POHLA SINGH @ POHLA RAM (D) BY LRS. AND ORS.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

A        POHLA SINGH @ POHLA RAM (D) BY LRS. AND ORS.
                                        v.
                        STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

                                  MAY 5, 2004

B
             [S. RAJENDRA BABU, CJ. AND G.P. MATHUR, J.]

         Tenancy and Land Laws:

         Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955:
c
        Section 51-A (inserted by Act No. 11 of 1968)-Lands granted for
  gallantry-Exemption from being taken into account for computing surplus
  area-Applicability of-Held: The specific land which had been granted
  for gallantry must be in possession ofthe person concerned for application
D of S. 51-A-Hence, exemption in respect of land allotted under Displaced
  Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 is not available
  under S. 51-A.

         Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954:
E
         Objects of-Explained.

         Constitution of India, 1950:

F         Article 142-Relief-Petitioner did not challenge a part of the order
    of a Single Judge of the High Court by filing any Letters Patent Appeal-
    However, Supreme Court took the view that the order of the Single Judge
    was not proper-Held: To avoid any scope for farther litigation and to do
    complete justice between the parties, the said part of the order set aside.

G        Article 226-Petitioners filed a writ petition for recalling the order
    passed in an earlier writ petition in which they were not impleaded as
    parties-Decision in earlier writ petition adversely affected the interest of
    the petitioners-Maintainability of-Held: In such circumstances, second
    writ petition was maintainable-High Court also rightly allowed the
H   second writ petition.
                                        360
                       POHLA SINGH v. STATE                          361

     Words & Phrases:                                                      A

      "Compensation "-Meaning. of

     The father of respondent No. 4 had been allotted land by way of
a military grant in Sind (Pakistan). On partition of the country he B
migrated to India and was given land under the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. However, under the
Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 a certain area of
the said land was declared as surplus by the Collector. Under
the Utilisation of Surplus Area Scheme the land declared as surplus C
was allotted to the appellants. The compensation amount with
regard to the surplus land was deposited by the appellants and was
received by respondent No. 4. After a long time, respondent No. 4 filed
a revision petition against the Collector's order before the Financial
Commissioner (Revenue), which was dismissed on the grounds of
limitation.                                                             D

      Thereafter, the Pepsu Act was amended by Act No. 11 of 1968
whereby Section 51-A was introduced therein, by which land allotted
for gallantry was exempted from being taken' into account in computing
surplus area unde.r the Pepsu Act. Thereupon, respondent No. 4 filed E
a writ petition challenging the order of the Financial Commissioner as
well as the order of the Collector. The High Court, relying on Section
51-A, allowed the writ petition. Since the appellants were not impleaded
as parties to tlie ~aid writ petition, they filed a writ petition before the
High Court claiming several reliefs including a writ of mandamus F
directing the respondents not to dispossess them from the land allotted
to them. The High Court allowed this second writ petition and further
held that the appellants were not bound by the decision rendered in
the earlier writ petition.

     Respondent No. 4 preferred a Letters Patent Appeal against the G
aforesaid decision, which was allowed. The High Court further held
that respondent No. 4 was entitled to the protection available under
Section 51-A of the Pepsu Act and consequently the declaration of
surplus area was wrong and its allotment to the appellants was illegal.
Hence the appeal.                                                       H
    362               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A         On behalf of respondent No. 4, it was contended that once the
    order of a Single Judge of the High Court, having not been challenged
    by the appellants by preferring an appeal, became final, it was not open
    to another Single Judge to entertain another writ petition at the
    instance of the appellants and to make a declaration that the appellants
B   were not bound by the decision rendered in the earlier writ petition
    filed by respondent No. 4 and also that the appellants could not be
    dispossessed from the land in dispute in compliance thereof.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court

C        HELD: I. Section 51-A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural
    Lands Act, 1955 can come into operation only ifthe specific land which
    had been granted for gallantry is in possession of the person concerned
    and not otherwise. [374-C(

