Holding

A withdrawn but duly nominated candidate remains a "candidate" under Section 79(b) and must be impleaded as a necessary party under Section 82(b); failure to do so invalidates the election petition.

Summary

Patangrao Kadam challenged the election of Prithviraj Yadav Deshmukh in a Maharashtra Assembly by‑election, alleging corrupt practices under Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(ii), 100(1)(d)(iv) read with Section 123(4) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The petition also named Sampatrao Chavan, a duly nominated candidate who withdrew his candidature before polling and subsequently acted as Deshmukh's election agent, alleging that he committed corrupt practices. The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition for non‑compliance with Section 82(b) because Chavan was not joined as a respondent. The Supreme Court held that a person who has been validly nominated remains a "candidate" under Section 79(b) even after withdrawal, and any allegation of corrupt practice against him makes his impleadment under Section 82(b) mandatory. Non‑joinder of such a necessary party renders the election petition non‑maintainable under Section 86(1). Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s dismissal of the election petition.

Issues considered

The legal status of a withdrawn candidate who later becomes an election agent of another candidate for purposes of Section 79(b) and Section 82(b) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.
Whether failure to join such a withdrawn candidate as a respondent makes an election petition non‑maintainable under Section 86(1).
Whether Section 99 can be invoked later to name a non‑joined candidate instead of complying with Section 82(b).

Legislation cited

Representation of People Act, 1951s. 100, s. 100(1)(b), s. 100(1)(d)(ii), s. 100(1)(d)(iv), s. 117, s. 123, s. 123(4), s. 40, s. 45, s. 79(b), s. 81, s. 82(a), s. 82(b), s. 83, s. 86(1), s. 8A, s. 98, s. 99

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practicecandidate withdrawalSection 82(b)necessary partyimplementation of RPAelection agentnatural justice

Judgment

+

A PATANGRAO KADAM
v. ~
PRITHVIRAJ SAYAJIRAO YADAV DESHMUKH AND ORS.

FEBRUARY26, 2001

B [DR. A.S. ANAND, C.J., R.C. LAHOTI AND
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]

Election Law :

Representation of People Act, 1951: Sections 79(b), 82(b), JOO and 123.
c
Election-Election pet it ion--Comtpt practice-Allegation of-Non-join-
der of necessary pmty-Effect of-Duly nominated candidate withdrew his
candidature and became election agent of the returned candidate-Bur such
candidate not made a party to the election although corrupt practice alleged
D against him-Maintainability of-Held : A duly nominated candidate, even
after withdrmval, renzains a cand;date and has to be joined as a necessary
party-His non-joinder is fatal to the election petition-Hence, election peti-
tion rightly dismissed.

Word< and Phrases :
E
"Candidate "-Meaning of-In the context ofS. 79(b) ofthe Representa-
tion of People Act, 1951.

The Appellant-defeated candidate filed an election petition before
the High Court impugning the election of respondent No. I-returned can-
F
didate to be void under Sections lOO(l)(b), lOO(l)(d)(ii) and lOO(l)(d)(iv)
read with Section 123(4) of the Repre~entation of People Act, 1951 and
sought for further declaration that he should he declared as elected. S, a
validly nominated candidate, withdrew his candidature and became an
election agent of respondent No. 1. The High Court dismissed the election
G petition under Section~ of the Act for non-compliance of Section 82(b)
inasmuch as S, a validly nominated candidate, against whom allegations of
corrupt practice were made, was not made a party to the election petition. ....
Hence this appeal.

