Holding

Voluntary retirement under Regulation 12(b) is effective only upon approval by the competent authority; without such approval, the retirement does not take effect.

Summary

The appellant, Padubidri Damodar Shenoy, gave a notice of voluntary retirement under Regulation 12(b) of the Service Regulations on 30 September 2005, having completed 29 years of service. The competent authority neither approved nor rejected the application within the three‑month notice period, and the appellant continued to work until June 2006 before claiming that his retirement was effective from 1 July 2006. The employer later communicated that the request had not been acceded to. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "shall be subject to approval" in the proviso to Regulation 12(b) makes approval by the competent authority a condition precedent to the retirement taking effect. Since no approval was granted, the appellant’s voluntary retirement never became operative. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The interpretation of the proviso to Regulation 12(b) – whether "shall be subject to approval" makes approval a condition precedent or merely a discretionary power.
Whether the employer’s failure to communicate a decision within the notice period affects the validity of the voluntary retirement.
Whether the appellant could claim retirement despite the lack of approval and continued service after the notice period.

Subjects

voluntary retirementservice regulationsapproval conditionstatutory interpretationproviso constructionemployee rightsservice law

Judgment

[2009] 14 (ADDL.) s.c:R. 356

j-
A PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY J
v.
INDIAN AIRLINES LTD. AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 6186 of 2009)
SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

Service Law - Voluntary Retirement - Service
Regulations for Employees (other than those in the Flying
C Crew and those in the Aircraft Engineering Departments) -
,,..
Regulation 12(b) - _Interpretation and construction of the
Regulation and the proviso appended thereto - Held: The
expression "shall be subject to approval" used in proviso
appended to Regulation 12 clearly indicates that voluntary
D retirement applied by employees covered by clause (b) is ~
effective only upon approval by the competent authority -
There is nothing to indicate in Regulation 12 that if employer
_ decides to withhold approval of voluntary retirement, such
refusal of approval must be communicated to the employee
E du_ring period of notice - Since on facts, approval was not
- granted, voluntary retirement of the employee never came into
effect. •
.J._
Words and Phrases:

F "shall be subject to approval" - "shall" and "subject to" -
Meaning and effect of.

On 30th September, 2005, the appellant, in terms of
Regulation 12 of the Service Regulations for Employees
G (other than those in the Flying Crew and those in the
Aircraft Engineering Departments), gave a notice of his
intention to voluntarily retire from service on completion
of three months from the date of the notice. At the
relevant time, the appellant had completed 29 years of.
continuous service.
H 356
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 357
LTD. AND ANR.

i The appellant purportedly sent a reminder to the A
authorities on December 16, 2005 and when he did not
receive any reply, he sent another letter dated June 8,
2006 informing the respondents that he would cease to
be an employee of the respondent no.1 after close of the
working hours on June 30, 2006. Again on July 1, 2006, B
the appellant purportedly informed the respondent no.1
and the concerned authority that in terms of notice dated
~
September 30, 2005 he has ceased to be an employee of
.> the respondent no.1 in terms of Regulation 12(b) of the
Service Regulations and requested the respondents to c
.., release and pay all his legal dues including the provident
fund and gratuity from July 1, 2006.
Purportedly by letter dated July 31, 2006, the
appellant was informed that his application for voluntary
_) ' retirement has been forwarded to the Headquarters for D
decision and he was advised to report for duty
immediately, failing which he was informed that a
disciplinary action would be taken against him. The -
appellant sent reply reiterating his stand and further
informing, the respondents that he had ceased to be the E
employee of the respondents from July 1, 2006 and,
' ;. • therefore, there was no question of his reporting for duty.
-
The appellant then filed a writ petition. During
pendency of the writ petition, the appellant received a F
communication dated September 15, 2006 from the
respondents that his request for voluntary retirement
from service has not been acceded to by the competent
authority. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed by
the High 'Court. The appellant filed fresh writ petition G
.... before the High Court which too was dismissed .
/

In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that
· Regulation 12 vests the employees covered thereby with
a right to voluntarily retire after giving three months
H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A notice, namely, those who have attained the age of 55 1
years and also those who have completed 20 years of
continuous service anct both these categories form one
class and that the proviso appended to Regulation 12
only empowers the competent authority to withhold
B approval before the notice period is over.

Per contra, the Respondent contended that the notice
dated 30th September, 2005 given by the appellant to the .
employer under Regulation 12(b) expiring on 31st ....(

c December, 2005 did not become effective and rather
remained inoperative since the appellant continued to ,..,
attend his duties not only until the expiry of notice period
but thereafter as well upto June 30, 2006; that the proviso
to Regulation 12-expressly· mandates the approval of the
competent authority or, in other words, approval of the
D competent authority is a condition precedent to the event ~

of voluntary retirement and that the word "approval"
occurring in proviso to Regulation 12 in its context would
mean "to accept".

E The interpretation and construction of Regulation 12
of the Service Regulations was in issue in the present
appeal. •
.....i__

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F HELD: 1.1. Regulation 12 of the Service Regulations
for Employees (other than those in the Flying Crew and
those in the Aircraft Engineering Departments), inter alia,
enables an employee to seek voluntary retirement on
attaining the age of 55 years or on completion of 20 years
G of continuous service by giving three months notice. An
employee who has attained the age of 55 years and has
applied for voluntary retirement under Regulation 12, his
voluntary retirement is automatic on expiry of notice
period i.e. three months. It is not equally applicable to an
H
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v.. INDIAN AIRLINES 359
LTD. AND ANR.

j employee who has not attained the age of 55 years but A
completed 20 years of continuous service and applied for
voluntary retirement, because for a category covered by
clause (b), namely, an employee having completed 20
years of continuous service who has given three months
notice for voluntary retirement from the service, the B
proviso appended thereto provides that voluntary
;l
retirement under clause (b) shall be subject to approval
of the competent authority. [Para 21) [369-F-G; 370-A-B]
>--
1.2. The key words used in proviso appended to
Regulation 12 are that voluntary retirement under clause
c
(b) 'shall be subject to approval' of the competent
authority. The use of the word 'shall' in the proviso, prima
facie leads to an inference that provision is imperative.

