Holding

A confession recorded under Section 15 of TADA remains admissible for other offences tried together under Section 12, even if the accused is acquitted of TADA offences, and Section 18 applies only at the stage of taking cognizance.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether a confession recorded under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) remains admissible for offences under other statutes when the accused is acquitted of TADA charges but tried together with those offences under Section 12. The Court held that the confession is admissible for the other offences, as Section 15 has overriding effect and must be read in conjunction with Section 12, which empowers the Designated Court to convict for connected offences even if no TADA offence is proved. The Court also clarified that Section 18, which allows transfer of cases to regular courts, is triggered only when the Designated Court takes cognizance after investigation and filing of charge‑sheet, not at any later stage. The judgment reaffirmed the constitutionality of TADA provisions against Articles 14 and 21, emphasizing the distinct class of terrorist offenders and the need for stringent procedures. The reference was answered and the appeals were listed for hearing before a regular bench.

Issues considered

The admissibility of a confession recorded under Section 15 of TADA for non‑TADA offences when the accused is acquitted of TADA charges.
Whether Section 12 of TADA authorises conviction for other offences in the same trial despite acquittal on TADA charges.
The scope of Section 18 of TADA regarding transfer of cases to regular courts.
Whether the provisions of TADA violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 209
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 12, s. 15, s. 18

Subjects

TADAconfession admissibilitySection 15Section 12Section 18Designated Courtterrorism legislationArticles 14 and 21statutory interpretationconstitutional law

Judgment

A PRAKASH KUMAR @ PRAKASH BHUTTO
v.
.,,
STATE OF GUJARAT

JANUARY 12, 2005

B [R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., B.N. AGRAWAL, H.K. SEMA, G.P. MATHUR AND
P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.]

~

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987:
-f

c Sections 15 & 12-Tria/ of offer.ces under TADA together with offence
under any other law-Admissibility of confession recorded under S.15 of TADA,
in case accused acquitted of offences under TADA in the same trial-Held, it
would continue to remain admissible for offences under any other law which
were tried alongwith TADA offences.
D Section 12-Trial under TADA-Non-availability of ordinary procedural
Jaw-Held, not discriminatory-Persons tried under TADA form a distinct
~
class-Procedure prescribed for trying them for the aggravated and incensed
nature of offences are under different classification-Constitution of India, ~

1950--Articles 14 and 21.
E
Section 18-Invocation of for transferring cases to regular courts-
Held, the provision is invokable only at the stage where the Designated Court
takes cognizance, i.e. after the investigation is complete and charge-sheet is
filed.

F Misuse of the Act-Caution against, to Police Officials as well as
Presiding Officers of Designated Courts-To enforce the Act effectively and
.I,
in consonance with the legislative intendment i.e. after application of mind

Interpretation of Statutes-Jurisdiction of Court to interpret a statute
can be invoked only in case of ambiguity.
G
Words and Phrases- "but subject to the provisions of this Section" and
'for an offence under this Act" -Meaning of in context to S.15 of the Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act.

Doubting the correctness of the decision in State v. Nalini, [1999] 5
H 408
P. KUMAR@ PRAKASH BHUTTO"' STATE OF GU.IA RAT 409
\ SCC 253 as to admissibility of a confession in terms of Section 15 of the A
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), a two-
Judge Bench of this Court referred the matter to a three-Judge Bench
which in turn made this reference to a five-Judge Bench.

The primary question for determination is, as to whether the
confessional statement duly recorded under Section 15 of the TADA would B
continue to remain admissible as for the offences under any other law
which were tried along with TADA offences under Section 12 of the Act,
)<
notwithstanding the fact that the accused was acquitted of offences under
TADA in the said trial.
"
Answering the reference, the Court c
HELD: I.I. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
.1987 (TADA), though a miniature legislation, is very harsh and drastic
containing stringent provisions to combat the menace of terrorism.
[415-H)
D
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994] 3 SCC 569 and Hitendra Vishnu
1
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994] 4 SCC 602, referred to.
i
Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1,
cited.
E
1.2. The more stringent the law, the less is the discretion of the Court.
Stringent laws are made for the purpose to achieve its objectives. This
being the intendment of the legislature the duty of the court is to seP that
the intention of the legislature is not frustrated. (422-G-H)
F
;.. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431, overruled.

Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, (1997] 7 SCC 744 and
· Gurprit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2002] 10 SCC 201, held, per incuriam.

Swedish Match AB and Anr. v. Securities & Exchange Board, India and G
Anr., (2004) 7 Scale 158, relied on.

2.l. The jurisdiction of the Court to interpret a statute can be
invoked only in case of ambiguity. The Court cannot enlarge the scope of
legislation or intention when the language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous. (426-C] H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (20031 2 SCC 577; Mohan Kumar /
Singhania v. Union of India, 119921 Supp. I SCC 594 and Bairam Kumawat
v. Union of India, (20031 7 SCC 628, relied on.

Supdt. And Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of W.B. v. Abani
Maity, (1979) 4 SCC 85, cited.
B
2.2. Section 15 of the TADA Act and Rules framed thereunder is a
self-contained code in itself, providing procedural safeguards and the
words, "but subject to the provisions of this Section" employed therein
would mean the procedural safeguards prescribed under the Section.
Section 15 has overriding effect over the Evidence Act and Criminal
C Procedure Code, the only procedure to be followed in recording confession
is the procedure prescribed under the provisions of Section 15 and Rules
framed thereunder. This would be the only intention of the Legislation
whi!e introducing the words, "but subject to provisions of this section" in
Section 15(1). (430-H; 431-A-BI
D
2.3 So far the words "for an offence under this Act" employed in
Section 15 is concerned, the word 'Act' referred to in Section 15(1) is ,.
relatable to Section 12 of the Act. Section 15 therefore has to be read
together with Section 12. [431-B)

E 2.4. A conjoint reading of Sections 12 and 15 as a whole leaves no
manner of doubt that one provision is to be construed with reference to
the other provision and vice versa so as to make the provision consistent
with the object sought to be achieved. 1432-D-EI

Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co.
F Ltd., (19871 1 SCC 424 and Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd Shafi and Ors.,
120011 8 sec 540, relied on.

