Supreme Court of India
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM.versusA.K. JOSSEPH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 886
- Decided
- 7 July 2009
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The 1958 decree is not binding on the Travancore Devaswom Board, and the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 27; therefore the appeal is partly allowed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration.
Summary
The Payappar Sree Dharmasastha Temple, represented by its Advisory Committee, challenged a Kerala High Court order that dismissed the Travancore Devaswom Board’s suit for eviction of an alleged encroacher, A.K. Joseph. The Board’s suit was rejected on the ground that a 1958 decree in favour of Joseph, obtained in a suit where the Board was not a party, was binding. The Supreme Court held that the 1958 decree could bind only the State Government, not the Board, which was a necessary party and therefore not bound by that judgment. The Court also found that the High Court mis‑interpreted Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950, and failed to consider crucial revenue records. The appeal was partly allowed, the High Court’s judgment set aside, and the matter remitted for fresh consideration, with directions for speedy disposal. The Court affirmed the appellant’s locus standi based on earlier permission to file a Special Leave Petition.
Issues considered
- The effect of a decree passed in a suit where the Travancore Devaswom Board was not a party on the Board’s title to temple property.
- Interpretation of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950 with respect to Devaswom properties.
- Whether the Temple Advisory Committee has locus standi to file the appeal after a Special Leave Petition was granted.
- The maintainability of the appeal in view of the earlier dismissal of a Special Leave Petition on limitation grounds.
Subjects
Devaswom propertySection 27Temple land encroachmentDecree bindingLocus standiSpecial Leave PetitionTravancore Devaswom BoardSupervisory jurisdictionProperty rights
Judgment
[2009] 10 S.C.R. 762
A PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM.
v.
A.K. JOSSEPH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4138 of 2009)
JULY 7, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.]
Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950:
s. 27 - Administration of temples - Respondent 1 obtained a
C decree of declaration of his rights in temple properties in 1958
by filing a suit in which Board was not made party - Suit filed
by Board in 1998 claiming to be owner of the temple
properties - Dismissed in view of earlier decree obtained by
respondent 1 - Held : The decree of 1958 was not binding
O and effective against the Board since it was necessary party '
and was not arrayed as party - High Court had not
appreciated the evidence on. record - Matter remitted to High
Court for fresh consideration - High Court to dispose of the
proceedings expeditiously.
E
The Travancore Devaswom Board was constituted to
look after the management of property of the appellant-
temple. The appellant was a body constituted by the
Board. There were large track of land belonging to the
•
temple. A part of land was allegedly encroached by the
F predecessor of respondent no.1. In 1958, the
predecessor of respondent 1 filed a suit for declaration
of his rights in the suit land. In the suit, the Board was
not impleaded as a party.
G The trial Court decreed the suit which remained
unchallenged. In 1998, the Board filed a suit against
respondent 1 for eviction from the suit land. However, the
trial court dismissed the suit in view of earlier decree
obtained by respondent 1. The Board filed appeal against
H 762
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A: COM. v. 763
A.K. JOSSEPH
~ the order of trial court. A complaint was filed on behalf A
of the temple alleging trespass by respondent 1, invoking
supervisory powers of High Court under Travancore
Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950. Since two
proceedings were pending before High Court, one for
exercise of supervisory powers and appeal against order B
of trial court, both were heard together.
The records showed that in 1929, the State
Government transferred the suit land in favour of
predecessor of respondent 1. However, in 1931, the State
Government rectified the position and set aside the
c
previous order of 1929 of transfer ot suit land. The same
was challenged by predecessor of respondent 1 in 1998
making only State Government a party without making
the temple authorities party to the suit. The Munsif Court
decreed the suit on the ground that the Dewan had no D
jurisdiction to pass the order.
High Court whi~h exercised supervisory powers
under 1950 Act directed that report be given by Tehsildar.
Based on the report submitted, High Court passed an E
order directing State Government to evict the illegal
occupants. The property was handed over to Board after
evicting respondent 1.
The appellant filed the present appeal before this
Court contending that courts below failed to consider the
F
documents and decreed the suit filed by respondent 1
only on the ground that the earlier suit filed by
predecessor of respondent 1 was decreed in his favour,
but totally ignored the fact that in the said suit even the
appellant or the Board were not made party and, G
I-
therefore, the said decree was neither binding nor
effective against the Board and the temple authorities.