H Dismissing the appeal, the Court
118
-
PATANGRAO KADAM v. PRITHVIRAJ SAYAJ!RAO YADAV DESHMUKH 119
HELD : 1. The distinction between a candidate who has withdrawn A
and a candidate who has continued till the contest is over is of no rel-
evance. As per Section 82 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 the
appellant was required to join all the contesting candidates other than
himself and further he had to join any other candidate against whom
allegations of any corrupt l'ractice were made inthe petition. Even though
B
S had withdrawn his candidature after it had been °duly accepted and
notified he could not go out of the definition elf "candidate" within the
meaning of Section 79(b). [125-E; G-Hl

2. S had to be necessarily joined as a respondent. He was candidate
within the meaning of Section 70(b) and in the election petition the appel- c
lant had sought a further declaration that he should be declared as duly
elected. Hence Section 82(b) got attracted. Merely because S became an
election agent of respondent No. 1 subsequently after withdrawal of his
candidature, he did not cease to be a "candidate'' within the meaning of
Section 79(b). [126-F-G]
D
3.1. Since serious consequences follow against a candidate within the
meaning of Section 79(b) indulging in corrupt practices in an election,
principles of natural justice do demand of providing an opportunity to
such a candidate. Therefore, impleadink of S as respondent to the election
petition was necessary in terms of Section 82(b). [128-G] E
3.2. S did not cease to be a candidate within the meaning of Section
79(b) and, therefore, his non-joining as respondent in the election petition
was fatal. [129-G]

Natau Ram Indra Singh v. Trikamal Jamandas Pate~ 37 ELR 267; Har F
Swarup v. Brij Bhushan Saran, AIR (1967) SC 836 and Amin I.al v. Hwma
Ma~ [1965] 1 SCR 393, relied on.

Keshavji Ravji v. CIT, AIR (1991) SC 1806; Mohan Raj v. Surendra
Kumar Tapar, AIR (1969) SC 677; Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur,
AIR (1958) All. 809; Ram Pratap Chandel v. Chaudhary I.ajja Ram, (1998] 8 G
SCC 564 and Gadnis Bhawani Shankarv. Faleiro Eduardo Martinho, (2000]
7 sec 472, referred to.

Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988] 2 SCC 299, cited.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1789of1998. !-I
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment and Order dated 29.1.98 of the Bombay High Court
in E.P. No. 5 of 1996.

WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 2080-2081 of 1998.
B
P.P. Rao, V.A. Mohta, Nikhil Sakhardande, Ms. Meenakshi Sakhardande,
Ms. Poonam, Mrs. V.D. Khanna, S.V. Deshpande, PramitSaxena, L.M. Acharya,
Ms. Anuradha Rastogi and S.M. Jadhav for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J. These appeals are filed under Section 116-
A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, aggrieved by the judgment and
order dated 29.1.1998 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay made in
election petition No. 5 of 1996. Since the election petition was dismissed
upholding the preliminary objection by the respondent no.3, we consider it
D uonecessary to narrate the pleadings and facts in detail. However, the relevant
and material facts, which are considered necessary for the disposal of these
appeals, briefly stated, are the following.

