PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS.versusRAJIB CHATTERJEE & CO. & ORS.

                          [2009] 1 S.C.R. 259


                    PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS.                        A
                                   v.
                 RAJIB CHATTERJEE & CO. & ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal Nos. 101-102 of 2009)
                          JANUARY 13, 2009
                                                                   B
                [S.B. SINHA AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]
...
           WEST BENGAL EXCISE (SELECTION OF PERSONS
       FOR GRANT OF LICENSE AT NEW SITES FOR RETAIL
       SALE OF SPIRIT AND CERTAIN OTHER INTOXICANTS                c
       OTHER THAN FOREIGN LIQUOR ON CATEGORIES OF
       LICENSEE AND LICENSES FOR DENATURED SPIRIT)
       ORDER, 2000:

           Clause 3, Explanation, and Clause 5(3) - Criteria for D
      grant of licence for country spirit shops- 'Unemployed youth'
      - Connotation of - Held: A person helping his brother in a
      shop of which he is not owner or a person carrying on a
      business which is of seasonal nature, and living on mere
      subsistence earning as of necessity cannot be considered to
                                                                    E
      be gainfully employed - The word 'unemployed' is required
      to be given a purposive meaning which satisfies text and
      context in which the word has been used - Interpretation of
      Statutes - Purposive construction.

           WORDS AND PHRASES:                                      F

          Expression 'unemployed youth' - Connotation of in the
      context of grant of licence for retail sale of spirit.

            In response to an advertisement issued by the State
        of West Bengal inviting applications from companies/       G
        firms/societies formed by unemployed youths,
        respondent No.1, a partnership firm of respondents Nos.2
      .·and 3, applied for and was granted licence for country
        spirit shops. Appellant No.1, a partnership firm of
                                 259                               H
    260       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A appellants Nos.2 and 3, filed a writ petition before the
  High Court challenging the grant of licence to the
  respondents primarily on the ground that respondent
  No.2 carried on seasonal business of paddy and
  respondent No.3 carried on business with his brother,
B and as such both could not be termed as 'unemployed
  youth'. The single Judge of the High Court allowed the
  writ petition, but the Division Bench in intra-court appeal
  reversed the judgment of the Single Judge.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court
c
       HELD:1.1. Keeping in view the provisions of Clause
  3 of the West Bengal Excise (Selection of Person for grant
  of License at New Sites for Retail Sale of Spirit and
  Certain other Intoxicants other than Foreign Liquor on
D Categories of Licensee and Licenses for Denatured
  Spirit) Order, 2000, there are three criteria v.iz., (i) the age
  of the applicant, (ii) he has to be registered as
  unemployed in any Employment Exchange in the State
  of West Bengal and (iii) certified to be unemployed by any
E of the authorities specified therein. The main thrust
  appears to be on the registration of a person as
  unemployed in the Employment Exchange. Certificate is
  requi~ed to be given by the authorities specified therein
  as despite such registration and/ or continuation thereof,
F a person may be employed with a private person or in
  some other districts or in some other States. [Paras 13,15
  and 18) [268-H; 269-A; 271-B-E]
       1.2. A person cannot be said to be employed only
  because he earns his bare subsistence livelihood by
G engaging himself in some work. In the instant case, one
  of the respondents was helping his brother who was
  owner of the shop. He was not the owner of the shop.
  The other respondent used to carry on business which
  is of seasonal nature. He was, therefore, also not a full
H fledged businessman. Nothing has been brought on
  PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATTERJEE & 261
                   CO. & ORS.

