PHOOL PATTI AND ANRversusRAM SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ANR.

                         (2009] 5 S.C.R. 362


A                     PHOOL PATTI AND ANR.
                                   v.
          RAM SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ANR.
                (Civil Appeal No. 1240 of 2005)

                          MARCH 31, 2009
B
           [MARKANDEY KATJU AND ASOK KUMAR
                     GANGULY, JJ.]

        Registration Act, 1908: s.17(2)(vi) - Exception in
c   s.17(2)(vi) - Interpretation of - Inconsistency between the
    decisions of Supreme Court regarding interpretation of
    exception in s.17(2)(vi) - Matter referred to larger Bench -
    Reference to larger Bench.
        Appeal: First appellate court - Finding of first appellate
D court that consent decree in another suit was not collusive was
    a finding of fact - High Court rightly refused to interfere with
    the findings of fact.
         Interpretation of statutes: Court cannot add words to the
    statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain
E                                                                      ~
    reading the meaning is clear.
        The appellants were daughters of one 'B'. They filect
  a suit No. 234 of 1982 challenging a consent decree
  dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 on the
F ground    that same was collusive. The trial court decreed
  the suit. However, first appellate court set aside the order
  of trial court. High Court dismissed the appeal. Hence the
  present appeal.
      Referring the matter to larger Bench on interpretation
G of exception in clause (vi) of s.17(2) of Registration Act,
  the Court
       HELD: 1. The finding of the First Appellate Court that
  the judgment and decree dated 24.11.1980 was not
  collusive is a finding of fact. '8' who was the defendant
H                             362
...       PHOOL PATii AND ANR. v. RAM SINGH (DEAD)            363
                  THROUGH LRS. & ANR.

      in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 supported the judgment and        A
      decree dated 24.11.1980 by giving his evidence on oath.
      On the other hand the appellants did not appear at any
      stage of the trial of the suit being No.234 of 1982 before
      the trial Court to stake or affirm or claim any right in the
 -~
      disputed land. '8' was residing with the respondents for       B
      the last several years and he treated the respondent as
      his real son. As regards the appellants who were his
      daughters, they were married long back, and left for their
      maternal home, and 'B' was living with the respondent
      alone. 'B' was said to have had great love and affection       c
      for the respondent. There was a family arrangement in
      which the disputed property fell exclusively to the
      respondent. Since the consent decree dated 24.11.1980
      was held by the first appellate court to be not collusive,
  .   the High Court rightly refused to interfere with that          D
      findings of fact. [Paras 5 to 9] [365-D-H; 366-A-B]
           2.1. The exception mentioned in Section 17(2)(vi) of
      Registration Act, 1908 means that if a suit is filed by the
      plaintiff in respect of property 'A', then a decree in that
      suit in respect of immovable property 'B' (which was not       E
      the subject-matter of the suit at all) would require
      registration. This was the view taken by this Court in *K.
      Raghunandan Case. [Para 12] [366-E]

  A       *K. Raghunandan & Ors. v. Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors.
      (2008) 9Scale 215 and **Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major         F
      1995 (5) sec 709, referred to.
          2.2. There seems to be inconsistency between the
      decisions of this Court in *K. Raghunandan's case and
      **Bhoop Singh's case in so far as the interpretation to the
                                                                     G
      exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the
      Registration Act is concerned. Prima facie it seems that
      the decision in **Bhoop Singh's case does not lay down
      the correct law. It is a well settled principle of
                                                                     H
    364        SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2009] 5 S.C.R.


