Holding

A landlord’s bona‑fide requirement does not cease merely because of subsequent developments during pendency; it must be shown with certainty that the need has been fully satisfied, otherwise the eviction decree stands.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction suit under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 alleging default in rent, illegal sub‑letting and a bona‑fide requirement for the premises. The trial court and the first appellate court upheld the landlord’s claim of genuine need and decreed eviction. On second appeal, the tenants argued that the landlord’s son, for whose use the premises were required, had completed his studies and moved abroad, thereby extinguishing the bona‑fide need. The High Court rejected this argument, holding that the requirement continued to subsist, and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed that a bona‑fide requirement does not cease merely because of subsequent developments unless it is shown with certainty that the need has been fully satisfied, and consequently dismissed the tenants’ appeal, extending the time to vacate until the end of 2005 subject to conditions.

Issues considered

Whether the landlord's bona‑fide requirement for possession continues despite subsequent events such as the son completing studies and moving abroad.
Whether subsequent events can eclipse the bona‑fide need under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
Whether Section 17 of the Act provides protection to the tenant if the landlord does not use the premises for the purpose for which eviction was granted.
Whether the time granted for vacating the premises is reasonable given the long tenancy.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 41 Rule 27
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961s. 12(1)(f), s. 17

Subjects

rent controlevictionbona fide requirementlandlord-tenantsubsequent eventsSection 12Section 17civil appeal

Judgment

PRAT AP RAI TANW ANI AND ANR. A
v.
UTTAM CHAND AND ANR.
'
SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND B
PRAKASH PRABHAKAR NAOLEKAR, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction :
-.t
MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Sections 12(1)(j) & 17- C
Eviction suit-Bona fide need ofpremises-Suit decreed-Affirmed by First
Appellate Court-Second appeal-During its pendency landlord's son
completing studies and going abroad-But High Court held that the bona fide
need continued to subsist-On appeal, Held: Bonafide need did not eclipse
merely because certain developments occurred pendente lite-Delivery of
possession to landlord-Time extended-However, protection available to D
tenant under Section I 7 ofthe Act in case of non-user ofpremises by landlord
for purpose for which eviction was sought for.

Landlord filed suit for eviction under the M.P. Accomodation
Control Act, 1961 inter alia on ground of bonafide requirement. Trial E
Court found the need to be genuine and decreed the suit. First Appellate
Court affirmed the same. In second appeal, the Appellant-tenants pleaded

-
that during pendency of the matter, son of Respondent-landlord had
acquired a decree in Engineering and settled in USA with no chance of
coming back to India and therefore, the alleged bonafide need and
requirement had become non-existent. High Court, however found that F
requirement o.f Section 12(1)(t) was fully complied with and in view of
concurrent findings that there was bona fide need of the premises,
dismissed the second appeal.

In appeal to this Court, it was contended that on the facts of the G
case High Court lightly set aside the subsequent events and erroneously
came to the conclusion that the need subsisted.

Respondents however contended that a person for whose bona.fide
need the premises are required, cannot just remain idle in anticipation
of getting the premises for starting business; that as there was delay in H '
197
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A disposal of the matter, the son of landlord completed his Engineering
studies and took temporary employment with visa for limited period but
intended to come back to India as soon as the premises were available
to start the business and that in any event, if there was non-user of the
premises for the purpose for which eviction was sought for, the tenant
had protection in terms of section 17 of the Act.
B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new
enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant
C from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by
subsequent' developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the
litigation. His need may get dusted, nonetheless the need would remain
intact. It is pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant
just on the eye of his reaching the finale after passing through all the
previous levels of the litigation merely on ground that certain
D developments occurred pendente Ute because t~«~ opposite party succeeded
in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. (201-C, DJ

Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001] 2 SCC 604, relied on.

Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, (1992] Suppl. 2 SCC 623, referred to.
E
1.2. What the Appellants have highlighted as subsequent events fall
within the realm of possibility or probability of non-return but a certainty
is necessary to be established to show that the need has been eclipsed.
(204-D] ...

F 2. The Appellate Court is required to examine, evaluate and
·adjudicate the subsequent events and their effect, which has been done
in the instant case. In the background of the factual position, it is clear
that the High Court had considered the subsequent events which the
Appellants highlighted and then held that the bona fide need continues
G to subsist. (204-D, C]

Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981] 3 SCC 103, relied on.