The appellant filed election petition No. 5 of 1996 impugning the
election of the respondent no. I to be void under section IOO(l)(b)
E and lOO(l)(d)(ii) and lOO(l)(d)(iv) read with section 123(4) of the Represen-
tation of People Act, 1951 (for short 'the RPA') and sought for further
declaration that he should be declared as elected. One Sampatrao Yadav
Deshmukh was elected to 'the Maharashtra State Assembly from Bhilawadi-
Wangi Constituency No. 270 of Sangli District in the general election held
F in the month of March; 1995. He died on 6.5.1996. Consequently, a notifi-
cation was issued on 13.9.1996 for holding bye-election to the said Constitu-
ency. The last date for filing nomination papers was 20.9.1996. On 18.9.1996
the appellant, the respondent no. 1 and one Sampatrao Chavan filed nomina-
tion papers. Sampatrao Chavan withdrew his candidature on 23.9, 1996, which
was the last date_ for withdrawal of nomination papers. The fmal list of
G
contesting candidates was published on the same day wherein the appellant
and the respondents 1-6 were left in the field: Sampatrao Chavan after
withdrawal of his candidature became the election agent of the respondent no.
!. Polling took place on 11.10.1996. After counting the respondent no.
1 was declared elected on 13.10.1996 having secured 72,526 votes being the
H highest.
PATANGRAO KADAM v. PRITJMRAJ SAYAnRAO YADAV DESHMUKH (PAm, J .] 121 •
In the election petition, allegations were made against the respondent A
..j no. I, his agents, supporters and his election agent - Sampatrao Chavan. The
respondent no. I filed his written statement inter alia raising the contention
that the election petition was not maintainable for non-compliance of man-
datory provisions of sections 81 and 83 of the RPA and sought for its
dismissal. He denied all the ~aterial averments made in the election petition.
B
The trial court framed issues including issues as to the maintfilnability of the
election petition. The respondent no. I took out chamber summons no.
66/98 to decide the maintainability of the election petition. After hearing the
learned counsel, the High court held that the issue nos. I and 2 regarding
maintainability of election petition cannot be decided at the threshold and the
points raised in the said chamber summons were kept open until final hearing c
of the election petition. Thereafter the trial court proceeded to examine the
witnesses produced by the appellant. The respondent no. 3 took out chamber
summons no. 72198 praying for dismissal of the election petition for non-
compliance of section 82(b) of the RPA inasmuch as Sampatrao Chavan, a
validly nominated candidate, had not been made a party to the election D
petition. The appellant took out chamber summons no. 93/98 seeking permis-
sion to amend the election petition so as to delete lhe allegation of conupt
practice made against Sampatrao Chavan. Both of them were beard together.
Chamber smtµnons no. 72198 was allowed and the chamber summons no.
93/98 was rejected. Consequently the election petition was dismissed by the
E
impugned judgment and order.
'
The appellant has filed Civil Appeal No. 1789 of 1998 aggrieved by the
dismissal of election petition and Civil Appeal Nos. 2080-2081/98 aggrieved
by allowing chamber summons no. 72198 and dismissing chamber summons
no. 93/98. F

Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended:

I. Once a contesting candidate is impleaded under Section 82(a) of the
RPA, Section 82(b) does not oome into play at all if the allegations of corrupt
G
practice are made against a contesting candidate because of the additional
declaration prayed for.

2. In clause (b) the words "any other candidate" do not include a
contesting candidate impleaded under clause (a) even if allegations of corrupt
practice are levelled against him. H
.122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A 3. In a petition merely claiming a declaration that the election of the
returned candidate is void on the allegations, of conupt practice against
another candidate, whether contesting candidate or not, he has to be impleaded;
clause (b) is wide enough to include even a non- contesting candidate, who
had withdrawn from the contest either .before committing a conupt practice
or after committing it.
B
4. In terms of Section 123 conupt practices mentioned therein can be
. ~ommitted not only by the "candidate" himself but also by his election agent
or other agent or any other person with his consent or the consent of his
>
election agent· such allegations of conupt practice made are against the
c candidate himself and he alone is made liable to answer the same as a
necessary party to the election petition; therefore, for any alleged conupt
pr~ctice committed by an election agent, who is the alter ego of the candidate,
the candidate alone has to be impleaded and bis election agent need not be
impleaded at all under Section 82; if, however, the High Court comes to the
conclusion after considering the evidence on record that the· election agent is
D also to be named as having committed the conupt practice, notice has to be
given to him under the _proviso to Section 99(l)(a)(ii).

5. If two interpretations are possible of Section 82(b), the one which
furthers the object of purity of election should be preferred to the one which
E permits a candidate who has resorted to conupt practice through bis election
agent or agent or. any other person, to escape the liability for the same and
thereby vitiate free and fair elections, which is a basic feature of the Consti-
tution.

He made submissions elaborately in support of these contentions and
F cited few decisions.

Per contra, Shri V.A. Mohta, leamed senior counsel for respondent no.
1, while supporting the judgment and order of the High Court urged:

!. Having regard to the scheme of RPA and by reading Sections 79, 82,
G 99 and 123 it is quite clear that a candidate within the meaning of Section
79(b) has to be necessarily impleaded in an election petition where a conupt
practice is alleged irrespective of the fact whether he withdrew his candida·
lure or retired from the contest or became an election agent after withdrawal
of his candidature of another contesting candidate; the object of the provisions
H is to see that no candidate against whom corrupt practice is alleged escapes
PATANGRAO KADAM v. PRITIN!RAJ SAYAJIRAO YADAV DESllMUKH [PATIL, 1 .] 123
the consequences. A

2. There was no choice to the High Court but to dismiss the election
petition when there was non- compliance-of Section 82(b) and such a petition
ought to be dismissed in te1ms of Section 86(1).'