Respondent 1 contested the appeal contending that
H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 10 S.C.R.
A it was not maintainable on the ground that an earlier SLP
filed by Board was dismissed on account of delay.
Partly allowing the appeal and remitting the matter of
High Court, the Court
B HELD : 1.1. After coming into force of Travancore
Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950, the
administration of temples and all their properties and
funds, except the Sree Padmanabhaswami Temple got
vested in the Travancore Board. Section 27 of the Act
c states that the immovable properties entered or classed
in the revenue records as Devaswom property, which is
in the possession or enjoyment of the Devaswom
effective from 12th April, 1922 shall be dealt with as
Devaswom Properties. In the suit filed by the Board, a
D number of documents were placed on record relating to
the land in question but High Court came to the
conclusion that the Board could not produce any
document to show that the schedule property belonged
to the Board. [Paras 13 and 14) [773-E-G; 774-B-C]
E
1.2. The trial court as also the High Court dismissed
the suit filed by the Board, mainly, on the ground that the
Respondent No. 1 obtained a decree in his favour by
filing a suit in 1980. But the said suit was filed in the year
1958 by the Respondent No. 1 only against the State
F Government. Board claimed to be the owner of the suit
property which was the subject matter of the suit, and
therefore, the Board was a necessary party. Since the
Board was not arrayed as a party to the suit and decree
was obtained only against the State Government, the
G said decree at the most be binding only against the State
I
and not against the Board. The High Court confirmed the
judgment of the trial court only on the ground that there
was already a decree passed in favour of Respondent
No. 1 in a suit filed in 1958. But while doing so, the High
H
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 765
A.K. JOSSEPH
Court totally ignored the earlier judgment passed by the A
"'
same High Court and also the report of the Tahsildar with
""
regard to the encroachment of the temple land by the
Respondent No. 1. [Para 15] [77 4-D-H]
1.3. The interpretation sought to be given by the High B
Court so far as Section 27 of the 1950 Act is concerned,
was incorrect. The High Court upheld the order of the trial
court dismissing the suit filed by the Board, mainly, on
two grounds, namely, the decree passed in 1.958 suit
which according to the High Court was final and binding
and on interpretation of Section 27 of the Travancore
c
Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950, which was
an incorrect interpretation, particularly, in view of the fact
that the findings arrived at by the High Court that the
Board could not produce evidence that it was in
possession of the property on the date in question. (Para D
16) [775-8-F]
2. It is indeed true that the Board had filed SLP which
was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The appellant
is a legal entity in view of the fact that it was constituted E
by the Board as per the byelaws issued by the Board.
While filing the present appeal, the appellant stated that
its interest in filing this appeal was only to protect the
Board properties from the encroachers and to see that
the lands belonging to temples and religious worships F
were not tampered with and also to give effective
implementation to the provisions of the Travancore
Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950, interest and
purpose of which is to protect Devaswom p~operties. An
order was passed by this Court on 27.02.2006 when
G
permission to file the SLP was granted, and therefore, the
-·
•
I said question of locus standi cannot be re-agitated before
this Court. (Paras 17 and 18] (775-G-H; 776-A-B]
Gurpreet Singh Bhul!ar v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 10 S.C.R.
A 758; Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi (2001) 8 SCC 289;
Raju Ramsingh Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkr (2008)
9 sec 54, relied on. -
3. The High Court passed the impugned order only
on the basis of the fact that earlier decree would be
8
binding on the appellant as also the Board and also on
interpretation given to Section 27 of the Travancore
Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950. Both the
views taken by the High Court were incorrect and
required to be re-considered by the High Court. After
C considering all the relevant documents including the
revenue record, it was found that the High Court could
not appreciate the evidence on record. Those records
should not be ignored by the High Court as it was
exercising the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court and
D therefore the High Court committed a manifest error of law
apparent on the face of the record. Matter is remitted to
the High Court. Since the matter is old, High Court is
requested to dispose of the proceedings as expeditiously
as possible. [Paras 20, 21 and 22] [777-F-H; 778-A-C]
E
Case Law Reference:
(2006) 3 sec 758 relied on Para 17
(2001) 8 sec 289 relied on Para 18
F (2008) 9 sec 54 relied on Para 19
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4138 of 2009.