2.5. The legislative intendment underlying Section 12(1) and (2) is
clearly discernable, to empower the Designated Court to try and convict
the accused for offences committed under any other law along with
G offences committed under the Act, if the offence is connected with such
other offence. The language, "if the offence is connected with such other
offence" employed in Section 12(1) of the Act has great significance. The
necessary corollary is that once the other offence is connected with the
offence under the TADA and if the accused is charged under the Code
H and tried together in the same trial, the Designated Court is empowered
P. KUMAR@ PRAKASH BHUTTO r. STA TE OF GUJARAT 411

'1t to convict the accused for the offence under any other law, notwithstanding A
the fact that no offence under TADA is made out. This could be the only
intendment of the legislature. To hold otherwise, would amount to rewrite
or recast the legislation and read something into it which is not there.
1433-C-EI

3.1. The contention that the rigours of Section 12 is discriminatory B
and attract the wrath of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution as it
empowers the Designated Court to try and convict the accused for the
offences committed under any other law along with the offences committed
under the TADA thereby depriving the rights available to the accused
under the ordinary law, is misconceived. (433-F) C
3.2. Article 14 prohibits discrimination, but allows reasonable
classification based on intelligible differentia, having nexus with the object
sought to be achieved. The object sought to be achieved by introducing
Section 12 is to take care of the offence connected with or incidental. to
terrorist activities,the other offence being connected and inextricably inter- D
twined with the Terrorist Act. (433-F-G]

3.3. Trial under TADA is a departure from the ordinary law. The
persons who are tried for offences specified under the provisions of TADA
are a distinct class of persons and the procedure prescribed for trying them
for the aggravated and incensed nature of offences are under different E
classification distinguishable from the ordinary criminals and procedure.
This distinction and classification of grouping of the accused and the
offences to be tried under TADA are to achieve the meaningful purpose
and object of the Act as reflected from the preamble as well as the
statement of objects and reasons. 1433-H; 434-A] F
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, relied on.

4. The confessional statement duly recorded under Section 15 of
TADA and Rules framed thereunder would continue to remain admissible
for the offences under any other law which were tried along with TADA
offences under Section 12 of the Act, notwithstanding that the accused was G
acquitted of offences under TADA in the same trial. (434-C-D]

State v. Nalini, (1999] 5 SCC 253, affirmed.

5.1. It cannot be said that the words, "after taking cognizance"
employed in Section 18 of the Act would include any stage of trial including H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.

A the stage when the judgment is to be delivered. If it ought to have been
1'
the intention of the legislature they could have said so. The legislature
deliberately uses the words "after taking cognizance of any offence" to
mean that Section 18 would be attracted only at the stage where the
Designated Court takes cognizance of offence i.e., after the investigation
is complete and charge-sheet is filed. There is no ambiguity in the language
B used in Section 18. [434-G-H; 435-C]

5.2. The provisions of Section 209 Cr.P.C. to which the appellants
sought to rely are not in pari materia with Section 18. In Section 209 -<

Cr.P.C. the words "after taking cognizance" are absent conspicuously. ..,
c Section 18 is a filtered provision which is attracted only at a stage the
Designated Court takes cognizance of offence. [434-H; 435-A]

6. The note of caution given by this Court in Kartar Singh 's case is
eloquently sufficient to caution police officials as well as the Presiding
Officers of the Designated Courts from misusing the Act and to enforce
D the Act effectively and in consonance with the legislative intendment which
would mean after application of mind. (435-C, H; 436-A)

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994] 3 SCC 569, affirmed.
..
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 526
E of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.3.2001 of the Designated Court
No. 3 at Ahmedabad in Terrorist Crl. Case No. 2 of 1977.

Manish Singhvi, Saurabh, Ajay and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Appellant
F in Crl. A. No. 526/200 I.

Sushil Kumar, Adolf Mathew, Puneet Rai, Vinay Arora and Sanjay Jain
for the Appellant in Crl.A. No. 545/200 I.

Ms. Asha G. Nair and Ms. Anu Mohla for the Appellant in Crl. A. No.
G 66512001.

Yashank Adhyaru, Ms. Hemantika Wahi and Ms. Aruna Gupta for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
?. KUMAR@ PRAKASH BHUTTO 1·. STA TE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, J ] 4 J3
\
H.K. SEMA, J. All these appeals are directed against the judgment and A
"" order dated 19th March, 200 I passed by the Designated Court No.3 at
Ahmedabad in Terrorist Case No.2 of 1997, Terrorist Case No. 33 of 1994
and Terrorist Case No. 16of1995. The two-Judge bench before whom these
appeals were posted fo~ hearing referred the matters to a three-Judge Bench
by an order dated 24.9.2002. The said Order reads as under:-
B
"The issue involved concerns the admissibility of a confession in
terms of Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short "TADA ACT"). Consequently,
therefore, the other provisions as contained in Sections 12 and 18
have to be read in order to assess the legislative intent therein. C
This Court in State v. Nalini, [1999] 5 SCC 253, in paragraphs
80 and 81 stated the law to be as below:-

"80. Section 12 of TADA enables the Designated Court
to jointly try, at the same trial, any offence under TADA together
with any other offence "with which the accused may be charged" D
as per the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (2) thereof
~
empowers the Designated Court to convict the accused, in such
a trial, of any offence "under any other law" if it is found by
" such Designated Court in such trial that the accused is found
guilty of such offence. If the accused is acquitted of the offences
E
under TADA in such a trial, but convicted of the offence under
any other law, it does not mean that there was only a trial for
such other offence under any other law.

81. Section 15 of TADA enables the confessional
statement of an accused made to a police officer specified therein
F
to become admissible "in the trial of such a person". It means,
if there was a trial of any offence under TADA together with any
other offence under any other law, the admissibility of the
confessional statement would continue to hold good even if the
accused is acquitted under TADA offences."
G
The view expressed above stands in unison with view expressed
in paragraphs 408 and 674 and same is noticed as below:- .
1'..
"408.As to whether any offence under Section 3 or Section 4 of
TADA is made out in the present case, we will cons.ider at subsequent
stage of the judgment. In view of the decision of this Court in Bilal
H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Ahmed Kaloo Case contention of Mr. Natarajan is rather correct.
However, it appears to us that while holding the confession to be
inadmissible in a trial when the accused is acquitted of offences under
Section 3 or Section 4 of TADA, provisions of Section 12 of TADA
were not taken into consideration by this Court in the said judgment.
Section 12 reads as under:
B
"12. Power of Designated Courts with respect to other
offences.
(I) When trying any offence, a Designated Court may
also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the
c Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected
with such other offence.
(2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any
offence, it is found that the accused person has committed any
other offence under this Act or any rule made thereunder or
D under any other law, the Designated Court may convict such
person of such other offence and pass any sentence authorised
by this Act or such rule or, as the case may be, such other law,
for the punishment thereof."
"674. Having regard to the provisions of Section 12 of the TADA
E Act, the confession recorded under Section 15 will be admissible in
the trial of a person, co-accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence
under the TADA Act or the rules made thereunder and such other
offence with which such a person miiy be charged at the same trial
under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code provided the
offence under the TADA Act or the rules made thereunder is connected
F with such other offence."

