Holding

The reckoning date for a juvenile's age is the date of the offence, and the 2000 Act applies to pending proceedings where the accused was under 18 on the date the Act came into force.

Summary

The appellant Pratap Singh was charged with offences allegedly committed on 31‑12‑1998 and was produced before the Juvenile Court in 2000. The key issues were whether the age of a juvenile offender should be reckoned as of the date of the offence or the date of production before the court, and whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 applied to proceedings that began under the 1986 Act and were pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The Constitution Bench held that the correct reckoning date is the date of the offence, not the date of production, because the legislation aims to protect juveniles at the time of the delinquent act. It also held that the 2000 Act applies to pending cases provided the accused was under 18 on 1‑4‑2001, the date of its enforcement, and that the savings clause in Section 69(2) treats actions taken under the 1986 Act as if taken under the 2000 Act. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in favour of the lower court’s view.

Issues considered

The appropriate reckoning date for determining the age of a juvenile offender – date of offence vs. date of production before the authority/court.
Whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 applies to cases initiated under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and pending at the time of its enforcement.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 35
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986s. 18, s. 26, s. 2(h), s. 3, s. 32
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 20, s. 2(k), s. 69

Subjects

juvenile justiceage determinationreckoning datebeneficial legislationpending casesSection 20Section 69legal fictionModel Rule 62constitutional bench

Judgment

PRATAP SINGH A
v.
STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 2, 2005

[N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIAVA, B.P. SINGH, H.K. SEMA AND B
S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986-Sections 2(h), 3, 18, 26 and 32

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Sections C
2(k), 20 and 69.

Juvenile offender-Age-Determination-Reckoning date-Held: The
reckoning date for determining the age of the Juvenile offender is the date of
offence and not the date when he is produced before the Authority/Court.
D
2000 Act-Applicability of-To the cases initiated under 1986 Act,
pending on the date of enforcement of 2000 Act-Held: The Act of 2000
would be applicable to such cases only when the accused had not attained 18
years of age on the date of its enforcement-Model Rules framed by Central
Government-Rule 62-United National Standard Minimum Rules for E
Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985.

The questions for determination in the present appeal before the
Constitution Bench were :

1. What would be the reckoning date in determining the age of p
juvenile offender, viz., date when produced in a Court, as had.been held
by this Court in Amit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 or the date
on which the offence was committed as had been held in Umesh Chandra
v. State of Rajasthan, (1982( 2 SCC 202?

2. Whether Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, G
2000 would be applicable to the case, proceeding whereof was initiated
' , under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and was pending on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2000?

Disposing of the appeal, the Court
1019 H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) I S.C.R.

A HELD : Per Sema, J. (for himself N Santosh Hegde, S.N Variava and
B. P. Singh, JJ.) :

1.1. The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the
juvenile is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced
before the Authority or in the Court. ( 1039-G I
B
1.2. The whole object of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 is to provide for the care, protection, treatment,
development and rehabilitation of neglected delinquent juveniles. It is a
beneficial legislation aimed at to make available the benefit of the Act to
C the neglected or delinquent juveniles. The interpretation of the Statute of
beneficial legislation must be to advance the cause of legislation to the
benefit for whom it is made and not to frustrate the intendment of the
legislation. l 1031-0-E I

1.3. The distinction between the definition of 'delinquent juvenile'
D under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 is that in 1986 Act "juvenile in conflict with law"
is absent. The definition in 1986 Act is referable to an offence said to have
been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in conflict
with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent Authority
and or Court he has not committed an offence on that date, but he was
E brought before the Authority for the alleged offence which he has been
found to have committed. Therefore, what was implicit in 1986 Act has
been made explicit in 2000 Act. (1031-F-AJ

1.4. It cannot be said that the use of the word is in two places of
Section 32 of 1986 Act suggests that for determination of age of juvenile
F the date of production would be reckoning date as the inquiry with regard
to his age begins from the date he is brought before the Court and not
otherwise. The definition of delinquent juvenile means a juvenile who has
been found to have committed an offence. The word is employed in Section
32 is referable to a junnile who is said to have committed an offence on
G the date of the occurrence. The word is has been used in more than one
place in Section 18of1986 Act also. Often than not, an offender is arrested
immediately after an offence is alleged to have been committed or some
t;me even arrested on the spot. This would also show that the arrest and
release on bail and custody of juveniles, the reckoning date of a juvenile
is the date of an offence and not the date of production. Furthermore,
H Section 32 of 1986 Act also does not envisage the production of a juvenile
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND 1021
in the Court. 11032-E-F; 1033-D-Fl A
1.5. A conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 26, preamble, aims and
objects of 1986 Act leaves no matter of doubt that the legislature intended
to provide protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of
neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication thereof.
B
Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982( 2 SCC 202, affirmed.

