Holding

The Central Government had no jurisdiction to issue the direction creating an OTA quota; the direction was void and no legal right or legitimate expectation arose for the appellants.

Summary

The appellants, Poonam Verma and others, had registered under the Fifth Self‑Financing Housing Registration Scheme of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) but never received a flat. After the scheme was closed, they sought inclusion in the "out‑of‑turn allotment" (OTA) quota based on a letter dated 24‑08‑2000 from the Union Ministry directing the DDA to consider three "hard cases". The DDA refused, and the appellants pursued remedies in consumer forums, the State Commission, Lok Adalat and writ petitions, all of which were dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether the Central Government could, under Section 41 (and Section 56) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, create or direct a quota and whether such a direction gave rise to a legal right or a legitimate expectation. The Court held that the Act confers only policy‑making powers for efficient administration and does not empower the Centre to issue directions on flat allotment; the Ministry’s letter was therefore ultra vires and a nullity, and no enforceable right arose for the appellants. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Central Government, under Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, can issue a direction creating an 'out‑of‑turn allotment' quota for DDA flats.
Whether Section 56 of the Act empowers the Centre to make such a direction.
Whether the Ministry’s letter confers a legal right or a legitimate expectation on the appellants.
Whether the guidelines in the DDA brochure have statutory force.
Whether the direction is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Delhi Development Actout‑of‑turn allotment quotalegitimate expectationadministrative lawcentral government jurisdictionguidelines advisoryconsumer protectionnullity of administrative order

Judgment

A POONAM VERMA AND ORS. 4 ?'""
'
v. ,..
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

DECEMBER 13, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
-l -
Urban Development:

c Delhi Development Act, 1957-ss. 41 and 56-Direction by
Central Government for creation of 'out ofturn quota' for allotment
offlats--Legality of-Held: Central Government could not issue such
directions-It did not have any quota under the Act or the Scheme-
s. 41 envisages that Central Government could issue directions having
D nexus with efficient administration ofthe Act and not in the matter of
allotment offlats-Moreso, Scheme was closed and could not be
revived thereafter-Guidelines being advisory in character per se did
not confer any legal right-Also doctrine oflegitimate expectation was
not invokable-Thus, purported decision being wholly without
E jurisdiction is a nullity-Administrative law-Legitimate expectation.
The respondents floated the Self Financing Registration Scheme,
1982 for the allotment offlats. The appellants got themselves registered
under the Scheme, but were not successful in obtaining the flats. The
1 -
F Scheme was closed. Thereafter, public notice was issued for release of
more flats and the unsuccessful registrants were given chance to apply.
Appellants did not respond to the notice, however, were allotted flats in
category III. Appellants did not make payments whereas raised a claim
for including their names in VI and VI ASchemes. Respondents rejected
G the claim. Aggrieved appellants filed complaint before the Consumer
Forum on the ground of deficiency of service and unfair trade practice.
They were unsuccessful in the first round oflitigation. Appellants then
approached the Ministry ofU rban Affairs. The Joint Secretary ( D &
L) by letter dated 24.08.2000 addressed to Vice Chairman, DDA
H 552
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 553
AUTHORITY
directed that the VC, DDA would cover the case of pending registrants A
(three in number) under the out of Turn Allotment Quota, being hard
cases and action would be taken to allot flats. Despite availability of
flats, the Ministry's orders were not complied with. Appellant's
application before the State Commission was dismissed. Appellants then
filed application before Lok Adalat. Lok Adalat held thatthe DDA did B
not accept the recommendations since SFS Scheme had become defunct
->' and the scheme of OTA was no longer in existence and thus, directed
the appellants to approach appropriate forum. Both the Writ Petitions
as also Letter Patent appeals thereagainstwere dismissed. Hence the
present appeal. C
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 only
envisages that the respondent would carry out such directions that may
be issued by the Central Government from time to time for the efficient D
administration of the Act It speaks about policy decision. Any direction
issued must have a nexus with the efficient administration of the Act.
The same does not take within its fold an order which can be passed by
the Central Government in the matter of allotment of flats by the
Authority in respect of a particular scheme. E
[Para 12] [560-G; 561-A, BJ
1.2. The Central Government does not have any quota under the
- t
Act. It did not have any quota under the Scheme. The Central
Government had no say in the matter either on its own or under the p
Act. In terms of the Brochure, Section 41 of the Act does not clothe any
jurisdiction upon the Central Government to issue such a direction.
[Paras 13and14) [561-B, D,E]