3. When Sampatrao Chavan was a candidate within the meaning of B
Section 79(b), as the nomination filed by him was accepted as valid, his
becoming the election agent of respondent no. I after withdrawal did not
make any difference as to impleading him as a party to the election petition.

While citing few decisions in support of his contentions, he added that C
the Jaw is already settled by this Court on the point in controversy.

We think, it is appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of the RPA
to the extent required, for the purpose of immediate reference and focus on
them for appreciating the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for
the parties. D

"Section 79. Definitions - In this Part and in [Part VII] unless the
context otherwise requires -

(a) ............................ .
E
(b) "candidate" means a person· who ·has been or claims to have
been duly nominated as a candidate at any election;

(c) ............................. "

"Section 82. Parties of the petition - A petitioner shall join as F
respondents to his petition.

(a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming declaration that the
election of all or any of the retnmed candidates is void, claims
a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has G
been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other the peti-
tioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the
returned candidates; and

(b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any conupt
practice are made in the petition." H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A "Section 86. Trial of election petitions - (I) The High court shall
dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provi-
sions of section 81 or section 82 or section 117. ~

Explanation- .................

B (2)-(7) ............................ "

"Section 99. Other orders to be made by the High court - (1) At the
time of making an order ririder section 98 [the High Court] shall also
make an order -
>

c (a) where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice
having been committed at the election, regarding -

(i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been
proved to have been committed at the election, and the nature
of that corrupt practice; and
D
(ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the
trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature
of that practice; and

(b) .......................
E -I
Provided that [a person who is not a party to the petition shall not be
named] in the order under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless -
'
(a) he has been given notice to appear before (the High Court] and
to show cause why he should not be so named; and
F (b) ........................

(2) In this section and in section 100, the expression "agent" has
the same meaning as in section 123."

"Section 123. Corrupt practices -The following shall be deemed to be
G corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act -

(1) ·························

(2) ......................... ""'-
H (3) ..........................
PATANGRAO KADAM '· PRITHV!RAJ SAYAJIRAO YADAVDESHMUKll [PATIL, 1 .) 125
(4) The publication by a caodidate or his agent or by aoy other A
person [with the consent of a caodidate or his election agent],
of aoy statement of fact which is false, and which he either
believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation
to the personal character or conduct of aoy caodidate, or in
relation to the caodidature, or withdrawal, of aoy caodidate,
B
being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the pros-
pects of that candidate's election.

(5)

(6)
c
(7)

(8) "

There are three categories of caodidates as cao be gathered from the
provisions contained in the RPA- (1) caodidate, (2) contesting caodidate, D
aod (3) returned caodidate.

