Holding

The Supreme Court held that the unexplained delay of over ten years in initiating disciplinary proceedings prejudiced the officer and warranted quashing the charge memo.

Summary

P.V. Mahadevan, a Superintending Engineer of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, was served with a charge memo in 2000 for alleged irregularities in issuing a sale deed in 1990. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated after a delay of more than ten years, with the Board offering no satisfactory explanation for the lapse. Mahadevan challenged the memo through a writ petition, arguing that the unexplained delay caused undue mental agony and prejudice, and that the Board had failed to comply with statutory audit provisions. The Supreme Court examined precedents on delay in departmental enquiries and held that such an inordinate, unexplained delay vitiates the disciplinary process. Consequently, the Court quashed the charge memo, allowed the appeal, and ordered that Mahadevan receive his retiral benefits.

Issues considered

Whether a disciplinary proceeding can be sustained when there is an inordinate, unexplained delay in initiating the charge memo.
Whether the lack of compliance with statutory audit provisions under the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961, justifies quashing the charge memo.
Whether the mental agony and prejudice suffered by the officer due to the delay warrant dismissal of the proceedings.

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsdelayquash charge memoadministrative lawmental agonyTamil Nadu Housing Boardservice lawdepartmental enquirystatutory compliance

Judgment

A P.V. MAHADEVAN '
v.
M.D. TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD

AUGUST 8, 2005

B [RUMA PAL AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.]

Service Law :

Disciplinary proceedings-Delay in initiating of-Effect of-Housing
Board-Superintending Engineer-Charged in 2000 for irregularity caused
c by him in issuing a sale deed in 1990-Held, allowing the Board to proceed
further with the departmental proceedings at this distance oftime will be very
prejudicial to the officer-Keeping a higher government official under
charges ofcorruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental
agony and distress to the officer concerned-Protracted disciplinary enquiry
D against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the
interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the
interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees-
As a matter offact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to
the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the
punishment-For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure
E for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be
suffer-Charge memo issued against the appellant quashed.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr., [1990) Supp. SCC
738 and State of A.P. v. N. Radhakrishan, (1998] 4 SCC 154, relied on.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4901 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.11.2004 of the Madras High
Court in W.P. No. 7854 of 2001.

G V. Prabhakar, R.S. Krishna Kumar, Rakesh Garg, Ashok K. Sadhu
Khan and Ms. Revathy Raghavan for the Appellant.

R. Venkataramani, R. Ayyam Perumal and S. Vallinayagam for the
Respondent.

H The Order of the Court was delivered :
474
P.V. MAHADEVAN v. M.D., TAMIL NADU HOUSG. BOARD 475

Leave granted. A
This appeal is directed against the common order passed by the High
Court of Madras in Writ Appeal Nos. 297 and 331 of2001 and Writ Petition
No. 7854/200 I filed by the appellant herein. Certain disciplinary actions were
initiated against the appellant herein who was working as Superintending
Engineer in the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. A charge memo was issued on B
8.6.2000. The appellant preferred a writ petition to call for the records, to
quash the charge memo by the respondent and to forebear the respondent
from in any manner proceeding with the charge memo against the appellant.
Certain other consequential prayers have also been made in regard to the
disbursement of monetary benefits, etc. c
Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
charge memo had been issued in the year 2000 for the irregularity in issuing
a sale deed in 1990 to one Mr. A.N. Beemaiah who was an employee of the
Housing Board and was to superannuate shortly. Mr. Prabhakar also submitted
that though the records were very much available with the respondent, no D
action has been taken against the appellant since 1990 for about IO years;
that no explanation whatsoever was offered by the Housing Board for the
inordinate delay in initiating the disciplinary action against the appellant. Mr.
Prabhakar placed strong reliance on the following two decisions of this Court
in (i) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Another, reported in [1990] E
Supp. sec 738 and (ii) State of A.P. v. N Radhakrishan reported in [1998]
4 SCC 154 and submitted that the High Court did not even consider any of
these judgments, which were specifically referred in the writ petition.

In the first case [ 1990] Supp. SCC 738, an 0.A. was filed by the officer
concerned against initiation of departmental enquiry proceedings and issue F
of charge-sheet on· April, 22, 1987 in respect of certain incidents that
happened in 1975;76 when the said officer was posted as Commandant 14th
Battalion, SAF Gwalior. The Tribunal quashed the charge memo and the
departmental enquiry on the ground of inordinate delay of over 12 years in
the initiation of the departmental proceedings with reference to an incident
G

- that took place in 1975-76.