1.3. The submission that the Central Government could issue the G
said direction in exercise of rule making power under section 56 of the
Act is wholly misplaced. In issuing the letter dated 24.08.2000, the
Central Government did not exercise its legislative power nor could it
do so. The Central Government in terms of the Act apart from Section
41 did not have any power and, thus, could not have issued any direction H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A in terms thereof. Hsection 41 ofthe Actorforthatmatter Section 56(2)(r)
thereof were not applicable, the question of issuing any direction
purported to be in terms of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act did
not arise. [Paras 15and16] (561-E, F, G]

B
MP. Gangadharan and Ors. v. State ofKera/a and Ors., (2006] 6
sec 162, distinguished.
1.4. All the authorities under the Act including the Central
Government being the creature of statute were bound to act within the
four comers thereof. A specific grievance was raised by the appellants
C that the action on the part of the authority amounted to unfair trade
practice and there was deficiency of service. The same had been
negatived. The courts having appropriate jurisdiction having found
neither unfair trade practice nor there being deficiency in service and
in that view of the matter, the Central Government ordinarily ought not
D to have interfered in the matter. Appellants took recourse to remedies
on administrative side which stricto sensu were not available.
(Paras 19 and 20] (562-B, C, DJ
1.5. Some officers of the respondent by themselves could not have
E evolved a Scheme which was beyond the purview and scope of the Act.
Respondent being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India is bound to fulfill the constitutional scheme
contained in Article 14 thereof. The Central Government itselfdirected
the authority to confine the 'outoftum allotment' quota by reason ofa 1 _
F direction issued in June, 2000 only for widows of Government servants
who dies in harness and those who were killed by terrorists. It would be
preposterous to suggest that the Central Government could act beyond
its professed policy decision. Thus Central Government, acted illegally
and without jurisdiction in purporting to take a decision that the hard
G cases may be brought within the purview of tlie 'Out ofTum Allotment'
Quota, as therefor there was no legal sanction. Having professed to
abide by the Brochure which contained the policy ofreservation, the
Central Government could not in absence of any statutory provision
directed creation of any quota and that too after closure of the Scheme.
H The Scheme after its closure could not even have been revived Such a
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 555
AUTHORITY
purported decision being wholly without jurisdiction, is a nullity. A
[Paras21,22 and 23] [562-D,E, F, G; 563-A, D,E]

- Ramana Dayaram She tty v. The International Airport Authority of
India and Ors., AIR (1979) SC 1628 and Harjit Singh and Anr. v. The
State ofPunjab and Anr., (2007) 3 SCALE 553, relied on. B
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 US 535 referred to.

1.6. Guidelines per se do not partake to the character of s_tatute.
Such guidelines in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in
nature. Guidelines being advisory in character per se do not confer any c
legal right. [Para 24] [563-E; 564-C]

P.M Ashwathanarayana Setty and Ors. v. State ofKarnataka and
Ors., AIR (1989) SC 100 and State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v.
Kai/ash Chand Mahajan and Ors., [1992] Supp 2 SCC 351, distinguished. D
Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union ofIndia and Ors., AIR (1989)
SC 2138; Narendra Kumar Maheshwariv. Union ofIndia and Ors., [1990]
(Supp) SCC 440; Maharao Sahib Shir Bhim Singh}iv. Union ofIndia and
Ors., [1981] l SCC 166; JR. Raghupathy and Ors. v. State ofA.P. and
Ors., [1988) 4 SCC 464 and Uttam Parkash Bansal and Ors. v. L.1 C. of E
India, (2002) (100) DLT 487, referred to.

1.7. The doctrine of Legitimate Expectation would apply only when
. t a practice is found to be prevailing. It has a positive concept. But, in a
case of this nature where purported expectation is based on an illegal F
and unconstitutional order, same is wholly inapplicable, as it cannot be
founded on an order which is per se illegal and without foundation.
[Para 27) [564-G, H; 565-A]

Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State ofBihar and Ors., [2006) 8
SCC381;JP. Bansa!v.StateofRajasthan, [2003) 5SCC 134: (2003)3 G
SCALE 154 and Union ofIndia v. KP. Joseph and Ors., [1973) 1 SCC
194: AIR (1973) SC 303, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5874 of
2007. H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A From the final Judgment dated 18.08.2006 with orders dated L....._
25.4.2006 and 20.3.2006 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in
Civil Writ No. 19633-35 of2005.