- )

4-
There is nothing in the context to suggest that it is merely
directory. It is followed by the words, 'subject to approval'. D
The effect of the use of words 'subject to' is to introduce
a condition. The expression, "shall be subject to
approval" is indicative of its intendment that the voluntary
retirement applied by the employees covered by clause
(b) is effective only upon approval by the competent E
authority. The effect of these words is to introduce a
llllljo.
'
). condition and thereby make voluntary retirement applied
by employees covered by category (b) conditional upon
its approval by the competent authority. There is nothing
.,
to indicate in Regulation 12 that if employer decides to F
withhold approval of voluntary retirement, such refusa1
of approval must be communicated to the petitioner
during the period of notice. True it is that notice of three
months for voluntary retirement given by an employee
covered by clause (b) remains valid even if no G
communication is received within notice period but it
becomes effective only on its approval by the competent
authority. As a matter of fact, this seems to have been
understood by both the parties. [Paras 27 and 32) [381-
C; 383-B-F) H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 1.3. In the present case, the appellant issued a notice I
).
of voluntary retirement under Regulation 12 (b) on
September 30, 2005. The notice period was to expire on
December-31, 2005. The competent authority neither
gave approval nor indicated disapproval to the appellant
B within the notice period of three months. The employee
never treated that there has been cessation of
employment on expiry of three months notice period
inasmuch as he continued to attend his duties after
December 31, 2005 until June 30, 2006. It is only by his
c letter dated June 8, 2006 that the appellant requested the
respondent to relieve him in terms of his notice dated
September 30, 2005 by June 30, 2006 and he stopped
attending work from July 1, 2006. The letter dated June
8, ~006 does not make any material differ~nce as the fact
0
of the matter is that after expiry of notice period, the
appellant continued to attend his duties ·for many months
thereafter. By the letter dated September 15, 2006 the
-
respondent communicated to the ap~ellant that his
application for voluntary retirement under Service
Regulation 12(b) has not been acceded to by the
E competent authority .. Since the notice for voluntary
retirement by an employee who has not attained 55 years
but has completed 20 years of continuous service, under
proviso appended to Regulation 12(b), is subject to
approval by the competent authority and that approval
F was not granted, the voluntary retirement of the appellant
'never came into effect. [Para 32] [383-F-H; 384-A-C]

A.N. Sehgal & Others vs. Raje Ram Sheoran & Others
1992 Supp. (1)SCC 304; State of Haryana & Others vs. S.K.
G Singhal (1999) 4 SCC 293; Tek Chand vs. Dile Ram (2001)
3 SCC 290; K.L.E. Society vs. Dr.R.R. Patil & Anr. (2002) 6
SCC 278; Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India & Ors., (2006)
6 $.CC 704; H.P. Horticultural Produce Marketing &
Processing Corpn. Ltd. vs. V. Suman Behari Sharma (1996)
H
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 361
LTD. AND ANR.

'
) 4 SCC 584; Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of Assam & A
Ors. (1977) 4 SCC 441; B.J. She/at vs. State of Gujarat &
Others (1978) 2 SCC 202; Union of India vs. Sayed Muzaffar
Mir 1995 Supp ( 1) SCC 76; Jaipal Singh vs. Sumitra
Mahajan & Anr. (2004) 4 SCC 522; Madras & Southern
Maharatta Rly. Co. Ltd. vs. Bezwada Municipality AIR 1944 B
PC 71; Shah Bhoraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory vs.
Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha AIR 1961 SC 1596 and CIT,
• Mysore etc. vs. lndo Mercantile Bank Ltd. AIR 1959 SC 713,
> referred to.

Local Govt. Board vs. South Stoneham Union (1909) AC
c
57, referred to.

'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' (Seventh Edition,
.. ' .4.
1999); by G.P. Singh,.referred to.
D
Case Law Reference
1992 Supp. (1) SCC 304 referred to Para 17
(1999) 4 sec 293 referred to Para 18
(2001) 3 sec 290 referred to Para 19 E

,. 1 (2002) 5 sec 218 referred to Para 20
(2006) 6 sec 104 referred to Para 20
(1996) 4 sec 584 referred to Para 20 F
(1977) 4 sec 441 referred to Para 23
(1978) 2 sec 202 referred to Para 23
1995 Supp ( 1) SCC 76referred to Para 23
G
(2004) 4 sec s22 referred to Para 26
AIR 1944 PC 71 referred to Para 27

H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 {ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (1909) AC 57 referred to Para 28 j,

AIR 1961 SC 1596 referred to Para 29
1959 SC 713 referred to Para 30

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6186 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 17.10.2007 of the High •
_....
~

Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1463 of
2007.
c
S.F. Deshmukh, N.M. Ganguli; P.K. Manohar for the
Appellant.

P .S. Narasimha, Lalit Bhasin, Nina Gupta, Bina Gupta for
• .,-.L
D
the Respondents. _._
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2._ In this appeal by special leave, interpretation and
E
construction of Regulation 12 of Service Regulations for
Employees (other than those in the Flying Crew and those in ....._ .....
the Aircraft Engineering Departments) - for short 'Service
ReguJations' - framed by respondent no. 1, is involved.

F 3. Padubidri Damodar Shenoy - appellant - joined the .,.,,111...
services of the Indian Airlines Limited - respondent no. 1 as
Traffic Assistant on January 13, 1977. The appellant was
promoted from time to time and, lastly, he was promoted to the
post of Manager in the commercial department, In or about
.G September, 2002, the appellant was posted to work at Muscat
as Airport Manager but was recalled from posting soon
thereafter and posted as Manager, Mumbai Airport. The
appellant challenged the pre-mature recall by filing writ petition
which was later on withdrawn. It is not necessary to refer to the
H

•
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 363
LTD. AND ANR. [RM. LODHA, J.]

