PIARA LALversusKEWAL KRISHAN CHOPRA

                                                                               l
                                 PIARA LAL
A
                                       v.
                       KEWAL KRISHAN CHOPRA

                                MAY 6, 1988

B      [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. NATARAJAN, JJ.]

          East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Section J3(3)(a)
    (iii)-Tenant-Eviction of-On ground premises became unsafe and
    unfit for human habitation-Falling down of roof.. in one room-
    Whether sufficient for a declaration building unsafe and unfit for human
    habitation.
c
         The suit premises consisted of four room• in the ground floor
  where the appellant-tenant was running his office. Oue room in the
  first floor was in the possession of the landlord-respondent. The roof
  of one room in the rear side of the leased portion had fallen down, and it
D has been replaced by the appellant after obtaining orders of the Rent
  Controller under Section 12 ofthe East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
  Act, 1949.

        The landlord filed a petition for eviction on the ground of bona
  fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation, and
E change of user of the premises by the tenant. As he failed before the
  Rent Controller, he preferred an appeal and during the pendency of the
  appeal he obtained the court's order and amended the petition and
  raised an additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, seek-
  ing eviction of the tenant on the ground that the I.eased premises had
  become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. The Appellate Autho-
F rity called for a findings on this additional ground from the Rent
  Controller and the finding went against the landlord. The Appellate
  Authority concurred with the Rent Controller on the said finding and
  dismissed the appeal.

        The respondent preferred a Civil Revision Petition before the
G High Court which sustained the case, and ordered the eviction of the
  appellant under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The High Court came to
  the finding that the falling down of the roof of one of the rooms afforded
  by itself a cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant
  under the said section, and the said cause of action would subsist even if
  the tenant had repaired the roof under orders of the Rent Controller
H under Section 12 of the Act.,
                                      202
                       PIARA LAL v. K.K. CHOPRA                        203

      In the appeal to this Court by the tenant it was contended that the
                                                                              A
Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had concurrently found
that the building was neither unsafe nor unfit for human habitation and
as such the High Court was not justified in interferring with those
findings especially when they were fmdings of fact. On behalf of the
respondent, the appeal was contested on the ground that the falling
down of the roof in a room was indicative of the damage condition of the      B
building and, therefore, the High Court was fully justified in ordering
eviction, and that the replacement of the roof by the appellant would
not extinguish the right which had accrued to the respondent under
Section 13(3)(a)(iii) to seek recovery of the possession of the leased
premises.

      Allowing the appeal,                                                    c
        HELD: 1. The High Court was not justified in allowing the
revision and directing eviction of the appellant under Section 13(3)
(a)(iii). [206H]
                                                                              D
      2. The High Court proceeded on the erroneous assumption that
the falling down of the roof in one room was itself sufficient to warrant a
finding that the entire building had become unfit and unsafe for human
habitation and called for a declaration to that effect. [207F]

       In the instant case, the admitted position was except for the          E
 roof in one of the.rooms falling down, no other damage to the building
 was noticed and in such circumstances, there is no scope for holding
'that a substantial or major part of the building had become unfit and
unsafe for human habitation and hence an order of eviction was. called
for. [208G-H]
                                                                         F
       3. The High Court had wrongly assumed that besides the falling
down of the roof, one of the walls has also crumbled. This assumption
was a mistaken one because the expert witnesses examined during the
trial by the parties have spoken about the good condition of three walls
alone of the room and not the fourth because they are the outer walls of
the room while the fourth wall was a common wall for the room in G
question, and the adjoining room and hence there was no need to certify
its good condition. [20SE-F]

     4. The High Court had also failed to notice two factors of rele-
vance: viz. (I) that the respondent had given his consent to the Rent
Controller granting permission under Section 12 of the Act to the appel- · H
    204         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A !ant to replace the roof, and (2) that in spite of the all"l(ed cause of action
  having arisen due to the falling down of the roof, the respondent did not
  seek amendment of the petition so as to seek eviction of the appellant on
  the additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) hut instead he chose to
  prosecute his petition only on the original ground for eviction set forth
B therein and only after falling before the Rent Controller and preferring
  an appeal to the Appellate Authority, he deemed it necessary to amend
  the petition and ask for eviction of the appellant on the -additional
  ground. [207C-E]

