Holding

A consent decree is a binding contract that must be construed with reference to the factual background and surrounding circumstances, and the lower courts' decree was correct; the High Court’s reversal was erroneous.

Summary

The hereditary priests of a Karnataka temple entered into a consent decree in the 1950s to settle their inheritance dispute over temple offerings. A later civil suit sought a share of perishable and non‑perishable offerings, and the trial court and first appellate court upheld the plaintiffs' claim based on the decree and ancillary documents. The Karnataka High Court reversed, holding that the decree barred the suit and that the parties' rights were limited to alternate turns of worship. On SLP, the Supreme Court examined the construction of the consent decree, held that such decrees are contracts subject to estoppel and must be interpreted in light of the surrounding facts, pleadings and customs, and found that the lower courts had correctly considered the evidence. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the appeal was allowed, restoring the earlier decree.

Issues considered

Whether a consent decree, being a contract with the seal of the Court, is binding and operable as an estoppel between the parties.
How a vague consent decree should be construed, particularly regarding the allocation of non‑perishable offerings and the phrase ‘in his individual capacity’.
Whether Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 applies to the interpretation of the consent decree.
Whether the High Court was justified in re‑appreciating the evidence and setting aside the lower courts' decree under Section 100 of the CPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 92

Subjects

consent decreecontract interpretationestoppelsection 92 Evidence Actcivil proceduretemple offeringsinheritance disputeres judicataconstruction of decree

Judgment

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A PARAYYAALLAYYA HITTALAMANI
V.

SRI PARAYYA GURULINGAYYA POOJARI AND ORS.

OCTOBER 12, 2007 .
_t

B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
;,

1'
Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908:

c Decree-Consent decree-Interpretation of-Consent decree not
referring to entire disputes between the parties-Some vagueness
remaining-Held: In such a case, factual background as also the
manner in which existence ofrights have been claimed by the parties
would be relevant-Evidence Act, 1872-s.92.
D
Parties hereto are the hereditary 'poojaris' of the temple in
question. They are entitled to bless the devotees, receive alms and other
offerings made by the devotees throughout the year·. Dispute between
the parties in regard to right of inheritance of offering 'poojas' in the
said temple was resolved in terms of a consent decree which was
E
accepted by Court. Subsequently, there arose a dispute between the
Ji'::
parties with regard to share in the offerings made by the devotees which
led to a civil suit. The suit was decreed. The decree was affirmed in
appeal. Second appeal was filed before High Court which held that the
decree passed was liable to be set aside as it was perverse and arbitrary
F
being based upon irrelevant material and being contrary to the terms ~
of said consent decree which was binding upon both the parties. Hence
the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1. A consent decree is a contract between the parties
with the seal of the Court supcradded to it. Such consent decree may L
'\ ~

operate as an estoppel. [Paras 14 and 15) [334-B, C]