\ details of that writ petition as the subject matter of the present A
i,
appeal does not concern that. What is relevant to be noticed
here is that a charge-sheet dated January 16/21, 2003 was
served upon the appellant; enquiry was conducted and the
appellant was found guilty of misconduct alleged in the charge-
sheet and vide order dated March 31, 2006/April 10, 2006, the B
appellant's time scale by two incremental stages with
cumulative effect was reduced by way of punishment.
~

> 4. In the year 2003, the respondent no. 1 came out with a
scheme of Voluntary Retirement for its employees entitled c
Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2003 (for short, 'VRS, 2003').
The appellant applied for voluntary retirement under the said
scheme on September 17, 2003.

t
5. On September 30, 2005 the appellant gave a notice of
...r his intention to voluntarily retire from service on completion of D
• ~
three months from the date of the notice as the appellant had
completed 29 years of service. This was done under regulation
12 of the Service Regulations .
•
I

4 6. The appellant's case is that he sent a reminder to the E
authorities on December 16, 2005 and when he did not receive
any reply, he sent another letter dated June 8, 2006 informing
' .l ' the respondents that he would cease to be an employee of the
respondent no. 1 after close of the working hours on June 30,
2006. Again on July 1, 2006, the appellant is said to have
F
informed the respondent no. 1 and the concerned authority that
.. in terms of notice dated September 30, 2005 he has ceased
to be an employee of the respondent no. 1 in terms of
Regulation 12(b) of the Service Regulations and requested the
respondents to release and pay all his legal dues including the
provident fund and gratuity within two weeks from July 1, 2006. G
Another letter is said to have been sent by the appellant on July
20, 2006 asking the respondents to release his legal dues
failing which he informed them that he would be left with no
alternative but to approach the court.
H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

/
A 7. It appears that by a letter dated July 31, 2006, the
.:L
appellant was informed that his application for voluntary
;
retirement has been forwarded to the Headquarters for decision
in the matter. The appellant was advised to report for duty
immediately, failing which he was informed .that a disciplinary.
B action would be taken against him.
8. The appellant sent reply to the said letter on August 8,
2006 reiterating his stand and further informing the respondents ..
trlat he has ceased to be the employee of the respondents from _.(

July 1, 2006 and, therefore, there was no question of his
c reporting for duty.

9. The appellant then filed a writ petition (Writ Petition No.
2522 of 2006) before th~ High court of Judicature at Bombay.
During the pendency of writ petition, the appellant received a
D communication dated September 15, 2006 from the
~

~ '
respondents that his request for voluntary retirement.from
service has not been acceded to by the competent authority.

10. Writ Petition No.2522 of 2006 was contested by the
respondents. The Division Bench of the High Court heard the
E
parties and by its order dated April 23, 2007, dismissed that
writ petition.
J'
11. The appellant filed a fresh writ petition being Writ
Petition No, 1463 of 2007 before the High Court of Judicature
F at Bombay praying therein that the communication dated
September 15, 2006 rejecting the appellant's applicatiQn for
voluntary retirement be quashed and set aside and a direction
be issued to the respondents to approve the voluntary
retirement of the appellant under Regulation 12(b) of Service
G Regulations pursuant to the notice dated September 30, 2005.
The appellant also prayed that the respondents be further .\·
directed to release and pay all legal dues of the appellant along
with interest thereon at 18% per annum from July 1, 2006 till
payment and extend all post-retirement benefits.
H
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 365
LTD. AND ANR. [R.M. LODHA, J.]

12. The respondents contested that writ petition on diverse A
grounds, inter alia, namely: (i) that the appellant had raised the
same issue in earlier writ petition (Writ Petition No. 2522 of
2006) and by a detailed order, his writ petition was dismissed
and, therefore, it was not open to the appellant to re-agitate the
same issue; (ii) that the application for voluntary retirement is B
an offer made by an employee and unless it is accepted by the
employer, it does not become effective. The employee is not
relieved from service till the offer is accepted because the
relationship of the employer and employee does not come to
an end. The offer of the appellant was not accepted by the first c
respondent and (iii) that the delayed communication does not
create any right in the appellant and that the Service
Regulations do not contemplate reasons to be communicated
for rejection of the application for voluntary retirement.

13. The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the D
parties, dismissed the writ petition on October 17, 2007.
Hence, the present appeal by special leave.

14. Before we turn to Regulation 12 of the Service
Regulations, we may observe that the appellant had raised the E
same controversy by filing Writ Petition No. 2522 of 2006. It is

- >
).
true that the communication dated September 15, 2006 was
received by him during the pendency of writ petition but the .
Division Bench was conscious of this fact while passing the
order dated April 23, 2007. The Division Bench held that right F
to accept or reject the offer for voluntary retirement is that of
the employer and although this has to be exercised within a
reasonable time but that, however, does not give any right to
the employee, if not accepted within reasonable time, to hold
that the employment has come to an end. This is what the G
Division Bench said in its order dated April 23, 2007 while
dismissing earlier writ petition :

•·. "The case of the petitioner is that once application is
'
moved for retirement, under the provisions of Regulation
16(b), it would be the bounden duty of the Respondents H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) s·.c.R.
•
,,-

A to have decided the same recently. As the Respondents
~
for a long period of time did not accept the letter to offer
retirement, the petitioner stopped attending the work as in
his opinion, he ceases to be in the employment and
demanded the compensation/retiremental benefits from
B. Respondent No. 1.