Amit Das v. State of Bihar., (20001 5 SCC 488, overruled.

2.1. The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in
any Court/Authority initiated under the l 986 Act and is pending when C
the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years
of age as on the date of enforcement of 2000 Act. (1039-H; 1040-Al

2.2. Although the 1986 Act was repealed by the 2000 Act, anything
done or any action taken under the 1986 Act is saved by sub-section (2)
of Section 69 of 2000 Act, as if the action has been taken under the D
provisions of the 2000 Act. (1036-D-El

2.3. Section 20 of 2000 Act deals with the special provision in respect
of pending cases and begins with non-obstante clause. The proceedings in
respect of a juvenile pending in any Court referred to in Section 20 is
relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and E
which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "an;
court" would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a
"juvenile" under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in
criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy
had crossed 16 years or girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section F
20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the
j
1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending
case shall continue in that Court as if the 2000 Act has not been passed
and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall
record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the
juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders G
in respect of that juvenile. Section 16 of the 2000 Act is identical to Section
22 of the 1986 Act. Similarly Section 15 of the 2000 Act is in pari materia
with Section 21 of the 1986 Act. Thus, such an interpretation does not
offend Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India and the juvenile is not
subjected to any penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A on him under the 1986 Act. 11038-B-EJ

2.4. Rule 62 of Model Rules framed by Central Government also
indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that the provisions of
the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided, the date on which
the 2000 Act came into force, the person was a "juvenile" within the
B meaning of the term as defined in the 2000 Act i.e. he/she had not crossed
18 years of age. 11039-CI

Upendra Kumar v. State of Bihar; Bhola Bhagat v. State ofBihar, [1997)
8 SCC 720; Gopinath Ghosh v. State of WB., [1984) Supp. SCC 228; Bhoop
C Ram v. State of U.P., [1989) 3 SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar v. State ofU.P.,
[1995) Supp. 4 SCC 419, referred to. [1039-D-F]

Per Sinha, J (Partly dissenting) :

I.I. In terms of the 1986 Act, the age of the offender must be
D reckoned from the date when the alleged offence was committed. Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection o.f Children) Ace, 2000 is not only a
beneficient legislation, but also a remedial one. The Act aims at grant of
care, protection and rehabilitation of a juvenile vis-a-vis the adult
criminals. Having regard to Rule 4 of United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, it must also be borne in
E mind that the moral and psychological components of criminal
responsibility was also one of the factors in defining a juvenile.
[1052-H; 1053-A; 1063-H; 1064-AJ

1.2. The meaning of the exp·ression 'Juvenile' used in a statute by
reason of its very nature has to be assigned with reference to a definite
F date. The term 'Juvenile' must be given a definite connotation. It was,
having regard to the constitutional and statutory scheme, not necessary
for the Parliament to specifically state that the age of juvenile must be
determined as on the date of commission of the offence. The same is in-
built in the statutory scheme. The statute must be construed having regard
G to the Scheme and the ordinary state of affairs and consequences flowing
therefrom. [1053-B-DJ

1.3. Only because his age is to be determined in a case of dispute by '" .
tile competent Court or the Board in terms of Section 26 of the Act, the
same would not mean that the relevant date therefor would be the one on
H which he is produced before the Board. If such an argument is accepted,
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND 1023

-
the same would result in absurdity as, in a given case, it would be open to A
the police authorities not to produce him before the Board before he ceases
to be juvenile. If he is produced after he ceases to be juvenile, it may not
be necessary for the Board to send him in the protective custody or release
him on bail as a result whereof he would be sent to judicial or police
custody which would defeat the very purpose for which the Act had been B
enacted. Law cannot be applied in an uncertain position. Furthermore,
the right to have a fair trial strictly in terms of the Act which would include
procedural safeguard is a fundamental right of the juvenile. A proceeding
against a juvenile must conform to the provisions of the Act. (I 054-E-G I

Dilip Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR(1978) Calcutta 529, referred C
to.

