Holding

When the claimant is not present at the award and no notice under Section 12(2) is served, the limitation period for filing a reference under Section 18 is computed from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the award.

Summary

The State of Gujarat acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act and an award was declared on 17 January 1982. The claimants, who were not present at the award and received no notice under Section 12(2), only learned of the award when compensation was paid in July 1988. They filed a reference petition under Section 18 on 22 September 1988. The Gujarat High Court held the petition barred by the six‑month limitation from the date of the award and quashed the award. The Supreme Court, relying on Raja Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1961 SC 1500), held that where no notice is given and the parties are not present, the limitation must be computed from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the award. Consequently, the petition was filed within time. The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s finding, and remitted the matter to the High Court for disposal on merits.

Issues considered

Whether the six‑month limitation for filing a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is to be measured from the date of the award or from the date of actual/constructive knowledge when no notice under Section 12(2) was served.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Acts. 11, s. 12(2), s. 18(2)(a), s. 18(2)(b)

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 18 reference petitionLimitation periodSection 12(2) noticeConstructive knowledgeSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

f

A PARSOTTAMBHAI MAGANBHAI PATEL AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT THROUGH DEPUTY COLLECTOR MODASA
AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 6, 2005
B
[B.P. SINGH AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act; Ss. 12 and 18 : ,.
C Acquisition of land-Award-Filing of Reference petition by the
claimants beyond six months from the date of pronouncement of the Award
but within six months from the date on which the declaration of the award
came to their knowledge-Limitation-Held : Since claimants were not
present when the Award was pronounced and notice under Section 12(2)
D of the Act was not given to them, reference application was filed within
limitation period-Matter remitted to the High Court for disposal on merit.

Pursuant to acquisition proceedings taken by the authorities under
the Land Acquisition Act, an award was declared under Section 11 of
the Act on January 17, 1982. The claimants filed an application for
E making a reference under Section 18 of the Act on September 22, 1988.
The High Court held that since the application for making a reference
was filed beyond a period of six months from the date of declaration
of the award; it was barred by limitation, and quashed the award passed
by the Reference Court. Hence the present appeals.
F .....
It was contended by the claimants-appellants that the High Court
clearly erred in law in holding the reference application to be barred
by time inasmuch as they were not present when the award was made
nor where they served with notices under Section 12(2) of the Act and
that they had no knowledge of the date of declaration of the award
G till July, 1988 when compensation was paid to them.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. Since the claimants were not present when the award
H was made, and no notice was given to them under Section 12(2) of the
1192
PARSOTTAMBHAI MAGANBHAI PATEL 1•_ STATE TIIROUGH DY. COLLECTOR MODASA \ 193

Land Acquisition Act, the application for making a reference under A
Section 18 of the Act must be held to be within time if it is filed within
six months from the date of knowledge of the declaration or the award.

2.1. This Court in the case of Rajah Harish Candra held that the
limitation under the latter part to Section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to B
be computed having regard to the date on which 1he claimants got
knowledge of the declaration of the award either actual or constructive.
• This principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant
was not present or represented when the award was made, or where
no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was served upon him It will
also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award c
is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on
the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties, are
not actually present on the date of its pronouncement.

Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition D
Officer and Another, AIR (1961) SC 1500, referred to.
'
2.2. In the instant case, the High Court has not rejected the plea
of the appellants that they came to know of the award only when
compensation was paid to them in July, 1988. They had admittedly no
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. They had therefore filed the E
application under Section 18 of the Act on September 22, 1988 well
within the period of limitation. The Reference Court recorded a finding
in favour of the limitation. The Reference. Court recorded a finding
in favour of the claimants but the High Court has reversed that finding
without applying the principle laid down by this Court in the case of F
Raja Harish Chandra. Moreover, it is found from the grounds of appeal
filed before the High Court that the assertion of the claimants that they
came to know of the declaration of the award only when compensation
was being paid to them in July, 1988, has not even been challenged.
Hence, the finding of the High Court that the application for reference
under Section 18 of the Act was barred by limitation is set aside. G
However, since the appeals have not been disposed of on merit, the
matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal of the appeals OR
merit in accordance with law.

Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The deputy Land Acquisition Officer H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. f

A and Anolh<fr. AIR (1961) SC 1500, referred to.

CIVIL APPEL LA TE' JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8818-8830
of 2003.

B From the Judgment and Order dated 7.11.2000 of the Gujarat High
Court in F.A. Nos. 7957-7969 of 1999.

H.A. Raichura and Mrs. S.H. Raichura for the Appellants.

Ms. H. Wahi for M/s. J.M. Nanavati Associates for the Respondent.
c
Ms. Shipla Singh and Mrs. Anil Katiyar for Respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D B.P. SINGH, J. : These appeals by special leave are directed against
the common judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahemdabad
dated November 7, 2000 in First Appeals Nos.7957 to 7969 of 1999
whereby the High Court held that the application for making a reference
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was barred by limitation.

E The facts of the case are few and undisputed. Pursuant to acquisition
proceeding taken under the Land Acquisition Act, an award was declared
under Section 11 of the Act on January 17, 1982. The respondents filed
an application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act on
September 22, 1988. The High Court held that since the application for
F making a reference under Section 18 of the Act was filed beyond the period
of six months from the date of declaration of the award, the same was
barred by limitation. Hence, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred
by the State of Gujarat and quashed the judgment and awards passed by
the Reference Court in Land References Cases referred to it for adjudication.