 record to show that they were income tax payees or were            A
 otherwise established in their life. It may be true that the
 authorities specified in the Explanation appended to
 Clause 3 of the Order were required to issue certificate
 on the basis of their own concept in regard thereto. It is
 true that no guideline was issued, but, probably none              8
 was required to be issued, as the said authorities
 concerned, keeping in view the legal position, would be
 presumed to be aware of the financial status as also the
 fact as to whether the candidates concerned remained
 unemployed. [Para 19] (271-G-H; 272-A-B]                           c
      1.3. The Order does not contemplate that the
 applicants would be absolutely poor or they would not
 have any property at all. They were required to establish
 a business in liquor. They were required to make
 substantial investment. Their financial capacity was · D
 required to be such so as to enable them to carry out the
 business and fulfill their obligations both contractual and
 statutory in terms of the provisions of the Excise Act, the
 Rules framed thereunder as also the conditions of
 licence. [Para 19] [272-C-D]                                E
       2.1. In a situation of this nature, the interpretation
  clause should be given a contextual meaning. It is not
. exhaustive. It is trite that when a statutory provision
  defines its terms, the same should govern what is
  proved, authorized or done under or by reference to that          F
  enactment. It is also trite that all statutory definitions have
  to be read subject to the qualification variously expressed
  in the interpretation clause, which created them. [Para 21)
  [272-E-F]
                                                                    G
     Feroze N. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani and Others (2003)
 1 SCC 433; State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria (2003) 7
 SCC 336; P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology 1995
 Supp (2) SCC 348; K. V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997)
 2 SCC 53; Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank            H
    262        SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A Employees Union (2007) 4 SCC 685 and Novartis India Ltd.
  v. State of West Bengal and Ors. 2008 (15) SCALE 470,
  referred to.
        2.2. It is not a case where the word 'unemployed'
  should be given a literal or even the dictionary meaning.
B It is required to be given a purposive meaning; a meaning
  which is capable of being translated into action which
  would not lead to an anomaly or absurdity, and satisfies
  the text and context in which the word has been used.
  [Para 22] [276-D]
c     2.3. Keeping in view the interpretative tools required
  to be used in a case of this nature, despite the fact that
  the respondents had been earning some money, the
  same would not disentitle them to take part in the
  selection process for grant of a license in terms of the
D Order. [Para 22] [276-A]
       2.4. In the instant case, the Division Bench satisfied
  itself that the respondents were to be considered as
  'unemployed youth' in terms of the advertisement. The
E advertisement in question, keeping in view the text and
  context in which it was issued, clearly go to show that
  for the purpose of applying for grant of a liquor shop, the
  respondents were qualified having been continuing to be
  registered in the Employment Exchange and having been
F granted a certificate in that behalf by the person specified
  in the advertisement. Appellant No. 1 also applied for and
  was granted the similar certificate. It would, therefore, not
  be open for him to contend that the provisions relating
  to grant of certificate being devoid of any guiderine or
  objective criteria, should be declared ultra vires. In any
G event, even otherwise, validity and/or legality of the Order
  has not been challenged. [Para 20, 22 and 23] [272-D;
  276-E-F]
                        Case Law Reference:
H         (2003) 1 sec 433      referred to          Para 21
                    l
                  PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATIERJEE & 263
 "                                 CO. & ORS.

           ,A;
                        (2003) 1 sec 336           referred to           Para 21    A
                        1995 Supp (2) SCC 348 referred to                Para 21
                        (1997) 2 sec 53            referred to           Para 21
                        (2001) 4 sec 685           referred to           Para 21
                                                                                    B
                        2008 (15) SCALE 470 referred to                  Para 22
           ·~         CIVIL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.101-
--'-....         1.02 of 2009.

                      From the Judgment and final order dated 8.6.2005 of the       c
                 High Court at Calacutta in Mandamus Appeal Tender No. 2183
                 of 2004 and 2377 of 2004.

                    Joydeep Mazmumdar, P.Addey, Abhishek Sarkar and
                 Ruby Singh Ahuja for the Apellants.                                D
                     Rana Mukherjee, Siddharth Gautam, Goodwill lndeevar,
                 Radha Rangaswamy, Tara Chandra Sharma and Neelam
                 Sharma for the Respondent.