1.4. The statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make
it effective and operative on the principle of Vt res magis valeat quam
pereat. The courts lean strongly against any constructions which tend to
reduce a statute to a futility. When two meanings, one making the statute D
absolutely vague, wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless and the
other leading to certainty and meaningful are given, in such an event the
latter should be followed. (1055-C-D)

Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. ltd v. State of Assam and Ors., (1989) 3
SCC 709; Andhra Bank v. B. Satyanarayana and Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 657 E
and Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2003)
7 sec 589, referred to.

1.5. The court in an appropriate case is not powerless to pass an
order as is contemplated under the statute if the situation so demands but
' ..... only because a person is produced before the Court after he attains F
majority either on his own volition or by reason of machinations adopted
by the investigating agency, the same would not be determinative of the
fact that the said person is to be differently dealt with. Law favours strict
adherence of the procedures subject to just exceptions. (1055-G-HI

Amit Das v. State of Bihar, 120001 5 SCC 488, overruled.
G

1.6. The definition of 'Juvenile' under the 1986 Act, of course refers
to a person who has been found to have committed offence but the same
has been clarified in the 2000 Act. The provisions of 1986 Act, sought to
protect not only those juveniles who have been found to have committed H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A
-
an offence but also those who had been charged therefor. In terms of
Section 3 of the 1986 Act as well as 2000 Act when an enquiry has betn
initiated even if the juvenile has ceased to be so as he has crossed the age
of 16 and 18 as the case may be, the same must be continued in respect of
such person as if he had continued to be a juvenile. Section 3 of the 1986
B Act therefore cannot be given effect to if it is held that the same only
applied to post delinquency of the juvenile. 11055-E-FI

2.1. The 2002 Act will have a limited application in the cases pending
under the 1986 Act. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not
juvenile could be tried in any Court. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 takes
C care of such a situation stating that despite the same the trial shall continue
in that Court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is
found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall
be recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing
any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the
Board which shall pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the
D Act as if he has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed
the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said provision. A + .·
legal fiction must be given its full effect although it has its limitations.
(1057-D-F(

Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2003]
E 2 SCC 111; /TW Signode India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (2003) 9
SCALE 720; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2004] 3
SCC I and Mis Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal (C.A. No. 2946 of 2002
decided by Supreme Court on 25. 1.2005), referred to.

2.2. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a juvenile,
F
has to be treated to be one by the Board for the purpose of sentencing
which takes care of a situation that the person although not a juvenile in
terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000
Act for the said limited purpose. The Act provides for beneficent
consequences and, thus, it is required to be construed liberally.
G (1057-H; 1058-A]

2.3. A beneficent legislation should not be construed liberally so as ,._ '
to bring within its fore a person who does not answer the statutory scheme.

Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
H Baroda, ]2004] 5 sec 385, referred to.
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKl-IAND 1025
2.4. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be applicable A
when a person is below the age of 18 years as on the date of enforcement
of Act of2000. For the purpose of attracting Section 20 of the Act, it must
be established that : (i) on the date of coming into force the proceedings
in which the petitioner was accused was pending; and (ii) on that day he
was below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of the said Act, both the
aforementioned conditions are required to be fulfilled. 11058-D-EI B
2.5. The embargo of giving a retrospective effect to a statute arises
only when it takes away vested right of a person. By reason of Section 20
of 2000 Act no vested right in a person has been taken away, but thereby
only an additional protection has been provided to a juvenile. C
(1058-H; 1059-AI

Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, (19641 7 SCR 676; Basheer alias N.P.
Basheer v. State of Kera/a, (200413 SCC 609; life Singh v. State of Haryana
and Ors., JT (2004) 8 SC 589 and Dayal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, JT
(2004) Supp.I SC 37, referred to. D
Attorney General's Reference (No.2of2001) (2004) 2 AC 72 and R.
(on the application of Uttley) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
(2004) 4 All ER I, referred to.

2.6. Interpretation of a statute depends upon the text and context E
thereof and having regard and object with which the same was made. The
provision of the 2000 Act is furthermore a remedial statute. They are, thus,
required to be given liberal construction. A remedial statute applied in a
pending proceeding would not mean that thereby a retrospective effect
and retroactive operation is being given thereto. (1061-E-FI
F
Principles ofStatutory interpretation, by G.P. Singh Ninth Edition, 2004,
page 733, referred to.