        5. The aforesaid conduct of the respondent clearly reveals that he
  him!ielf has not attached any significance to the falling down of the roof
C in one of the rooms and has not seriously considered the sustainable
  cause of action that had arisen to him under Section 13(3)(a )(iii) for
  seeking eviction of the appellant. [207E-F]

      Balbir Singh v. Hari Ram, AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana 132;
D Chander Mohini v. Jiva Singh, [1983] 2 RCJ 523 and Sardarni
  Sampurna Kaur v. Sant Singh & Anr., [1983] PLR 449, distinguished.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1682
    of 1984.

E         From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.1983 of the Punjab
     and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 959 of 1979

           V ,M. Tarkunde, A.D. Sikri for the Appellant.

           Hardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents.
F
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           NATARAJAN, J. What falls for consideration in this appeal by
     special leave by a tenant against the judgment of the High Court of
     Pun jab and Haryana in a Civil Revision is whether the High Court had
G    uansgressed its revisional powers in interfering with the concurrent
     findings rendered by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority
     and ordering the eviction of the appellant herein from the leased pre-
     mises and secondly whether the High Court had erred in holding that
     the leased premises had become unsafe and unfit for human habitation
     as envisaged in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent
H    Eviction Act, 1949 (hereinafter the Act).
             PIARA LAL v. K.K. CHOPRA [NATARAJAN, J.J                205

       The respondent's petition for eviction was originally t>ased on
                                                                         A
other grounds such as bona fide requirement of the premises for own
use and change of user of the premises by the tenant. As he failed
before the Rent Controller, the respondent preferred an appeal and
during the pendency of the appeal he obtained orders and amended
the petition and raised an additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii)
for seeking the eviction of the appellant viz. the leased premises had B
become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. The Appellate Autho-
tity called for a finding on the additional ground from the Rent
Controller and the finding went against the respondent. The Appellate
Authority concurred with the Rent Controller on the said finding and
dismissed the appeal. Before the appellate Authority the respondent
did not seriously press the original grounds on which eviction was C
sought for and laid stress only upon the ground under Section 13(3)
(a)(iii) of the Act. The respondent then preferred a Civil Revision
wherein the High Court sust.ained his case and ordered the eviction of
the appellant under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) and hence the present appeal
by the appellant-tenant.
                                                                         D
       Section 13(3)(a)(iii) was resorted to for seeking eviction of the
tenant on the footing that one room in the rear-side of the leased
premises had fallen down. We may state, even at this juncture that the
High Court had wrongly assumed th~t besides the falling down of the
roof, one of the walls had also crumbled. This assumption was a mis-
taken one because the expert witnesses examined during the trial by the E
parties have spoken about the good condition of three walls alone of
the room and not the fourth because they are the outer walls of the
room while the fourth wall was a common wall for the room in ques-
tion and the adjoining room and hence there was no need to certify its
good condition. It was therefore wrong for the High Court to have
assumed that only three walls of the room were ii! good condition and F
not the fourth wall.

      The High Court deemed it necessary to allow the Revision and
set aside the order of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority
because of its view that the falling down of the roof of one of the rooms
afforded by i~self a cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of    G
the tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) and the said cause of action
woul.d subsist even if the tenant had repaired the roof under· orders of
the Rent Controller under Section 12 of the Act. It is necessary to
mention here· that during the pendency of the proceedings before the
Rent Controller, the appellant obtained the permission of the Rent
Controller under Section 12 to replace the roof fallen down and re-         H
    206         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
A   cover the cost from the respondent since the respondent had failed to
    do the work himself. The High Court relied upon two decision Balbir
    Singh v. Hari Ram, AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana 132 and Chander
    Mohini v. Jiva Singh, [1983] 2 RCJ 523 for holding that once a cause of
    action ensued under Section 13(3)(a)(iii), it would subsist inspite of
    any repairs effected by the tenant. It also relied on another decision
B   Sardarni Sampurna Kaur v. Sant Singh & Anr., [1983] PLR 449 for
    holding that even if the rest of the building was in go'bft condition, the
    falling down of the roof of one room would constitute sufficient mate-
    rial to sustain a landlord's claim under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act
    for seeking the tenant's eviction.