After having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner
and the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 and the
relevant Regulation, we are clearly of the opinion that right -( t-
to accept or reject is that of the employer. It is true that this L
c has to be exercised within a reasonable time, that however
does not give right in employee if not accepted within
.
i'
reasonable time to hold that the employment has to come Ir

\.-
to an end. The requirement of the regulation is approval
of the competent authority. The Competent Authority has ,,L
D by a communication on 15.9.2006 refused the request for '
~
voluntary retirement. Considering the above, we are of the
opinion that no case is made out for interference by this
court. - }.

\
E It is made clear that we are not going to the merits as to l
whether Respondent No. 1 was within its jurisdiction to
accept or refuse. If the petitioner is aggrieved, it is for the t
...
petitioner to take whatever action which he desires." -l. 'J

15. While dismissing the subsequent writ petition, in the
F
impugned order, the Division Bench has observed that it was
..,
improper for the appellant to have another round of litigation
on the same point. The Division Bench expressed its
unhappiness about the conduct of the appellant thus :

G "In its order dated 23/4/07, the Division Bench quoted ~
Regulation 12(b). The Division Bench heard arguments on ~

this point. It is reflected in the order that this point was
canvassed. The Division Bench then observed that
""
't
·I
~
•
because the employer does not exercise the right to
H accept or reject the application within a reasonable time ;JI
\

I
,;
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 367
LTD. AND ANR. [R.M. LODHA, J.]

l that does not give right in employee to contend that A
employment has come to an end. It is distressing to note
• that though this contention is rejected it is again raised in
the present petition. It is improper for the petitioner to have
a round of litigation in this manner on the same point. We
are unhappy about this conduct of the petitioner." B
16. Now, we come to the core issue. Regulation 12 of the
.. Service Regulations, which is the area of controversy, reads
_.,._
thus:

"12. An employee shall retire from _the service of the c
""'f..
Company on attaining the age of 58 years provided that
the competent authority may ask an employee to retire after
he attains the age of 55 years on giving three months'
notice without assigning any reason. An employee :-
• .-i
(a) On attaining the age of 55 years;
D

OR

(b) On the completion of 20 years of continuous
service may by giving three months notice E
voluntarily retire from the service;
~ Provided that the voluntary retirement under Clause (b)
shall be subject to approval of the competent authority.

Provided further, notwithstanding anything contained in F
regulation - 12 the services of an employee may at the
option of the Managing Director and the employee being
found medically fit, be extended by one year at a time
beyond the age of retirement of 58 years for an aggregate
period not exceeding two years." G
4._

17. Mr. S.J. Deshmukh, learned counsel for the appellant
contended that Regulation 12 ves~s the employees covered
..... thereby with a right to voluntarily retire after giving three months
notice, namely, those who have attained age of 55 years and H

"r
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A also those who have completed 20 years of continuous service
,._'
and both these categories form one class. According to him,
proviso appended to Regulation 12 only empowers the
-·

.:-
.
competent authority to withhold approval before the notice
period is over. In other words, he would submit, that the
B employer can stop the voluntary retirement by not granting the
approval within the period of notice and communicating the >-
,r
same to the concerned employee that the employer was not
giving his approval. Learned counsel submitted that a 'proviso' ~

to particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which -4.
c is covered by main provision to which it has been enacted and
to no other. He relied upon a decision of this Court in A.N.
'
'
• )Im
Sehgal & Others vs. Raje Ram Sheoran & Others 1 and
submitted that where the language of the main enactment is rj:i::
explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no
D repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so ~
as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its _,.t__
express terms.

18. Insofar as norms relating to voluntary retirement are
concerned, Mr. S.J. Deshmukh, learned counsel for the
E appellant submitted that the law in this regard is laid down by
this Court in State of Haryana & Others vs. S.K. SinghaP. He,
particularly, referred to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the report and (

submitted that any decision to withhold approval has to be taken --(

and communicated during the period of notice.
F-
19. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior ' ...
counsel for the respondents submitted that cases of voluntary i
retirement fall in three categories name!y: (i) where, voluntary c

retirement is automatic and comes into force on the expiry of
notice period; (ii) where voluntary retirement comes into force
G
on the expiry of notice period unless an order is passed within
),.
the notice period withholding permission to retire; and (iii)
where voluntary retirement does not come into force unless
1. (1992) Supp. (1) sec 304. ~
\
H_ 2. (1999) 4 sec 293.

..,
1"
_lC
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 369
LTD. AND ANR. [RM. LODHA, J.]
permission to this effect is specifically granted by the controlling A
'
A authority. The learned senior counsel would submit that proviso
appended to Regulation 12 relates to category (iii). He also
relied upon decision of this Court in S.K. Singhal and another
decision of this Court in the case of Tek Chand vs. Dile Ram3.
B
20. Learned senior counsel for the respondents -submitted
that notice dated September 30, 2005 given by the appellant
4
to the employer under Regulation 12(b) expiring on December
31, 2005 did not become effective and rather remained
~
inoperative since the appellant continued to attend his duties
not only until the expiry of notice periop but thereafter as well
c
upto June 30, 2006. In this regard, he referred to a decision of
this Court in the case of K.L.E. Society vs. Dr.RR. Patil & Anr.•
He also submitted that the word "approval" occurring in proviso
to Regulation 12 in its context would mean "to accept". In this
regard, he referred to a decision of this Court in the case of D
J..
Ashok Kumar Sahu vs. Union of India & Ors. 5 Relying upon a
decision of this Court in the case of H.P. Horticultural Produce
Marketing & Processing Corpn. Ltd. vs. V. Suman Behari
Sharma 6 , Mr. P.S.Narasimha submitted that 'proviso' to
Regulation 12 expressly mandates the approval of the E
competent authority or, in other words, approval of the
> competent authority is a condition precedent to the event of
;. voluntary retirement.