2. 7. In a case where an additional protection had been granted
pursuant to or in furtherance of the international treaties and keeping in
view of the experience which had been gathered by the Parliament after G
coming into force of the 1986 Act, it should be read in such a fashion so
that the extended benefit can be granted even to the juvenile under the
2000 Act. Furthermore, sub-section (2) of Section 69 provides that all
proceedings shall be deemed to have been held under the new Act. This is
also suggestive of the fact that the new Act would, to the aforementioned H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A extent, apply to a pending proceeding which was initiated under the 1986
Act. 11061-G-H; 1062-AI

3.1. The age of the delinquent juvenile cannot be determined in terms
of the Model Rule 62. Any law mandating the court to take into
consideration certain documents over others in determining an issue, must
B be provided for only by law. Only a validly made law can take away the
power of the court to appreciate evidence for the purpose of determination
of such a question in the light of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. It cannot be done by the Central Government in exercise of the
executive power. (1062-F-G)

C Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, 120041 2 SCC 510; State of U.P. v.
Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714; Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR
(1988) SC 1796 and Sushi/ Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, 120031 8 SCC 673,
referred to.

3.2. The Model Rules cannot be agreed to as the same have not been
D framed in terms of the provisions of the Act so as to attract the principles
that rules validly framed are to be treated as part of the Act. The Central
Government is a statutory functionary. Its functions are circumscribed
by Section 70 of the Act only. It has not been authorized to make any rule.
Such rule making power has been entrusted only to the State. The Central
E Government has, thus, no say in the matter nor can it exercise such power
by resorting to its power 'to remove difficulties'. (1062-B-DI

Chief Forest Conservator (Wildlife) and Ors. v. Nisar Khan, [2003) 4
SCC 595 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Ors., (20041
3 sec 297, distinguished

F Mis Ja/an Trading Co. Private Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, AIR (1967)
SC 691 at 703, referred to.

Liverpool and London S.P. and I Association Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success
I and Anr., (20041 9 SCC 512, referred to.

G Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2001) 2
AC 532; S. v. Makwanyane, (1995) 3 SA 391; (Reference re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [19871 1 SCR 313; (Presumption of
Innocence and the European Convention on Human Rights (1987) BverfGE
74, 3580; Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, (1994) 2 NZLR 257; United
Kingdom Pratt v. Attorney-Genera/for Jamaica, (1994) 2 AC I; Atkins v.
H Virginia, (2002) 536 US 304; Lawrence v. Texas, (2003) 539 US 558; Hamdi
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SEMA, J.) 1027
.).
v. Rumsfeld, (2004) 72 USLW 4607; Russel v. Bush, (2004) 72 USLW 4596; A
Rumsjieldv. Padi/a, (2004) 72 USLW 4584; In re Frank C., 70 N.Y. 2d 408;
Alfreda v. Superior Court 849 P. 2d 1330 (Cal. 1993); Robinson v. Texas,
707 S.W. 2d 47 and Illinois v. Stufflebean, 392 N.E. 2d 414, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 210
of 2005. B

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.9.2001 of the _Jharkhand High
Court at Ranchi in Crl.R.No. 98 of 200 I.

Amarendra Sharan, Additional Solicitor General, P.S. Mishra, Alok
Kumar, Manu Shankar Mishra, Tathagat Harsh Vardhan, Sishir Pinaki, c
Amitesh Chandra Mishra, Upendra Mishra, Dhrub Jha, Himanshu Shekhar,
Ansul, Krishnanand Pandeya, Devashish Bharuka, Mrs. Sudha Gupta, Ms.
Maharukh Adenwala, Trideep Pais and Nikhil Nayyar for the Appearing
parties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by D
+ H.K. SEM~, J. Leave granted.