G From the Judgment & Order dated 18.5.2004 of the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in AS. No. 298 of 2002.
Mathai M. Paideday, Shishir Pinaki and Sanjay Jain for
-
the Appellants. '
H S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Bina Madhavan, Shwetank
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 767
AK. JOSSEPH
.. _.,_
Silakwal (for Lawyer's Knit & Co.), R. Sathish, M.P. Vinod, A
....... Dillep Pillai and Ajay K. Jain for the Respondents .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Leave granted.
B
2. The present appeal is filed by the appellant herein
challenging the legality of the Judgment dated 18.05.2004
... passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court
dismissing not only the CMP No. 1118 of 2001 in T.D.B. No.
38 of 1996 but also the appeal registered as A.S. No. 298 of c
2002 arising out of O.S. No. 37 of 1998.
3. In T.D.B. No. 38 of 1996, the Travancore Devaswom
Board (hereinafter "the Board") alleged that the property, which
j
was the plaint sct)edule property in O.S. No. 37 of 1998, belong
to Travancore Devaswom Board and that said land had been D
illegally encroached upon and was in occupation of the
trespassers. The aforesaid suit was filed for removing the
trespassers.
4. Earlier, the Travancore Devaswom Board had filed a suit E
for evicting the trespassers (the respondents), which was
registered as O.S. No. 37 of 1998. The said suit was contested
by the respondents. However, the aforesaid suit was finally
dismissed.
F
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order an appeal was
filed by the Board before the Kerala High Court contending,
inter alia, that the plaint scheduled property belongs to it and
that the respondent no. 1 was in illegal occupation of the same
and prayed for an eviction order against respondent no. 1. As
CMP No. 1118 of 2001 in T.D.B. No. 38of1996 was pending G
• for consideration before the Munsiff Court, the High Court on
coming to know that another proceeding, namely, A.S. No. 298
of 2002 is pending for consideration for the same property in
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A the appellate court, High Court withdrew the said proceedings ;'4
from the appellate court and proceeded to decide both the
matter together. The High Court held that the trial court was
,,,,
justified in dismissing the suit of the Board, particularly, in view
of Exhibit B5. After recording that the property did not belong
B to the Boc;rd and that it actually belong to Respondent No. 1, it
was held that the Respondent No. 1 was wrongly dispossessed
on the basis of the subsequent survey and therefore a direction
was issued to hand over the possession of the property to the
Respondent No. 1.
c 6. Being aggrieved by the said Judgment and Order a
Special Leave Petition No. 15250 of 2005 (CC No. 6642 of f-
2005) was filed before this Court by the Board, which was,
however, dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay. The
present appeal is filed by the Temple Advisory Committee
D against the aforesaid Judgment of the High Court contending,
'
inter alia, that the Board is not interested in protecting its
property and therefore the aforesaid SLP was filed casually
after expir/ of the limitation period thereby allowing a large part
of immovable property which belong to the temple to go to the
E third party which would adversely affect the very functioning of
the temple. This Court issued notice in the SLP as also on the
application seeking for condonation of delay and also on the
application for interim relief. The matter was consequently listed
before us for final hearing upon which we heard the learned
F counsel appearing for the parties.
7. However, before we advert to the submissions made
by the counsel appearing for the respective parties, we may
record a few facts leading to the filing of the present appeal
so as to enable us to effectively consider the contentions of the
G
parties. Payappar Sree Dharma Sastha Temple was settled
with a large track of land, which was necessary for the better
management of the temple. A Board was constituted to look
after the management of the property of the Temple - the
appellant herein. The appellant is a Body duly constituted by
H
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 769
A.K. JOS8t:PH [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
. ,,., A
...
the Board as per the bylaws issued by the Board. Large extent
of valuable property adjoining the temple wa& trespassed by
some people and from that, an extent of 1.85 acres was
allegedly encroached upon by the predecessor of Respondent
No. 1. When at the behest of the Temple, orders were issued
to evict the predecessor of Respondent No. 1, a suit was filed B
by him before the Munsiff's court in the year 1958 praying for
a decree declaring the plaintiffs rights in the property and in
--i the alternative for a declaration that the State should pay the
value of improvements before the evic,ion of the plaintiff. In the
said suit, the Board was not impleaded as a party on the ground c
that the Board was in unauthorized possession of the property.