                        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                  E

                        S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

                      2. What would be the meaning of the term 'unemployed
                 youth' stated in an advertisement issued pursuant to an 'excise
                 policy' of the State of West Bengal is involved in these appeals   F
                 which arise out of a judgment and order dated 8.06.2005
                 passed by the Calcutta High Court reversing the judgment and
                 order dated 11.06.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge of
                 the said Court in Writ Petition No. 14945 (W) of 2003.
                                                                                    G
                        3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.
           "'         An advertisement was issued on or about 18.01.2001 by
                 the State of West Bengal inviting applications from companies/
   ;             firms/societies formed by unemployed youth for the purpose of
                                                                                    H
    264         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A grant of excise licence for country spirit shops in certain
  locations. Appellant No. 1, a partnership firm of the appellant
  Nos. 2 and 3 herein applied therefor. In terms of the said
  advertisement, respondent No. 1, which is also a partnership
  firm of which respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are partners as also
8 several others, applied for allotment of the said country spirit
  shop.

       4. In the select list, the appellant No. 1 was placed at SI.
  No. 3 whereas the respondent No. 1 was placed at SI. No. 1.
  The candidature of the respondent No. 1 was objected to by
C the appellants inter alia contending that the respondent Nos. 2
  and 3 were not 'unemployed youth' within the meaning of the
  said advertisement and two locations of the liquor shops
  proposed by them were not conducive therefor.

D        5. The District Magistrate, Bankura being a licericing
    authority directed an enquiry to be held. The Enqui1y Officer. in
    his report, inter alia opined that whereas the respondent No. 2
    carried on seasonal business in paddy, Til, potatoes, etc.; the
    respondent No. 1 carried on business with his brother.
E         As regards, location, it was stated:

          "... The proposed site of the country spirit shop is situated
          within the market place of Chatramore where ladies also
          frequently visit the spot for shopping. The drunken people
F         will disturb ladies and other public if license for a country
          spirit shop is granted with in the market place."

    It was noticed:
          "Rajib Chattopadhyay has stated that he is unemployed
G         and lives with his brother, Sanjib Chattopadhyay in a joint
          family. His brother, Sanjib Chbattopadhyay is the owner of
          the "Light House" shop at Gelia More. Rajib
          Chattopadhyay has admitted that he sells electrical goods
          of the said shop. Rajib Chattopadhyay submitted a Xerox
H
PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATIERJEE & 265
          CO. & ORS. [S.8. SINHA, J.)
    copy of a challan showing deposit of profession Tax by           A
    Sanjib Chattopadhyay, as a token of Sanjib's shop. Rajib
    Chattopadhyay has admitted that there are decorators'
    shop and tailoring shop by the side of the proposed country
    spirit shop and the proposed shop is within 30/40 feet from
    the Bishnupur, Kotulpur metalled Road..                          B

    Another partner, Sri Subhendu Chatterjee has admitted
    that he was a businessman and dealt in potato till March,
    2001. They signed the application form for grant of license
    for country spirit shop on 12.2.2001 and mentioned in            C
    column 4 seasonal business - paddy, Til potatoes etc.
    against business or sales experience, if any, Subhendu
    Chatterjee has further admitted that he took loan of Rs.
    25,000/ - (Rupees Twenty five thousand) for business from
    Chatramore co-operative Bank but he could not repay the
    same till 4.1.2002. Subhendu Chatterjee has admitted that        D
    his partner's name for potato business has been registered
    with Chatramore Kshudra Babsayee Samiti. From the
    above, it transpires that Subhendu Chatterjee, as on the
    date of application, was self-employed, at least, partially
    and the site for the proposed country spirit shop is situated    E
    within the market place of Chatramore."

     6. The Additional District Magistrate (Excise), Bankura,
however, disagreed with the said view of the Enquiry Officer,
opining:                                                             F
    "I think, this is not any point for rejecting them because all
    these points of objection were m§!ntioned in the application
    form and these are not matters for discarding their
    candidature for the business in Country Spirit"
                                                                     G
    7. Admittedly, allotment of the country liquor shop in
question was made in favour of the respondent No. 1 herein.
     8. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, appellants filed
a writ application before the Calcutta High Court. By reason of H
    266          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2009) 1 S.C.R.