As per Section 79(b) "caodidate" meaos the person who has been or
claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at aoy election. The
defmition of the word "caodidate", as given in clause (b) of Section 79, has
been amended by Act 40 of 1975 retrospectively. Therefore, the distinction E
between a candidate who has withdrawn and a caodidate who has continued
till the contest is over is of no relevance. It is not disputed that the nomination
filed by Sarnpatrao Chavan had been accepted and a list of validly nominated
caodidates including that of Sarnpatrao Chavao was affixed on the notice
board as required nnder Section 36(8). He withdrew his caodidature on F
23.9.1996 as per Section 37(1); thereafter a list of contesting candidates was
published under Section 38(1); in the election petition filed, conupt practices
were alleged against the respondent no. 1 and his election agent Sarnpatrao
Chavan besides others; he was not joined as a respondent in the election
petition; in the election petition the appellant in addition to seeking election
G
of respondent no. 1 to be void had sought for further declaration that he should
be declared as elected. As per Section 82 the appellaot was required to join
all the contesting candidates other than himself and further he had to join any
other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice were made
in the petition. Even though Sarnpatrao Chavan had withdrawn his candida-
ture after it had been duly accepted aod notified he could not go out of the H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A definition of "candidate" within the meaning of Section 79(b). This position
is made amply clear by various pronouncements Of this Court. Even the
learned counsel for the appellant could not dispute this position but he made
efforts to distinguish the case on hand stating that Sampatrao Chavan after
withdrawing his candidature had become the election agent of respondent no.
1; the respondent no. 1 having been impleaded under Section 82(a) there was
B no need to implead his election agent Sampatrao Chavan; there was merger
of personality between the respondent no. 1 and Sampatrao Chavan inasmuch
as all actions of Sampatrao Chavan in law were to be considered as the actions
of respondent no. 1 himself; since the respondent no. 1 as a contesting
candidate had been impleaded under Section 82(a) he col'.ld not be considered
c as "any other candidate" under Section 82(b) for impleading. It was also urged
that there was no need to implcad the election agent as conupt practices
alleged against him were subsequent to the withdrawal of his candidature. The
learned counsel added that the decisions of this Court cited did not specifi-
cally deal with a candidate, who after withdrawing his candidature subse-
)'
quently became the election agent of another contesting candidate and where
D allegations of colTUpt practice pertained to the period after withdrawal. Ac-
cording to the learned counsel, consequent to the dismissal of the election
petition the respondent no. 1, who had committed corrupt practices, was left
free and that because of the time gap no action could be taken against his
election agent Sampatrao Chavan also.
E From the plain and tinambiguous langnage and terms of Sections 79(b)
and 82(b) without anything more, Sampatrao Chavan had to be necessarily
joined as a respondent. He was a candidate within the meaning of Section
79(b) and in the election petition the appellant had sought fnriher declaration
that he shonld be declared as dnly elected. Hence Section 82(b) got attracted.
F Section 82 speaks of all the three categories - the contesting candidates, the
returned candidates and any other candidate. Sampatrao Chavan, as already
stated above, undoubtedly, is covered by Section 82(b) read with Section
79(b). Merely because he became an election agent of the respondent no. I
subsequently after withdrawal of his candidature, he did not cease to be a
"candidate" within the meaning of Section 79(b). Sections 82 and 99 are
G independent and are to serve different purposes. Sections 82 to 84 are included
in Chapter II of the RPA dealing with the presentation of election petitions.
Section 82 speaks of the parties to be joined in the petition and Section 84
states as to the relief that may be claimed by the election petitioner. Chapter
III contains Sections 86 to 107 relating to trial of election petitions and section
H 99 indicates as to other orders to be made by the High Court at the time of
PATANGRAO KADAM v. PRITHVIRAJ SAYAilRAO YADAV DESHMUKH [PATIL, J .] 127
making an order under Section 98 concerning lhe relief/reliefs to be grated A
at the conclusion of the trial. Under Section 99, the High Court has to make
~
other orders regarding (i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has
not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of
corrupt practice; and (ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been
proved at the trial to have been guilty of corrupt practice and its nature. But
B
before naming any person who is not a party to the election petition, he has
to be given an opportunity to show cause and hearing. Thereafter action shall
be taken under Section SA against all the persons who are found guilty of
corrupt practice and so named. Thus it is clear that Section 82 deals with an
election i.e. parties to the election petition in relation to the reliefs claimed
whereas Section 99 deals with the action to be taken against all persons found c
guilty of corrupt practices and to name them for further action under Section
8A. Section 82 is mandatory in relation to joining of respondents mentioned
therein. Section 86(1) does not leave any option to the High Court but to
dismiss an election petition for non-compliance of Sections 81, 82 and 117.
Section 82 speaks of impleading of the respondents in the election petition
itself requiring their presence at the trial. Section 99 comes into operation at D
the time of making an order under Section 98 at the conclusion of the trial
of an election petition. The argument that Sampatrao Chavan could have been
impleaded at later stage if necessary under Section 99, if accepted, renders
the mandatory requirement of Section 82 ineffective. Unambiguous language
and clear terms contained in Section 82(b) read with Section 79(b) lead to E
only one interpretation as stated above and there is no scope for two inter-
pretations, as sought, to be made out on behalf of the appellant. This Court
in the case of Mis. Keshavji Ravji & Co. etc. etc. v. Commissioner of Income-
tax, AIR (1991) SC 1806, while dealing with interpretation of statutes when
language of statute is unambiguous, in para 6 .has observed thus:-
F
.... "As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to
any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes
impermissible. The supposed intention of the legislature cannot then
be appealed to whittle down the statutory language which is other-
wise unambiguous. If the intendment is n0t in the words used it is
G
nowhere else. The need for interpretation arises when the words used
in the statute are, 011 their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest
__,,.._ the intention of the Legislature. In Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Union of India (1988) 2 SCC 299: AIR 1988 SC 782) it was observed:

"The words in the statute must, prima facie, be given their ordinary H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) 2 S.C.R.
A meanings. Where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest
and without doub~ that construction ought to prevail unless there are
some strong and obvious reasons to the contrary ......." (p.331) (of
SCC)(at pg. 301 of AIR).

Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look
B at well-settled principles of construction but it is not open to first to create
an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the same by taking
recourse to some general principle.

It must be remembered in relation to a returned candidate if the alle-
gations of c0In1pt practices are established, two consequences follow - (1) his
c election will be declared as void and (2) he shall be disqualified to contest
or vote at any election for a period up to six years. Against all others, who
are found guilty of c0In1pt practices other consequences shall follow. Under
Section 8A the case of every person found guilty of a coffilpt practice by an
order made under Section 99 shall be submitted to the competent authority y
D for detenni.nation of the question as to whether such person shall be disquali-
fied and, if so, for what period provided the period of disqualification shall
not exceed six years from the date on which the order made in relation to a
person under Section 99 takes effect. C0In1pt practice is not confined only
to a remmed candidate, it can._be committed by the persons mentioned in
Section 123 and no one can be allowed to escape consequences of Section
E 8A, the object being to maintain the purity in the election process. Fair and
free elections are e~sential requisites to maintain the purity of election and
to sustain the faith of the people in election itself in a democratic set up.
Clean, efficient and benevolent administration are the essential features of
good governance which in tum depends upon persons of competency and
F good character. Hence those indulging in c0In1pt practices at an election
cannot be spared and allowed to pollute the election process and this purpose
is sought to be achieved by these provisions contained in the RPA.

One more aspect to be kept in view is that since serious consequences
follow against a candidate within the meaning of Section 79(b) indulging in
G coffilpt practices in an election, principles of natural justice do demand of
providing an oppormnity to such a candidate. Jn this view also impleading
of Sampatrao Chavan as respondent to the election petition was necessary in
terms of Section 82(b).

It is the general rule that the act of an agent does not bind his principal
H unless it is within the authority given to him. An agent is having an authority
PATANGRAO KADAM v. PRITHVIRAJ SAYAJIRAO YADAV DESHMUKH {PATIL, I.] 129
to do every lawful thing whic):t is necessary to do an act authorized, but in A
;
law an agent can neither be 'authorized to do an unlawful thing/act nor an
.{
agent can be permitted to do so. This apart, under Section 40 a candidate at
an election may appoint one person other than himself to be his election agent.
As per Section 45 an election agent is to perform only such functions as are
· a~thorized by or under the RPA in connection with the election.
B
If an election agent travels beyond bis authority given under Section 45
and commits an illegal act or an offence, may be electoral or criminal, he
cannot pass on bis sins to the candidate and escape punishment and conse-
quences on proof of commission of sue~ act/ offence merely on the ground
or saying tl\at he is only an election agent of a candidate and it is enough to c
proceed against the candidate alone.

lu the case on hand it was also pointed out to us that the corrupt practice
was alleged in the election petition not only against the respondent no. I but
also against his election agent Sarnpatrao Chavan specifically pointing out to
para ll(h) of the election petition, which reads: - D

"(h) On 10.10.1996, at about 10 A.M., Shri Sarnpatrao Chavan, the
election agent of Respondent No. I was himself distributing the said
reconstructed handouts/bills in respect of the said news item to
various people in the village Nagrale, Tahika Tasgaon, District Sangli
E
and was indulging in publication of statement of fact which is false
and which he believed to be false and did not believe to be true in
relation to the personal character and co~duct of the petitioner for
prejudicially affecting the petitioner's election prospects. Other workers
of Respondent No. I (along with said Shri Sarnpatrao Chavan) were
also distributing the reconstructed handouts/bills to various reople of F
village Nagrale, Taluka Tasgaon, District Sangli."