21. Regulation 12 of the Service Regulations, inter alia, F
enables an employee to seek voluntary retirement on attaining
the age of 55 years or on completion of 20 years of continuous
service by giving three months notice. An employee who .ha~
attained the age of 55 years and has applied for voluntary
retirement under Regulation 12, his voluntary reUrement is
G
automatic on expiry of notice period i.e. three months. Is it
4.-
3. (2001) 3 sec 290.
4. (2002) 5 sec 278.
...
1111(
5. (2006) 6 sec 704.
6. (1996) 4 sec 584. H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A equally applicable to an employee who has not attained the age r
,fa.
of 55 years but completed 20 years of continuous service and
applied for voluntary retirement. In our judgment, it is not so
because for a category covered by clause (b), namely, an
employee having completed 20 years of continuous service who
8 has given three months notice for voluntary retirement from the
service, a proviso appended thereto provides that voluntary
retirement under clause (b) shall be subject to approval of the
competent authority. ..
--'--
22. It is appropriate at this stage to consider the decision
c of this Court in S.K. Singhal. In S.K. Singhal, the relevant rule
5.32(8) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules under consideration
was as follows:

"5.32(8)(1) At any time a government employee has
D completed twenty years' qualifying service, he may, by
)._
.giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the
· appointing· authority retire from service. However, a
government employee may make a request in writing to
the appointing authority to accept notice of less than three
E months·giving reason therefor. On receipt of a request, the
appointing authority may consider such request for the
curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits I
and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of -A
notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the
-F ap.pointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of
three months on the condition that the government
employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his
• pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three
months.
G -(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule
(1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority
subject to Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.II:

Provided that where the appointing authority does not
refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
,,_,.
H
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 371

.. i
- LTD. AND ANR. [RM. LODHA, J.]

expiry of the period specified in sub-rule (1) supra, the· A
' retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry
........
of the said period:

Provided further that before a government employee
gives notice of voli.mtary retirement with reference to sub-
B
rule (1) he should satisfy himself by means of a reference
to the appropriate authority that he has, in fact, completed
twenty years' service qualifying for pension."
"
~
23. In paragraph 9 of the report, this Court considered the
general scheme of voluntary retirement in service rules and also c
.. noted earlier decisions of this Court in the case of Dinesh
Chandra Sangma vs. State of Assam & Ors. 7, B.J. She/at vs.
State of Gujarat & Others6, Union of India vs. Sayed Muzaffar
Mir6 and H.P.Horticultural Produce Marketing & Processing
Corpn. Ltd. This Court observed: D
.A
"9. The employment of government servants is
governed by rules. These rules provide a partic~lar age as
the age of superannuation. Nonetheless, the rules confer
a right on the Government to compulsorily retire an
E
employee before the age of superannuation provided the
employee has reached a particular age or has completed
l a particular number of years of qualifying service in case
it is found that his service has not been found to be
satisfactory. The rules also provide that an employee who
..',..
has completed the said number of years in his age or who F
has completed the prescribed number of years of qualifying
service could give notice of, say, three months that he
would voluntarily retire on the expiry of the said period of
three months. Some rules are couched in language which
results in an automatic retirement of the employee upon G
-+- the expiry of the period specified in the employee's notice.

7. (1977) 4 sec 441.
...: 8. (1978) 2 sec 202.
9. 1995 supp (1) sec 76. H

..
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. _,_
..:
A" On the other hand, certain rules in some other departments i
are couched in language which makes it clear that even
). -,
'1'
upon expiry of the period specified in the notice, the
retirement is not automatic and an express order granting
permission is required and has to be communicated. The
B relationship of master and servant in the latter type of rules
continues after the period specified in the notice till such
acceptance is communicated; refusal of permission could
~
also be communicated after 3 months and the employee
continues to be in service. Cases like Dinesh Chandra ---'---·
c Sangma v State of Assam (1977) 4 SCC 441; B.J. She/at
v. State of Gujarat (1978) 2 SCC 202 and Union of India ...
.,.

v. Sayed Muzaffar Mir (1995 Supp.(1) SCC 76 belong to
the former category where it is held that upon the expiry
of the period, the voluntary retirement takes effect
D
automatically as no order of refusal is passed within the
,A
'
notice period. On the other hand H.P. Horticultural
Produce Marketing & Processing Corpn. Ltd. vs. Suman
Behari Sharma ( 1996) 4 SCC 584 belongs to the second
category where the bye-laws were interpreted as not giving
an option "to retire" but only provided a limited right to
E "seek" retirement thereby implying the need for a consent
of the employer even if the period of the notice has
(
elapsed. We shall refer to these two categories in some -;4

detail."
~
24. In S.K. Singhal, this Court considered previous ...
F
decisions at quite some length and held: ·-
"13. Thus, from the aforesaid three decisions it is
clear that if the right to voluntarily retire is conferred in
absolute terms as in Dinesh Chandra Sangma case by the
G
relevant rules and there is no provision in the rules to ,+.
withhold permission in certain contingencies the voluntary
retirement comes into effect automatically on the expiry of
the period specified in the notice. If, however, as in B.J. 'p

Shelat case and as in Sayed Muzaffar Mir case the
H
-.. •
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 373
LTD. AND ANR. [RM. LODHA, J.]
authority concerned is empowered to withhold permission A
l
to retire if certain conditions exist, viz., in case the
employee is under suspension or in case a departmental
enquiry is pending or is contemplated, the mere pendency
of the suspension or departmental enquiry or its
contemplation does not result in the notice for voluntary 8
retirement not coming into effect on the expiry of the period
specified. What is further needed is that the authority
"
-~
concerned must pass a positive order withholding
permission to retire and must also communicate the same
to the employee as stated in B.J. Shelat case and in Sayed c
.... Muzaffar Mir case before the expiry of the notice period .
Consequently, there is no requirement of an order of
acceptance of the notice to be communicated to the
employee nor can it be said that non-communication of
acceptance should be treated as amounting to withholding D
~ of permission.
14. Before referring to the second category of cases
where the rules require a positive acceptance of the notice
of voluntary retirement and communication thereof, it is
necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Ba/jit E
Singh (Dr) v. State of Haryana (1997 (1) SCC 754] strongly
~ ,,t-
> relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants and
to Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia [
(1997) 4 sec 280]. The former case arose under Rule
5.32(8) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules. That rule F
extracted earlier contains an express provision in the
proviso to sub-rule (2) that the retirement takes effect
automatically if refusal is not communicated within 3
months. In that case, when the employee gave notice for
voluntary retirement on 20-9-1993, criminal cases were G
pending against him. After expiry of 3 months, on 25-2-
1994, the competent authority declined to accept the
,,, notice. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, however, held that
the voluntary retirement did not come about automatically
'
on the expiry of the notice period but that it could take H