B
Poonam Verma Appellant-In-Person. -
Ashwani Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by -l.-

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

c 2. Respondent is an authority created under the Delhi Development
Act, 1957 (for short "the Act"). The Act was enacted to provide for the
development of Delhi according to plan and for matters connected
therewith or ancillary thereto.
Respondent floated a scheme known as Fifth Self Financing Housing
D Registration Scheme, 1982 (for short "the Scheme"). Appellants herein r
pursuant to an advertisement issued in this behalf registered themselves;
their registration numbers being 13463, 16602 and 13464. For the
purpose of allotment of flats, lots were drawn on various occasions, viz.,
in June, 1987, November, 1987, March, 1989, July, 1990, January, 1991,
E January, 1993. Appellants were not successful therein and, thus, were
unable to get flats in locality of their choice. The Scheme was closed.
However, with a view to give a chance to those who were not successful
in the lots on the earlier occasions, a public notice was issued in some
newspapers on 8.12.1993 for release of about 3000 flats which included
F some built and ready-built ones situated in Kondli-Gharoli. Registrants
under the Scheme were entitled to apply therefor. In the public notice, it
was categorically stated that the registrants of the said scheme who had
not applied for an allotment in that release would not be eligible to apply
again for allotment. It was further stated that in the case registrants of 5th
G SFS did not avail of this opportunity or if they surrendered allotment/
allocation after being successful, they shall be deemed to have opted out
of the scheme and action shall be taken to refund their registration money.
3. Appellants did not respond to the said notice. Despite the same
H allegedly they had been allotted Category- III flats. They were called upon
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 557

... ~
AUTHORITY [SINHA, J.]
to pay the price specified therefor and to take delivery thereof. They A
declined to do so. They asked their names to be included in the VI and
VI-A Self Financing Schemes which were issued later on. Respondent
did not agree thereto.
4. A complaint was filed by the appellants before the Consumer
B
Disputes Redressal District Forum -II on or about 16.01.1995 inter alia
-~ for a direction upon the respondent herein that their registration should
not be cancelled and they should be considered in future draw oflots till
they could be allotted flats in the locality of their choice. By a judgment
and order dated 24.07.1995, the said application was allowed holding
that the action of the respondent in not considering the cases of the
c
appellants for allotment through the process of draw oflots amounted to
unfair trade practice, apart from being unilateral and unjustified. Aggrieved
by and dissatisfied therewith, the respondent preferred an appeal before
the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi and by
D
an order dated 30.11.1998 allowed the said appeal and set aside the order
of the District Forum. Appellants herein thereafter filed a revision
application before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission. During pendency of the said application, they approached
the Finance Member and Chairman of the respondent to place their case
E
before the 'out of court settlement committee'. By an order dated
25.11.1999, the National Commission dismissed the revision petition filed
by the appellants herein relying inter alia on Clause 16 of the Brochure
't wherein it had categorically been stated that "DDA reserves the right to
withdraw the Scheme at any time". A Special Leave Petition preferred
F
thereagainst was dismissed.
5. Although the appellants were not successful in their attempt to
obtain any remedy on the judicial side, they purported to approach the
Ministry of Urban Affairs in 1997. They made certain representations.
Allegedly, the Joint S:!cretary (D&L) by reason of a letter dated G
24.08.2000 addressed to the Vice-Chairman of Delhi Development
Authority directed as under:
"I am directed to refer to D.O. letter No. F.1 (Misc.) 5th SFS &
onwards/2000/SFS, dated the 15th May, 2000 from Shri Arvind H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addl.) S.C.R.