The appeal against the said order was filed in this Court on the ground
that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the
ground of delay and !aches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on
to decide the matter on merits. H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A This Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel. While
dismissing the appeal this Court observed as follows :

"The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry
is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the
case of the department that they were not aware of the said
B irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According
to them even in April 1977 there was doubt the involvement of the
officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going
on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would
have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings
c as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for
the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of
the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to
be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds
to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss
this appeal."
D
In the second case [1998] 4 SCC 154, the respondent was appointed
as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. A report dated
7, 11.1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal
E Administration & Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad, about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorized constructions
in multi storied complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad
in collusion with municipal authorities. On the basis of the report, the State
issued two memos both dated 12.12.1987 in respect of three officials
including the respodnent-Radhakishan, the then Assistant City Planner. In
F this case, till 31.07 .1995 the article of charges had not been served on the
respondent.

The Tribunal, however, held that the memo dated 31. 7.1995 related to
incidents that happened ten years of more prior to the date of the memo and
G that there was absolutely no explanation by the Government for this
inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the enquiry against .
the respondent and that there was no justification on the part of the State now
conducting the enquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at
this late stage.

H This Court, in para 19, has observed as follows :
P.V. MAHADEVANv. M.D., TAMIL NADU HOUSG. BOARD 477

• "It is not possible to lay down any predetennined principles A
applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in
concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the
disciplinary proceedings are to be tenninated each case has to be
examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence
of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the
B
relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it
is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the
disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to tenninate after delay
particularly when the delay is abnonnal and there is no explanation
for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary
proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not c
made to undergo mental agony and also monetary Joss when these
are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying
the proceedings. Jn considering whether the delay has vitiated the
disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of
charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. D
If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is
writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much
the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against
its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that
an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perfonn his duties
honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. Ifhe deviates E
from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Nonnally,
'
disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as
per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes
prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to
blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay F
in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is
to balance these two diverse considerations."

This Court held that there was hardly any explanation worth consideration
as to why the delay occurred. In the circumstances, this Court held that the
Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31.7.I995 and G
directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the
DPC ignoring memos dated 27.I0.1995 and 1.6.1996. Accordingly, the
appeal filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh was dismissed.

Mr. Prabhakar also invited our attention to the affidavit filed by the H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP: 2 S.C.R.

A appellant in support of his case. It is stated in para 14 of the affidavit that
the respondent with the ma/a fide intention issued the present charge memo
against the appellant even though the alleged incident of issuance of sale deed
was of the year 1990, which was 10 year prior to the issuance of charge memo
and that very reason for issuing charge memo was that the appellant could
be detained from promoting to the post of Chief Engineer of the Housing
B Board.

The very same ground has been specifically raised in this appeal before
this Court wherein it is stated that the delay of more than 10 years in initiating
the disciplinary proceedings by issuance of charge memo would render the
c departmental proceedings vitiated and that in the absence ofany explanation
for the inordinate delay in initiating such proceedings of issuance of charge
memo would justify the prayer for quashing the proceedings as made in the
writ petition.

Our attention was also drawn to the counter affidavit filed by the
D respondent-Board in this appeal. Though· some explanation was given, the
explanation offered is not at all convincing. It is stated in the counter affida.vit
for the first ti111e that the irregularity during the year 1990, for which
disciplinary action had been initiated against the appellant in the year 2000,
came to light in the audit report for the second half of 1994-1995.
E
Section 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Bo'1rd Act, 1961
(Tamil Nadu Act No. 17 of 1961 read thus :

"118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the
Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure
F
for such year.

119. The accounts of the Board shall be examined and audited
once in every year by such auditor as the Government may appoint
in this behalf."
G
Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of the
accounts at the end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual audit of
accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all.
In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The
H expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of the succeeding
P.V. MAHADEVAN v. M.D., TAMIL NADU HOUSG. BOARD 479

year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in the 1994- A
1995. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account
cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu
Act 17. It is now stated that the appellant has retired from service. There is
also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the
inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr. R. B
Venkataramani, learned Senior counsel is appearing for the respondent. His
submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities
by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing
Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was
any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the C
respondent in this Court in the counter affidavit is not convincing and is only
an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay.

Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the
respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this D
distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher
government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would
cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The
protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should,
therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee
but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the E
minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw
the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already
suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a
• matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the
protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. F
For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating
the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.

We, therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge memo issued
I against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled
I to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefit shall be G
I·- disbursed within three months from this date. No costs.

R.P. Appeal allowed.