          2.1. In the present case, the land, which had been granted to
D respondent No. 4 by way of gallantry award was situate in Sind which he
   abandoned when he came to India on account of partition of the country.
   Thereafter, respondent No. 4 was given land under the Displaced Persons
   (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The said Act was enacted
   to provide for payment of compensation and rehabilitation grants to
E those persons who had been displaced from the area now falling in
   Pakistan on account of their migration to India. The relevant provisions
 . of the said Act clearly show that a displaced person on account of his
   migration to India after partition did not get the same property, which
   he had in the area which became Pakistan, but he got monetary
F compensation though it was possible that some property out of
   compensation pool could be sold or transferred to him out of the said
    compensation amount. Therefore, the land in possession of respondent
    No. 4 was an altogether different land and not "such land" which may
    have been given to him byway of gallantry and consequently Section SI-
G A of the Pepsu Act can have no application at all. (374-D-Fl
         Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal. AIR (1977) SC 1226 and Sai/en Krishna
     Majumdar v. Malik Labhu Masih, (1989[ Supp. 1 SCC 302, relied on.

          2.2. The contention that the land would not lose its character and
H for all intent and purposes should be treated as land given for gallantry
                       POHLA SINGH v. STATE                           36J

as the same was given to respondent No. 4 in lieu of the land which A
he had in Sind (Pakistan), is not sustainable. [374-G; 375-AJ

     Gurbachan Singh v. Puran Singh, AIR (1961) SC 1263, held
inapplicable.

      3.1. If a decision rendered in a writ petition adversely affects the
                                                                             B
interest of a third person who was not impleaded as a party in the writ
petition, it is always open to him to ask for recall of the judgment which
has been rendered without affording any opportunity of hearing to
him. (377-A)
                                                                             c
      3.2. The recourse taken to the second writ petition by the
appellants, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal as their basic
grievance was that though they were in possession of the land for
nearly 18 years, but the order declaring the land as surplus had been
set aside in a writ petition, wherein they were not impleaded as parties. D
In these circumstances, the writ petition filed by the appellants was
rigl;tly allowed by the Single Judge. (377-E-F]

      4. The High Court while allowing the writ petition of the appellants
has also observed in the order that if permissible the question as to E
whether the land could be declared surplus or not may be determined
in any proceedings that may be competent under law and also whether
on account of retrospective operation of Section 51-A of the Pepsu Act
respondent No. 4 was entitled to ask for setting aside of the orders
declaring his land ,as surplus where the question as to whether the F
appellants had acquired an indefeasible right which cannot be taken
away even by retrospective amendment of the Pepsu Act shall also be
gone into. The appellants did not challenge this part of the order by
filing any Letters Patent Appeal. However, having regard to the view
taken by this Court and to avoid any scope for further litigation and G
to do complete justice between the parties the said direction of the
Single Judge and also the judgment and order passed in the writ
petition filed by respondent No. 4 are set aside. (377-G-H; 378-A-DJ

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6741 of
1999.                                                         H
    364                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A       From the Judgment and Order dated 4.6.1999 of the Punjab and
    Haryana High Court in LP.A. No. 1199 of 1992.

        P.P. Rao, Anant Vijay Palli, Mrs. Rekha Palli, Arindam Ghose, Vimal
    Chandra, S. Dave, Mrs. Neelam Kalsi, K.K. Mohan, Kuldip Singh, R.K.
B Pandey and R.S. Suri for the appearing parties.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          G.P. MATHUR, J. : 1. This appeal by special kave has been
C preferred against the judgment and order dated 4.6.1999 of a Full Bench
    of High Court of Punjab & Haryana whereby Letters Patent Appeal
    preferred by respondent no. 4 Gurcharan Singh was allowed, the judgment
    and order dated 13.8.1992 of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ
    petition filed by the appellants Pohla Singh and others was set aside and
D   the writ petition was dismissed.

        2. Dhanna Singh (father of Gurcharan Singh respondent no. 4) had
  been allotted land by way of a military grant in Sind (Pakistan). On
  partition of the country he migrated to India. He was initially allotted 79.39
  standard acres of land in Village Budhlada, Tehsil Mansa, District Bhatinda
E which on account of report of Patwari in some Revenue Proceedings was
  reduced to 68.68 standard acres. In the year 1955, The Pepsu Tenancy and
  Agricultural Lands Act was promulgated and section 3 thereof provides
  that the permissible limit shall mean "thirty standard acres of land".
  Accordingly proceedings for determination of the surplus area were
F initiated and by an order passed on 28.3.1961, which was ex-parte, 28.68
  acres of land were declared as surplus. Dhanna Singh then filed an
  application for setting aside the ex parte order wherein he also indicated
  his choice for the plots to be declared as surplus. The Collector (Agrarian
  Reforms) Bhatinda, by his order dated 9.6.1961, set aside the ex-parte
G order and the plots, choice of which was given by Dhanna Singh,
  equivalent to 28.68 standard acres, were declared as surplus. Under the
  Utilization of Surplus Area Scheme the land declared as surplus was
  allotted to the appellants on 5.3.1962, Sannads as prescribed in Form-V
  were issued to them and they were put in possession of the land. The
H compensation with regard to surplus area was determined at Rs.13,882.53
              POHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.]                  365