G The High Court considered the case in the light of the provisions
of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It, firstly, held that the claimants
were not present when the award was made and, therefore, Section 18 (2)
(a) was not attracted. It, then, held that the State had not been able to
establish that a notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act was issued and served
H upon the claimant. Thus, the first part of Section l8(2)(b) was also not
PARSOTIA~ffiHAl MAGANBHAI PATEL'' STATE THROUGH DY. COLLECTOR MODASA {B.P SINGH, J.] 1195
'
'
attracted. It, therefore, held that the limitation prescribed under the latter A
part of Section 18 (2) (b) applied in the case and held that the application
under Section 18 ought to have been tiled within six months from the date
of the declaration of the award. Since the application for reference was
made beyond the period of six months from the date of declaration of the
award, the same was barred by time. B

Counsel for the claimants-appellants urged that the High Court clearly
• erred in law in holding the reference application to be barred by time
inasmuch as the appellants were not present when the award was made
nor were they served with notices under Section 12(2) of the Act. In fact
the appellants had no knowledge of the date of declaration of the award C
till July, 1988 when compensation was paid to them. It was only then that
they came to know that the award had been declared on January I 7, I 982.

The learned Assistant Judge, Sabarkantha District at Himmatnagar by
his judgment and order of April 21, 1999 recorded a finding that the D
application under Section 18 of the Act made on September 22, 1988 was
not barred by limitation. This finding is based on the fact that the claimants
had been paid compensation in July, I 988 and the application under Section
18 was made on September 22, 1988. There was no evidence to prove
that notice under Section 12(2) was even served on the appellants. In these
circumstances, he held that the application under Section I 8 of the Act E
was within time. In sum and substance, the Assistant Judge computed the
period of limitation from the date of knowledge of the award in July, 1988.

Learned counsel for the appellant rightly placed reliance upon the
judgment of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy F
Land Acquisition Officer and another, AIR (1961) SC 1500 and submitted
that since the appellants were not present when the award was made, and
no notice was given to them under Section 12(2) of the Act, the application
for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act must be held to be
within time if it is tiled within six months of the date of knowledge of
the declaration of the award. In our view, the submission is sound and G
• must be accepted. This Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra)
was dealing with a case in which an award was declared under the Act
on March 25, 1951. No notice under Section I 2(2) of the Act was given
to the claimants. It was only on January 12, I 953 that the claimants came
to know about the declaration of the award whereafrer they filed an H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. !

A application claiming a reference under Section 18 of the Act on Febmary
24, 1953. The High Court of Allahabad held that the case fell under the
latter part of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 and since the application
made by the appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer for claiming
a reference under Section 18 was made beyond six months from the date
B of the award in question, it was beyond time. This view of the High Court
was overruled by this Court and in doing so the Court made the following
pertinent observations:-

"Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more
than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of
c the property then the making of the award as properly understood
must involve the communication·ofthe offer to the party concerned.
That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its
applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be
reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot
D be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is
signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office: it must
involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known
to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be
the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of
the words "the date of the award" occurring in the relevant section
E would not be appropriate.

(6) There is yet another point which leads to the same
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision
taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property
F sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately
affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense,
like all decisions which affects persons, it is essentially fair and
just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party.
The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either
actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be
G satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thu:;
considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the
physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it
in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication
of the said award to the party concerned either actually or
H constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the
PARSQTTAMBHAI MAGANBHAI PATEL v. STATE THROUGH DY. COLLECTORMODASA [B.P. SINGH, J} 1197

party whose rights are affected by it it can be said to be made A
when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award
is commnunicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced
on the date previously announced the award is said to be
communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually
present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice B
of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a
party is not present the award can be said to be made when it
is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party
' affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an
essential requirement of fair-ply and natural justice the expression
"the date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date C
when the award is either communicated to the party or is known
by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore,
it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date
of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to S.18 in literal
or mechanical way". D
This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter part
of section l 8(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having regard to the
date on which the claimants got knowledge of the declaration of the award
either actual or constructive. This principle, however, will apply only to
cases where the appli~ant was not present or represented when the award E
was made, or where no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him.
It will also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the
award is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on
the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are not
actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Coming to the facts of F
the instant case the High Court has not rejected the plea of the appellants
that they came to know of the award only when compensation was being
paid to them in July, 1988. They had admittedly no notice under Section
12(2) of the Act. They had therefore filed the application under Section
18 of the Act on :)eptember 22, 1988 well within the period of limitation.
The Reference Court recorded a finding in favour of the appellants but G
the High Court has reversed that finding without applying the principle laid
down in Raja Harish Chandra (supra). Moreover, we find from the grounds
of appeal filed before the High Court that the assertion of the claimants
that they came to know of the declaration of the award only when ..
.. compensation was being paid to them in July, 1988, has not even been H
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
t
A challenged.

We are, therefore, of the view that these appeals must be allowed.
We, accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the finding of the·High
Court that the application for reference under Section 18 of the Act was
B barred by limitation. However, since the appeals have not been disposed
of on merit, we remit the matter to the High Court for disposal of the
appeals on merit in accordance with law.

S.K.S. Appeals allowed.