A Kumar, the then Commissioner (Housing), on the subject noted '
i.-...
-
above, and to state that the matter pertaining to giving one more
opportunity to the left out registrants of 5th and subsequent Self
Financing Schemes was discussed in the Chamber ofUDM with
VC, DDA some time back. After discussion, it was agreed that
B instead of a general scheme, VC, DDA would cover the pending
petitioners, especially, the hard cases under the OTA quota. It was
also mentioned by the VC, DDA that there are only three such -l-
cases. It is, therefore, requested that further action to allot the flats
to these three petitioners may please be taken and action taken in
c the matter may be intimated to this Ministry in due course."
6. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was again
approached. The application of the appellants was dismissed. Another
application was filed by them before the Permanent Lok Adalat for non-
compliance of orders of Ministry of Urban Development despite availability
D
of flats. By an order dated 6.09.2005, the Lok Adalat observed:
"On 12.4.2005, Lok Adalat had recommended that the case of
the petitioner is a hard case and instead of General Scheme the
case of the petitioner should be considered under the Out of Turn
E Allotment quota particularly when there are only three cases left.
In this connection a Jetter of Minister of Urban Development &
Poverty Alleviation dated 24.8.2005 refers to. This letter clearly
provides that according to the Vice-Chairman, DDA there are only
three such cases left and in such a situation the case of the petitioner 'I
F should be covered under OTA Quota being a hard case. This
recommendation has not been accepted by the DDA presumably
for the reason that the scheme of SFS under which the petitioner
had applied had become defunct. The scheme of OTA under the
quota is also no longer in existence and as such the case of the
G petitioner cannot be considered under this category. The petitioner
cannot be considered under this category. The petitioner cannot
be allotted a flat as the flats which arc lying vacant for which the
petitioner has applied for the DDA has merged the flats with the
Higher Income Group. In other words, the DDA in the aforesaid
H circumstances has opposed such allotment to the petitioner. There
- ' POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 559
) AUTHORITY [SINHA, J.]
is no meeting ground between the parties, the matter is closed as A
unsettled. The petitioner is at liberty to approach appropriate
Forum/Court of Law for redressal of his grievances if she is so
advised."

7. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court B
which was marked as Civil Writ No. 19633-35 of2005. By an order
dated 20.03.2006, the said petition was dismissed. Letters Patent Appeal
preferred thereagainst by the appellants being LPA No. 652-654 of2006
has also been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment dated
25.04.2006. A review application filed thereagainst also stand dismissed. C
8. Mr. Ram Prakash, representing the appellants, in support of this
appeal inter alia would submit:
(i) As in the Brochure, a policy of reservation was provided, the
High Court committed a serious illegality in opining that no D
legal right accrued in their favour in terms of the said letter
dated 24.08.2000.
(ii) The Central Government, having regard to Section 41 read
with Section 56(2)(r) of the Act, could direct allotment of flats
from 'out of tum quota' keeping in view the cases of the E
appellants who were three in number, as falling in the category
of hard cases.
(Iii) The Central Government in a situation of this nature was
entitled to formulate a Scheme for the left out registrants. The
authorities of the respondent having participated in the meeting F
with the Minister of Urban Development, pursuant whereto the
said letter dated 24.08.2000 was issued, the respondent was
bound to implement the same in view of the principles of
Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel. G
(iv) As a large number of flats had been vacant, as would appear
from the statement made by the Vice-Chairman of the
respondent on 8.11.2002 by reason of allotment of the flats,
nobody else would be prejudiced.
H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A 9. Mr. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, submitted:
(i) Appellant do not have any legal right in obtaining allotment of
flats.