which was deposited by the appellants and was received by Dhanna Singh. A
Thereafter consolidation proceedings took place and mutation was ordered
in favour of the appellants.

      3. After a long time Dhanna Singh filed a revision on 19.11.1966
against the order dated 9.6.1961 of the Collector, declaring his land as B
surplus, but the same was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner,
Revenue on 2.3 .1967 on the ground of limitation as the same was beyond
time by 1882 days. Thereafter he filed CWP No. 3213 of 1968 challenging
the order of the Financial Commission and also the order of Collector dated
9.6.1961. The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (hereinafter C
referred to as 'the Act') had been amended by Act No. 11 of 1968 whereby
section 5 IA was introduced therein which provides that where any land
is granted for gallantry at any time before 26th day of January, 1950 such
land or portion, as the case may be, shall not be taken into account in
computing the surplus area under the Act. Relying upon the said provision D
the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by the judgment and
order dated 9.1.1980 and set aside the order declaring 28.68 standard acres
as surplus. It is important to note that in this petition (i) State of Punjab;
(ii) Financial Commissioner; and (iii) Collector, (Agrarian R.A. II),
Bhatinda were impleaded as respondents. Though the surplus land had E
been allotted in favour of appellants on 5.3.1962 and they had been put
in possession over the same, but they were not impleaded as parties to the
writ petition nor any notice was issued to them.

      4. The appellants then filed CWP 1287of1980 wherein they claimed
several reliefs including a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not F
to dispossess them from the land allotted to them. In this petition besides
the above mentioned official respondents, Gurcharan Singh son of Dhanna
Singh was also impleaded as respondent no.4 as he had been substituted
on account of death of his father during the pendency of CWP no. 3213
of 1968. The ;rit petition was contested by Gurcharan Singh alone. The G
learned Single Judge held that no doubt section 51 A of the Act had been
ihtroduced with retrospective affect i.e. from the date of the enforcement
of the Act of 1955 itself, but the question whether it could be applied to
transactions or sales which had already been completed and confirmed by
the authorities was a significant question and before divesting the persons H
                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.CR.

A of the rights which h<ld accrued in their favour the least which was required
  to be done was to afford them an opportunity of hearing. In view of the
  !Jct that Dhanna Singh in his writ petition did not implead the appellant
  Pohla Singh and others. who had been allotted the surplus land under the
  provi~:ons of Utilisation of Surplus Area Scheme and further he had
B acc<:pt.:d the >:omp.:m.~tion amount for the land declared as surplus and had
  deliberately concealed tile said fact, the writ petition was liable to be
  allowed. On these finJ~11gs the writ petition was allowed on 13.8.1992 and
   it was held that the appellants were not bound by the decision rendered
   in CWP no.3213 of 1968 decided on 9. l.1980 and further that they shall
C not be dispossessej from the !awl m dispute in compliance with the
   aforesaid order. Gurcharan Singh then preferred a Letters Patent Appeal
   which has been allowed by a Full Bench of the High Court by the judgment
   and order ~at.:d 4 . 6.1999 and it has been held that he was entitled to the
   protection available under section 51 A of the Act and consequently the
   declaration of surplus area was wrong and its allotment to the appellants
D w·as illegal. He was also held entitied to restoration of the possession. A
    further directkm was issued that the competent authority shall consider the
    claim of the arpellants herein for allotment of alternative land in accordance
    with law.

E        5. For convenience salu: we will refer to Dhanna Singh or his son
     Gurcharan Singh as land holder and the appellants Pohla Singh and others
     (some of whom have also died) as allottces.