..
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A . effect only upon acceptance of the notice by the
Government and that the acceptance must also be j
communicated and till then the jural relationship of master
and servant continues. This Court referred only to the
decision of the two-Judge Bench in Sayed Muzaffar Mir
B case and stated that that case was to be confined to its
own facts. The two-Judge Bench of this Court in Baljit
Singh case did not notice that there were two three-Judge
Bench cases in Dinesh Chandra Sangma and She/at ..
taking the view under similar rules that a positive order
--"-·
c was to be passed within the notice period withholding
permission to retire and that the said order was also to
,.....
be communicated to the employee during the said period.
By stating that an order of acceptance of the notice was
necessary and that the said acceptance must be
communicated to the employee and till that was done the
D
jural relationship continued and there was no automatic
~
snapping thereof on the expiry of 3 months' period, the two-
Judge Bench, in our view, has gone contrary to the two
three-Judge Bench cases which were not brought to its
notice. In the above circumstances, we follow the ~o three-
E Judge Bench ,cases for deciding the case before us.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on
a two-Judge Bench decision in Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. '
"'-·
v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia. That was a case where the
F letter of voluntary retirement was conditionally accepted
subject to payment of dues and the employee wrote a
further letter seeking adjustment thereof but before that
was done, the scheme itself was withdrawn. There are
again some observations made to the effect that there
G must be acceptance of request to retire and that it must
be communicated. Neither Dinesh Chandra Sangma nor
She/at was referred to. In our opinion, the express
provision in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 5.32(B) in
the case before us does not permit such a view to be ,'V
taken. The said observations again run contrary to the
H '
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOYv. INDIANAIRLINES 375
LTD. AND ANR. [RM. LODHA, J.]

decision in the two three-Judge Bench cases referred to A
•
j, above. Our comments on Baljit Singh apply equally to this
case, so far as the observations are concerned.

16. We then come to the second category of cases .
where the rules require that an order of acceptance of
B
notice be passed to make the voluntary retirement
effective. In HPMC v. Suman Behari Sharma it will be
noticed, the principle in Dinesh Chandra Sangma case
• was accepted but the case was distinguished on the
~
ground that Bye-law 3.8(2) in HPMC case provided
differently and that under that bye-law an employee could
c
be permitted at his request to retire on completion of 25
years' service or 50 years of age. Para (5) of Bye-law 3.8
stated as follows: (SCC p.588, para 7)
~ "(5) Notwithstanding the provision under para (2) D
J above, the corporation employees who. have a
satisfactory service record of 20 years may also
seek retirement from the service of the Corporation
after giving three months' notice in writing to the
appropriate authority. Persons under suspension E
would not be retired under this clause unless
proceedings of the case against them are
finalised .... "(emphasis supplied)

While clause (2) speaks of 25 years' service, clause (5)
· speaks of 20 years' service. F

17. The employee applied on 26-11-1990 for
voluntary retirement effective from 30-11-1990 and also
requested for waiver of notice of 3 months. He did not
report to duty right from 1-12-1990. Earlier on 12-12-1989, G
a charge-sheet was issued against him for certain acts of
misconduct. On 26-12-1990 he filed a reply to the charge-
sheet. On 22-8-1992 another charge-sheet was served for
unauthorised absence and one more on 18-9-1992. On
H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200~] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 30-9-1992 he approached the Tribunal contending that he •
stood retired on expiry of 3 months from notice, w.e.f. 26- J
2-1990. The Tribunal accepted the said plea. Reversing
the order of the Tribunal, this Court held- while
distinguishing Dinesh Chandra Sangma case1 and other
B similar High Court judgments, that clause (2) o.Mhe bye-
law merely gave a right to make a request and :the request
would become effective only if permitted; .• Under
.
clause (2)
of the bye-law, it was a "right to a request" and not "a right
to retire". If the request was not accepted a!!ld permission ~

c was not granted, the employee could not claim that there
was an automatic retirement on the expiry of the period.
Even under clause (5) while it was true that there was a
non obstante clause, it was only an exception to clause (2)
to a limited extent, i.e., completion of 20 years' satisfactory
service [rather than 25 under clause (2)] but the grant of
D
~permission" to the request seeking retirement was \__
necessary even under clause (5) and was not dispensed
with. If under clause (2) a person who had put in 25 years
had to "seek to retire" and had to be "permitted to retire",
a person with only 20 years' service under clause.(5) could
E not have been placed on a better footing, it was held. The
Court emphasised: (SCC pp.588-89, para 8)

"The words 'seek retirement' in para 5 indicate that '
i--.

the right which is conferred by it is not the right to
F retire but a right to ask for retirement. The word
'seek' implies a request by the employee and
corresponding acceptance or permission by
HPMC. Therefore, there cannot be automatic
retirement or snapping of service relationship on
G expiry of three months' period."

