PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS.versusCHANDRIKA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 760
- Decided
- 8 November 2010
- Disposal
- Hearing Adjourned
- Bench
- MARKANDEY KATJU
Holding
Section 23 of the Travancore‑Cochin High Court Act is a special provision that prevails over Section 98(2) CPC, and the unresolved question on referral to a third judge under Articles 136/142 is to be considered by a larger Bench.
Summary
The appeal challenged a Kerala High Court Division Bench order that dismissed an appeal against a trial court decree on the ground of a difference of opinion between the two judges on the genuineness of a will. The bench relied on Section 98(2) of the CPC, which the appellant argued should not apply because the disagreement was factual, not legal, and therefore the matter should have been referred to the Chief Justice under Section 23 of the Travancore‑Cochin High Court Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 23 is a special provision that prevails over the general law of Section 98(2) CPC, and consequently the earlier decision in P.V. Hemlatha must be reconsidered. The Court also noted that the power of the Supreme Court under Articles 136 and 142 to refer such matters to a third judge has not been decided, and therefore referred the questions to a larger Bench. The matter was placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 23 of the Travancore‑Cochin High Court Act remains effective despite its repeal by Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act and, if so, whether it is a special provision vis‑à‑vis Section 98(2) of the CPC.
- Whether the Supreme Court, under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, can direct a reference to a third judge to resolve a factual disagreement between two High Court judges hearing an appeal.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[201 O] 12 S.C.R. 989
PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. A
v.
CHANDRIKA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 201 of 2005)
NOVEMBER 8, 2010
B
[MARKANDEY KAT JU AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
s. 98(2) - Decision by Division Bench of High Court - c
Difference of opinion between the two Judges comprising the
Bench - Procedure to be adopted - Matter referred to larger
Bench for consideration on the questions: (i) whether s. 23 of
Travancore-Cochin High Court Act remains unaffected by tfJe
repealing provisions of s. 9 of Kera/a High Court Act? If so, D
whether s. 23 is in the nature of a special provision vis-a-vis
s. 98 (2) CPC? and (ii) whether the Supreme Court under
Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution can direct in an
appropriate case a reference to a third Judge to resoleve the
conflict arising between two Judges of the High Court hearing E
an appeal, on a question of fact? - Travancore-Cochin High
Court Act - s. 23 - Kera/a High Court Act - s. 9 - Constitution
of India, 1950 - Articles 136 and 142.
The instant appeal was filed challenging the order
passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court F
dismissing an appeal against the decree passed by the
trial court, as there was difference of opinion between the
two Judges comprising the Bench, as regards
genuineness of the will. It was contended for the
appellant that since there was difference of opinion G
between the two Judges of the High Court, the appeal
should have been referred to the Chief Justice for placing
it before one or more other Judges.
989 H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A The Court noticed the decision of a two Judge Bench
in Tej Kaur* to the effect that in the case of difference of
opinion between the two Judges in a Division Bench of
the High Court hearing an appeal on a question of fact,
the decree of the trial court must be confirmed in view of
s s. 98 (2) CPC. The Court also noticed the three Judge
Bench decision in P. V. Hemlatha** wherein it was further
held that while s. 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court
Act was the general law, s. 98 (2) CPC was a special
provision.
c Referring the matter to a larger Bench, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act
is in the nature of a special provision while s. 98 (2) CPC
is in the nature of a general law. As between the two, the
D former would apply in preference to the latter. The
decision of this Court in P. V. Hem/atha** to the extent it
takes a contrary view, requires to be reconsidered. [para
8] [994-H; 995-A-B]
E *Tej Kaur and Anr vs Kirpa/ Singh and Anr. [1995] SCR
385=1995 (5) SCC 119 and ** P. V. Hemlatha vs Kattamkandi
Puthiva Maliackal Saheeda and Anr 2002 ( 3 ) SCR 1098 =
AIR 2002 SC 2445 - referred to.