H 326
1
PARAYYA ALLAYYA HITTALAMANI v. 327
SRI PARAYYA GURULINGA YYA POOJARI
1 ")
.II.
r 1.2. However, while construing a decree, the court can and in A
appropriate case ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well
as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the
meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court has to ascertain
the circumstances under which these words came to be used. In the event
the document is vague, the same must be construed having regard to B
~
surroundings and/or attending circumstances.
.,.. [Paras 16 and 17] [334-C, D, E]
Baldevdas Shiv/al & Anr. v. Filmistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd &
Ors., [1969) 2 SCC 201; Hindustan Motors Ltd v. Amritpal Singh Nayar
& Anr., 100 (2002) DLT 278; Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo. v. The State c
ofOrissa, AIR (1956) SC 346 and Bhavan Vaja & Ors. v. Solanki. Hanuji
K.hodaji Mansang & Anr., AIR (1972) SC 1371, relied on.
2.1. The nature of the document also plays an important part for
construction thereof. The suit filed by the parties, inter alia, involved D
the question ofinterpretation of the said consent decree. Parties adduced
...I.
evidences, inter alia, in regard to the nature of poojas and offerings made
to the priest in their individual capacity. The dispute between the parties
related to right of worship upon inheritance thereof from their
predecessor. Their rights in regard to offer poojas in the temple are itself E
not in dispute. In a case of this nature where a consent decree does not
refer to the entire disputes between the parties and some vaguness
remained, the factual background as also the manner in which existence
of rights have been claimed by the parties would be relevant. The
consent decree appears to be meant to be operative for a limited period F
..,r viz.1956and1961. Section 92 of the Evidence Act in a situation of this
nature, cannot be said to be attracted. [Para 18] [334-E, F, G; 335-A]
2.2. The right of the parties to offer pooja had not been disputed.
Clause 2(A) of the consent decree was not determinative of the status
of the parties. Their rights and obligations are not clearly spelt out G
thereby. In the aforementioned situation, the recital to the effect that
~
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f Pooja has to be performed as usual is significant. Clause2(C), however,
speaks of offerings of non-perishable goods were to be offered to the
defendant No.1 in his individual capacity. The parties to the compromise
knew as to why the said expression had been used. If any of the party H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A to the suit was entitled to keep with him even such non-perishable goods
which were to be offered to the Deity, the question of using the terms
"in his individual capacity" was not necessary. The parties, therefore,
were allowed to lead evidence, to show as to what ceren,tonies are
performed by the Priest in his individual capacity and not necessarily
B offeririg pooja to the Deity. A devotee may arrange a special ceremony
or a special pooja and entrust the same to be done by one or the other
Priest ofthe said temple. The courts, therefore, were required to construe
the terms implied in the consent decree having regard to the customs
in regard to holding of religious and other functions in the temple by
C the devotees. [Paras 19 and 20) [335-B, C, D, E, F]
2.3. Equally important was the conduct of the parties soon
thereafter. The father of the defendant No.1 executed deeds of safo in
favour of the plaintift's father. The relationship between the parties and
D their status were referred to therein. Defendant No.1 's fatherin the said
document accepted the right ofthe plaintiff's father ofhaving equal right
to the offerings and offer poojas during the tum of said Neelawwa. It is )-
not the case of the defendants that such statements came to be made
..._
by reason of any fraud or inducement or threat on the part of the \-

E plaintiff's father. That being so, the said statements were relevant The
Trial Judge as also the Court ofthe First Appeal cannot be said to have
committed any mistake in taking the same into consideration for
determining the rights of the parties. The High Court was, thus, not
correct in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Judge
F as also the Court of Appeal.
[Paras 21 and 22) [335-F, G, H; 336-A, BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4887 of
2007.
G From the Judgment and final Order dated 20.01.2005 of the High \,

Court ofKamataka at Bangalore in Regular Second Appeal No. 250 of
1992.
S.K. Mahale and Rajesh Mahale for the Appellant.

H
G.V. Chandrashekhar and Anjana Chandrashekar for the
PARAYYA ALLAYYA HITIALAMANI v. 329
SRI PARAYY A GURULINGAYY A POOJARI [SINHA, J.]
'
/
--r
Respondents. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. I. Leave granted.
2. There is a temple in the village Terdal under the Jharkhandi Taluk B
in the State ofKarnataka, commonly known as 'Sri Prabhudeva Temple'.
.4_ Parties hereto are the hereditary poojaris of the said temple. They are
.,.. entitled to bless the devotees, receive alms and other offerings made by
the devotees throughout the year. The tum of worship has been amicably
divided and settled, inter alia, amongst the plaintiffs and the defendants. c
3. There were three branches with which we are concerned; one is
the branch of the plaintiff, second is the branch of the defendants and the
third is the branch represented by Parayya Allayya Hittalamani. The said
Allayya and his wife Neelawwa died without any issue. The plaintiffs and
the defendant No. I inherited their right to worship. D

4. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties in
regard to right of inheritance of offering poojas in the said temple, the
father of the plaintiff filed a suit which was marked as OS No.143 of 1956.
Parties therein purported to settle their disputes. The consent terms were E
filed which were accepted by the Cowt. The said terms are :
"For the present year and the tum of Pooja which will come after
I2 years, the defendant No.I with the plaintiff herein and with his
help perform the pooja as usual of Prabhudeva in Neelavva' s pooja
tum. F
._,., ..
~

During th~ a~ovesaid pooja's time the offerings ofNaivedya to
Prabhudeva, fruits corns Oil and Milk and Curd, Sugar, Jaggery
'
etc.1nperishable goods, defendant No. I should give half share of
peri'shable goods to plaintiff and take half of the perishable goods G
to hlfnself.
. ;1 In the abovenoted pooja tum the defendant No. I in his individual
capacity as a poojari receiving gold, silver, offering (dakshina) etc.
the non-perishable goods the defendant No. I shall take in that he
H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I I S.C.R.