A a judgment and order dated 11.06.2004, a learned 'Single
                                                                            "-
  Judge of the said Court allowed the said writ application
  opining that only a person who was sitting idle would come                      ·.
  within the purview of the term 'unemployed youth' and as the
  respondents had been carrying on ·business, they did not
B satisfy the conditions for allotment of country spirit shop. It was
  directed:
                                               I                                  ._
          "I accordingly allow this writ application and set aside the    .....    •
          order dated December 9, 2002 issued by the District
          Magistrate and Collector, Bankura granting licence in
c         favour of the Private respondents as well as the order
          passed by the Appellate Authority dated July 25, 2003                   ~
          which affirmed the said order. The licence granted in favour
          of the Private respondents is hereby quashed. The
          respondents are directed to take consequential steps for
D         setting the licence for setting up the country spirit shop at    ,,,.
          Chatramore strictly in accordance with law. Such steps
          must be completed within one month from the date of
          communication of this order to Collector and District
          Magistrate, Bankura.
E
                In view of the disposal of the main Writ Petition, the
          application filed by the respondent Nos, 7 and 8 for
          vacating the ad-interim order passed in this writ petition,
          becomes infructuous. The said application is also
                                                                          'It

F         disposed of as infructuous."

        9. An intra court appeal was preferred thereagainst. By
    reason of the impugned judgment, the writ appeal was allowed
    by a Division Bench of the said Court, opining:

G       "11. It cannot be assumed from the nature of the
        advertisement that by 'unemployed youth' the authorities
        have meant a person who shall be totally without any              ~

      · income in order to sustain himself. There is no basis for
        such assumption. In fact, in order to get; the licence the
H       candidates will have to furnish an objection free site,
          PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATIERJEE & 267
                    CO. & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
               normally such a site has to be obtained either by taking it       A
    )I
               on rent or by offering such a site which is part of one's
               property. Apart from that such unemployed youths are
•              supposed to show some financial strength by way of
               furnishing of bank balance and so on. It is not expected
~
               that a person who has no income even to sustain himself           B
               will be able to satisfy these requirements.

                12. In the instant case it may be noted that the appellants
                are earning some money in order to sustain themselves
                but it is nobody's case that they have got any permanent
               employment or they are serving in any institution as              c
                regularly paid employees. In fact the registration of persons'
                name in Employment Exchange will show that the persons
               concerned have registered themselve_s as unemployed
               youth for an employment but have not got the employment.
               The same is true of the appellants also. It is not disputed       0
               by anybody that they are registered with the Employment
               Exchange. But even after such registration they are not
               getting any employment in order to sustain themselves. But
               they are doing some work may be by way of seasonal
               business or by working in family business which cannot be         E
              called an employment. Therefore on this ground alone the
               licence which has been granted to the appellants cannot
              be rejected. In this connection this Court is also
    _)'
              constrained to observe that since the expression
              'unemployed youth' has been explained in the                       F
              advertisement with the help of expression 'mean', there is
              no scope for further interpreting the said expression
              'unemployed youth' with the help of Black's Law Dictionary
              or an ordinary dictionary."

          It was held:
                                                                                 G

              "17. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of law on
              the subject it is difficult for this Court to accept tne
              interpretation of 'unemployed youth' given by the learned
                                                                                 H
     268         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2009) 1 S.C.R.      I

A          Judge by relying on Black's Law Dictionary. The learned
           Judge possibly fell into an error by not holding that. here
           the expression 'unemployed youth' must receive a
           contextual interpretation namely it would mean a person         •
           who has not been substantially employed or has not been
B·         in any service even though lie is registered as an
           unemployed youth with the Employment Exchange and as
           has been so declared by the authorities and also must be
           within a certain age group. Apart from that there is no other
           requirement. If the person concerned earns some money
           for subsistence, he does not go out of the category of
c          unemployed youth if he otherwise fulfils the prescribed
           conditions. Going by this reasoning, as we must, this Court
           cannot accept the interpretation given to 'unemployed
           youth' by the Id. Judge of the Writ Court. As such we feel
           constrained to take a different view and, set aside the
D          judgment under appeal."