B (ii) They having failed to deposit the amount as far back in 1994
cannot now be pennitted to claim an equitable right despite
their unsuccessful attempt before the Forums created under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1985.
10. Indisputably, the Scheme was an independent one. It was a Self
C Financing Housing Registration Scheme. Other similar schemes following
the same were also wholly independent of each other. The Brochure issued
for enforcing the said Scheme is a self-contained document. It provides
for the mode and manner in which flats are to be allotted, the categories
of the allotment of flats thereof, mode of payment as also cancellation
D thereof. Indisputably, despite the fact that the appellants were not successful
in obtaining the flats by reason of draw oflots and despite the fact that r
they did not respond to the notice issued by the respondent, those cases
had not been considered in the year 1994. On what ground, we do not
know, flats were allotted in their favour. They were asked to make
E deposits. They did not do so. They, on the other hand, made a totally
untenable claim of continuing their registration again in VI and VI-A
Schemes.
11. We have noticed hereinbefore that their claim based on deficiency
F of service and/ or unfair trade practice was rejected by the Higher Forum i ~
on the pmt of the respondent. They lost their battle upto this Court in the
first round oflitigation.
12. Having failed to establish any legal right in themselves as also
G purported deficiency in services on the part of the respondent before
competent legal forums, they took recourse to remedies on administrative
side which stricto sensu were not available. It has not been shown as to
on what premise the Central Government can interfere with the day to
day affairs of the respondent. Section 41 of the Act, only envisages that
H the respondent would carry out such directions that may be issued by
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 561
AUTHORITY [SINHA, J.]
the Central Government from time to time for the efficient administration A
of the Act. The same does not take within its fold an order which can be
passed by the Central Government in the matter of allotment of flats by
the Authority. Section 41 speaks about policy decision. Any direction
issued must have a nexus with the efficient administration of the Act. It
has nothing to do with carrying out of the plans of the authority in respect B
of a particular scheme.
13. The Central Government does not have any quota under the Act.
It did not have any quota under the Scheme. The reservations envisaged
in terms of the Scheme were as under:
c
"a) 25% of the flats for the persons belonging to SC/ST.
b) 3% of the flats for MPs.
c) 2% of the flats for persons who have won national recognition
in the field of sports, art and music. D
d) 1% of the flats for physically handicapped."
14. Evidently, the Central Government had no say in the matter either
on its own or under the Act. In terms of the Brochure, Section 41 of the
Act does not clothe any jurisdiction upon the Central Government to issue E
such a direction.
15. Submission of Mr. Ram Prakash that the Central Government
could issue the said direction in exercise of its rule making power under
Section 56 of the Act is wholly misplaced. In issuing the said letter, the F
Central Government did not exercise its legislative power nor could it do
so. The Central Government in terms of the Act apart from Section 41
did not have any power and, thus, could not have issue any direction in
terms thereof.
16. lf Section 41 of the Act or for that matter Section 56(2)(r) thereof G
were not applicable, the question of issuing any direction purported to be
in terms of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, as has been submitted
by Mr. Ram Prakash, did not arise.
17. MP. Gangadharan and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors., H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A [2006] 6 SCC 162, whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Ram
Prakash, has no application in the instant case.
18. The Scheme in question was closed as far back as in the year
1994. The Central Government in terms of the provisions of the Act or
B otherwise had no jurisdiction to revive the same.
19. All the authorities under the Act including the Central Government
being the creature of statute were bound to act within the four comers
thereof. A specific grievance was raised by the appellants herein that the
action on the part of the authority amounted to unfair trade practice.
C Deficiency of service was also pleaded. The same had been negatived.
The courts having appropriate jurisdiction having found neither unfair trade
practice nor there being deficiency in service and in that view of the matter,
the Central Government ordinarily ought not to have interfered in the
matter.
D
20. The purported letter dated 24.08.2000 does not specify as to
how the Central Government assumed any jUiisdiction in the matter.
21. Some officers of the respondent by themselves could not have
evolved a Scheme which was beyond the purview and scope of the Act.
E Respondent being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India is bound to fulfill the constitutional scheme contained
in Article 14 thereof. It could not, going behind the professed scheme as
contained in the Brochure, create a quota Such a purported decision being
wholly without jurisdiction, is a nullity. The Central Government itself
F directed the authority to confine the 'out of tum allotment' quota by reason
of a direction issued in June, 2000 only for widows of:
(a) Government servants who dies in harness.
(b) Those who were killed by terrorists.
G
It would be preposterous to suggest that the Central Government
could act beyond its professed policy decision.
22. The Central Government, thus, acted illegally and without
jurisdiction in purporting to take a decision that the hard cases may be
H
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 563
AUTHORITY [SINHA, J.]
brought within the purview of the 'Out of Turn Allotment' Quota, as A
therefor there was no legal sanction.
Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton [359 US 535] stated:
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by
which it professes its action to be judged...... Accordingly, if B
dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even
though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency,
that procedure must be scrupulously observed......This judicially
evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if
I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall C
perish with the sword."
[See also Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport
Authority of India and Ors., AIR (1979) SC 1628 : [1979] 3 SCC
489, Harjit Singh & Anr. v. The State of Punjab & Anr. (2007) 3 D
SCALE 553])
23. Having professed to abide by the Brochure which contained the
policy of reservation, as noticed hereinbefore, the Central Government
could not in absence of any statutory provision directed creation of any
quota and that too after closure of the Scheme. The Scheme after its E
closure could not even have been revived.
24. Guidelines per se do not partake to the character of statute. Such
guidelines in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature.
Mr. Ram Prakash himself has relied upon a decision of this Court in F
Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union ofIndia and Ors., AIR (1989)
SC 2138 wherein it has been laid down:
"I 00 ... This is because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall
into the category oflegislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary. They
have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence to or G
deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible ifthe
, .-+
circumstances of any particular fact or law situation warrants the
same. Judicial control takes over only where the deviation either
involves arbitrariness or discrimination or is so fundamental as to
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A undermine a basic public purpose which the guidelines and the
statute under which they are issued are intended to achieve."