This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 10.9.2001
passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Revision No.
98 of 2001. E
Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeal are
as follows :

First Information Report was lodged before the police in Bokaro city

-J .~
registered as P.S. case No.1/99 dated 1.1.1999 for the offence under Sections
364A, 302/201 !PC read with Section 120B !PC to the effect that on 31.12.1998
the appellant was alleged as one of the conspirators to have caused the death
F

of the deceased by poisoning. On the basis of the FIR the appellant was

- arrested and produced before the C.J.M. Chas on 22.11.1999. On production,
the learned CJM assessed the age of the appellant to be around 18 years old.
On 28.2.2000, a petition was filed on behalf of the appellant claiming that he
was a minor on the date of occurrence i.e. 31.12.1998, whereupon the learned
G

i .1 CJM transmitted the case to the Juvenile Court. The appellant was produced
in the Juvenile Court on 3.3.2000. On his production the Juvenile Court
assessed the age of the appellant by appearance to be between 15 and 16
years and directed the Civil Surgeon to constitute a Medical Board for the H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A purpose of assessing the age of the appellant by scientific examination and
submit a report. No such Medical Board was constituted. Thus, the learned
ACJM asked the parties to adduce evidence and on examining the school
leaving certificate and mark sheet of Central Board of Secondary Education
came to the finding that the appellant was below 16 years of age as on
B 31.12.1998 taking the date of birth of the appellant as 18.12.1983 recorded
in the aforesaid certificate. The appellant was then released on bail.

Aggrieved thereby the informant filed an appeal before the I st Additio:ial
Sessions Judge, who after referring to the judgment of this Court rendered in
Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, [2000] 5 SCC 488, disposed of the appeal on
C 19.2.2001 holding that the Juvenile Court had erred in not taking note of the
fact that the date of production before the Juvenile Court was the date relevant
for deciding whether the appellant was juvenile or not for the purpose of trial
and directed a fresh inquiry to assess the age of the appellant. Aggrieved
thereby the appellant moved the High Court by filing Criminal Revision
Petition. The High Court while disposing of the Revision has followed the
D decision rendered by this Court in Arnit Das (supra) and held that reckoning
date is the date of production of the accused before the Court. and not the date
of the occurrence of the offence.

The High Court held that for determining the age of juvenile, the
E provisions of 1986 Act would apply and not 2000 Act. The High Court,
however, took the view that the date of birth, as recorded in the school and
the school certificate, should be the best evidence for fixing the age of the
appellant. High Court was also of the view that any other evidence in proof
of age would be of much inferior quality. As the enquiry is pending, we need
not delve into this question.
F
Having noticed the conflicting views in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar,
[2000] 5 SCC 488 and Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982] 2 SCC
202, this matter has been referred to the Constitution Bench by an order
dated 7.2.2003. It reads :

G "The High Court in its impugned judgment has relied on a two-Judge
bench decision of this Court in Arl(it Das v. State o/Bihar, [2000] 5
SCC 488. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that in Arnit Das (supra), the decision of this Court in Umesh Chandra
V. State of Rajashtan, [1982] 2 sec 202, was not considered. The
point arising is one of the frequent recurrence and view of the law
H taken in this case is likely to have a bearing on the new Act, that is,
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.] I029
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000 also, the matter A
deserves to be heard by the Constitution Bench of this Court. Be
placed before the Hon.Chief Justice of India, soliciting directions."

This is how the matter has been placed before us.

The dual questions which require authoritative decision are : B
(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for
determining the age of the alleged offender as Juvenile offender
or the date when he is produced in the Court/competent authority.
(b) Whether the Act of2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding
initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was C
enforced with effect from 1.4.200 I.

Question (a)

Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining
the age of the alleged offender as Juvenile offender or the date when he is D
produced in the Court/competent authority.
+
Mr. Mishra submits that the decision in Umesh Chandra (supra) rendered
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the correct law and a
two-Judge Bench decision in Amit Das (supra) cannot be said to have laid
down a correct law. Mr. Mishra also submits that the decision in Amit Das E
(supra) has not noticed the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Umesh Chandra
(supra). Mr. Mishra also referred to the aims and objects of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the 1986 Act) and submits that
the whole object is to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile for the offence he
is alleged to have committed and if the date of offence is not taken as F
.\ + reckoning the age of the juvenile, the purpose of the Act itself would be
) defeated. In this connection, he has referred to Sections 18, 20, 26 and 32 of
the Act. Per contra Mr. Sharan refers to the aims and objects of the Act and
various Sections of the Act and particularly emphasized the word is employed
in Section 32 of the Act and submits that cumulative reading of the provisions
as well as of the scheme of the Act would show that the reckoning date for G
determining the date of juvenile would come into play only when a juvenile
appears or is brought before the authority/court and not the date of an offence.