A decree came to be passed in the said suit in favour of the
plaintiff therein. The Board had no knowledge about the said
decree. Even the State did not file any appeal against the
aforesaid decree passed by the trial court. D
8. In the year 1998, the Board filed a suit against
Respondent No. 1 in the Munsiff Court for eviction of
Respondent No. 1 from the aforesaid suit property. However,
the aforesaid suit was dismissed by the Court on the ground
that the said suit was not maintainable in view of the decree E
passed in the earlier suit, which was filed by Respondent No.
1. An appeal was preferred by the Board from the aforesaid
~ Judgment contending inter-alia that the learned Munsiff failed
to consider the fraud and collusion with regard to the earlier suit
filed in the year 1958 by Respondent No. 1 and that decree in F
the said suit was obtained behind the back of the Board and
that the Board was completely unaware both about filing and
disposal of the earlier suit. It was also contended that the
learned Munsiff failed to appreciate the purport of Section 27
of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 G
(hereinafter referred to as "1950 Act"). There was in fact a
• complaint preferred by th~ Secretary of the Renovation
Committee of the appellant temple alleging trespass by
Respondent No. 1, invoking the supervisory powers of the High
Court under the 1950 Act. The same was numbered as TDB H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A No. 38 of 1996. Since there were two proceedings pending,
namely, TDB No. 38 of 1996 before the High Court seeking
for exercise of supervisory powers and the appeal pending
before the appellate court filed by the Board against the
Judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit, the said appeal
B was transferred to the High Court and same was ordered to
be heard along with TDB No. 38 of 1996. The aforesaid cases
were taken up for hearing by the Division Bench of the High
Court. However, the aforesaid appeal as also the TDB No. 38
of 1996 were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High
c Court by passing a common order, which is the subject matter
of the present appeal.
9. The record placed before us disclose that the State
Government on 21.06.1929 passed an order transferring 1 acre
85 cents of land to Thomman Kuruvilla. The said order was also
D placed on record as Exhibit D-4. Subsequently, however, the •
State Government passed a second order dated 11.05.1931
rectifying the position by setting aside the previous order dated
21.06.1929 transferring 1 acre 85 cents of land to Thomman
Kuruvilla, which was Exhibit D-5. The second order dated
E 11.05.1931 passed by the State Government was however
challenged by the plaintiff (Thomman Kuruvilla) in O.S. No. 53
of 1998 making only the State Government a party and without
making the temple authorities, namely, Payappar Sree
Dharmasastha Temple a party to the said suit. In the said suit •
F the court granted an injunction by which the State Government
was prevented from dispossessing predecessor of Respondent
No. 1, namely, the plaintiff. The court of Munsiff subsequently
decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff i.e. the predecessor of
Respondent No. 1 on the ground that the Divan, who passed
G order dated 11.05.1931, namely, Exhibit D-5, had no jurisdiction
to pass such an order. The High Court which exercised a
supervisory power under the 1950 Act directed that a report
be given by the Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk, regarding the area
and other details of the property which was being held by
H Respondent No. 1. On 18.09.1997, the Tahsildar, Meenachil
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 771
A.K. JOSSEPH [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
A
... "' filed a detailed report with regard to the property before the
Kera la High Court. On 24.10.1997, the High Cou1 t passed an
order directing the State Government to evict the illegal
occupants in the property. On 13.11.1997, the property was
handed over the Board after evicting the Respondent No. 1,
Joseph and other trespassers and after such eviction the B
Assistant Devaswom Commissioner has been in possession
of the property. On 21.11.1997, an order was passed by the
Kerala High Court referring to the memo filed by the
government pleader to the effect that the trespassers over the
property in Survey No. 383/3 of Block 21 of Lalom village have c
been evicted and it has been restored to Payappar Sree
Dharmasastha Temple on 13.11.1997 and that the ~oard will
carry out the necessary renovation work in the temple without
delay. In the meantime, a suit was filed by Respondent No. 1
as stated herein before the Court of Munsiff, which was D
registered as Suit No. 37 of 1998.