          10. Mr. Joydeep Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing on
     behalf of the appellants, would contend that the Division Bench           -!
     of the High Court committeq a serious error insofar as it failed
 E to take into consideration that the definition of the term
     'unemployed youth' as contained in the aforementioned
     advertisement dated 18.01.2001 was decisive inasmuch as not
   · o~IY a person who was to apply for allotment of country liquor
     shop was to be registered with the employment exchange, but
,7 · also a certificate was required to be obtained from the persons
     specified therein. It was urged that grant of such certificate
     having an impact on the factual aspect in regard to the person
     being employed or not and having an element of subjectivity
     wherefor no parameter or guidelines having been laid down,
 G the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

          11. Mr. Tara Chandra Sharma, learned counsel appearing
     on behalf of the State of West Bengal, on the other hand, would
     draw our attention to Clause 5(3) of the West Bengal Excise
     (Selection of Person for grant of License at New Sites for Retail
H
 PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATTERJEE & 269
          · CO. &.ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

Sale of Spirit and Certain other intoxicants other than Foreign       A
Liquor on categories of licensee and licenses for Denatured
Spirit) Order, 2000 [For short "the said Order"] to contend that
some income or some property at the hands of the applicants
was necessary as otherwise they would not be in a position to
carry out any business in liquor.                                     B

    12. Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, submitted:

      (i)     Appellants themselves having obtained a certificate
              granted by the persons specified in the                 C
              advertisement cannot now question the correctness
              or otherwise of the certificate (s) granted in favour
              of the partners of the respondent No. 1.

      (ii)    In any event, no such contention having been raised     o
              before the High Court, this Court should not permit
              the appellant to raise such contention for the first
              time before this Court.

      (iii)   Validity and/or legality of the advertisement and/ or
              the said Order having not been challenged by the        E
              appellants, the contentions of the appellants in that
              behalf are wholly misplaced.

     13. The matter relating to grant of licence is governed by
the provisions of the West Bengal Excise (Selection of New . F
Sites and Grant of license for Retail Sale of Spirit and certain
other Intoxicants) Rules, 1993 (for short "the Rules").

     In the said Order, it is stated that "unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context, words and expressions            G
used in this Order and not defined, shall have the meaning
respectively assigned to them in the West Bengal Excise
(Selection of New Sites and Grant of License for Retail Sale
of Spirit and Certain Other Intoxicants) Rules, .1993".

     Clause 3 of the said Order provides that "the State              H
    270         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2009) 1 S.C.R.


A Government may reserve any new site or sites for settlement
  amongst firms or societies formed by unemployed youths under
  the provisions of any Jaw for the time being in force" Explanation
  appended thereto reads as under:                                               ·~
                                                                                 '
          "'Unemployed youth' shall mean any person of or above
B
          the age of 21 years but not above 37 years, registered as
          unemployed in any Employment Exchange in the State of
          West Bengal and certified to be unemployed by any of the
          authorities mentioned hereunder in whose jurisdiction such
          person resides: -
c
          (a) Member of Parliament

          (b) Member of Legislative Assembly

          (c) Sabhadhipati of a Zilia Parishad
D
          (d) Sabhadhipati, Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad;

          (e) Chairman, Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council,

          (f) Chief Executive Officer of a notified area;
E
          (g) Mayor or Commissioner of a Municipal Corporation;

          (h) Chairman of a Municipality"                                        ,,
                                                                                 ii
                                                                        ;
  The relevant portion of Clause 5(3) of the said Order reads as
F under:

          "(3) To be eligible for a license, an applicant-

          (i) must have sufficient education to enable him to make
G         and follow the calculation necessary for conducting the
          business and writing accounts appertaining thereto
          correctly. Knowledge of English is essential only in the
          case of a foreign liquor shop;                                    "'

          (ii) must be in a position to invest the capital necessary
H         for financing the shop properly without borrowing from
      PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATIERJEE & 271
                CO. & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
           others;"                                                             A

           14. The question posed before us must be answered inter
      alia keeping in view the aforementioned rule.

             15. There are three criteria attached thereto, viz., (i) the age
      of the applicant, (ii) they have to be registered as unemployed           B
      in any employment exchange in the State of West Bengal and
      (iii) they have to be certified to be unemployed by any of the
      authorities specified therein.

           16. The meaning of the term 'unemployed youth' must be               c
      culled out from the text and context in which the same appeared.

