promoted as Deputy Transport Commissioner and G
in the promoted post also, the appellant was shown senior to respondent

-- no. I.

Respondent no. I filed a petition before State Administrative
Tribunal contending that the appellant should be ranked junior to
II 1-I
~

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A respondent no. 1 since the appellant joined the duty after the prescribed )
period of 60 days indicated in the appointment order; that the power to
grant extension of time vested with the State Service Commission and not
with the State Government; and that under a G.O. issued in 1967, the
appellant is ~ot entitled to seniority. The Tribunal dismissed the petition
ofrespondent no.I. He filed a Writ Petition before High Court. The High
B Court, allowed the Writ Petition.

In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that the State
Government granted extension of time for joining duty and that he had
joined the duty within the extended time; that he was placed senior to
c respondent no. 1 in various seniority lists for over a decade which was
never questioned at any point of time by respondent no. 1; and that the
respondent cannot, after a long lapse of time, question the propriety of
the State Government to extend the time of joining of the appellant.

Respondent no. I contended that the State Government had no
D power to grant extension of time which vested with the State Service ·
Commission; and that the extension of time granted by the State
Government to the appellant was bad in law.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

E HELD: 1.1. The State Service Commission was enabled to extend
and give further time for joining before deleting the name of the candidate
concerned from the select list for not joining in time. The power of
..
extending time givefl to the State Service Commission under the G.O. was ;.
not in relation to any statutory prescription and cannot be also said to be
in derogation of the powers of the State Government as the ultimate
F repository of all Executive power. On the other hand, the State
Gove~nment itself provided that the time could be extended if the State
Service Commission considered it necessary. This was merely an enabling
power conferred by the State Government only and the G.O. cannot be
construed to be self destructive of the power of the .State Government in
G the absence of any statutory rules as such, in this regard. The State Service
Commission appears to have been enabled to grant time to effectively
monitor the operation of the main list as well as the waiting list (in order

··•
of merit) without any undue lapse of time, in case the selected candidates
did not join within the indicated time period. It.was an executive decision
of the State Government. When the State Government itself extended the
1

-
H time, in case of the petitioner, on the basis of the reasonableness of the
P. SRINIVAS v. M.R. MURTHY 13
request, it cannot be said that in the absence of any order passed by the A
State Ser\'ice Commission extending the time, the extension granted by
the State Government was without authority in law. 117-B-EI

1.2. The appellant was .granted extension upto 31. 7. 1987 to join. It
was open to the State Service Commission or the State Government at that
stage to direct removal of his name from the list of selected candidat\s. B
Neither the State Service Commission nor the State Government thought
it appropriate to do so. On the other hand, the State Government extended
the joining period and the appellant joined the post. In several periodical
seniority lists thereafter, the appellant's name was placed higher than
respondent no. 1. For more than a decade, respondent no. I did not C
question that position. After a very long 11eriod, it was not open to
respondent no.I to turn around and say that the extension of time to the
appellant was not in accordance with law. It is undisputed that both the
appellant and respondent no. I were selected in the same selection and the
appellant was more meritorious in terms of marks secured by him in the
selections process and ranked above the 1st respondent and the inter se D
ranking and consequent inter se seniority cannot be disturbed and rights
flowing from such ranking cannot be denied merely because there was
Some delay in joining-all the more so when such delay was only of 8 days
and also on account of getting relieved from the Central Government, for
reasons beyond his control, \\•hich only seems to have weighed with the E
State Government to accord extension of time. The High Court seems to
have lost sight of the fact that it was not a case where reasons were absent
in the order of the State Government extending the joining time. On the
contrary, the order itself indicates the reasons why the appellant had
sought for extension. The State Government taking note of the factual
position highlighted therein had granted extension. The High Court has F
erroneously held that no reasons were indicated. Hence, the appellant has
to be placed higher in the seniority list than respondent no.1 in terms of
the inter se merit ranking assigned by the State Service Commission.
117-E-H; 18-A-EI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 628 of G
2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2002 of the Andina Pradesh
High Court in W.P. No. 25433 of 2001.

Ranjit Kumar and R. Santhana Krishnan for C.S.N. Mohan Rao for the H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A Appellant.
R. Venkataramani and G. Ramakrishna Prasad for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by .

B ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.

Appellant questions correctness of the judgment rendered by a Division
-I
I
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which by the impugned judgment
held that respondent no. I was to be ranked seni9r to the appellant in the
seniority list. The view taken by the Andhra Prade~1 Administrative Tribunal
C at Hyderabad (for short 'the Tribunal') holding that the appellant was senior
to respondent no. I was upset.