A interpretation that the Court cannot add words to the
  statute or change its language, particularly when on a
  plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there
  is no mention of any pre-existing right in the exception
  in clause (vi) it is difficult to accept the views in **Bhoop
B Singh's case. [Para!; 14 and 16] (367-A-B, F]
                         Case Law Reference:
          (2008) 9 Scale 215     referred to           Para 12
          1995 (5) sec 109       referred to           Para 13
c       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1240 of 2005.
      From the Judgment & Order dated 22.10.2003 of the High
  Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second
D Appeal No. 2176 of 1985.
        Mahabir Singh, Rakesh Dahiya, Urned Singh Gulia and
    Rutwik Panda for the Appellants.
      Nidesh Gupta, S.K. Bansal, Savitri Bansal, Dr. Kailash
  Chand, Ashok Kumar Sharma and Avinash Kumar Jain for the
E Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. This appeal by special leave
  has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Punjab
F and Haryana High Court dated 22.10.2003 in Regular Second
  Appeal No.2176 of 1985.
        2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
    record.
G      3. The appellants are the daughters of one Bhagwana.
  They along with one Shobha Ram filed Civil Suit No.234 of
  1982 against the respondents challenging the decree in Civil
  Suit No.630 of 1980 regarding certain land and a house filed
  by Ram Singh against Bhagwana on the ground that the said
H suit was a collusive suit and hence the decree was illegal and
              PHOOL PATii AND ANR. v. RAM SINGH (DEAD)                365
-... I       THROUGH LRS. & ANR. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
         void. Accordingly the prayer in Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 filed     A
         by the appellants was to set aside the decree in Civil Suit
         No.630 of 1980. The trial court on 31.5.1983 decreed Civil Suit
         No.234 of 1982 and set aside the judgment and decree dated
         24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 on the ground that the
 -1      same was collusive. However, in the first appeal under Section      B
         96 C.P.C. the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,
         Sonepat allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the
         trial court and dismissed the suit by his judgment dated
         21.3.1985.
             4. Aggrieved against the judgment of the learned                c
         Additional District and Sessions Judge dated 21.3.1985 the
         appellants filed a second appeal before the High Court which
         was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 22.10.2003.
         Hence this appeal by special leave.
   ¥
                                                                            D
              5. The finding of the First Appellate Court that the judgment
         and decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 was
         not collusive is a finding of fact. It may be noted that Bhagwana
         who was the defendant in the said Civil Suit No.630 of 1980
         was alive when the Suit No.18 of 1982 was filed and he had
         supported the judgment and decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil E
         Suit No.630of1980 by giving his evidence on oath as DW2. ·

               6. On the other hand the appellants did not appear at any
         stage of the trial of the suit being No. 234 of 1982 before the     F
    ~    trial court to stake or affirm or claim any right in the disputed
         land.
              7. It has come in evidence that Bhagwana was residing
         with the respondents for the last several years and Bhagwana
         treated the respondent as his real son. As regards the              G

   ..    appellants who are daughters of Bhagwana, they had been
         married long back, and had left for their maternal home, and
         hence Bhagwana was living with the respondent alone.
         Bhagwana is said to have had great love and affection for the
         respondent. There was a family arrangement in which the             H
    366         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2009] 5 S.C.R.


A disputed property fell exclusively to the respondent.
         9. Since the consent decree dated 24.11.1980 had been
    held by the First Appellate Court to be not collusive, the High
    Court in our opinion rightly refused to interfere with that findings
    of fact.
8                                                                           ,~




        10. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the
    appellant that there was violation of the Section 17 of the
    Registration Act, 1908.
         11. In this connection, it may be noted that Section 17(2)(vi)
c   of the Registration Act states that "nothing in clauses (b) and
    (c) of sub-section(1) of Section 17 applies to:
          "any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order
          expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising
          immovable property other than that which is the subject-
D         matter of the suit or proceeding."                                'l'

                                                 (emphasis supplied)
        12. In our opinion the exception mentioned in Section
  17(2)(vi) means that if a suit is filed by the plaintiff in respect
E of property A, then a decree in that suit in respect of immovable
  property 8 (which was not the subject-matter of the suit at all)
  will require registration. This is the view taken by this Court in
  K. Raghunandan & Ors. vs. Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors. 2008(9)
  Scale 215.
F       13. However, a different view was taken by this Court in           Jc     ~




    Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major 1995(5) SCC 709 in which
    it is stated that :
          "...... We would think that the exception engrafted is meant
G         to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree
          or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which
          declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself
          create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable    ...
          property of the value of Rs.100 or upwards ................. "
H                                                (emphasis supplied)
               PHOOL PATii AND ANR. v. RAM SINGH (DEAD)                  367
     .        THROUGH LRS. & ANR. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
                14. In our opinion there seems to be inconsistency between      A
          the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) and
          K. Raghunandan's case (supra) in so far as the interpretation
          to the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the
          Registration Act is concerned. Prima facie it seems to us that
          the decision in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) does not lay down          B
          the correct law since Section 17(2)(vi) on its plain reading has
          nothing to do with any pre existing right. All that seems to have
          been stated therein is that if a decree is passed regarding
          some immovable property which is not a subject-matter of the
          suit then it will require registration. As already explained above,   c
          if a suit is filed in respect of property A but the decree is in
          respect of immovable property B, then the decree so far as it
          relates to immovable property B will require registration. This
          seems to be the plain meaning of clause (vi) of Section 17(2)
"I        of the Registration Act.
     ~
                                                                                D
                15. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the
           Court cannot add words to the statute or change its language,
           particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be
           clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right in the
           exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the    E
         · views in Bhoop Singh's case (supra).
                16. It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of
          this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (sup,ra) and K.
          Raghunandan's case (supra), and since we are finding it

-    )    difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh's
          case (supra), the matter should be considered by a larger
          Bench of this Court.
                                                                                F



               17. Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice
          of India for constituting a larger Bench for interpreting the
          exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.
                                                                                G

          D.G.                            Matter referred to larger Bench.