This apart, one thing is clear that since he did not cease to be a candidate
within the meaning of Section 79(b ), as already discussed above, his non-
joining as respondent in the election petition was fatal.
G
Almost in an identical case, this Court, in Natau Ram Indra Singh v.
Trikamal JamandasPatel and Others, 37 ELR 267, has held that a person who
~ had been nominated as a candidate for an election and h~d since withdrawn
his candidature was for the pwpose of Section 82 a candidate and he must
be impleaded in a petition. if any allegations of corrupt practice were made
H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A against him, whether committed before or after his withdrawal in the election
petition. That was also a case where the appellant had filed an election
petition on 10.4.1967 to set aside the election of first respondent and for a
further order that the fourth respondent be declared elected. In the petition
it was averred that the first respondent and his election agent Jamna Shanker
Pandya and other agents with their consent had committed corrupt practices
B
within the meaning of Section 123(3), (3A) and (4) of the RPA. Jamna
Shanker Pandya had filed his nomination for election to the same constitu-
ency, bnt he had later withdrawn his candidature and thereafter he had become
an election agent of the first respondent. He was not impleaded as respondent
to the election petition. The first respondent applied co the High Conrt praying
c for dismissal of the election petition. Thereafter, in Jnne 1967 an application
was made nnder Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for irnpleading Jamna Shanker Pandya
as a party respondent. The High Court rejected the application and dismissed
the election petition for non-compliance with Section 82(b). This Court
affirmed the said decision of the High Court stating that Section 79 of the RPA
D defines "candidate" as meaning a person who has been or claims to have been
duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and any such person should
be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election
in prospect, he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. The
Court went on to say as nnder: ,

E "This Court has held that a person who had been nominated as a
candidate for an election and has since withdrawn his candidature is
for the purpose of S.82 a candidate and he must be irnpleaded in a
petition if any allegations of corrupt practice are made against him
whether committed before or after his withdrawal in the election
petition. Har Swarup and Another v. Brij Bhushan Saran and Others,
F (1967] l SCR 342, Mohan Singh v. Bhanwar Lal and Others, (1964]
5 SCR 12 and Amin Lull v. Hunna Mal, (1965] 1 SCR 393, Jamna
Shanker Pandya being a necessary party to the election petition,
failure to implead him rendered the election petition, defe9tive, and
the High Court was bonnd to dismiss the election petition."
G This Court, in Har Swarup and Another v. Brij Bhushan Saran and
Others, AIR (!967) SC 836, expressed the opinion "that if the effect of
withdrawal is said to be that a person nominated can no longer be considered
to be a candidate only after his withdrawal, the date of withdrawal cannot be
a dividing line as to the time upto which he can be treated as a candidate and
H the time after which he caimot be treated as a candidate. If pw:ity of elections
PATA!lORAO KADAM v. PRITINIRAJ SAYAJIRAO YADAVDESHMUKH [PATIL, 1 .] 131
has to be maintained a person, who is a candidate as defmed in S. 79(b) of A
the Act, will remain a candidate even after he withdraws till the election is
over, and if he commits a corrupt practice whether before or after his with-
drawal he would be a necessary party under Section 82 (b) of the Act. We
are therefore of opinion that the view taken by the Patna High Court on which
reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellants is' not correct and the
decisibn of the High Court under appeal is correct."
B

The view that a candidate, who is duly nominated, continues tci be a
candidate for the pUipooe of Section 82(b) in spite of withdrawal is supported
by the decisions of Har Swarup (supra) and Amin Lal v. Hunna Mal, [1965]
1 SCR 393. This Court referring to the said decisions in Mohan Raj v. c
Surendra Kumar Taparia and Others, AIR (1969) SC 677, agreed with the
said view. Further the decision in Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal Kanpur,
. AIR (1958) All 809 taking the same view after elaborate consideration on all
aspects touching the question is approved. Dealing with the applications made
for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 and amendment under Order 6 Rule
17, in para 10 of the same judgment, this Court bas stated thus: D