A need not give any share or goods."
5. Indisputably, the turn of worship so far as the said Allayya was
concerned, comes once in I 2 years. After I 956, the said tum came in
I 968. There exists a dispute as to how the parties hereto shared the
B offerings in 1968. However, when the tum again came in I980, the
plaintiffs filed a suit praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs :
"It may be declared that plaintiffs and their family members have
a joint right of pooja and receiving offerings of Prabhudev Temple
at Terdal along with defendant No.l or his successors regarding
c the tum of deceased Neelawwa's branch once in I2 years in
perpetually.
Consequently perpetual injunction may kindly be issued against the
defendants, their relatives and agents from threatening, obstructing
D or causing obstruction to the joint right of the plaintiffs to perform
the Pooja and receive offering during the tum ofNeelawwa's
branch every twelve years." I-
6. The said suit was decreed by the learned Trial Judge. Defendants
preferred an appeal thereagainst. The learned Court of First Appeal also
E affirmed the said decree, inter alia, opining :
"The term in para 2 of Ex.P-2 makes it clear that silver, Gold,
money which are non-perishable commodities given to deft. I in
his individual capacity being a poojari should be taken by himself
F and he need give any share to the plaintiff therein. It makes it clear
· that any non-perishable commodities offered to deft. I in his
individual capacity as poojari of the deity such as gold, sliver and
money should be taken by himself and he need not give share
therein to the plaintiff. So, any offerings given in individual capacity
G of deft. I as poojari should be taken by deft. I. Once example is
sufficient to what kind of offerings given to poojari in his individual
capacity is given, i.e., if the poojari removes heirs of a child during
Javala ceremony and parents of the child given any offerings such
gold, silver and money to poojari he should take it as it is given to
H him being poojari in his individual capacity for performing Javala
~
PARAYYA ALLAYYA HITTALAMANI v. 331
SRI PARA YY A GURULINGA YY A POOJARI [SINHA, J.]
• ~ ceremony. Such offerings made to poojari in his individual capacity A
should be taken by the father of deft. I and deft. I should take same
but not offering made in the form of gold, silver and money to deity
and they should be shared by deft. I and plaintiffs together as per
the decree at Ex.P.2 If it was the intention of the parties, the father
of deft. I should have taken all the offerings made to deity in non- B
perishable commodities for himself in 1955-56 and 1968-69."
~
y 7. Both the Trial Judge as also the First Appellate Court furthermore
took into consideration the documents marked as Exhibit P-1 as also
Exhibit P-3 executed by the father of the defendant No. I in favour father
of the plaintiff wherein it was categorically stated that plaintiff's branch
c
had equal right in worshipping the deity during the turn of Nilawwa and
he had right to receive alms equally. In this respect, the learned Court of
appeal held :
"This goes to prove that father of deft. I has admitted that father D
of the plaintiffs was the nearest heir ofNeelawwa and he has also
right in the property ofNeelawwa such as land Sy. No. 759 and
right to worship of Prabhuswami. Ex.P.3 is dated 23.03.1965. Even
subsequent to Ex.P.2 father of deft. I confirmed that father of the
plaintiffs is nearest heir to Neelawwa and he has no objection for E
the property to be shared by father of the plaintiffs such as land
and right to worship during turn ofNeelawwa. The evidence led
by the plaintiff is overwhelming the evidence of the defendants and
as such after considering the evidence the learned Munsiff has
rightly held that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive half of non- F
_,)
perishable offerings such as gold, silver and money made to deity
and deft. I should perform pula along with the plaintiffs and they
have equal right in worshipping deity and there is no distinction
between the plaintiffs and deft. I in worshiping the deity and he has
rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs." G

~ ,;i 8. Defendants filed a second appeal before the High Court which
was marked as Revision Second Appeal No. 250 of 1992. The.High
Court, however, was of the opinion that as both the parties would get
their turns alternatively, i.e., once in 12 years, the courts below committed H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.