Factual scenario which is also almost undisputed is as follows :

The Andhra Pradesh Service Commission (for short 'the Commission')
D issued an advertisement inviting application from eligible candidates to be
appointed to the post of Road Transport Officer (for short 'the RTO').
Appellant and Respondent no. I and others responded to the advertisement.
On 13.5.1987 appointment order was issued to the appellant and other selected
candidates including respondent no. I after they were successful in the selection
process conducted by the Commission. In the appointment order 60 days
E time was granted to the appellant as well as other selected candidates to join
the post i.e. the selected candidate was to join the duty on or before 12. 7.1987.
At the relevant time, the appellant was employed with the Central Secretariat
as Section Officer. Therefore, he made a request to the Government of Andhra
Pradcs11 to extend the time as per clause 3 for joiBing the duty in terms of
F appointment order. On 25.6.1987, the Government vide its memo dated
25.6.1987 extended the joining time and permitted the appellant to join duty
on or before 31.7.1987. In reality the appellant joined on 21.7.1987. By
Govt. memo no.470 dated 10.10.1991 appellant's services in the post of RTO
were regularized. Seniority lists were periodically prepared and circulated on
28.3.1989, 13.5.1993 and 27.5.1996 where the appellant was shown as senior
G

-
to respondent no. I. There was no challenge to the same by the I st respondent,
at any of the relevant points of time.

In 1997, both the appellant and respondent no. I were promoted as
Deputy Transport Commissioner and in the promoted post also, appellant
H was shown at Sl.No.14 as against 1st respondent shown as SI. No. 17. In the
P. SRINIVAS v. M.R. MURTHY [PASAYAT, J.] 15
seniority list prepared on the basis of notional dates given in G.O.M.S.No. A
153 dated 14.8.1997 was said to have been approved and communicated by
Transport Commissioner in his proceedings dated 19.6.1995 also the appellant
was shown as senior to respondent no. I. Respondent no. I approached the
Tribunal only at this stage making a grievance that his representation regarding
fixation of seniority was not being disposed of. By order dated 17 .5.2000 in
OA No. 2369 of 2000 the Tribunal directed the concerned authorities to B
dispose of the representation said to have been made for relief. On 26.5.2000
a combined list of RTOs was published as noticed above, where the appellant
was shown as senior at Sl.No.41 to respondent no. I shown as Sl.No.44.
Subsequently on 31.5.2000 provisional seniority list of DTCs was published
as indicated above. Respondent no. I assailed the seniority lists dated 26.5.2000 C
and 31.5.2000 before the Tribunal in OA No. 3381 of2000. During pendency
of the matter before !h~ Tribunal, the Government issued GO Ms No.14 dated
29.1.200 I showing respondent no. I as senior to the appellant in the seniority
list. In view of this memo, respondent no. I wanted disposal of his application
before the Tribunal as infructuous, but the Tribunal refused to accept the
prayer observing that there was challenge to the correctness of the same in D
some connected matters.

The stand of respondent no. I before the Tribunal was that since the
appellant had joined the duties after the prescribed period of 60 days indicated
in the appointment order, he had to be ranked junior to respondent no. I who E
had joined earlier. It was submitted that Government could not have extended
the joining report and it was the Commission alone which is competent to do
it. In any event, the effect ofG.O.Ms. 822 dated 18.9.1967 made the position
clear that if a person does not join within the stipulated time not only there
was power to withdraw his selection but even if somebody had joined later,
the fact that he did not join within the stipulated period of 60 days disentitled F
him from seniority. Tribunal did not accept this plea. It also found no substance
in the plea that the date of joining would govern seniority if the concerned
employee had not joined within the time stipulated in the appointment order.
It took note of the fact that Government had permitted the appellant to join
by 31.1.1987; and in fact, he had joined on 2 J. l.1987. :leferring to Rule G
33(b) of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rule 1962 (in
short 'the Rule'), it held that the appointing authority may at the time of
t passing an order appointing two or more persons simultaneously to a service,
'' fix the order of preference among them and when such order has been fixed,
seniority is to be determined in accordance with it. Appellant, indisputably
was placed on the basis ofmerit performance in inter se ranking higher than H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A the respondent no. I. Obviously, he has to be treated necessarily as senior to
the respondent no. I.
-
1·

Respondent no. I questioned correctness of the Tribunal's judgment by
filing writ petition before the Andhra P.radesh High Court. It was contended
that power of extension was available only to the Commission and. not tlJe
B State Government. Further the GO itself merely provided that in case a person
does not join within the stipulated time, the effect was that his name is to be
removed from the list of selected candidates, except in cases where the
--
Commission considers that there are valid reasons for extending the period.