10. The present appellant has filed the present appeal
before this Court contending that the trial court as also the High
Court failed to consider the documents on record and decreed
E
the suit filed by Respondent No. 1 only on the ground that the
earlier suit filed by predecessor of Respondent No. 1 was
decreed in his favour but totally ignoring the fact that in the said
suit even the appellant herein or the Board were not made party,
and therefore, the said decree was neither binding nor effective
against the Board and the temple a~thority or property. It was
F
also contended in the present appeal by the appellant that the
High Court has gone wrong in not adverting to crucial
documents like Exhibit A-6 and Exhibit A-7 - Revenue Register
for the period from 17.08.1949 as also other relevant documents
like Exhibit A-10, which was the Kuthakapattom Register. G
' 11. The Respondent No. 1, h')wever, contested the
aforesaid appeal contending, inter alia, that the present appeal
is not even maintainable as the earlier Special Leave Petition
No. 15250 of 2005 (CC No. 6642 of 2005) filed by Board was H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A dismissed on 20.07.2005. It was also submitted on behalf of
"
Respondent No. 1 that the appellant has no locus standi to
prefer the present appeal, as it is only the Advisory Committee
of Payappar Sree Dharmasastha Temple constituted by the
-
Board as per byelaws issued by the Board. Since the earlier
B SLP filed by the Board has been already dismissed therefore
a body constituted by the Board cannot maintain a separate
proceeding of its own. It was also submitted by the
Respondents that the Board was plaintiff in O.S. No. 37of1998
and also the owner, and therefore, there was no need for the
c Board to implead the appellant herein as additional plaintiff. It
was also submitted that if the present appeal is entertained and
allowed the effect would be that the decree passed by the court
in between the Board and the Respondent No. 1, which has
attained finality, would be nullified and the appellant herein, who
0 is neither an original plaintiff, nor a person impleaded as •
additional plaintiff at any stage of the suit before the decree
became final, would be bestowed with a decree. It was also
denied that the Respondent No. 1 was a trespasser and that
the aforesaid property was assigned in his favour by Augustly
E Mathai on 21.06.1929.
12. The said order, however, came to be superceded by
a subsequent order dated 11.05.1931. In the meantime, one
Varkey Varkey purchased the said land from the aforesaid
•
Augusthy Mathai. The predecessor of Respondent No. 1,
F namely, Thomman Kuruvilla, purchased the aforesaid property
from Varkey Varkey. It is alleged that Thomman Kuruvilla, the
father of Respondent No. 1, was in continuous occupation and
possession of the land as if he was the owner. It is only in 1957
that the State Government initiated proceedings under the Land
G Conservancy Act, as LC 65 and 66 of 1957 to evict Thomman
Kuruvilla from the property. The Board never came forward with
any claim at any point of time, till 1998 when they filed O.S. No. •
37 of 1998. Since it was the State who initiated eviction
proceedings in LC 65 and 66 of 1957 that Thomman Kuruvilla,
H father of Respondent No. 1 herein, filed the O.S. No. 53 of 1958,
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 773
A.K. JOSSEPH [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
• before the Additional Munsiff Court, Meenachil against the A
action of the State, seeking a declaration of his title over the
aforementioned 1.85 acres of property and a perpetual
injunction. It was also contended that failure to implead the
Board in that suit was under such circumstances, as the State
alone was projected as the owner and believed to be the B
owner. The suit - O.S. 53 of 1958 filed by the predecessor of
Respondent No. 1 was decreed on 30.10.1959 holding that the
~ Divan had no power to cancel the assignment. It was also
alleged that Thiruvithamkur Devaswom is a statutory body
which came into being only by Act of 1950 and before that the c
Government and Devaswom was one and the same and there
was no separate existence, and therefore, whatever order was
passed by the Government prior to 1950 regarding the land in
question was also binding upon the Board. It was also
contended that Section 27 of the 1950 Act does not nullify any
D
assignment by the Government before the Devaswom came into
existence.
13. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions we
have also perused the provisions of the aforesaid 1950 Act to
which reference was made by the counsel appearing for the E
parties before us. After coming into the force of 1950 Act the
administration of temples and all their properties and funds,
except the Sree Padmanabhaswami Temple got vested in the
Travancore Board.
F
Section 27 of the Act reads as under:
"Devaswom properties: lmmovabie properties entered or
classed in the revenue records as Devaswom Vaga or
Devaswom Poramboke and such other Pandaravaga
lands as are in the possession or enjoyment of the G
:; Devaswom mentioned in Schedule 1 after the 30th
Meenam 1097 corresponding to the 12th April, 1922 shall
be dealt with as Devaswom Properties. The provisions of
the Land Conservancy Act of 1091 (IV of 1091) shall be
applicable to Devaswom lands as in the case of H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A Government lands"
14. It is clearly mentioned in the aforesaid provision that
the immovable properties entered or classed in the revenue
records as Devaswom property, which is in the possession or
B enjoyment of the Devaswom effective from 12th April, 1922
shall be dealt with as Devaswom Properties. In the suit filed
by the Board a number of documents were placed on record,
namely, Exhibit A-6 and Exhibit A-7 - Revenue Register for the
period from 17.08.1949 as also other relevant documents like
Exhibit A-10, which was the Kuthakapattom Register, relating
C to the land in question but it appears from the Judgment passed
by the High Court that the High Court came to the conclusion
that the Board could not produce any document which shows
that the schedule property belong to the Board.
D 15. On consideration of the contentions raised before us,
we find that the trial court as also the High Court were
persuaded to dismiss the suit filed by the Board, mainly, on the
ground that the Respondent No. 1 obtained a decree in his
favour by filing a suit in 1980. But it appears to us that the said
E suit was filed in the year 1958 by the Respondent No. 1 only
against the State Government. Board claims to be the owner
of the suit property which was the subject matter of the suit, and
therefore, the Board was a necessary party. Since the Board
was not arrayed as a party to the suit and decree was obtained
F only against the State Government, so, the said decree at the
most be binding only against the State and not against the
Board. The High Court without even considering the contentions
that the Judgment in O.S. 53of1958 is not binding on the Board
confirmed the said Judgment of the trial court only on the ground
G that there is already a decree passed in favour of Respondent
No. 1 in O.S. No. 53of1958. But while doing so, the High Court
totally ignored the earlier Judgment passed by the same High ...
Court and also the report of the Tahsildar with regard to the
encroachment of the temple land by the Respondent No. 1. We
do not find any discussion of the material on record regarding
H
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 775
A.K. JOSSEPH [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
proceeding in the Kerala High Court initiated in exercise of A
supervisory power and the report obtained by the High Court
from the Tehsildar in that regard. There is also no discussion
with regard to effect and implication of the orders of the High
Court dated 24.10.1997 and dated 21.11.1997.
B
16. The interpretation sought to be given by the High Court
so far as Section 27 of the 1950 Act is concerned, in our
considered opinion was incorrect and the High Court was not
justified to come to the same as it totally overlooked the fact
that Section 27 stipulates immovable properties entered or
classed in the revenue records as Devaswom Vaga or
c
Devaswom Poramboke after 12th April 1922 would be dealt
with as Devaswom Properties whether or not the same
Devaswom properties was the issue which was sought to be
resolved and adjudicated by the High Court by looking into
various documents which were placed on record. On going D
.V·
through the records, we find that the High Court upheld the order
of the trial court dismissing the suit filed by the Board, mainly,
on two grounds, namely, the decree passed in suit no. 53 of
1958, which according to the High Court was final and binding
and on interpretation of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin E
Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950, which according to us was
an incorrect interpretation, particularly, in view of the fact that
the findings arrived at by the High Court that the Board could
-.;
not produce evidence that it was in possession of the property
on the date in question. F
17. At this stage, we are required to deal with and· also to
answer the contentions raised by the counsel appearing for
Respondent No. 1 that the present appeal itself is not
maintainable as the earlier SLP filed by the Board was
G
dismissed on the ground of limitation and the body created by
.;
. the Board cannot maintain this appeal. It is indeed true that the
Board had filed Special Leave Petition No. 15250 of 2005 (CC
No. 6642 of 2005) but the said SLP was dismissed on the
ground of limitation as the said SLP was filed by the Board
H,
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A beyond the period of limitation. The appellant herein is a legal
entity in view of the fact that it was constituted by the Board as '
per the byelaws issued by the Board. While filing the present
appeal, the appellant has stated that its interest in filing this
appeal is only to protect the Board properties from the
B encroachers and to see that the lands belonging to temples and
religious worships are not tampered with and also to give
effective implementation to the provisions of the Travancore
Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950, interest and
purpose of which is to protect Devaswom properties. The
C contention of Respondent No. 1 that the appellant has no locus
standi to file the present petition also cannot be raised and
canvass at this stage in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Gurpreet Singh Bhullar vs. Union of India (2006) 3
sec 758, wherein it was held that:
D "18. This contention need not detain us any longer,
because permission to file SLP has already been granted
by this Court on 6-1-2006".