Ram Dass v. Jshwar Chander, (1988] 3 SCC 131; Gulabbai v. Na/in
Narsi Vohra, [1991] 3 SCC 483; Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, [1979)
H 1 SCC 273; Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, [1999) 6 SCC
P.R. TANWANI v. UTTAM CHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 199

222 and Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh, (2003) 2 sec 3, referred to. A
3. Considering the fact that the tenants are occupying the premises
for nearly two decades, the time granted by the High Court to the
Appellant to vacate the premises is extended till the end of 2005 subject
to Appellant's filing the requisite undertaking before Trial Court and B
continuing to make payment of rents due within the stipulated time.
Arrears, if any, shall be paid to Respondents within two months from
the date of the judgment. (204-H, 205-A)

4. Besides it would be appropriate to take note of Section 17 of the
Act which deals with consequences which statutorily follow if there is C
· deviation from the purposes for which possession has been recovered. If
in the instant case such contingency arises, the Respondents shall re-
deliver possession to the Appellants-tenants on such terms as the Rent
Controlling Authority shall fix. (204-E, F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7608 of2002. D

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.6.2002 of the Madhya Prad!!?!L.
High Court in S.A. No. 914 of 2001.

Raju Ramachandran and Prakash Shrivastava for the Appellants. E

S.S. Khanduja, for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : The tenants are in appeal against the F
impugned judgment of the Vllth Civil Judge No. 2, Bhopal, M.P., the first
Appellate Court, and finally the judgment of affirmation by learned Single
Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur. Background facts in
a nutshell are as follows:

A suit for eviction was filed before the trial court under Section 12
G
(l)(a)(b) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
(in short the 'Act'). The plaintiffs filed the suit on the ground that (a) there
was default in payments of the rent due, (b) the tenant (defendant No. I) had
unlawfully sublet the tenanted premises and (c) for bona fide requirement.
The t;ial court framed, in total, 13 issues and held that the need of the H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A plaintiffs, so far as the suit premises are concerned, was genuine and bona
fide. It was also held that the plaintiffs had not got other suitable
accommodation available and the defendant No. I had sublet the premises
to defendant No. 2. The suit was accordingly decreed.

In appeal the Appellate Authority held th.at the plea of subletting was
B not establishe~. Howeve~, the finding regarding bona fide need was affirmed
by the First Appellate Court. In Second Appeal the judgments of the courts
below, so far as it was adverse to the appellant, were affirmed. Tenants filed ,
an application in terms of Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code )

1908 (in short the 'CPC'). Another application for amendment of the Written
C Statement was also filed. By these two applications the appellants wanted
to highlight the alleged factual po~ition that during the pendency of the matter
Naresh Talreja son of the appellant No. 1, Uttam Chand (respondent No.1
herein) had acquired a degree in Engineering, got an employment in an Indian
Company and subsequently was settled in USA and was working there, with
no chance of his coming back to India. Therefore it was submitted that the
D alleged bona fide need and requirement, for which the application was filed,
had become non-existent, thereby disentitling the plaintiffs from any relief.

The present respondents refuted the claim of the appellants and
submitted that since there was no other accommodation readily available
E Naresh Talreja pursued study in Engineering and was temporarily engaged
in USA. He wanted to come back and start his business.

The High Court found that the requirements of Section 12( I)( f) of the
Act were fully complied with and in view of concurrent findings recorded
to the effect that there was bona fide need of the premises, Second Appeal
F had no merit. Accordingly the High Court dismissed the Second appeal.
Time was granted till the end of August, 2002 to vacate the premises.

In support of the appeal, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior
counsel submitted that the High Court has lightly set aside the subsequent
G events. It is a settled position in law that the question whether a person has
bona fide need, was not restricted to the point of time when the application
for eviction is made; it continues till final adjudication. On the facts of the
case the High Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that the need
subsisted.

H Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that a
P.R. TANWANI v. UTTAM CHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 201

person, for whose bona fide need the premises are required, cannot just A
remain idle in anticipation of getting the premises for starting business. As
there was delay in disposal of the matter, Naresh completed his studies and
had taken temporary employment with visa for limited period and intended
to come back to India as soon as premises are available to start the business.
In any event, it was pointed out if there was non-user of the premises for B
the purpose for which eviction was sought for, the concerned tenant has
protection in tenns of Section 17 of the Act.

It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more -
would be the number of devel"pments sprouting up during the long
interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and C
on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building,
the proposed enterprise would not get faded.out by subsequent developments
during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get
dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain
intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is D
pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just
on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous
levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments
occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging
the matter for such unduly long period.
E
We cannot forget that while considering the bona jides of the need
of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar v.
Kesha Ram, [1992] Suppl. 2 SCC 623 a two-judge Bench of this Court (M.N.
Venkatachalia, J., as he then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the
nonnal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be detennined F
as they were when the !is commenced and the only exception is that the court
is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of
subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and
obligations. What the learned Chief Jt?Stice observed therein is this (SCC pp.
626-27, para 6)
G
"6. The nonnal rule is that in any litigation the rights and
obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the
commencement of the !is. But this is subject to an exception.
Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material
bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded
from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of
fact and law to mould the relief."