"No doubt the power of amendment is preserved to the Cqurl and 0.
1 R. 10 enables the Court to strike out parties but the Court cannot
use 0. 6 R. 17 or 0. 1 R. 10 to avoid the consequences of non-joinder
for which a special provision is to be found in the Act. The Court can
E
order an amendment and even strike out a party who is not necessary.
But when the Act makes a person a necessary party and provides that
the petition shall be dismissed if such a party is not joined, the power
of amendment or to strike out parties cannot be used at all. The Civil
Procedure Code applies subject to the provisions of the Representa-
tion of the People Act and any rules made thereunder (see S. 87). . F
When the Act enjoins the penalty of dismissal of the petition for non-
joinder of a party the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot
be used as curative means to save the petition."

It may be noted that the facts of the case in Ram Partap Chand.el v.
Chaudhary Lajja Ram and Others, [1998] 8 SCC 564 are similar to the facts
G
of the case in hand. In the election petition the appellant averred that certain
corrupt practices had been committed by the first respondent (the returned
candidate) and by his son Harbhajan Singh, who was the election agent; also,
by one Amarnath Kaushal, who was the colll!.ting agent of the firslrespondent.
Both Harbhajan Singh and Amarnath K8Ilshal had been candidat"" at the H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A election but had wilhdrawn !heir candidature. They were not impleaded as
respondents to lhe election petition. The High Court in lhe light of Section
82 of lhe RPA dismissed lhe election petition as not maintainable. This Court,
while dismissing lhe appeal against the said judgment of the High Court
referring to the case of Mohan Raj (supra), in paragraph 7 of the judgmen~
has stated thus: -
B
"7. It will be seen that sub-section (a) of Section 82 uses the words
"contesting candidates" and sub-section (b) uses the words "any other
candidate". The combined effect of sub-sections (a) and (b) is, plainly,
to require lhe impleadment in an election petition of all candidates
c at an election against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made.
This would apply not only to those who actually contested lhe
election, but also to those who stood for election but withdrew
their candidature before the polling date. The person being the same,
it is of no consequence that the allegation of corrupt practice is made
in relation to a point of time when lhe candidature had been with-
D drawn and the person was now acting as the agent of a contesting
candidate."

Yet in anolher recent judgment in Gadnis Bhawani Shankar, V. v.
Faleiro Eduardo Mattinho, [2000] 7 SCC 472, agreeing with the exposition
E oflaw made in the cases of HarSwarup, Mohan Raj and Ram Pattap Chandel
aforementioried, this Court in para 13, concluded thus:-

"13. In our opinion, lhe allegations which have been made in lhe
election petition are allegations of corrupt practice against Cardozo
besides some others. Since Cardozo was a nominated candidate, it
F was necessary to implead him as a party-respondent under Section
82(b) of the Ac~ irrespective of the fact tliat before the actual date
of election, he had withdrawn his candidature and allegedly commit-
ted the corrupt practice after his withdrawal from the election. Thus,
the answer to the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment
is in lhe affirmative."
G
No arguments were advanced in support of Civil Appeal Nos. 2080-
2081of1998. Even otherwise in view of decisions in Natau Ram Indra Singh
v. Trikamal Jamandas Patel and Others, (37 ELR 267) and Mohan Raj v.
Surendra Kumar Taparia and Others, AIR (1969) SC 677 there is no merit
H ill these appeals.
PATANGRAO KADAM v. PRITIIV!RAJ SAYAJIRAO YADAV DESHMUKll [PATIL, l .) 133
Thus having regard to all aspects, we do not find any infinnity in the A
~ judgment and order impugned in these appeals which may warrant interfer-
ence by this Court.

In the light of the facts stated, discussions made and reasons given
above, these appeals, in our view, are devoid of any merit and consequently
they are dismissed, but without any order as to costs. B
v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.