We are, however, constrained to record our doubt as regards the state
of the law as declared by the 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Na/ini
(supra).

G The issue, therefore, is whether the confessional statement would
continue to hold good even if the accused is acquitted under TADA
offe!lces and there is a clear finding that TADA Act has been wrongly
taken recourse to or the confession loses its legal efficacy under the
Act and thus rendering itself to an ordinary confessional statement
before the Police under the general law of the land. Nalini (supra) ,
H
P. KUMAR@PRAKASH BHUTTO 1·. STATE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, J.] 4 J5
however, answers this as noticed above, in positive terms but we A
have some doubts pertaining thereto since the entire justice delivery
system is dependent upon the concept of fairness: It is the interest of
justice which has a pre-dominant role in the criminal jurisprudence of
the country The irnll-mark of justice is the requirement of the day and
the need of the hour. Once the Court comes to a definite finding that B
invocation of TADA Act is wholly unjustified or there is utter frivolity
to implicate under TADA, would it be justified that Section 15 would
be made applicable with equal force as in TADA cases to book the
offenders even under the general law of the land. There is thus doubt
as noticed above!!

On the wake of the aforesaid and having regard to the decision
c
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pradip Chandra Parija v.
Pramod Chandra Patnaik, [2002] I SCC 1, we do feel it expedient
to direct the Registry for placing this matter before Hon 'ble the Chief
Justice of India for constituting a 3-Judge Bench for the purpose. It
is ordered accordingly." D
..,. In turn, the three-Judge Bench by an order dated 9 .3 .2004 has referred
the matters to a five-Judge Bench. The order reads:-

"This matter has been referred to a 3-Judge Bench doubting the
correctness of the decision in State v. Nalini, [ 1999] 5 sec 2~3 as E
to admissibility of a confession in terms of Section 15 of the Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. It is stated that
there are similar provisions available even under Prevention of Terrorist
Activities Act (POTA). If really the question as posed by the 2-Judge
Bench is to be answered, it could only be done by a Bench of 5
Judges as Nalini's case (supra) has been decided by a bench of three F
learned Judges. Therefore, this matter is referred to 5-Judge Bench.
The Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of India for appropriate orders."

This is how the matters have been placed before this Bench.
G
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) is a piece of Legislation containing 30
Sections. Though miniature legislation, the Act tends to be very harsh and
drastic containing the stringent provisions to combat the menace of terrorism
which has taken an endemic form indulging in wanton killings, arson, looting H
_)...

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A of properties and other heinous crimes affecting human rights and individual
liberty. The constitutionality of the Act has been concluded by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh V. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.
The validity of Section 15 of the Act which would be relevant for the present
purpose has been held to be intra-virus the Constitution. In paragraphs 217,
B 218, 220, 222, 236 and 243 it is said:

"217. If the procedural law is oppressive and violates the principle of
just and fair trial offending Article 21 of the Constitution and is
discriminatory violating the equal protection of laws offending Article
14 of the Constitution, then Section 15 of TADA Act is to be struck
down. Therefore, it has become inevitably essential to examine the
c classification of 'offenders' and 'offences' so as to enable us in
deciding whether Section 15 is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution.

218. The principle of legislative classification is an accepted principle
whereunder persons may be classified into groups and such groups
D
may differently be treated if there is a reasonable basis for such
difference or distinction. The rule of differentiation is that in enacting
laws differentiating between different persons or things in different
circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects such iaws
may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of
E persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not
really arise between persons governed by different conditions and
different set of circumstances.

220. Coming to the distinction made in TADA Act grouping the
terrorists and disruptionists as a separate class of offenders from
F ordinary criminals under the normal laws and the classification of the
offences under TADA Act as aggravated form of crimes
distinguishable from the ordinary crimes have to be tested and
determined as to whether this distinction and classification are
reasonable and valid within the term of Article 14 of the Constitution.
In order to consider the question as to the reasonableness of the
G
distinction and classification, it is necessary to take into account the
objective for such distinction and classification which of course need
not be made with mathematical precision. Suffice, if there is little or
no difference between the persons and the things which have been
grouped together and those left out of the groups, the classification
H cannot be said to be a reasonable one. In making the classification,
P. KUMAR@PRAKASH BHUTTO'" STATE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, .I] 417

various factors have to be taken into consideration and examined as A
to whether such a distinction or classification justifies the different
treatment and whether they subserve the object sought to be achieved.

222. As pointed out supra, the persons who are to be tried for offences
specified under the provisions of TADA Act are a distinct class of
persons and the procedure prescribed for trying them for the aggravated B
and incensed nature of offences are under different classification
distinguishable from the ordinary criminals and procedure. This
distinction and classification of grouping of the accused and the
offences to be tried under TADA are to achieve the meaningful purpose
and object of the Act as reflected from the preamble as well as the C
'Statement of Objects and Reasons' abort which we have elaborately
dealt with in the preceding part of this judgment.

236. Keeping the above proposition, we have to decide whether the
provisions of Section 15 of the 1987 Act (TADA) contravene Article
14. True, ifthe classification is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable D
and without any substantial basis, the law would be contrary to the
equal protection of laws by Article 14.

243. The above decision, in our view, cannot be availed of for striking
down Section 15 of TADA Act because the classification of'offenders'
and 'offences' to be tried by the Designated Court under the TADA E
Act or by the Special Courts under the Act of 1984, are not left to
the arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion of the Central Government
but the Act itself has made a delineated classification of the offenders
as terrorists and disruptionists in the TADA Act and the terrorists
under the Special Courts Act, 1984 as well as the classification of F
offences under both the Acts.

This Court also pointed out in paragraph 259 the procedural safeguards
to be followed by the police officer with regard to the mode of recording the
confession. It is then held in paragraph 260 (SCC p.681) as under:-

"260.For the foregoing discussion, we hold that Section 15 is not G
liable to be struck down since that section does not offend either
Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution."