           6. Learned counsel for the appellants (a!lottees) has submitted that
 F   after 28.68 standard acres of the land had be..:n finally declared surplus,
     the same was allotted to them on 5.3 .1962 and they wen~ put in possession
     of the land. Mutation of their name was done and revenue entries were
     corrected. The compensation amount determined for the surplus area
     declared was paid by the allottecs and was accepted by Dhanna Singh
     which he continued to retain. The entire land was barren, had tibbas and
G    deep ditches. The allottees toiled hard, made the land cultivable, invested
     money in installing tubcwe!ls and planted trees and made the land fertile
     and of high yielding variety. Dhanna Singh had initially not challenged the
     order dated 9.6.1961 of the Colkctur declaring his land as surplus and was
     satisfied with the same. However, it was only after he came to know that
H    -the Act is going to be amended that he filed the revision which was beyond
              POHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.]                 367

time by 1882 days. Paragraph 4 of the revision petition and the prayer made A
read as under:

         Para 4: That the State of Punjab is presently enacting that the
        lands which have been granted as Military grants should be
        excluded from the operation of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural B
        Lands Act. The Bill is shortly to be introduced in the Punjab
        Legislative Assembly which is going to have retrospective effect."

        Prayer: It is therefore humbly prayed that since the proposed Act
        is being introduced for excepting such land from the operation of
        the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the petition may C
        be kept to be pending and be decided after the passing of the
        proposed Act exempting the land in question from being declared
        surplus."

      7. Learned counsel has further submitted that after the revision was D
dismissed on the ground of limitation he preferred the writ petition no.
3213 of 1968 wherein he deliberately did not implead the allottees as
respondents though they were in possession for more than six years of the
surplus area declared. It has also been submitted that the amended
provision section 51 A of the Act could not in any manner affect the E
transactions which had attained finality and therefore the allottees cannot
be dispossessed in pursuance of the 9rder passed in the writ petition
preferred by the land holder especially when the order therein has Peen
passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to them.

      8. Shri PP Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the land holder
                                                                            F
(respondent no. 4) in this appeal, has submitted that Dhanna Singh had
been given land for gallantry by way of military grant in Sind (Pakistan).
After partition of the country he migrated to India and was allotted 79.39
standard acres of land in lieu of the land held by him in Sind. Act no. I I
of 1968 specifically provided that section 51 A shall be deemed always to G
have been inserted in the principal Act and in view of the language used
in the said provision, the land granted for gallantry could not be taken into
account in computing the surplus area. The provisions of section 51 A had
to be given affect to and consequently no land of Dhanna Singh could be
declared as surplus. He has also submitted that where a land holder is H
    368                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A challenging the declaration of his land as surplus, he is required to imp lead
  the State authorities only as respondents who are taking the action and there
  is no requirement to imp lead the allottees of the surplus land as parties to
  the proceedings. It has thus been contended that the view taken by the
  learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the land holder wherein
B he set aside the declaration of surplus land was perfectly correct and the
  Full Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the order dated 13.8.1992
  passed by the learned Single Judge wherein a writ of mandamus had been
   issued not to dispossess the allottees as such an order could not be passed
  once it is held that the declaration of surplus area of the land holder itself
C was contrary to law. Shri Rao has also submitted that writ petition no. 1287
   of 1980 preferred by the allottees was not maintainable as a petition under
   Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be filed for quashing or setting aside
   of the order passed in an earlier writ petition.

           9. In our opinion a question which goes to the root of the matter has
D   escaped the attention of the High Court and has not been considered at all.
    There is no dispute that Dhanna Singh had been allotted land by way of
    military grant in Sind (Pakistan). After partition of the country, he came
    to India and he was given land in District Bhatinda under the Displaced
    Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and proceedings for
E   declaration of surplus area have been applied to such land, namely, land
    in Bhatinda and not to the original land which had been allotted in Sind.
    The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 was amended by Act
    no. I I of 1968 by which section 51 A was inserted therein and it was
    specifically mentioned that section 51 A "shall be deemed always to have
F   been inserted". Section 5 IA of the Act reads as under:-

             "Section 51A Exemption of lands granted for gallantry before
             26th January, 1950- Notwithstanding anything contained in this
             Act, where any land is granted for gallantry at any time before
             the 26th day of January, 1950, to any member of the armed forces,
G            whether maintained by the Central Government or by any Indian
             State, then, so long as such land or any portion thereof, as the case
             may be, has not passed from the original grantee into more than
             three successive hands by inheritance or bequest and is held by
             the grantee or any of such hands, such land or portion, as the case
H            may be, shall not be taken into account in computing the surplus
              POHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.]                     369

         area under this Act, nor shall any tenant of such land or portion A
         have the right to purchase it under section 22:

         Provided that where such land or portion has passed into more
         than three such hands and the person holding such land or portion,
         immediately before the 3rd of August, 1967, is a person to whom B
         it has passed by inheritance or bequest, the exemption under this
         section shall apply to such land or portion thereof, as the case may
         be, during the life time of such person.".
                                                       (Emphasis supplied)

       This provision, therefore, gives protection to such land which had
                                                                                c
been given for gallantry at any time before 26th day of January, 1950,
subject to fulfillment of certain other conditions.

     I 0. The land which Dhanna Singh was holding in District Bhatinda
had been given to him under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and D
Rehabilitation Act, 1954) (for short 'Rehabilitation Act'). The preamble of
the Act reads as under:

         "An Act to provide for the payment of compensation and
         rehabilitation grants to displaced persons and for matters connected E
         therewith."

     The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, inter alia, says that
the compensation to be paid to displaced persons will be confined to the
utilisation of the acquired evacuee property in India as well ·as any amount F
realised from Pakistan on account of the difference between the values of
evacuee properties in the two countries. The Joans so far advanced to
displaced persons from West Pakistan, the properties built by the Government
for their rehabilitation and the provision made till May 1953 for their
rehabilitation for the future under the Five Year Plan or otherwise will be G
utilised for rehabilitation by giving grants. The Bill provides for the
payment of rehabilitation grants and also for appointment of a Chief
Settlement Commissioner, Settlement Commissioners and Settlement
Officers who will determine and pay the amount of compensation and
rehabilitation grant payable to persons having verified claims. Managing H
     370                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A officers and managing corporations will be entrusted with the custody,
     management and disposal of the assets in the pool.

        11. Some provisions of the Rehabilitation Act which have a bearing
  on the controversy in hand need examination. Section 2(a) of this Act
B defines 'compensation pool' and it means the compensation pool constituted
  under section 14; Section 2(b) contains a long definition of a 'aisplaced
  person' and it basically means any person who, on account of the setting
  up of the Dominion of India and Pakistan or on account of civil
  disturbances etc. has after the first day of March 1947, left or been
  displaced from his place of residence and who has been subsequently
C residing in India and who for that reason is unable or has been rendered
  unable to manage, supervise or control any immovable property belonging
  to him in West Pakistan. Section 4(1) of this Act provides that the Central
  Government shall, from time to time, but not later than the thirtieth day
  of June, 1955, by notification in the official gazette, require all displaced
D persons having a verified claim to make applications for the payment of
  compensation and any such notification may be issued with reference to
  displaced persons residing in any State or any one of a group of States.
   Section 7 (1) and (2) and Section 8 of this Act read as under:

              Section 7. Determination of the amount of compensation - (1)
E             On receipt ofan application for payment of compensation together
              with the record of the case forwarded under section 5, the
              Settlement Commissioner shall make an inquiry in such manner
              as may be prescribed and having due regard to the prescribed
              scales of compensation, the nature of the verified claim and other
 F            circumstances of the case, shall ascertain the amount of
              compensation to which the applicant is entitled.

              (2) On ascertaining the amount of compensation to which an
              applicant is entitled under sub-section ( 1), the Settlement
              Commissioner shall deduct therefrom the following dues
 G            recoverable from the applicant, in the order of priority mentioned
              below:-

              (a)   ............................. (omitted as not relevant)

 H            (b) .............................(omitted as not relevant)
              POHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.]                 371

        (c) .............................(omitted as not relevant)         A
        (3) After deducting the dues referred to in sub-section (2), the
        Settlement Commissioner shall make an order determining the net
        amount of compensation if any, .payable to the applicant.

        (4) The amount, if any, deducted under sub-section (2) shall be B
        paid to the person entitled to it.

        Section 8. Form and manner ofpayment of compensation - (!)
        A displaced person shall be paid out of the compensation pool the
        amount of net compensation determined under sub-section (3) of C
        section 7 as being payable to him, and subject to any rules that
        may be made under this Act, the Settlement Commissioner or any
        other officer or authority authorised by the Chief Settlement
        Commissioner in this behalf may make such payment in any one
        of the following forms or partly in one and partly in any other D
        form, namely:-

        (a)   in cash;

        (b)   in Government bond;
                                                                           E
        (c)   by sale to the displaced person of any property from the
              compensation pool and setting off the purchase money
              against the compensation payable to him;

        (d)   by any other mode of transfer to the displaced· person of any F
              property from the compensation pool and setting off the·
              valuation of the property against the compensation payable
              to him;

        (e)   by transfer of shares or debentures in any company or G
              corporation;

        (f)   in such other form or may be prescribed.