The next three-Judge Bench of this Court which approved and followed
B the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, {1981] 3 SCC 103
has taken care to emphasise that the subsequent events should have "wholly
satisfied" the requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the
ground of personal requirement. The relevant passage is extracted below :
(SCC pp. 113-14, para 14)

c "Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is
sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the
requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date
of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for
eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which
would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then
D in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect
to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant
he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent
events."

E The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system _has acquired
notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long ye~rs from
the start to the ultimate termini, is a- malady afflicting the system."· 'D'iiring
this long interval many many events a;e .bound to take place which might
happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the !is. If
the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account
F of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite
the impairment already caused.

The above position in law was highlighted in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep
Srivastava, [2001] 2 SCC 604.

G One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by all the rent control
legislations, which otherwise generally lean heavily in favour of the tenants,
is the need of the owner landlord to have his own premises, residential or
non-residential, for his own use or his own occupation. The expressions
employed by different legislations may vary such as "bona fide requirement",
H "genuine need", "requires reasonably and in good faith'', and so on. Whatever
P.R. TANWANI v. UTTAM CHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 203

be the expression employed, the underlying legislative intent is one and that A
has been demonstrated in several judicial pronouncements of which we
would like to refer to only three.

In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, [1988] 3 SCC 131 M.N.
Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the three-Judge
Bench, said: (SCC pp. 134-35, para 11) B

"11. Statutes enacted to afford protection to tenants from
eviction on the basis of contractual rights of the parties make the
resumption of possession by the landlord subject to the satisfaction
of certain statutory conditions. One of them is the bona fide
requirement of the landlord, variously described in the statutes as
c
'bona fide requirement', 'reasonable requirement', 'bona fide and
reasonable requirement' or, as in the case of the present statute,
merely referred to as 'landlord requires for his own use'. But the
essential idea basic to all such cases is that the need of the landlord
should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that, D
further, the court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that
need. Landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might
otherwise be, 'requirement' in law must have the objective element
of a 'need'. It must also be such that the court considers it
reasonable and therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the E
court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that
the protection afforded by law to the tenant is not rendered merely
illusory or whittled down."

In Gulabbai v. Na/in Narsi Vohra, [1991] 3 SCC 483 reiterating the
view taken in Bega Begum V. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979] 1 sec 273 it was F
held that the words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that
there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The
distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not
so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire.

Recently, in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, [1999]
G
6 SCC 222 this Court in a detailed judgment, dealing with this aspect,
analysed the concept of bona fide requirement and said that the requirement
in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in
contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext ·to evict a tenant refers to
a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by
placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question
to himself - whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need
to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the
answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. We do not think that we
B can usefully add anything to the exposition of law of requirement· for self-
occupation than what has been already stated in the three precedents.

The above position was remained effected in Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar
Singh, (2003] 2 sec 3 :

C In the background of the factual position one thing which clearly
emerges is that the High Court had considered the subsequent events which
the appellants highlighted and ·tend to hold that the bona fide need continues
to subsist. As observed in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) the appellate Court is
required to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the subsequent events and their
D effect. This has been done in the instant case. That factual finding does not
suffer from any infirmity. What the appellants have highlighted as subsequent
events fall within the realm of possibility or probability of non-return and
a certainty, which is necessary to be established to show that the need has
been eclipsed.

E At this juncture it would be appropriate to take note of Section 17 of
the Act. Same deals with consequences which statutorily follow if there is
deviation from the purposes for which possession has been recovered. If in
the instant case such contingency arises, the respondents shall re-deliver
possession to the appellants-tenants on such terms as the Rent Controlling
Authority shall fix.
F
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that considering the long
period of tenancy a reasonable time should be granted to the appellant to
vacate the premises.

G Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the High Court has
granted time till the end of August, 2002 and by order dated 9th August, 2002
status quo regarding possession was directed to be maintained. Undisputedly
the tenants are in occupation of the tenanted premises.

Considering the fact that the tenants are occupying the premises for
H nearly two decades, in our considered view the time granted by the High
"'·
P.R. TANWANI v. UTTAM CHAND [PASAYAT, J.] 205

Court can be extended till the end of2005. The period of tenancy is extended A
till the aforesaid date subject to the appellants' filing the requisite undertaking
before the trial court and make continuing to payment of rents due within
the stipulated time. Arrears, if any, shall be paid to the respondents within
the period of two months from today.

The appeal stands dismissed subject to the aforesaid directions with B
no orders as to costs.

B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.