           17. In Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 'Unemployment'
      is defined as 'state of being not employed; lack of employment'.
      The word 'unemployed' has been explained in the New Shorter
                                                                                D
      Oxford English Dictionary, 1993 as 'not made use of, use for a
      particular purpose, not engaged in any occupation, idle, out of
      paid employment, redundant'.

           18. The main thrust in this case, however, appears to be
      on the registration of a person as unemployed in the                      E
      employment exchange. Certificate is required to be given by
      the authorities specified therein as despite such registration
      and/ or continuation thereof, a person may be employed with a
...   private person or in some other districts or in some other
      states.                                                                   F
            19. In a case of this nature, a person cannot be said to be
      employed only because he earns his bare subsistence
      livelihood by engaging himself in some work. In this case, one
      of the respondents was helping his brother who was owner of
                                                                        G
      the shop. He was not the owner of the shop. The other
      respondent used to carry on business which is of seasonal
      nature. He was, therefore, also not a full fledged businessman.
      Nothing has been brought on record to show that they were
      income tax payees or were otherwise established in their life.
                                                                        H
    272         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2009) 1 S.C.R.


A It may be true that the authorities specified in the Explanation
  appended to Clause 3 of the said Order were required to issue
  certificate on the basis of their own concept in regard thereto.
  It is true that no guideline had been issued, but, probably no
  guideline was required to be issued, as the said authorities
B concerned, keeping in view the legal position, would be
  presumed to be aware of the financial status as also the fact
  as to whether they remained unemployed. Furthermore, the
  said Order does not contemplate that the applicants would be
  absolutely poor or they would not have any property at all. They
C were required to establish a business in liquor. They were
  required to make substantial investment. Their financial capacity
  was required to be such so as to enable them to carry out the
  business and furthermore fulfill their obligations both contractual
  and statutory in terms of the provisions of the Excise Act, the
D Rules framed thereunder as also the conditions of licence.

         20. In the instant case, the Division Bench satisfied itself
    that the respondents were to be considered as 'unemployed
    youth' in terms of the aforementioned advertisement.

E        21. In a situation of this nature, the interpretation clause
  should be given a contextual meaning. It is not exhaustive. It is
  trite that when a statutory enactment defines its terms, the same
  should govern what is proved, authorized or done under or by
  reference to that enactment. It is also trite that all statutory
F definitions have to be read subject to the qualification variously
  expressed in the interpretation clause, which created them.

         In Feroze N. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani and Others
    [(2003) 1 SCC 433], this Court held:

G         "11. It appears that the legislature only intended that in
          cases where the landlord residing in a premises, parts with
          possession of a part of it, it would always be open to him
          to regain the possession of the whole as and when the
          licensor may so deem necessary. The question of
H         acquiring common lease right by a person not a member
     PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATiERJEE & 273
               CO. & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
         of the family may not arise. This is a plain and simple          A
         meaning flowing from the definition of the words "paying
         guest" under the Act. Introducing any other element or
         ingredient to give meaning to the words "paying guest" as
         may be prevalent under any other law or under English law
         will be doing violence to the definition of the words "paying    B
         guest" as defined under the Act."

          In State of Maharashtra v. 8.E. Billimoria [(2003) 7 SCC
     336], this Court observed:

         "32. It is well settled that the provisions of the statule are   c
         to be read in the text and context in which they have been
         enacted. It is well settled that in construction of a statute
         an effort should be made to give effect to all the provisions
         contained therein. It is equally well settled that a statute
         should be interpreted equitably so as to avoid hardship ... "    D

         In P. Kasilingam-v. P.S.G. College of Technology [1995
     Supp (2) SCC 348], this Court held:

          "A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature
          by using the word 'means' or the word 'includes'. E
          Sometimes the words 'means and includes' are used. The
          use of the word 'means' indicates that "definition is a hard-
          and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned
)r
          to the expression than is put down in definition". (See :
          Gough v. Gough; Punjab Land Development and F
          Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour
          Court) The word 'includes' when used, enlarges the
          meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend
          not only such things as they signify according to their natural
          import but also those things which the clause declares that G
         they shall include. The words "means and includes", on the
          other hand, indicate 'an exhaustive explanation of the
          meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably
         .be attached to these words or expressions'."
                                                                          H