     12. The heading of Chapter III is - Compensation Pool For Purposes
Of Payment Of Compensation And Rehabilitation Grants To Displaced H
    372                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Persons. Sub-section (I) of section 12 confers power on the Central
    Government to acquire evacuee property for a public purpose, being a
    purpose connected with the relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons
    including payment of compensation to such persons by notification in the
    official gazette. Sub-section (2) of section 12 provides that after publication
B of a notification, the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee
    property specified in the notification shall be extinguished and the evacuee
    property shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all
    encumbrances. Section 14 deals with compensation pool and it reads as
    under:

c            Section 14. Compensation Pool (I) For the purpose of payment
             of compensation and rehabilitation grants to displaced persons,
             there shall be constituted a compensation pool which shall consist
             of-

D            (a) all evacuee property acquired under section 12, including the
             sale proceeds of any such property and all profits and income
             accruing from such property;

             (b) such cash balances lying with the Custodian as may, by order
E            of the Central Government, be transferred to the compensation
             pool;

              ( c) such contributions, in any form whatsoever, as may be made
              to the compensation pool by the Central Government or any State
              Government;
F
              (d) such other assets as may be prescribed.

              (2) The compensation pool shall vest in the Central Government
              free from all encumbrances and shall be utilised in accordance
G             with the provisior.s of this Act and the rules made thereunder.

          As the preamble shows that the Rehabilitation Act was enacted to
     provide for payment of compensation and rehabilitation grants to those
     persons who had been displaced from the area now falling in Pakistan on
H    account of their migration to India.
              i>OHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.]                   373

    13. The dictionary meaning of the word 'compensation' is as A
under:

Black's Law Dictionary     -    money given to compensate loss or injury.

Webster's Third New             The act or action of making up, making B
International Dictionary        good or counter balancing, rendering equal.

Law Lexicon by                  something given or obtained as an
P. Ramanatha Aiyer              equivalent, an equivalent given for property
                                taken or for any injury done to another.
                                                                               c
       14. Section 4 enjoins a displaced person having a verified claim to
 make application for payment of compensation. Under sub-section(!) of
 section 7 the Settlement Commissioner, after making an inquiry, has to
 ascertain the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled and
 under sub"section (3) of same section the Settlement Commissioner has to D
 make an order determining the net amount of compensation payable to the
 applicant. Section 8 provides for payment of net compensation amount out
 of the compensation pool and this can be done in various ways viz. (a) in
 cash; (b) in government bond; (c) by sale to the displaced person of any
 property from compensation pool and setting off the purchase money E
 against the compensation payable to him; (d) by any other mode of transfer
 of any property from the compensation pool and setting off the value
 thereof against the compensation payable to him. Therefor,e, the Scheme
 of the Act is that a displaced person, as defined in Section 2(b) of this Act,
 was entitled to compensation, which had to be determined by the Settlement F
 Commissioner and such an amount had to be paid to him. Sub-section (3)
 of section 7 is very impor.tant and it specifically provides for payment of
 the compensation amount which had been determined by the Settlement
 Commissioner to the displaced person. However, instead of paying the
 compensation amount in cash, some property from the compensation pool
 could be sold or transferred to him and the purchase money had to be set G
 off against the compensation payable. This clearly shows that a displaced
 person on account of his migration to India after partition did not get the
 same property which he had in the area which became Pakistan, but he got
 monetary compensation though it was possible that some property out of
.compensation pool could be sold or transferred to him out of the said H
    374                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A compensation amount. The consequence is that the land which Dhanna
    Singh got in village Budhlada, in District Bhatinda is not the same land
    which he had got by way of military grant in Sind. It is an altogether
    different land purchased out of compensation amount which was payable
    to him or could have been transferred to him by setting off the valuation
B   of the property against the compensation payable to him.