1.2. That apart, the question whether in an appeal
F arising out of an order passed by the High Court to which
s. 98 (2) CPC applies, this Court can, in exercise of its
power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India direct
the matter to be placed before a third Judge to resolve
the conflict arising from two differing judgments, has not
G been examined either in P. V. Hemlatha or Tej Kaur. This
Court, therefore, considers it appropriate to refer to a
larger Bench for consideration and an authoritative
pronouncement, the following two questions:
H
PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. 991
v. CHANDRIKA AND ORS.
(i) Whether s. 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act A
remains unaffected by the repealing provisions of s.
9 of the kerala High Court Act? If so, whether s. 23 is
in the nature of a special provision is-a-vis s. 98 (2)
CPC?
B
(ii) Whether this Court can under Articles 136 and 142
of the Constitution direct in any appropriate case a
reference to a third judge to resolve the conflict
arising between two judges of the High Court hearing
an appeal, on a question of fact? (para 9] [995-B-F]
c
Case Law Reference:
2002 (3) SCR 1098 referred to para 5
(1995] SCR 385 referred to para 6
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 201
of 2005.
From the Judgment & Order dated 20.8.2004 of the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in A.S. No. 686 of 1995 (C).
E
V. Giri, T.G. Narayanan Nair, Mohammed Sadique T.A.,
K.N. Madhusoodhanan for the Appellants.
Jayaprakash Sen, Malini Poduval, Babita Sant, M.T.
GeoFge for the Respondents.
F
TherJudgment of the Court was delivered by
MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for
the parties.
G
2. The facts of the case are that the respondent herein
Chandrika filed a suit before the Sub Judge, Kottayam, Kerala,
alleging that her father Raghavan died intestate on 18.06.1984.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were relying on the will
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 12 S.C.R.
A dated 14.06.1984 which was not a genuine will of Raghvan. On
the other hand, the defendants alleged that the will was genuine.
The Trial Court by its judgment dated 07.09.1994 held that the
defendants failed to prove that the will in question was a true
and genuine will of Raghavan.
B
3. Consequently, the trial court decreed the suit of
Chandrika. The appellant herein challenged the judgment of the
trial court in an appeal which came up before a Division Bench
of the Kerala High Court. One of the Hon'ble Judges who heard
the appeal was of the view that the will was genuine while the
C other held that it was not. Consequently the Division Bench by
its judgment and order dated 20.08.2004 dismissed the appeal
relying on Section 98 (2) CPC. It is this judgment and order
which is challenged before us.
D 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since
there was a difference of opinion between the two Hon'ble
Judges of the High Court, the appeal should have been referred
to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for placing it before one or
more other Judges. However, learned counsel for the
E respondent submitted that in view of the proviso to Section 98
(2) the reference to one or more other Judges can only be
made when there is difference of opinion between the two
Judges on a point of law. He submitted that since the difference
of opinion was on a question of fact no reference cou~d have
F been made to one or more other Judges, and the appeal should
have been dismissed in view of the main part of Section 98
(2) CPC. Section 98 CPC reads as follows:-
"98. Decision where appeal heard by two or more
Judges.- (1) Where an appeal is heard by a Bench of two
G or more Judges, the appeal shall be decided in
accordance with the opinion of such Judges or of the
majority (if any) of such Judges.
(2) Where there is no such majority which concurs
H
PANKAJAKSHl.(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. 993
v. CHANDRIKA AND ORS. [MAR KAN DEY KAT JU, J.]
in a judgment varying or reversing the decree appealed A
from, such decree shall be confirmed :
Provided that where the Bench hearing the appeal
is
•[composed of two· or other even number of Judges B
belonging to a Court consisting of more Judges than those
constituting the Bench] and the Judges composing the
Bench differ in opinion on a point of law, they may state
the point of law upon which they differ and the appeal shall
then be heard upon that point only by one or more of the C
other Judges, and such point shall be decided according
to the opinion of the majority (if any) of the Judges who
have heard the appeal, including those who first heard it.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to alter or D
otherwise affect any provision of the Letters Patent of any
High Court."