On that basis, it was held that though the rejection of the -+
request was not communicated within the notice period,
there was no automatic retirement. There are no such
provisions in the case before us.
H
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 377
LTD. AND ANR. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
\ 18. In the case before us sub-rule (1) of Rule 5.32(8) A
-" contemplates a "notice to retire" and not a request seeking
· permission to retire. The further "request" contemplated by
the sub-rule is only for seeking exemption from the 3
months' period. The proviso to sub-rule (2) makes a
positive provision that "where the appointing authority does B
not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
,, expiry of the period specified in sub-rule (1), the retirement
shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said
~ period. The case before us stands on a stronger footing
than Dinesh Chandra Sangma case so far as the c
employee is concerned. As already stated Rule 2.2 of the
Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. II only deals with a
situation of withholding or withdrawing pension to a person
who has already retired."
)._ 25. In Tek Chand vs. Dile Ram 3, a three Judge Bench of D
this Court considered S.K. Singhal in paragraph 34 of the
report and then went on to hold as follows:
35. In our view, this judgment fully supports the
contention urged on behalf of the appellant in this regard. E
In this judgment, it is observed that there are three
,. categories of rules relating to seeking of voluntary
~-
retirement after notice. In the first category, voluntary
retirement automatically comes into force on expiry of
notice period. In the second category also, retirement
F
comes into force unless an order is passed during notice
period withholding permission to retire and in the third
category voluntary retirement does not come into force
unless permission to this effect is granted by the
competent authority. In such a case, refusal of permission
can be communicated even after the expiry of the notice G
+ period. It all depends upon the relevant rules. In the case
decided, the relevant Rule required acceptance of notice
by appointing authority and the proviso to the Rule further
laid down that retirement shall come into force
H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A automatically if the appointing authority did not refuse
permission during the notice period. Refusal was not
communicated to the respondent during the notice period
and the Court held that voluntary retirement came into force
on expiry of the notice period and subsequent order
B conveyed to him that he could not be deemed to have
voluntary retired had no effect. The present case is almost
identical to the one decided by this Court in the aforesaid
decision.

36. This Court in B.J. Shelatv. State of Gujarat while
c dealing with a case of voluntary retirement, referring to the
Bombay Civil Service Rules, Rule 161(2)(il) proviso and
Rule 56(k) of the Fundamental Rules, in a similar situation,
held that a positive action by the appointing authority was
required and it was open to the appointing authority to
withhold. permission indicating the same and
communicating its intention to the government servant
withholding permission for voluntary retirement and that no
action can be taken once the government serVant has
effectively retired. ?:;:-as 9 and 10 of the said judgment
E read thus: (SCC pp. 207-08)

"9. Mr Patel next referred us to the meaning of the
word 'withhold' in Webster's Third New /ntemational
Dictionary which is given as 'hold back' and
submitted that the permission should be deemed
F
to have been withheld if it is not communicated. We·
are not able to read the meaning of the word
'withhold' as indicating that in the absence of a
communication it must be understood as the
permission having been withheld.
G
10. It will be useful to refer to the analogous
provision in the Fundamental Rules issued by the
Government of India applicable to the Central
Government servants. Fundamental Rule 56(a)
H provides that except as otherwise provided in this
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 379
LTD. AND ANR. [R.M. LODHA, J.]

Rule, every government servant shall retire from A
l service on the afternoon of the last day of the month
in which he attains the age of fifty-eight years.
Fundamental Rule 56(/) is similar to Rule 161(aa)(1)
of the Bombay Civil Services Rules conferring an
absolute right on the appropriate authority to retire B
a government servant by giving not less than three
months' notice. Under Fundamental Rule 56(k) the
-
__.__
government servant is entitled to retire from service
after he has attained the age of fifty-five years by
giving notice of not less than three months in writing c
to the appropriate authority on attaining the age
specified. But proviso (b) to sub-rule 56(k) states
that it is open to the appropriate authority to withhold
permission to a government servant under
+ suspension who seeks to retire under this clause. D
)._ Thus under the Fundamental Rules issued by the
Government of India also the right of the government
servant to retire is not an absolute right but is
subject to the proviso whereunder the appropriate
authority may withhold permission to a government
E
servant under suspension. On a consideration of
Rule 161(2)(it) and the proviso, we are satisfied that
' 1 it is incumbent on the Government to communicate
to the government servant its decision to withhold
permission to retire on one of the grounds specified
in the proviso. n F

In this decision effect of Rule 56(k) of the Fundamental
Rules is also considered which answers the argument of
the learned counsel for the respondent on this aspect. It
may also be noticed that under Rule 48-A in the G
+ Government of India's decision giving instructions to
regulate voluntary retirement it is stated:

"Even where the notice of voluntary retirement given
-)'
by a government servant requires acceptance by the
,f H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A appointing authority, the government servant giving notice
I
may ptesume acceptance and the retirement shall be ,,4-

effective in terms of the notice unless the competent
authority issues an order to the contrary before the expiry
of the period of notice."
B
26. In the case of Jaipa/ Singh vs. Sumitra Mahajan &
Anr. 10, in an appeal from election petition, this Court had an
occasion to consider the difference between "voluntary
lo
retirement" and "resignation". This Court held thus:
---+--
c 10 ....... ln the case of ReseNe Bank of India v. Cecil
Dennis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461, this Court has laid
down that in service jurisprudence there is a difference
between "voluntary retirement" and "resignation" as they
convey different connotations. It has been held that
D voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts
on the part of the employee to leave service and though -~
both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of
the basic distinctions between the two is that in the case
of resignation, it can be tendered at any time but in the
E case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after
rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. In the
case of resignation, a prior permission is nbt mandatory
while in the case of voluntary retirement, permission of the -;..
employer concerned is a requisite condition. Under Rule
F 16 of the 1958 Rules, an employee who seeks voluntary
retirement has to give three months' notice to enable the
employer to complete the design~ted mode of acceptance.
(See Ha/sbury's Laws ofEngland, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, p. 133.)
Lastly, in a given case, the appointing authority may refuse
to waive the said notice perio~ which shows that
G
resignation may be unilateral whereas voluntary retirement
is bilateral. A similar question came up before this Court -+
in the case of UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal [(2004) 4 SCC
412] in which this Court has.inter alia held that in the case