This Court, however, as a matter of abundant caution laid down certain
guidelines, so as to ensure that the confession obtained is not tainted with any H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.

A vice and then said in paragraph 263 (SCC p.682) as under:-
"263. However, we would like to lay down following guidelines so
as to ensure that the confession obtained in the pre-indictment
interrogation by a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent
of Police is not tainted with any vice but is in strict conformity with
B the well-recognised and accepted aesthetic principles and fundamental
fairness:

(I) The confession should be recorded in a free atmosphere in the
same language in which the person is examined and as narrated by
him;
c
(2) The person from whom a confession has been recorded under
Section 15(1) of the Act, should be produced before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the
confession is required to be sent under Rule 15(5) along with the
original statement of confession, written or recorded on mechanical
D device without unreasonable delay;

(3) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate
should scrupulously record the statement, if any, made by the accused
so produced and get his signature and in case of any complaint of
torture, the person should be directed to be produced for medical
E
examination before a Medical Officer not lower in rank than of an
Assistant Civil Surgeon;

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, no police officer below the rank of an Assistant
p Commissioner of Police in the Metropolitan cities and elsewhere of
a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent
rank, should investigate any offence punishable under this Act of
1987.

This is necessary in view of the drastic provisions of this Act.
G More so when the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 under Section
17 and the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956 under Section 13,
authorise only a police officer of a specified rank to investigate the
offences under those specified Acts.

(5) The police officer if he is seeking the custody of any person for
H pre-indictment or pre-trial interrogation from the judicial custody,
P KUMAR@PRAKASH BllUTTO 1·. STATE OF GUJARAT fSEMA. J.] 419

\.
must file an affidavit sworn by him explaining the reason not only for A
>I. such custody but also for the delay, if any, in seeking the police
custody;

(6) In case, the person, taken for interrogation, on receipt of the
statutory warning that he is not bound to make a confession and that
if he does so, the said statement may be used against him as evidence, B
asserts his right to silence, the police officer must respect his right of
assertion without making any comp\tlsion to give a statement of
disclosure;

The Central Government may take note of these guidelines and
incorporate them by appropriate amendments in the Act and the Rules. C
The 1985 Act received the assent of the President on 23rd May and
came into force on 24th May, 1985. The preamble of this Act reads that the
special provisions of this Act were made "for the prevention of, and for
coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto". D
(emphasis supplied)

The Statement - of Objects and Reasons of the Act reads as follows:-

"Prefatory Note - Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Terrorists had E
been indulging in wanton killings, arson, looting of properties and
other heinous crimes mostly in Punjab and Chandigarh. Since the
10th May, 1985, the terrorists have expanded their activities to other
parts of the country, i.e. Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan
as a result of which several innocent lives have been lost and many
suffered serious injuries. In planting of explosive devices in trains, F
buses and public places, the object to terrorise, to create fear and
panic in the minds of citizens and to disrupt communal peace and
harmony is clearly discernible. This is a new and overt phase of
terrorism which requires to be taken serious note of and dealt with
effectively and expeditiously. The alarming increase in disruptive G
activities is also a matter of serious concern."

As the Act of 1985 was due to expire on 23rd May 1987, the President
promulgated the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Ordinance,
1987 (2 of 1987) which came into force from 24th May 1987. The Ordinance
was repealed by the enactment of 1987 (No.28 of 1987) which received the H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A assent of the President on 3rd September 1987. However, the scheme of the
special provisions in the Act of 1985 and the Act of 1987 remains the same.
The scheme of the Act being, for the prevention of, and for coping with,
terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto.

B The 1987 Act was further amended by an Amending Act 43 of 1993.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons to Amending Act are as follows:-

"The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 was
enacted on 23rd May, 1985 in the background of escalating terrorist
activities in many parts of the country. The Act came into force with
c effect from 24th May, 1985 with the stipulation that it would remain
valid for a period of two years with effect from the date of its
commencement as it was hoped at that time that it would be possible
to control, the menace of terrorism in a period of two years.
Unfortunately, terrorist violence has continued unabated, necessitating
D tile Government to periodically extend the Act on the due dates in
1987, 1989 and 1991. The life of the Act is now due to expire on the
23rd May, 1993. The views of the State Governments were obtained
while processing these extensions and most of them had recommended
extension of the Act. ,.
E 2. Terrorism which was initially confined to the States of Punjab,
Jammu and Kashmir and North East has spread its tentacles to
the States of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Haryana, Delhi, Gujarat and West Bengal. Apart
from this, the sophisticated weapons, remote control devices,
rocket launchers, professional training and international
F involvement have added a new and disturbing dimension to the
problem.
3. The menace of terrorism has also been a matter of international
concern. Recently, we have entered into an agreement with the
United Kingdom for mutual assistance in the investigation and
G prosecution of terrorist crime and the tracing, restraint and
confiscation of the proceeds and instruments of crime and terrorist
funds. This agreement is particularly useful in dealing with
terrorism inspired from abroad.
4. Keeping in view the above considerations, it is proposed to
H amplify some of the existing provisions so as to also concretize
P. ~UMAR r;f· PR1\KASll BllUTT01·. STATE OF GUJARAT (5Er-1A. J_J 421 ·

the agreement signed recently with the United Kingdom for A ·
, mutual assistance in investigation and prosecution of terrorists
crime and the tr.icing, restraint and confiscation of the proceeds
and instruments of crime and terrorist funds and to extend the
Act for a further period of two years up to 23rd May, 1995.

.
5. -The present
. ;
Bill seeks to achieve the ·above nientioned objects."
' ~
B
Thus, this type of extra ordinary laws are made to contain the
extraordinary situation by providing harsh, drastic and stringent provisions,
prescribing special procedure, departing from the procedure prescribed under
the ordinary procedural law for the reasons that the prevalent ordinary
procedural law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to C
deal with the offenders indulging in terrorist and disruptive activities. The
preambles and statements of objects and reasons as referred to above are
manifestly evident that such extra-ordinary Act was made to deal with extra-
ordinary situation for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and
disruptive activities and for matters connecte.d therewith or incidental thereto. D

' under the Act. This Court in
. The term 'terrorism' has not been defined
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v, State of Maharashtra, [1994] 4 SCC 602 held in
paragraph 7 (SCC p. 618) as under:- .