We may at this stage notice the preamble as well as object of the 1986
Act:
H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A "An Act to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development
and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the
adjudication of certain matters relating to, and disposition of,
delinquent juveniles.

Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty-seventh Year of the
B Republic of India as follows :

Prefatory Note-Statement of Objects and Reasons.- A review of the
working of the existing Children Acts would indicate that much greater
attention is required to be given to children who may be found in
situations of social maladjustment, delinquency or neglect. The justice
c system as available for adults is not considered suitable for being
applied to juveniles. It is also necessary that a uniform juvenile justice
system should be available throughout the country which should make
adequate provision for dealing with all aspects in the changing social,
cultural and economic situation in the country. There is also need for
larger involvement of informal systems and community based welfare
D agencies in the care, protection, treatment, development and
rehabilitation of such juveniles. +
2. In this context, the proposed legislation aims at achieving the
following objectives :
E (i) to lay down a uniform legal framework for juvenile justice in the
country so as to ensure that no child under any circumstances is
lodged in jail or police lock-up. This is being ensured by establishing
Juvenile Welfare Boards and Juvenile Courts;

(ii) to provide for a specialized approach towards the prevention and
F treatment of juvenile delinquency in its full range in keeping with the
developmental needs of the child found in any situation of social
maladjustment; \.
(iii) to spell out the machinery and infrastructure required for the
care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of various
G categories of children coming within the purview of the juvenile
justice system. This is proposed to be achieved by establishing
observation homes, juvenile homes for neglected juveniles and special
homes for delinquent juveniles;
(iv) to establish norms and standards for the administration of juvenile
H justice in terms of investigation and prosecution, adjudication and
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.] 1031

disposition, and care, treatment and rehabilitation; A
(v) to develop appropriate linkages and co-ordination between the
formal system of juvenile justice and voluntary agencies engaged in
the welfare of neglected or socially maladjusted children and to
specifically define the areas of their responsibilities and roles;
B
(vi) to constitute special offences in relation to juveniles and provide
for punishments therefor;

(vii) to bring the operation of the juvenile justice system in the country
in conformity with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rule for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice. C
3. As its various provisions come into force in different parts of the
country they would replace the corresponding laws on the subject
such as the Children Act, 1960 and other State enactments on the
subject."
D
Thus, the whole object of the Act is to provide for the care, protection,
treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected delinquent juveniles.
It is a beneficial legislation aimed at to make available the benefit of the Act
, to the neglected ot delinquent juveniles. It is settled law that the interpretation
of the Statute of beneficial legislation must be to advance the cause of
legislation to the benefit for whom it is made and not to frustrate the intendment E
of the legislation.

We may also, at this stage, notic:e the definition of delinquent juvenile.
Sub-section (e) of Section 2 of the 1986 Act defines the delinquent juvenile
as : F
(e) "delinquent juvenile" means a juvenile who has been found to
have committed an offence;"

Sub-section (I) of Section 2 of 2000 Act defines "juvenile in conflict
with law" means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence. The G
notable distinction between the definitions of I986 Act and 2000 Act is that
in 1986 Act "juvenile in conflict with law" is absent. The definition of
delinquent juvenile in I 986 Act as noticed above is referable to an offence
said to have been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in
conflict with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent authority H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005 J I S.C.R.

A and or court he has not committed an offence on that date. but he was
brought before the authority for the alleged offence which he has been found
to have committed. In our view, therefore, what was implicit in 1986 Act has
been made explicit in 2000 Act.

Section 32 of the 1986 Act deals with the presumption and determination
B of age, which reads :
"32. Presumption and determination of age. - (I) Where it appears to
a competent authority that a person brought before it under any of the
provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving
C evidence) is a juvenile, the competent authority shall make due inquiry
as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such
evidence as may be necessary and shall record a finding whether the
person is a juvenile or not, stating his age as nearly as may be.

(2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become
D invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of
whom the order has been made is not a juvenile, and the age recorded
by the competent authority to be the age of the person so brought
before it shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the true
age of that person."