18. In the present case also we find that an order was
E passed by this Court on 27.02.2006 when permission to file
the SLP was granted, and therefore, the said question of locus
standi cannot be re-agitated before this Court. We may also
refer to another decision of this Court in Jasbir Singh vs. Vipin
Kumar Jaggi (2001) 8 SCC 289, wherein it was held that:
F "11. At the outset, a pre!iminary objection raised by
Respondent 1 is dealt with. According to Respondent 1
this appeal has been preferred from an order passed in
proceedings to which the appellant was not a party and
the appellant has not challenged the order by which his
G application for intervention was rejected. It is contended
that in the circumstances, the appeal preferred before us
is not maintainable. The objection, assuming that it had
some force, does not survive the order passed by this
Court on 3-11-2000 granting permission to the appellant
H
PAYAPPAR SREE DHARMASASTHA TEMPLE A. COM. v. 777
A.K. JOSSEPH [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
to file the special leave petition." A
19. In Raju Ramsingh Vasave vs. Mahesh Deorao
Bhivapurkr, (2008) 9 SCC 54, this Court has held as under:
"46. We could have dismissed this application on the
simple ground that the appellant has no locus standi. We B
did not do so because as a constitutional court we felt it
to be our duty to lay down the law correctly so that similar
mistakes are not committed in future. Apart from the
general power of the superior courts vested in it under
Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution of India, this c
Court is bestowed with a greater responsibility by the
makers of the Constitution in terms of Articles 141and142
of the Constitution. Decisions are galore wherein this Court
unhesitatingly exercised such jurisdiction to resort to the
~·
creative interpretation to arrive at a just result in regard to D
the societal and/or public interest. We thought that it is a
case of that nature. We may notice that recently such a
legal principle has been considered by this Court in Indian
Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd.22 This
Court, however, while laying down the law suitably moulded E
;
the relief so as to do complete justice between the parties."
20. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position and also
"" in view of the fact that permission to file special leave petition
was granted by this Court, if we find that the order of the High
Court cannot be maintained and is required to be set aside,
F
we would not hesitate to do so because of the locus of the
appellant to file the present appeal in this Court. The High Court
had passed the impugned order only on the basis of the fact
that earlier decree would be binding on the appellant as also
the Board and also on interpretation given to Section 27 of the G
Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act, 1950. We
have already held and recorded a finding that both the
aforesaid views taken by the High Court are incorrect and
required to be re-considered by the High Court.
H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 10 S.C.R.
A 21. After considering all the relevant documents including
the revenue record we find that the High Court could not
appreciated the evidence on record and those records would
not be ignored by the High Court as the High Court was
exercising the jurisdiction of the 1st Appellate Court and
B therefore the High Court has committed a manifest error of law
apparent on the face of the record.
22. Therefore, we set aside the impugned Judgment and
Order passed by the High Court and remit back the matter to
the High Court for fresh consideration of all the aspects,
C particularly, all the evidence that exist on the record. Since the
matter is old, the High Court is requested to dispose of the
proceedings as expeditiously as possible. The impugned
Judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. Accordingly,
the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
D
D.G. Appeal partly allowed.
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