Relying on the prescription in GO.Ms. 822 GA (~ervices-A) _Department
C dated 18.9.1967 the High Court accepted respondent no. I's stand and directed
that he is to be treated as s~nior. It was held so since appellant did not join /

within the period of 60 days and thereby he lost also seniority to which he
was entitled to on the basis of merit ranking.

D Learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the order of the
Government of Andhra Pradesh pointed out that the State Government itself,
in his case had granted time upto 31.1.1987 and, in fact, the appellant had
joined admittedly even before that date. That being so, there was no question
of appellant losing his seniority fixed initially based on merit ranking. In the
present case the name of the appellant was not removed from the list. He was
E permitted to join by grant of further time and continued as senior to respondent
no. I as shown in various seniority lists, and there was no challenge to any
of them, at the appropriate point of time. Admittedly, the appellant joined in
the year I 987 and after more than a decade it was not open to respondent
no. I to question the propriety of the extension of time given by the State
Government enabling the appellant to join within the extended time. The lst
F
respondent had no infeasible right to question the extension of time granted
by 'the State Government and at any rate to question the sa1rie, at any time
according to will and pleasure. The long lapse of time and !aches on his part
disentitles the Ist respondent to claim any such relief at the belated stage
almost after a decade.
G
Per contra learned counsel for respondent no. I submitted that the
State Government had no authority to extend joining time. It was only the
Commission which has power to do so and the High Court rightly observed
that the extension given to the appellant was itself•bad and; therefore, the
benefit of the Rules stipulated in terms of seniority of the candidates who
H were selected during one selection has to be reckoned in accordance with
P. SRINIVAS v. M.R. MURTHY rrASA YAT, .I.] 17
appointment in the selection was not available to be given. A
We find that the GO.Ms. 822 dated 18.9.1967 issued by the Government
of Andhra Pradesh was dealing with the question of fixing the time limit for
.the candidates selected by the Commission to join when they .were to be
appointed by direct recruitment. Taking the factual position as prevailing
then, it was indicated that the time limit to be normally 60 days. It was B
fu1ther stipulated therein that in case they did not join within stipulated time,
their names could be removed from list of selected candidates. Service
Commission was enabled to extend and give fu1ther time for joining before
deleting the name of the candidate concerned from the select list for not
joining in time. The power of extending time given to the Commission under C
the G.O. was not in relation to any statutory prescription, and cannot be also
said to be in derogation of the powers of the State Government as the ultimate
repository of all Executive power. On the other hand, the Government itself
provided that the time could be extended if the Commission considered it
necessary. This was merely an enabling power conferred by the Government
only and the G.O. cannot be construed to be self destructive of the power of D
the,Government, in the absence of any statutory rules as such, in this regard.
The Commission appears to have been enabled to grant time to effectively
monitor the operation of the main list as well as the waiting list (in order of
merit) without any undue lapse of time, in case the selected candidates did
not join within the indicated time period. It was an executive decision of the E
Government. When the Government itself extended the time, in case of the
petitioner, on the basis of the reasonableness of the request it cannot be said
that in the absence of any order passed by the Commission extending the
time, the extension granted by the Government was without authority in law.

- It can be also looked at from another angle. The appellant was granted F
extension upto 3 I. 7.1987 to join. It was open to the Service Commission or
Government at that stage to direct removal of his name from the list of
selected candidates. Neither the Commission nor the Government thought it
appropriate to do so. On the other hand, the Government extended the joining
period and the appellant joined the post. In several periodical seniority lists
thereafter the appellant's name was placed higher than respondent no. I. For G
more than a decade, respondent no. I did not question that position. After a
very long period it was not open to respondent no. I to turn around and say
that the extension of time to the appellant was not in accordance with law.
It is undisputed that both the appellant and respondent no. J were selected in
the same selection and the appellant was more meritorious in terms of marksp H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A secured by him in the selection process and ranked above the I st respondent
and the inter se ranking and consequent inter se seniority cannot be disturbed
and rights flowing from such ranking cannot be denied merely because there
was some delay in joining-all the more so when such delay was only of 8
days and also on account of getting relieved from the Central Government,
for reasons beyond his control, which only seems to have weighed with the
B State Government to accord e·xtension of time also. The High Court seems to
have lost sight of the fact that it was not a case where reasons were absent
in the order of the Government extending the joining time. On the contrary,
the order itself indicates the reasons why the appellant had sought for extension.
The Government taking note of the factual position highlighted therein had ,,_
E granted extension. High Court has erroneously held that no reasons were
indicated.

In the above background, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant
was to be placed higher in the seniority list than respondent no. I in terms of
the inter se merit ranking assigned by the Service Commission. The Tribunal
F . was right in its view, while the High Court could not be held to be so. We
set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Tribunal so
far as the appellant is concerned.

The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to
costs.
G
B.S. Appeal allowed.