                                                                      ~
    274         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A        In K. V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal [(1997) 2 SCC 53],
    this Court held:

          "10. Apparently, it appears that the definition is conclusive
          as the word "means" has been used to specify the
          members, namely, spouse, son, daughter, grandchild or
B
          dependant parent, who would constitute the family. Section
          2 of the Act in which various terms have been defined,
          opens with the words "in this Act, unless the context
          otherwise requires" which indicates that the definitions, as
          for example, that of "family", which are indicated to be
c         conclusive may not be treated to be conclusive if it was
          otherwise required by the context. This implies that a
          definition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read
          in the light of the context and scheme of the Act as also
          the object for which the Act was made by the legislature.
D
          11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind
          that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not
          repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would
          aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be
E         served by the Act. A construction which would defeat or
          was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be
          ignored and not accepted.

          12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant
          case, is· preceded by the words "unless the context
F         otherwise requires", the said definition set out in the
          section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule,
          which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be
          something in the context to show that the definition could
          not be applied."
G
       In Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank
    Employees Union [(2007) 4 SCC 685), this Court held:

          "23. Section 2(bb) of the ID Act as initially introduced by
          Act 54 of 1949 used the words "means ... and includes"
H
PAUL ENTERPRISES & ORS. v. RAJIB CHATIERJEE & 275
          CO. & ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

    and was confined to a "banking company" as defined in             A
    Section 5 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, having
    branches or other establishments in more than one
    province and includes Imperial Bank of India. Similarly,
    Section 2(kk), which was also introduced by Act 54 of
    1949, defines insurance company as "an insurance                  8
    company as defined in Section 2 of the Insurance Act, 1938
    (4 of 1938), having branches or other establishments in
    more than one province". It is trite to say that when in the
    definition clause given in any statute the word "means" is
    used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When        C
    the word "means" is used in the definition, to borrow the
    words of Lord Esher, M.R. in Gough v. Gough it is a "hard-
    and-fast" definition and no meaning other than that which
    is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. (Also
    see P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology.) On
    the other hand, when the word "includes" is used in the           D
    definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the
    definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not
    exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its
    ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring
    within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may       E
    not comprise. Therefore, the use of the word "means"
    followed by the word "includes" in Section 2(bb) of the ID
    Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the
    definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking
    companies which fall within the purview of the definition         F
    and no other."

     22. Even if we apply the standards which are applicable
in the industrial law meaning thereby Section 178 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as also a situation where the           G
question arises as to grant of back wages for not being able
to gainfully employed, a person living on mere subsistence
earning as of necessity is not considered to be gainfully
employed. [See Novartis India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal
and Ors. [2008 (15) SCALE 470]
                                                                      H
    276        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  {2009] 1 S.C.R.


A        Keeping in view the interpretative tools required to be
    used in a case of this nature, we are of the opinion, despite          '·
    the fact that the respondents had been earning some money,
    the same would not disentitle them to take part in the selection
    process for grant of a license in terms of the order.
B        The advertisement in question keeping in view the text and
    context in which it was issued clearly go to show that for the
    purpose of applying for grant of a liquor shop, the respondents
    were qualified having been continuing to be registered in the
    Employment Exchange and having been granted a certificate
c   in that behalf by the person specified in the advertisement.

        It is not a case where the word 'unemployed' should be
  given a literal or even the dictionary.meaning. In our view, it is
  required to be given a purposive meaning; a meaning which
D is capable of being translated in the action, a meaning which
  would not lead to an anomaly or absurdity; a meaning which
  satisfies the text and context in which the word has been used.

        23. Furthermore, the appellant No. 1 applied for and was
  granted the similar certificate. It is, therefore, too late in the day
E for him to contend now that the provisions relating to grant of
  certificate being devoid of any guideline or objective criteria
  should be declared ultra vires .
.
       In any event, even otherwise, the validity and/or legality of
F the said Order has not been c;hallenged.
         24. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are
    dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however,
    there shall be no order as to costs.
G R.P.                                           Appeals dismissed.