"7. "Terrorism' is one of the manifesiations ofincreas~d lawlessness E
and cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute· a threat to an
established order and are a. revolt against a civilised. society.
'Terrorism' has not been defined under TADA nor is it possible to
give a precise definition of ~terrorism· or lay do,vO_,vhat ~o-nstitutes
'terrorism'. It may be possible to describe !t as use of violence when F
its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage
of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or
. has the potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may
be death, injury, or destruction of property or even depri~ation of
individual liberty in the process but the extent.and reach of the intended
terrorist activity travels beyond the effect of an ordinary crime capable G
of being punished under the ordinary penal law of the land and its
main objective is to overawe the Government or disturb harmony. of
· the society or "terrorise" people and the society and not only tl1ose
directly assaulted, with a· view to disturb even tempo, peace and
tranquility of the society and create a sense of fear and insecurity. A H
)..

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A 'terrorist' activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance of
law and order or of public order. The fall out of the intended activity
must be such that it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law
enforcement agencies to tackle it under the ordinary penal law.
Experience has shown us that 'terrorism' is generally an attempt to
acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation and causing fear
B and helplessness in the minds of the people at large or any section
thereof and is a totally abnormal phenomenon. What distinguishes
'terrorism' from other forms of violence, therefore, appears to be the
deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation. More often
than not, a hardened criminal today takes advantage of the situation
c and by wearing the cloak of 'terrorism', aims to achieve for himself
acceptability and respectability in the society because unfortunately
in the States affected by militancy, a 'terrorist' is projected as a hero
by his group and often even by the misguided youth. It is therefore,
essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than
an ordinary criminal capable of being tried by the ordinary courts
D under the penal law of the land. Even though the crime committed by
a 'terrorist' and an ordinary criminal would be overlapping to an
extent but then it is not the intention of the Legislature that every
criminal should be tried under TADA, where the fall out of his activity
does not extend b.;yond the normal frontiers of the ordinary criminal
E activity. Every 'terrorist' may be a criminal but every criminal cannot
be given the label of a 'terrorist' only to set in motion the more
stringent provisions of TADA. The criminal activity in order to invoke
TADA must be committed with the requisite intention as contemplated
by Section 3( 1) of the Act by use of such weapons as have been
enumerated in Section 3(1) and which cause or are likely to result in
F the offences as mentioned in the said section."

As already noticed, the Act provides harsh and stringent provisions
aimed at to achieve the statement of objects and reasons for the prevention
of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.
G
The more stringent the Law, the less is the discretion of the Court.
Stringent laws are made for the purpose to achieve its objectives. This being :.
the intendment of the legislature the duty of the court is to see that the
intention of the legislature is not frustrated. If there is any doubt or ambiguity
H in the statutes, the rule of purposive construction should be taken recourse to,
P. KUMAR@ PRAKASH BHUTTO v. STA TE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, J.] 423
\ _.
to achieve the objectives. (See Swedish Match AB and Anr. v. Securities and A
Exchange Board, India and Anr., (2004) 7 Scale 158 para 84 at p, 176)

Before we proceed further, we may at this stage, notice a few decisions
of this Court on the subject. In the case of Bilal Ahmed.Kaloo v. State of
A. P., [ 1997] 7 SCC 431 the two-Judge Bench of this Court held in paragraph
5 (SCC p.434 ) as under:- B
"5. While dealing with the offences of which the appellant was
).
convicted there is no question of looking into the confessional
... statement attributed to him, much less relying on it since he was
acquitted of all offences under TADA. Any confession made to a
police officer is inadmissible in evidence as for these offences and c
hence it is fairly conceded that the said ban would not wane off in
respect of offences under the Penal Code merely because the trial was
held by the Designated Court for offences under TADA as welL
Hence the case against him would .stand or fall depending on the
other evidence." D
I This decision was rendered on 6th August, 1997. On the same day another
decision by the same Bench was rendered in the case of Rambhai Nathabhai
--;
Gadhvi V, State of Gujarat, [1997J 7 sec 744 where it was pointed out in
paragraph 18 (SCC p.751) as under:
E
"18. It is obvious that power of the Designated Court to charge the
accused with any offence other than TADA offences can be exercised
only in a trial conducted for any offence under TADA. When trial for
offence under TADA could not have been held by the Designated
Court for want of valid sanction envisaged in Section 20-A(2) the
consequence is that no valid trial could have been held by that court F
into any offence under the Arms Act also. It is clear that a Designated
Court has no independent power to try any other offence, Therefore,
no conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act is possible on the
materials collected by the Designated Court in the present case."

It will be noticed that in both the judgments provisions of Section 12 G
of the Act have not been noticed, The decision rendered in Bilal Ahmed's
)'
case was followed in Gurprit Singh v. State of Punjab, [2002] I 0 SCC 20 I.

The decision rendered in Bilal Ahmed's case was noticed by a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in State v. Nalini, [1999] 5 SCC 253. In Nalini's
H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20051 I S.C.R.

A case the Bench reconsiJered the decision in Bilal Ahmed's case and overruled
the decision in /li/al Ahmed's case. However, the decisions in Ramblwi 's
case and Gwpnt Singh 's case have not been noticed in Nalini 's case. In view
of the decision in Nulini 's case the decision rendered by a two-Judge Bench
in Rambahi 's and Gurprit Singh's case are per incuriam.

B The primary question referred to this Bench for determination is, as to
whether the confessional statement duly recorded under Section 15 of TADA
would continue to remain admissible as for the offences under any other law
which were tried along with TADA offences under Section 12 of the Act,
notwithstanding the fact that the accused was acquitted of offences under
C TADA in the said trial.