H 10. (2004) 4 sec s22.
- i

l
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES
LTD. AND ANR. [RM. LODHA, J.]

of "resignation", the relationship of employer and. A
employee terminates on acceptance of resignation
381

whereas in the case of "retirement", voluntary or on
superannuation, the relationship continues for the
purposes of payment of retiral benefits. In the case of

..
retirement, there is a nexus between such retirement and B
retiral benefits .... "

~ 27. The aforesaid decisions of this Court do provide some
,;.. guidance but the controversy in hand has to be decided in .the
light of the words used in proviso appended to Regulation 12.
The key words therein are that voluntary retirement under clause
c
(b) 'shall be subject to approval' of the competent authority. In
'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' (Seventh Edition, 1999),
Justice G.P. Singh has quoted words of Lord Macmillan in
Madras & Southern Maharatta Rly. Co. Ltd. vs. Bezwada
j Municipality11 which read thus: D

'The proper function of a proviso is to except and to
___. deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the
--;
general language of the main enactment and its effect is
confined to that case. n E·
28. In the aforesaid book, author has also quoted the
k opinion of Lord Macnaghten in Local Govt. Board vs. South
Stoneham Union 12 as follows:

"The proviso may be a qualification of the preceding F
enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be
quite accurate".

29. In the case of Shah Bhoraj Kuverji Oil Mills and
Ginning Factory vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha 13 , this G
Court held, " ... as a general rule, a proviso is added to an
enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
11. AIR 1944 PC 71.
12. (1909) AC 57, p.62.
13. AIR 1961 SC 1596. H
'
\

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A enactment. .. " J
30. In the case of CIT, Mysore etc. vs. lndo Mercantile
Bank Ltd. 14, this court observed: r

"The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the
B generality of the main enactment by providing an exception
and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a
t
portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main .
enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of -4..
proviso to read it as providing something by way of an
c addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the
main enactment".

31. In A.N. Sehgal & Ors1., upon which reliance has been
placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, this Court stated ...
D as follows:
\.
"14. It is a cardinal rule <:>f interpretation that a proviso
to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field
which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an r '
exception to the main provision to which it has been '
E enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function ~-

of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would \
'
,.___
otherwise fall within· the general language of the main ')l

enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where
the language of the main enactment is explicit and
F unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the >
interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from
it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms.

15. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve
G out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes
something which otherWise would have been within the rule.
It has to operate in the same fieid and if the language of
the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn
apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify
H 14. AIR 1959 SC 713.
PADUBIDRI DAMODAR SHENOY v. INDIAN AIRLINES 383
LTD. AND ANR. [R.M. LODHA, J.]

_._ by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at A
naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the
words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary
effect."

32. The use of the word 'shall' in the proviso, prima facie
B
leads to an inference that provision is imperative. There is
· nothing in the context to suggest that it is merely directory. It is
1
followed by the words, 'subject to approval'. The effect of the
use of words 'subject to' is to introduce a condition. The
.J..
expression, "shall be subject to approval" is indicative of its
intendment that the voluntary retirement applied by the
c
employees covered by clause (b) is effective only upon
approval by the competent authority. The effect of these words
is to introduce a condition and thereby make voluntary
retirement applied by employees covered by category (b)
conditional upon its approval by the competent authority. There D
j
is nothing to indicate in Regulation 12 that if employer decides
to withhold approval of voluntary retirement, such refusal of
approval must be communicated to the petitioner during the
period of notice. True it is that notice of three months for
voluntary retirement given by an employee covered by clause E
(b) remains valid even if no communication is received within
notice period but it becomes effective only on its approval by
~ the competent authority. As a matter of fact, this seems to have
been understood by both the parties. The appellant issued a
notice of voluntary retirement under Regulation 12 (b) on F
September 30, 2005. The notice period was to expire on
December 31, 2005. It is an admitted position that the
competent authority neither gave approval nor indicated
disapproval to the appellant within the notice period of three
months. The employee never treated that there has been G
cessation of employment on expiry of three months notice
+ period inasmuch as he continued to attend his duties after
December 31, 2005 until June 30, 2006. It is only by his letter
dated June 8, 2006 that the appellant requested the respondent
to relieve him in terms of his notice dated September 30, 2005 H
t

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A by June 30, 2006 and he stopped attending work from July 1,
2006. The letter dated June 8, 2006 does not make any J
material difference as the fact of the matter is that after expiry ,,.
· of notice period, the appellant continued to attend his duties
for many months thereafter. By the letter dated September 15,
B 2006 the respondent communicated to the appellant that his
application for voluntary retirement under Service Regulation
12(b) has not been acceded to by the competent authority. ·
Since the notice for voluntary retirement by an employee who •
has not attained 55 years but has completed 20 years of ..l_

continuous service, under proviso appended to Regulation
c
12(b), is subject to approval by the competent authority and that
approval was not granted, the voluntary retirement of the
appellant never came into effect.
-
33. It may be that voluntary retirement under a particular
D scheme framed by an employer is different from voluntary
retirement provided in the Service Regulations and some of the
observations by the Division Bench with reference to voluntary
"
retirement under a special scheme may not be relevant but the
ultimate decision of the Division Bench does not suffer from any
E legal infirmity.

34. By way of foot-note, we may record that before we ~
I
proceeded with the hearing of the matter, we granted an ~ !"-
opportunity to the parties to resolve the dispute amicably and
F an offer was made by the respondents to the appellant in this
regard but the appellant showed his disinclination to accept the
offer made by the respondents.

35. Be that as it may, the appeal must fail and is dismissed
with no order as to costs.
G- t
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed. + 'II

1-

J