         15. Section 51 A of the Act lays down that ''where any land is granted
  for gallantry ..... ..... such lands or portion......... shall not be taken into
  account in computing surplus area ............". The language used in the
C Section shows in unequivocal terms that if the grantee holds any specific
  land or portion which had been granted for gallantry then subject to
  fulfillment of other conditions it shall not be taken into account for
  computing the surplus area. Therefore, Section 51 A can come into
  operation only if the specific land which had been granted for gallantry
  is in possession of the person concerned and not otherwise. In the present
D case the land which had been granted to Dhanna Singh by way of gallantry
  award was situate in Sindh which he abandoned when he came to India
  on account of partition of country. Thereafter, on account of the loss
  suffered by him, he became entitled to compensation under Section 7 of
  the Rehabilitation Act, 1954. The land which he got in village Budhlada,
E District Bathinda, was either by way of sale by setting off the purchase
   money against the compensation payable to him in accordance with Clause
  (c) or by any other mode of transfer from the compensation pool and setting
  off the valuation of the property against the compensation payable to him
  in accordance with Clause (d) of Sub-section (I) of Section 8. Therefore,
F the land in possession of Dhanna Singh was an altogether different land
  and not "such land'' which may have been given to him by way of gallantry
  and consequently Section 51A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural
   Lands Act can have no application at all.

          16. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the land holder, has on
G the strength of Gurbachan Singh v. Puran Singh, AIR (1961) SC 1263
    urged that the land in village Budhlada would not lose its character and
    for all intent and purposes should be treated as land given for gallantry as
    the same was given to Dhanna Singh in lieu of the land which he had in
    Sindh (Pakistan). In the authority cited it was held that where land has been
H   consolidated and in lieu of ancestral land and non-ancestral land a
              POHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.]                     375

consolidated area is given to a proprietor, then such a portion of the A
consolidated area which corresponds to the area of land which was
ancestral, will be ancestral land. The authority cited is clearly distinguishable
on facts and further it does not relate to a case where land may have been
given to a displaced person under the Rehabilitation Act. In Piarey Lal v.
Hori Lal, AIR (1977) SC 1226 having regard to the provisions of the U.P. B
Consolidation of Holdings Act, it was held that where in a suit for specific
performance of agreement for sale the defendant had been allotted new
plots as a result of the consolidation of his holding under the said Act, the
agreement for sale became void within the meaning of Section 56 of the
Contract Act on account of defendant losing the plots for which the C
agreement was executed and getting new plots in lieu thereof and the
plaintiff's suit for specific performance was liable to be dismissed.

      17. A similar argument, as has been urged on behalf of the land holder
in the present case, was raised in Sailen Krishna Majumdar v. Malik Labhu
Masih, (1989] Supp. I sec 302, wherein the controversy hinged on the D
interpretation of certain provisions of Punjab Security of Land Tenures
Act. Herein land had been given by way of gallantry award to the
appellant's father posthumously in Layallpur (Pakistan) and after partition,
the appellant migrated to India and was given land in District Jallandhar.
In Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 Section 19-DD was inserted E
by Punjab Act 12of1968 and it is para materia with Section 5 IA of Pepsu
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. Repelling the contention it was
held as under in para 8 of the Reports :

         "8. We are referred to the provisions of the Displaced Persons F
         (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. It is an Act to
         provide for the payment of compensation and rehabilitation grants
         to displaced persons and for matters connected therewith. We
         have not been shown in it any provision to the effect that any land
         given as compensation to a displaced person for loss of gallantry
         award land may imbibe the covenant of exemption available G
         under Section 19-DD of the Act. We are consequently of the view
         that there is no basis for holding that the exemption in respect of
         the gallantry award land will be available in respect of the land
         given under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
         Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 as compensation for the loss thereof. H
    376                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A           We find no infirmity in the High Court judgment on this count."