The questions posed before us for the termination are no more res
integra. In our view, the same have been set at rest by the three-Judge Beric!i
decision rendered in Nalini (supra). The rigours of Sections 12 and 15 were
considered in Nalii1i 's case and rendered a finding in paragraphs 80, 81 and
D 82 (SCC p.304) as under:-
"80. Section 12 of TADA enables the Designated Court to jointly try,
at the same trial, any offence under TADA together with any other ...
offence "with which the accused may be charged" as per the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) thereof empowers the Designated
E Court 'to convict the accused, in such a trial, of any offence "under
any other law" if it is found by such Designated Court in such trial
that the accused is found guilty of such offence. If the accused is
acquitted of the offences under TADA in such a trial, but convicted
of the offence under any other law, it does not mean that there was
only a trial for such other offence under any other law.
F
81. Section 15 of TADA enables the confessional statement of an
accused made to a police officer specified therein to become admissible
"in the trial of such a person". It means, if there was a trial of any
offence under TADA together with any other offence under any other
law, the admissihility of the cOJ~fessional statement would continue to
G hold good even if the accused is acquiued under TADA offences. "

(emphasis supplied)

82. The aforesaid implications of Section 12 vis-a-vis Section 15 of
TADA have not been adverted to in Bilal Ahmed case. Hence the
H
P. KIJ~1AR i\ PRAK,\Sll IJllllTTOY. STATE OF Gl .IAkAT !SEMA, J.] 425

observations therein (at sec p. 434, para 5) that A
"while dealing with the offences of which the appellant was
convicted there is no question of looking into the confessional
statement attributed to him, much less relying on it since he was
acquitted of all offences under TADA"

cannot be followed by us. The correct position is that the confessional
B
statement duly recorded under Section I 5 of TADA would continue to
remain admissible as for the other offences under any other law
which too were tried along with TADA offences, no matter that the
accused was acquitted of offences under TADA in that trial."

(emphasis supplied)
c
We are in respectful agreement with the findings recorded by a three-Judge
Bench in Nalini 's case.

S.S.M. Quadri, J. in his concurring judgment held in paragraphs 674 D
and 675 at sec p.571 as under:-

"674. Having regard to the provisions of Section 12 of the TADA
Act, the confession recorded under Section 15 will be admissible in.,
the trial of a person, co-accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence
under the TADA Act or the rules made thereunder and such other E
offence with which such a person may be charged at the same trial
under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code provided the
offence under the TADA Act or the rules made thereunder is connected
with such other offence.

675. An analysis of sub-section (1) Section 15 shows that it ha" two F
limbs. The first limb bars application of µrovisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act to a confession
made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than a
Superintendent of Police and recorded by him in any of the modes
noted in the section. The second limb makes such a confession
admissible, de hors the provisions of the Evidence Act in the trial of G
such person or co-accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under
the TADA Act or rules made thereunder provided the co-accused,
abettor or conspirator is charged and tried in the same case together
with the accused. The import of Section 15 (I) is that insofar as the
provisions of Cr PC and the Evidence Act come in conflict with either H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A recording of a confession of a person by a police officer of the rank
mentioned therein, in any of the modes specified in the section, or its
admissibility at the trial, they will have to yield to the provision of
Section 15(1) of the TADA Act as it is given overriding effect."

It was also pointed out in paragraph 704 at SCC p.580 that a confession of .
B an accused under Section 15 of the TADA Act is substantive evidence against
the co-accused, abettor or conspirator jointly tried with the accused.

Before we proceed to consider the rigours of Sections 15 and 12 we
may at this stage point out that it is a trite law that the jurisdiction of the
Court to interpret a statute can be invoked only in case of ambiguity. The
C Court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language
of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction
may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction which
would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute
is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that
D when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the court would
attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of
the provision, having regard to the consequences of the alternative
constructions. In this connection, we may noti'e few decisions of this Court.

In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, [2003] 2 SCC 577, the three judge-
E Bench of this Court pointed out in paragraphs 35 and 37 (SCC p. 588) and
(SCC p. 589) as under:-

"35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous,
the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only
because of harsh consequences arising therefrom."
F
"37. The Court's jurisdiction to interpret a statue can be invoked
when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case
the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of
the fabric. It cannot· enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when
the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add
G or subtract words to a statue or read something into it which is not
there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to
determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not
used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention
of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be
H true that use of the expression "shall or may" is not decisive for
P. KUMAR@ PRAKASH BHUTTO 1·. STATE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, l.] 427
' I \, arriving at a finding as to whether the statue is directory or mandatory. A
But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme
of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are
used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was
that ~he provisions are mandatory in character."

(See also Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, (1992] Supp. I B
sec 594 (Sec p.624) para 67.

_. In the case of Bairam Kumawat v. Union of India, [2003] 7 SCC 628,
.,. the three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out in paragraph 23 at SCC p.
635 as under:-
c
"Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and
pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given
effect to. The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the
subject-matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to
achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak
out of the meshes of law. Criminal jurisprudence does not say so."
D
'\ and further in paragraph 30 at SCC p.638 it was pointed out as under:-
......
"30. Yet again in Supdt. And Remembrancer of Legal Affiars to
Govt. of W.B. v. Abani Maity [1979] 4 SCC 85 the law is stated in
the following terms: (SCC p.90, para 18) E
"19 {18}. Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long-
recognised rule of construction. Words in a statue often take
their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They
are therefore, not to be construed in isolation. For instance, the
use of the word 'may' would normally indicate that the provision F
was not mandatory. But in the context of a particular statute, this
word may connote a legislative imperative, particularly when its
construction in a permissive sense would relegate it to the
unenviable position, as it were, 'of an in effectual angel beating
its wings in a luminous void in vain'. 'If the choice is between G
two interpretations', said Viscount Simon, L.C. In Nokes v.
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd. (AC at p.1022)

'the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of
the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce
the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder H
428 ;UPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only
for the purpose of bringing about an effective result"'.

In the backdrop of referred decisions and keeping in view the legislative
intendment and scheme of the Act. we may now examine rigours of Sections
15 and 12 of the Act.
B
Section 15 deals with certain confessions made to police officers to be
taken into consideration. It reads:-

(l) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (I of 1872), but subject to the provisions of this section,
c a confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in
rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police
officer either in writing or on any mechanical device like cassettes,
tapes or sound tracks from out of which sounds or images can be
reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person ( or co-
accused, abettor or conspirator ) for an offence under this Act or rules
D made thereunder:

Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and
tried in the same case together with the accused.

(2) The police officer shall, before recording any confession under
E sub-section (I), explain to the person making it that he is not bound
to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as
evidence against him and such police officer shall not record any
such confession unless upon questioning the person making it, he has
reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.
F Rule 15 deals with the recording of confession made to police officers.
It reads:-

(I) A confession made by a person before a police officer and recorded
by such police officer under Section 15 of the Act shall invariably be
recorded in the language in which such confession is made and if that
G is not practicable. in the language used by such police officer for
official purposes or in the language of the Designated Com1 and it
shall form part of the record.