          A few facts may now be set out. The leased portion comprises of
C   four rooms in the ground floor where the appellant is running his
    office. There is a room in the first floor in the possession of the respon-
    dent himself but we are not concerned with it. It is common ground
    that the roof of one room in the rear-side of the leased portion had
    fallen down and it had been replaced by the appellant after obtaining.
D   orders of the Rent Controller under Section 12. The appellant's con-
    tention is that the falling down of the roof in one of the four rooms
    would not by itself render the entire building unsafe and unfit for
    human habitation as envisaged under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act
    and, as such, the High Court had erred in ordering eviction under the
    said provision. lt was further urged that the Rent Controller and the
E   Appellate Authority had concurrently found that the building was
    neither unsafe nor unfit for human habitation and as such the High
    Court was not justified in interfering with those findings especially
    when they were findings of fact. In reply to the above said contentions,
    the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the falling down of
    the roof in a room was indicative of the damaged condition of the
F   building and, therefore, the High Court was fully justified in ordering
    the eviction of the appellant under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It
    was further urged· that the replacement of the roof by the appellant
    would not extinguish the right which had accrued to the respondent
    under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) to seek recovery of possession of the leased
    premises and the High Court had rightly adverted to this aspect of the
G   matter also while allowing the revision filed by the respondent.

        On a careful consideration of the matter with reference to the
  contentions put-forth by the learned counsel for the parties, we are
  clearly of opinion that the High Court wa& not justified in allowing the
  revision and directing the eviction of the appellant under Section
H 13(3)(a)(iii). It is true that a roof of one of the rooms on the rear-side
             PIARA LAL v. K.K. CHOPRA [NATARAJAN, J.]                  207

had fallen down and required ·replacement but there was no evidence
                                                                              A
whatever that.the entire building or a substantial portion of it was in a
damaged condition and consequently· the building as a whole had
become unfit and unsafe for h'1man habitation. Unless the evi.dence
warranted an inference that the falling down of the roof in one room
was fully indicative of the damaged and weak condition of the entire
building and that the. collapse of the roof was not a localised event, we     B
fail to see how the High Court could have concluded that the entire
building had become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. In fact,
the appellant had replaced the roof only at a cost of about Rs.200 and
this would independently show that the damage that had occurred
could not have been of a serious or disquieting nature. The High Court
has failed to notice two factors of relevance, viz., (1) tliat the respon-
dent had given his consent to the Rent Controller granting permission         c
under Section 12 of the Act to the appellant to replace the roof and (2)
that inspite of the ·alleged cause of action having arisen due to the
falling down of the ;roof, the respondent did not immediately seek
amendment of the petition so as to seek eviction of the appellant on
the additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) but instead he chose        D
to prosecute his petition· only on the original grounds for eviction set
forth therein and only after failing before the Rent Control\er and
preferring an appeal to the Appellate Authority, he deemed it neces-
sary to amend the petition and ask for eviction of the appellant oc the
additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii). The above said conduct
of the respondent would clearly reveal that he himself had not                E
attached any significance to the falling down of the roof in one of the
rooms and had not seriously considered that a sustainable cause of
action had accrued to him under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) for seeking the
eviction of the appellant. The High Court has not only failed to
appreciate these factors but has also proceeded on the erroneous
assumption that the falling down of the roof in one room was by itself        F
sufficient to warrant a finding that the entire building had become
unfit and unsafe for human habitation· and called for a decfaration to
that effect. It is thls basic error which has affected the reasoning of the
High Court lead the High Court to apply the ratio laid down in certain
cases where the facts and circumstances were entirely different
                                                                              G
       What arose for consideration in Ba/bir Singh's case (supra) was
whether a tenant would stand deprived of his right under Section 12 to
carry out repairs of the tenanted premises by reason of an application
filed by a landlord under Section 13(3)(c) of the Haryana Urban
Control on Rent and Eviction Act (Corresponding to Section 13(3)(a)
(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction 'Act, 1949) and con-          H
    2{}8        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
                                                                                1
                                                                                tl