[See also Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union of India and
Ors., [1990] Supp SCC 440 at 508; Maharao Sahib Shir Rhim Singhji
B v. UnionoflndiaandOrs., [1981] 1SCC166at232;JR Raghupathy
and Ors. v. State ofA.P. and Ors., [1988] 4 SCC 464 (paragraph 31)
and Uttam Parkash Bansal and Ors. v. L.JC. of India, (2002) 100
DLT 487] *.
Guidelines being advisory in character per se do not confer any legal
c right.
25. Reliance has also been placed upon P.M Ashwathanarayana
Setty and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 100
for the proposition that the State cannot rely on an evasive reason. We
D fail to understand how a case relating to Court Fees and Suit Evaluation
Act, would assist us in invoking the principles in regard to the
discriminatory impact of the matter in a case of this nature. r
26. Mr. Ram Prakash has also placed reliance upon State of
Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors.,
E [1992] Supp (2) SCC 351 wherein this Court was considering the
statutory conditions of services framed under a regulation made in terms
of Electricity (Supply) Act. In that context, this Court considered the
question as to whether the term of appointment can be confined to a single
person. Reliance placed on the said decision is wholly misplaced. A
F reasonable classification is permissible although a class legislation is not,
but the same will have no application in a case where an executive order
was passed wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the constitutional
scheme relating to fixation of quota for certain categories of persons.

G 27. An endeavour has been made to invoke the principles of
Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel. The doctrine of
Legitimate Expectation would apply only when a practice is found to be
prevailing. It has a positive concept. But, in a case of this nature where
purported expectation is based on an illegal and unconstitutional order,
H the same is wholly inapplicable, as the same cannot be founded on an
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 565
AUTHORITY [SINHA, J.]
order which is per se illegal and without foundation. A
Strong reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in
Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [2006] 8
SCC 381 wherein a Bench of this Court opined:
"15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. B
It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily
flow from a promise or established practice. The term "established
practice" refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain
conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority. The
expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and C
valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or
random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot
be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable
as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review
of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the D
requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative action,
as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established.
In short, a person can be said to have a "legitimate expectation"
of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made
by an authority, either expressly or inipliedly, or ifthe regular and E
consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such
expectation in the normal course. As a ground for relief, the efficacy
of the doctrine is rather weak as its slot is just above "fairness in
action" but far below "promissory estoppel". It may only entitle
y
an expectant: ( a ) to an opportunity to show cause before the F
expectation is dashed; or ( b ) to an explanation as to the cause
for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction
requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or
established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made
out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, G
change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or
bona fide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient
to negative the "legitimate expectation". The doctrine oflegitimate
expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from
legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addl.) S.C.R.

A by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with
an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or
by someone who has a recognised legal relationship with the
authonty
. ... "

The said decision, thus, instead of assisting the appellants runs counter
B
to their contention.
..._ __
28. Mr. Ram Prakash has also placed strong reliance on JP. Bansal
v. State of Rajasthan, [2003] 5 SCC 134 : 2003 (3) SCALE 154.
Therein itself, it is laid down:
c
" ... The Constitution requires that action must be taken by the
authority concerned in the name of the Governor. It is not till this
formality is observed that the action can be regarded as that of
the State. Constitutionally speaking, the Council of Ministers are
D advisers and as the Head of the State, the Governor is to act with
the aid or advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, till the
advice is accepted by the Governor, views of the Council of
Ministers do not get crystallised into action of the State ... "
29. This decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that
E the government order, so as to confer a legal right, must conform to the
provisions contained in Article 166 of the Constitution of India.
30. Questioning the correctness of the observation of the Division
bench that the communication contained in the letter dated 24.08.2000
F did not confer any legal right, Mr. Ram Prakash, would submit that an
administrative order may also confer a legal right. No doubt, it was so
stated in Union of India v. K.P. Joseph and Ors., [1973] 1 SCC 194:
AIR 1973 SC 303 but then it was a case where an executive order was.
passed which was within the jurisdiction of the State in terms of the proviso
G appended to Article 309 of the Constitution oflndia. The Bench, it is
interesting to note, hastened to add:
+-
"11. We should not be understood as laying down any general
proposition on this question. But we think that the Order in question
conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed
H
POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT 567
AUTHORITY [SINHA, J.]
in the manner specified in the Order and that was part of the A
conditions of his service. We see no reason why the Court should
not enforce that right."

31. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed
accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there B
shall be no order as to costs.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.