5. In Tej Kaur and Another vs. Kirpal Singh and Another
1995 (5) SCC 119, a two Judge Bench of this Court has
held that when there is difference of opinion between the E
two High Court Judges in a Division Bench hearing an
appeal on a question of fact, the decree of the trial court
must be confirmed in view of the Section 98 (2) CPC. This
Court observed:
F
.............. "It is true that in a case where there is difference
·of opinion among the Judges of the High Court, the power
of this Court under Article 136 is wide enough to test the
correctness of the conclusion reached by the differing
learned Judges as pointed out by this Court in Dr. Prem G
Chand Tandon case. This proposition is unexceptionable
but this Court had no occasion in that case to consider the ··
scope of sub-section (2) of Section 98. The language
employed in sub-section (2) is imperative and in mandatory
terms. The object appears to be that on a question of fact H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A when there is a difference of opinion, the view expressed
by the court below, in the absence of a majority opinion,
needs to be given primacy and confirmed. When such is
the animation, this Court cannot enlarge the scope of the
controversy by itself examining the correctness of the
B finding of facts and decide which view of the two is correct.
This would be in direct negation of the legislative mandate
expressed in sub-section (2) of Section 98 of the CPC."
6. The above view was followed by three Judge Bench
C Court in P. V. Hemalatha vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal
Saheeda and Anr. AIR 2002 SC 2445. That was a case in
which the High Court of Kerala had, relying upon Section 98 of
CPC, confirmed the decree under appeal despite difference
of opinion between the two Judges comprising the Bench on
a question of fact. This Court held that while Section 23 of the
D Travancore-Cochin High Court Act is the general law, Section
98(2) is a special provision. Section 23 of the Travancore-
Cochin High Court Act reads as under:
"23. Reference by Chief Justice.-Where two Judges
E forming a Division Bench agree as to the decree, order
or sentence to be passed, their decision shall be final. But
if they disagree, they shall deliver separate judgments and
thereupon the Chief Justice shall refer, for the opinion of
another Judge, the matter or matters on which such
F disagreement exists, and the decree, order or sentence
shall follow the opinion of the Judges hearing the case."
7. Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act by which the
Travancore-Cochin High Court Act was repealed to the
extent of its repugnance may also be extracted. It reads:
G
"9. ·Repeal.-The provisions of the Travancore-Cochin
High Court Act, 1125 (5 of 1125), insofar as they relate to
matters provided in this Act, shall stand repealed."
8. In our opinion Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act
H
PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. 995
v. CHANDRIKA AND ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
is in the nature of a special provision while Section 98(2) is in A
the nature of general law. As between the two, the former would
apply in preference to the latter. The decision of this Court in
P. V. Hemlatha's v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliacka/ Saheeda
and Anr. (Supra) to the extent it takes a contrary view, in our
opinion, requires to be reconsidered. B
9. That apart, the question whether in an appeal arising
out of an order passed by the High Court to which Section 98(2)
of the CPC applies, this Court can in exercise of its povVer
under Article 136 of the Constitution direct the matter to be
placed before a third Judge to resolve the conflict arising from
c
two differing judgments, has not been examined either in P. V.
1-femlatha's or Tej Kaur's case. We, therefore, consider it
appropriate to refer to a larger Bench for consideration and an
authoritative pronouncement the following two questions:
D
(1) Whether Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act
remains unaffected by the repealing provisions of Section
9 of the Kerala High Court Act. If so, whether Section 23
is in the nature of a special provision vis-a-vis Section
98(2) of CPC. E
(2) Whether this Court can under Articles 136 and 142 of
the Constitution direct in any appropriate case a reference
to a third judge to resolve the conflict arising between two
judges of the High Court hearing an appeal, on a question
of fact.
F
Let the papers of this case be placed before Hon'ble the
Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench.
R.P. Matter adjourned. G
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