(2) the confession so recorded shall be shown, read or played back
to the person concerned and if he does not understand the language
H
I' Kl'\1'\R-~ l'Ki\KASll ;;l/UTT<l,- STi\TEOFGlJ.J,\R,\T[SEMA.J.] 429
in which it is recorded. it shall be interpreted 1<1 him in a language A
which he understands and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to
his confrssion.

(3) Th•; confession shall. if it is in writing, be-

(a) signed by the person wlrn nrnkes the confession; and B
(b) by the police officer who shall also certify under his own hand
that such confession was tahcn in his presence <.:>d recorded by him
and that the record contains a fu 11 and true account of the confession
made by the person and such police officer shall make a memorandum
at the rnd of the confession to the following effect:- C
"I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to mJ'-c a confession
and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as
evidence against him and [ believe that this confession was voluntarily
made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and recorded by me
and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be D
correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made
by him.

Sd/- Police Officer.".

(4) Where the confession is recorded on any ml'chan ical device, the
memorandum referred to in sub-rule (3) in so far as it is applicable
E
and a declaration made by the person making the confession that the
said confession recorded on the mechanical device has been correctly
recorded in his presence shall also be recorded in the mechanical
device at the end of the confession.
F
(5) Every confession recorded under the said Section I 5 shall be sent
forthwith to the Chief Metropolitan Ma'gistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in which such confession
has been recorded and such Magistrate shall forward the recorded
confession so received to the Designated Court which may take
cognizance of the offence. G
Section 12 deals with the power of Designated Courts with respect to
other offences. It reads:-

(I) When trying any offence, a Designated Court may also try any
other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. i.. '

(emphasis supplied)

(2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any offence, it is
found that the accused person has committed any other offence under
this Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other law, the
B Designated Court may convict such person of such other offence and
pass any sentence authorised by this Act or such rule or, as the case
may be, such other laws, for the punishment thereof.

On a cursory reading of both the Sections, it appears to us that the r
language employed therein is plain and unambiguous. As pointed out by this
c Court in Nalini 's case (supra) Section 15 consists of two limbs. The first limb
bars application of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
Indian Evidence Act to a confession made by a person before a police officer
not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by him in any
of the modes noted in the Section. The second limb makes such a confession
D admissible, dehors the provisions of the Evidence Act in the trial of such
person or co-accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under the TADA
Act or rules made thereunder provided the co-accused, abettor or conspirator "1'

is charged and tried in the same case together with the accused as provided
in Section 12 of the Act. It was also pointed out that in the event Cr.P.C. and
the Evidence Act come in conflict with either recording of a confession of
E a person by a police officer of the rank mentioned therein, in any of the
modes specified in the Section, or its admissibility at the trial, Section 15 of
the TADA Act will have a overriding effect over the Cr.P.C. and the Evidence
Act.

Counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that the words "for an
F
offence under this Act" employed in Section 15 suggest that the confession
recorded under Section 15 in the manner provided, excludes the confession
admissible in evidence if no offence under TADA is made out. In other
words, the confession recorded under Section 15 in the manner provided
excludes the confession admissible in evidence insofar for the other offences
G are concerned. Counsel also urged that the words, "but subject to provisions
of this Section" also suggest that the said provisions are confined only to the
TADA offences. We are unable to accept this contention. Section 15 of the ....
TADA Act and Rules framed thereunder is a self-contained code in itself,
providing procedural safeguards and the words, "but subject to the provisions
of this Section" employed therein would mean the procedural safeguards
H
P, KUMAR@PRAKASH BHUTTOv. STATE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, J] 43 J
'\+, prescribed under the Section. As already pointed out Section 15 has overriding A
effect over the Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code, the only procedure
to be followed in recording confession is the procedure prescribed under the
provisions of Section 15 and Rules framed thereunder. This would be the
only intention of the Legislation while introducing the words, "but subject to
provisions of this section" in Section 15(1).
B
So far the words "for an offence under this Act" is concerned, the word
'Act' referred to in Section 15(1) is relatable to Secti,1n l?. of the Act. Section
15 therefore has to be read together with Section 12.

By now it is well settled Principle of Law that no part of a statute and C
no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed
so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is also trite
that the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one
provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make
the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved.
D
Jh Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd., (1987] I SCC 424, this Court said: (SCC p. 450, para 33)

"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are
the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture,
context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are E
important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when
we know why it was enacted With this knowledge, the statute must
be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause,
phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the F
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided
by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words
may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked
at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each
clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as G
to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no
word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its
place."
(emphasis supplied) H
432 SUPfff~IE COURT RICPORJ"S (20115J I S.C.R.

A In An11ar Hasan Khan v. ,\Iohd Shafi um/ Ors .. [2001] 8 SCC 540, this
Court held:

"8 ....... lt is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effo1t
should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict
and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made
B thereunder should be read as a whole and one rrovision should be
construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision
consistent with the object sought to be achieved ....... "

Section 12 which empowers the Designated Court to try any other
C offence with which the accused may be charged under the Code at the same
trial provided the offence is connected with such other offence. This section
has been brought to the statute book in consonanre with the preamble of the
Act, which says, "for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and
disruptive activities and/or matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
Therefore, Section 12 is introduced to tah.e care of the matters connected with
D or incidental to terrorist activities.

A conjoint reading of two sections as a whole. it lc&ves no manner of
doul:it that one provision is to be construed with reference to ti1e other provision
and vice versa so as to make the provision consistent with the object sought
to be achieved. The scheme and object of the Act heing the admissibility of
E the confession recorded under Section 15 of the Act in the trial of a person
or co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried in the same case
together with the accused, as provided under Section 12 of the Act.