        18. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents (land
  holders) has also submitted that Civil Writ Petition No. 3213of1968 filed
  by Dhanna Singh had been allowed by the High Court by the judgment
B and order dated 9.1.1980 and the orders passed by the Collector on
  9.6.1961 and that by the Financial Commissioner on 2.3.1967 were set
  aside. This order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court having not
  been challenged by the allottees by preferring an appeal, became final and
                                                                                       .
  consequently it was not open to another learned Single Judge to entertain
  another Writ Petition (Civil Writ Petition No. 12°87of1980) at the instance
C of the allottees and to make a declaration that they (allottees) were not
  bound by the decision rendered on 9.1.1980 in CWP no.3213 of 1968 and
  also that they cannot be dispossessed from the land in dispute in compliance
  thereof. It may be mentioned here that the final order regarding declaration
  of surplus land of Dhanna Singh was passed by Collector on 9 .6.1961 and
D thereafter the surplus land was allotted to the allottees on 5.3.1962 and a
  Sannad was issued in their favour and they were also put in possession
  thereof. The allottees had deposited the compensation amount of
  Rs.13,882.53, which was received by Dhanna Singh. However, in the Writ
  Petition filed by Dhanna Singh in 1968 which came to be decided on
E 9.1.1980, the allottees were not impleaded as parties. The decision in the
   writ petition clearly affected their rights. Civil Writ Petition No.1287 of
   1980 was filed by the allottees under Articles 226 and 227 of the
   Constitution, wherein they claimed several reliefs and prayer nos. (ii) and
  (v) read as under :

F            "(ii) that the decision contained in the judgment dated 9.1.1980
                   in CWP 3213 of 1968 be declared to be not binding on the
                   petitioners as they had deliberately been omitted from
                   impleaded as parties in the writ petition.

G            (v)   that the decision dated 9.1.1980 in CWP 3213 of 1968 be
                   re-called and the case be re-decided after hearing the
                   petitioners who are necessary parties to the said writ petition."

        In this petition Gurcharan Singh son of Dhanna Singh was arrayed
H   as Respondent No. 4 and the judgment shows that the petition was
               POHLA SINGH v. STATE [G.P. MATHUR, J.)                      377

contested only by the said respondent. If a decision rendered in a writ A
petition adversely affects the interest of a third person who was not
impleaded as party in the writ petition, it is always open to him to ask for
recall of the judgment which has been rendered without affording any
opportunity of hearing to him. An identical question has been examined
by a Constitution Bench in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1963) B
SC 1909. Here in a writ petition filed by A for cancellation of the order
of allotment passed by the Director of Rehabilitation in favour of B, the
High Court cancelled the order in favour of B though he was not a party
to the writ proceedings. Subsequently, B filed a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution for impleading him as a party to A's writ petition and C
rehearing the whole matter. The High Court allowed the writ petition. It
was held by this Court that the second writ petition filed by B was
maintainable and the High Court had not acted without jurisdiction in
reviewing its previous order at the instance of B, who was not a party to
the previous proceedings. It was further held that there is nothing in Article
226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power D
of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct grave or palpable errors committed by
it. In entertaining B's petition, the High Court thereby did what the
principles of natural justice required it to do.
                                                                                   E
      19. The recourse taken to the second writ petition by the allottees,
therefore, cannot be said to be illegal as their basic grievance was that
though they were in possession since 1962 i.e. for nearly 18 years, but the
order 'declaring the land as surplus had been set aside in a writ petition,
wherein they were not impleaded as parties. In these circumstances we are          F
of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the allottees was rightly allowed
by the learned Single Judge.

      20. Against the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge,
Gurbachan Singh son of Dhanna Singh preferred Letters Patent Appeal
which was allowed by the Full Bench of the High Court and the said G
decision is subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. As discussed
earlier, the view taken by the Full Bench is not correct. The learned Single
Judge while allowing the writ petition of the allottees has also observed
in the order that if permissible the question as to whether the land could.
be declared surplus or not may be determined in any proceedings that may H
    378                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A be competent under law and also whether on account of retrospective
  operation of section 5 l A of the Act respondent no.4 was entitled to ask
  for setting aside of the orders declaring his land as surplus where the
  question as to whether the appellants had acquired an indefeasible right
  which cannot be taken away even by retrospective amendment of the Act
B shall also be gone into. The allottees did not challenge this part of the order
  by filing any Letters Patent Appeal. However, having regard to the view
  taken by us and to avoid any scope for further litigation and to do complete
  justice between the parties, we set aside the said direction of the learned
  Single Judge and also the judgment and order dated 9. l .1980 passed in the
C writ petition filed by Dhanna Singh.

         21. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs and the impugned
    judgment and order rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court on
    4.6.1999 and also the judgment and order dated 9.1.1980 passed in Civil
    Misc. Writ Petition no. 3213 of 1968 are set aside.
D
    v.s.s.                                                     Appeal allowed.