A versely whether a landlord would stand deprived of his right to seek
  eviction of his tenant under Section 13(3)(c) by reason of an order            •
  passed under Section 12 empowering the tenant to carry out repairs to         J
  the tenanted premises. It was in that context, the High Court held that
                                                                                ·~,
  the two sections operated in their respective spheres and they were not       r
B mutually destructive of each other and consequently, when a right ac-
  crued to a landlord under Section 13(3)(c) of the Haryana Act to seek
                                                                                 t
  eviction of a tenant, the right would not get extinguished on account of
  an order passed under Section 12 of the Act. In other words, it was
  held that once a cause of action had arisen for a landlord to seek
  eviction under Section 13(3)(c) of the Haryana Act that the said cause        ~
  of action would ensure to the benefit of the landlord in spite of the
c tenant effecting repairs to the building for his benefit in pursuance of
  permission obtained under Section 12 of the Act. The decision does
  not lay down that each and every damage to a building, without refer-
  ence to the seriousness of its nature or to the condition of the building
  as a whole would by itself entitle a landlord to invoke Section 13(3)
D (a)(iii) to seek eviction of the tenant. In Chander Mohini's case (supra)
  wherein Balbir Singh's case (supra) was followed, it was held that if
  the tenants had pulled down the roof of one of the rooms under their
  tenancy and replaced the same, obviously for their own convenience
  and for pre-empting the landlord from filing a petition for eviction
  under Section 13(3)(a)(iii), the landlord would undoubtedly, acquire a
                                                                                 ~
  cause of action under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) as soon as the tenants had
E
  pulled down the roof of the room and his rights could not be defeated
  by the tenants by the replacement of the roof of their own volition.
  The other decision in Sardarni Sampuma Kaur v. Sant Singh has also
  no relevance because it was found in that case that even though the           f,
                                                                                \•
                                                                                . '
  portion under the ocupation of the tenant was in a sound condition, a          •
F
  substantial   portion of the composite building had become unfit and
  unsafe for human habitation. In that situation, the High Court held
  that what was relevant for consideration for passing an order of evic-
  lion under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) was the condition of the building
  viewed as a whole and nonn parts or blocks. In the instant case, the
  admitted position is that except for the roof in one of the rooms falling
  down, no other damage to the building was noticed and in such
G
  circumstances, there is no scope for holding that a substantial or major
  part of the building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation
  and hence an order of eviction was called for. It is therefore obvious
  that the ratio laid down in the earlier decisions were not at all attracted
  to the facts of the case and the High Court had wrongly applied them          0
H because of its err.6neous assumptions.
            PIARA LAL v. K.K. CHOPRA [NATARAJAN, J.I             209

      Learned counsel for the respondent tried to contend that apart A
from t.he building having become unsafe and unfit for human habita-
tion, the respondent had also sought eviction on the ground he was
genuinely in need of additional accommodation but the Appellant
Court had unjustly rejected the plea by saying that since the respon-
dent was jointly living with his son, he can secure additional accommo-
                                                                        B
dation from out of the portion in his son's occupation. We do not find
any merit in this contention because the requirement of the building
on this ground was not canvassed before the High Court. Even the
Appellant Authority has Dbserved that the only ground pressed for
seeking eviction of the tenant was under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) and the
other grounds were not pressed seriously and only incidentally a half-
hearted argument was advanced regarding the requirement of the C
leased premises by way of additional accommodation.

     In the result, the appeal is allowed-and the judgment of the High
Court is set aside. The respondent's application for eviction of the
appellant will stand dismissed as ordered by the Rent Controller and D
the Appellate Authority. The parties are, however, directed to pay
and bear their respective costs.                     ·

N.V.K.                                              Appeal allowed.