Counsel contends that Section 12 is only enabling provision empow•;ring
F the Designated Court to try and convict for the offences committed under any
other law along with the offonces under the TADA so as to avoid multiplicity
of the Trial and does not empower the Designated Court to try and convict
for other offences. even if the offences under the TADA are not mdde out.
Does it mean, "Thou shalt have teeth, but not bite". We think not. When the
Cou:-.s have power to try, it is implicit in it that they have the power to
G convict also. In the present case sub-section 2 of Section 12 e\pressly
cmr•u,1·cred the Designated Court to convict the accused person of ;uch other
offence and pass any sentence authorised by the Act - if the offence is
connected with such other offence and - if it is found that the accused person
has comm;tted any other offence.
H Section l 2( l) as quoted above authorises the Designated Court to try
-~

P Kll~IAR ·ii PRAKASH 131\UTTO ,._ S IXIT OF GUJARAT !SIMA . .I.I 4:\3

offences under the TADA along with another offence with which the accused A
may be charged under Cr.P.C. at the same trial. The only embargo imposed
on the exercise of the power is that the offence under the TADA is connected
with any other offence being tried together. Further. Section 12(2) provides
that the Designated Court may convict the accused person of offence under
that Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other fall' and pass any B
sentence authorised under thal Act or !he rules or under any other law, as
the case may be for the punishment thereof, if in the course of any trial under
the TADA the accused persons are found to have committed any offence
either under that Act or any rule or under any other fall'.

The legislative intendment underlying Section 12(1) and (2) is clearly C
discernable, to empower the Designated Court to try and convict the accused
for offences committed under any other law along with offences committed
under the Act, if the offence is connected with such other offence. The
language, "if the offence is connected with such other offence" employed in
Section 12(1) of the Act has great significance. The neressary corollary is
that once the other offence is connected with the offence under the TADA D
and if the accused is charged under the Code and tried together in the same
trial, the Designated Court is empowered to convict the accused for the
offence under any other law, notwithstanding the fact that no offence under
TADA is made cut. This could be the only intendment of the legislature. To
hold otherwise, would amount to rewrite or recast legislation and read E
something into it which is not there.

Counsel also urged that the rigours of Section 12 is discriminatory and
attract the wrath of Articles I 4 and 21 of the Constitution as it empowers the
Designated Court to try and convict the accused for the offences committed
under any other law along with the offences committed under the TAQA p
thereby depriving the rights available to the accused under the ordinary law.
In our opmion, this contention is misconceived. It is trite law that Article 14
prohibits discrimination, but allows reasonable classificatio.n based on
intelligible differentia, having nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
The object sought to be achieved by introducing Section 12 is to take care
of the offence connected with or incidental to terrorist activities. The other G
offence being connected and inextricably inter-twined with the Terrorist Act.
As already pointed out in Kartar Singh (supra) the Trial under TADA is a
departure from the ordinary law. The persons who are tried for offences
specified under the provisions of TADA are a distinct class of persons and
the procedure prescribed for trying them for the aggravated and incensed H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.

A nature of offences are under different classification distinguishable from the
ordinary criminals and procedure. This distinction and classification of
grouping of the accused and the offences to be tried· under TADA are to
achieve the meaningful purpose and object of the Act as reflected from the
preamble as well as the statement of objects and reasons.

B The Act, as noticed above, is a special provision for special purpose.
It is a departure from the ordinary procedural law. Plea of discriminatory
treatment for want of availability of ordinary procedural law would not be
available.

For the reasons aforestated, we are of the view that the decision in
C Nalini 's case has laid down correct law and we hold that the confessional
statement duly recorded under Section 15 of TADA and Rules framed
thereunder would continue to remain admissible for the offences under any
other law which were tried along with TADA offences under Section 12 of
the Act, notwithstanding that the accused was acquitted of offences under
D TADA in the same trial.

The other leg of the submission is rigours of Section 18 of the Act.
Section 18 deals with the power to transfer cases to regular courts. It reads:-

"Where, after taking cognizance of any offence, a Designated Court
E is of opinion that the offence is not triable by it, it shall,
notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer
the case for the trial of such offence to any court having jurisdiction
under the Code and the court to which the case is transferred may
proceed with the trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance of
the offence."
F (emphasis supplied)

It is contended that the words, "after taking cognizance" employed in
Section 18 of the Act would include any stage of trial including the stage
when the judgment is to be delivered. This submission is also misconceived.
G If it ought to have been the intention of the legislature they could have said
S(.. The legislature deliberately uses the words "after taking cognizance of
any offence" to mean that Section 18 would be attracted only at the stage
where the Designated Court takes cognizance of offence i.e., after the
investigation is complete and charge-sheet is filed. The provisions of Section
209 Cr.P.C. to which the counsel for the appellants sought to rely are not in
H pari materia with Section 18. In Section 209 Cr.P.C. the words "after taking
r. KUMAR@PRAKASH BHUTTO v. STATE OF GUJARAT [SEMA, J.] 435
cognizance" are absent conspicuously. Section 18 is a filtered provision. The A
Section is attracted only at a stage the Designated Court takes cognizance of
offence. It is at the stage of taking cognizance, the Designated Court is
expected to scan the documents and evidence collected therewith, if the
Designated Court is of opinion that the offence is not triable by it, it shall,
then notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer B
the case for the trial of such offence to any court having jurisdiction under
the Code and the Court to which the case is transferred may proceed with the
trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance of the offence. In our view,
there is no ambiguity in the language used in Section 18. If the submissions
of the counsel for the appellant are accepted, it would amount to reading
something into the statute which is not there. C
Having said so, we also notice the note of caution of this Court in
Kartar Singh (supra) in paragraph 352 (SCC p.707) as under:-

"352. It is true that on many occasions, we have come across cases
wherein the prosecution unjustifiably invokes the provisions of the D
TADA Act with an oblique motive of depriving the accused persons
from getting bail and in some occasions when the courts are inclined
to grant bail in cases registered under ordinary criminal law, the
investigating officers in order to circumvent the authority of the courts
invoke the provisions of the TADA Act. This kind of invocation of
the provisions of TADA in cases, the facts of which do not warrant, E
is nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the Act by the police.
Unless, the public prosecutors rise to the occasion and discharge
their onerous responsibilities keeping in mind that they are prosecutors
on behalf of the public but not the police and unless the Presiding
Officers of the Designated Courts discharge their judicial /unctions p
keeping in view the fundamental rights particularly of the personal
right and liberty of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution to
which they have been assigned the role of sentinel on the qui vive,
it cannot be said that the provisions of TADA Act are enforced
effectively inconsonance with the legislative intendment. "
G
(emphasis supplied)

In our view the above observation is eloquently sufficient to caution
police officials as well as the Presiding Officers of the Designated Courts
from misusing the Act and to enforce the Act effectively and inconsonance
H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A with the legislative intendment which would mean after the application of ~(
mind. We reiterate the same.

for the reasons aforestated, the reference is answered in the above
terms. The appeals shall now be Iisled before a regular Bench for hearing.

B B.B.B. Reference answered.