A a mistake in mixing up that issues wrongly with the real dispute, stating :
"The reference to the individual functions in the decree is very
clearly to the fact that since the right to perform the pooja was
alternative, that it was a reference to the functions performed by
the party in that particular year when the officiating party was in
B
charge. This cannot be confused with a situation whereby the
poojari may perform individual functions at some other place de
hors these functions and for which he may receive separate
offerings. This is basically the essence of the matter and since it
has been very clearly and conclusively decided in the earlier
c compromise terms, there could be no question of re-opeining that
issue. To this extent, therefore, the submission canvassed by the
appellant's learned counsel that the suit itself as farmed was not
maintainable, is full justified."
D 9. The matter, however, was taken to this Court by the respondents
being SLP (C) No. 2109 of 1999 and on leave having been granted, this
Court by a judgment and order dated 15.9.2004 noticed that even no
substantial question oflaw was formulated by the High Court whereupon
the same was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court
E for formulating substantial questions oflaw.
10. The High Court thereafter formulated the following substantial
questions oflaw :
"(1) Whether both the Courts ignored the weight of preponderating
F circumstances while construing the contents of compromise decree
arrived at between the predecessors-in-title of the parties to the
suit and allowed their judgments to be influenced by inconsequential
matters, whether High Court would be justified in re-appreciating
the evidence and in coming to its own independent conclusion?
G
(2) Whether both the Courts below erred in misconstruing Ex.P-
2, the compromise arrived at between the predecessors-in-title in
question for purposes of ascertaining the foundation of the suit itself
and if so whether that error is to be interfered With in the exercise
H of High Court's power under Section 100 ofCPC?"
,-}-

PARAYYA ALLAYYA HITTALAMANI v. 333
SRI PARAYYA GURULINGAYYA POOJARI [SINHA, J.]
~

7-·
11. Both the aforementioned questions were answered by the High A
Court in the affirmative. It was of the view that as compromise decree
was binding between the parties and the dispute between them was
governed by the said compromise decree, the plaintiffs' suit was not
maintainable, stating :
B
"It is clear from the conditions of performance of pooja as per the
...
terms of the compromise decree that the right of performing pooja
T
during the turn ofNeelawwa and Allayya is conferred upon the
father of the first defendant and the pooja during that turn has to
be Perfonned by the father of the first defendant with the assistance
of the father of the plaintiffs and no joint right has been conferred
c
and regarding the offerings made by the devotees so far as the
perishable articles are concerned, they are to be divided equally
and non-perishable offerings such as gold, silver, dakshina (cash)
etc. which are not perishable, offered individually to the father of
the first defendant shall be taken by him exclusively and n~ such D
offerings shall be given to Parayya Allayya Hittalamani, i.e., father
of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs being the legal representatives,
being the sons of Parayya Allayya Hittalamani cannot claim of a
higher share than that is conferred upon them by the father of the
E
defendant and which is in fact the basis of the plaint and, thei;efore,
it is clear that the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below
cannot be sustained and the same are liable to be set aside as they
are perverse and arbitrary being based upon irrelevant material and
being contrary to the terms of compromise decree which is
F
-r admitted by both the parties as binding upon them."

12. Mr. Mahale, leamed coW1Sel appearing on behalf of the appellant,
submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the
inlpugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that in
terms of condition No. 2(C) of the agreement, the first respondent was G
not entitled to gold, sliver and money etc. which were offered to thei deity
.... ,,
._,4

and not to himself in his personal capacity.
13. Mr. Chandrashekhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
first respondent, on the other hand, urged that the High Court having H
-f- -
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.
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A rightly arrived at a decision that the plaintiffs suit was barred by res
judicata and the disputes between the parties being covered by the consent
decree, the impugned judgment is unassailable.
14. A consent decree, as is well known, is a contract between the
parties with the seal of the Court superadded to it. {See Baldevdas
B
Shivlal & Anr. v. Filmistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd. & Ors., (1969] ,.
2 SCC 201 and Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Amritpal Singh Nayar &
Anr., 100 (2002) DLT 278}. 'T

15. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that such consent
c decree may operate as an estoppel. {See Sailendra Narayan Bhanja
Deo. v. The State ofOrissa, AIR (1956) SC 346}.
16. It is equally well settled that which construing a decree, the court
can and in appropriate case ought to take into consideration the pleadings
D as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out
the meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court has to ascertain
the circumstances under which these words came to be used. {See I-
Bhavan Vaja & Ors. v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang & Anr., AIR
(1972) SC 1371 }.
E 17. It is now also a trite law that in the event the jfocument is vague,
the same must be construed having regard to surroundings and/or attending
circumstances.
18. The nature of the document also plays an important part for
F construction thereof. The suit filed by the parties, inter alia, iri.volved the \__
question of interpretation of the said consent decree. Parties adduced
evidences, inter alia, in regard to the nature of poojas and offerings made
to the priest in their individual capacity. The dispute between the parties
related to right of worship upon inheritance thereof from their predecessor.
G Their rights in regard to offer poojas in the temple are itself not in dispute.
In a case of this nature where a consent decree does not refer to the
entire disputes between the parties and some vaguness remained, the >-
. .,
factual background as also the manner in which existence of rights have
been claimed by the parties would be relevant.
H
A
PARA YYA ALLAYYA HITIALAMANI v. 335
·~ ..,. SRI PARA YYA GURULINGA YYA POOJARI [SINHA, J.]
The consent decree, appears to be meant to be operative for a A
limited period viz. I 956 and I96I.
;;J
~
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Section 92 of the Evidence Act in a situation of this nature, in our
opinion, cannot be said to be attracted.
J9. A consent decree must be construed keeping in view the lega B
..\ principles as noticed hereinbefore. The right of the parties to offer pooja
....,,. had not been disputed. Clause 2(A) of the consent decree was not
determinative of the status of the parties. Their rights and obligations are
not clearly spelt out thereby. In the aforementioned situation, the recital
to the effect that Pooja has to be performed "as usual" is significant. c
20. No difficulty arises in giving effect to clause 2(B) of the consent
decree. It is not necessary for us to consider the same. Clause 2(C),
however, deserves our attention. It speaks of offerings of non-perishable
goods were to be offered to the defendant No. I in his individual capacity. D
The parties to the compromise knew as to why the said expression had
~
been used. If any of the party to the suit was entitled to keep with him
even such non-perishable goods which were to be offered to the Deity,
the question of using the terms "in his individual capacity" was not
necessary. The parties, therefore, were allowed to lead evidence, to show E
as to what ceremonies are performed by the Priest in his individual
capacity and not necessarily offering pooja to the Deity. A devotee may
arrange a special ceremony or a special pooja and entrust the same to
be done by one or the other Priest of the said temple. The courts,
therefore, were required to construe the terms implied in the consent
_,r decree having regard to the customs in regard to holding of religious and
F

other functions in the temple by the devotees.
21. Equally important was the conduct of the parties soon thereafter.
We have noticed hereinbefore that the father of the defendant No. I
executed deeds of sale in favour of the plaintiff's father. The relationship G
- ;i' between the parties and their status were referred to therein. Defendant
No. I's father in the said document accepted the right of the plaintiff's father
of having equal right to the offerings and offer poojas during the turn of
said Neelawwa. It is not the case of the defendants that such statements
came to be made by reason of any fraud or inducement or threat on the H
336 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [2007]·11 S.C.R.

A part of the plaintiff's father.
22. That being so, the said statements were relevant. The learned
Trial Judge as also the Court of the First Appeal, in our opinion, cannot '
f-
be said to have committed any mistake in taking the same into
B consideration for determining the rights of the parties. The High Court, in
our opinion, was, thus, not correct in reversing the judgment and decree
passed by the learned Trial Judge as also the Court of Appeal.
23. We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the
question as to whether any offerings made in Hundies for development
C shall go to any of the parties or not. Such a question having not been
gone into by the courts below, we refrain ourselves from doing so.
24. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned judgment is set
aside. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of
D the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
B.B.B. Appeal allowed.