E Mr. Sharan stressed heavily on the word is used in two places of the
Section and contended that the word is suggests that for determination of age
of juvenile the date of production would be reckoning date as the inquiry
with regard to his age begins from the date he is brought before the Court
and not otherwise. We are unable to countenance this submission. We have
F already noticed that the definition of delinquent juvenile means a juvenile
who has been found to have committed an offence. The word is employed _.
in Section 32 is referable to a juvenile who is said to have committed an
offence on the date of the occurrence. We may also notice the provisions of
Section 18 of the 1986 Act. Section 18 provides for bail and custody of
G juveniles. It reads :
18. BAIL AND CUSTODY OF JUVENILES. (\) When any person
accused of a bailable or non-bailable offence and apparently a juvenile
is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Juvenile
Court, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the
H Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law
for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety
PRATAP SINGH v. STA TE OF .IHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.] 1033
but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for A
believing that the release is likely to bring him into association with
any known criminal or expose him to moral danger or that his release
would defeat the ends of justice.

(2) When such person having been arrested is not released on bail
under sub-section (I) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, B
such officer shall cause him to be kept in an observation home or a
place of safety in the prescribed manner (but not in a police station
or jail) until he can be brought before a Juvenile Court.

(3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (I ) by C
the Juvenile Court it shall, instead of committing him to prison, make
an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety for
such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding him as may
be specified in the order."

It will be noticed that the word is has been used in more than one place D
in this Section also. Often than not, an offender is arrested immediately after
an offence is alleged to have been committed or some time even arrested on
the spot.

This would also show that the arrest and release on bail and custody of
juveniles, the reckoning date of a juvenile is the date of an offence and not E
the date of production.

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Act heavily relied upon by the counsel
for the respondent does not envisage the production of a juvenile in the
Court.
F
We may also usefully refer to Sections 3 and 26 of the Act 1986.
Sections 3 and 26 of the Act reads :

"3. Continuation of inquiry in respect ofjuvenile who has ceased to
be a juvenile. - Where an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile G
and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile ceases to be such,
then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other
Jaw for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued and
orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had
continued to be a juvenile".
H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.
'
A "26. Special provision in respect of pending cases. - Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile
pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes
into force in that area, shall be continued in. that court as if this Act
had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of
B
passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile
to the Juvenile Court which.shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile
in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied·
on inquiry under this Act that the juvenile has committed the offence."

C The legislative intendment underlying Sections 3 and 26 read with the
preamble, aims and objects of the Act is clearly discernible. A conjoint reading
of the Sections, preamble, aims and· objects of the Act leaves no matter of
doubt that the legislature intended to provide protection, treatment,
development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for"
D the adjudication thereof. Interpretation of Sections 3 and 26 of the Act are no
more res-integra. Sections 3 and 26 of the 1986 Act as quoted above are in
pari materia with Sections 3 and 26 of the Raja~than Children Act, I 970
(Raj. Act 16 of 1970). A three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra
(supra) after considering the preamble, aims and objects and Sections 3 and
26 of the Rajasthan Act, held that the Act being a piece of social legislation
E is meant for the protection of infants who commit criminal offences and,
therefore, such provisions should be liberally and meaningfully construed so
as to advance the object of the Act. This Court then said in paragraph 28 at
210 sec: ·

"28. As regards the general applicability of the Act, we are clearly of
F the view that the relevant date for the applicability of the Act is the
date on which the offence takes place. Children Act was enacted to
protect young children from the consequences of their criminal acts
on the footing that their mind at that age could not be said to be
mature for imputing mens rea as in the case of an adult. This being
G the intendment of the Act, a clear finding has to be recorded that the
relevant date for applicability of the Act is the date on which the
offence takes place. It is quite possible that by the time the case
comes up for trial, growing in age being an involuntary factor, the ~ '
child may have. ceased to be a child. Therefore, Sections 3 and 26
H became necessary. Both the sections clearly point in the direction of
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.] 1035
the relevant date for the applicability of the Act as the date of A
occurrence. We are clearly of the view that the relevant date for
applicability of the Act so far as age of the accused, who claims to
be a child, is concerned, is the date of the occurrence and not the
date of the trial. "

(emphasis supplied) B
As already noticed the decision rendered by a three-Judge bench of this
..._, Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) was not noticed by a two-Judge bench of
this Court in Arni/ Das (supra). We are clearly of the view that the law laid
down in Umesh Chandra (supra) is the correct law and that the decision
rendered by a two-Judge bench of this Court in Arnit Das (supra) cannot be C
said to have laid down a good law. We, accordingly, hold that the law laid
down by a three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) is the
correct law.

Question No.(b) :
D
+ Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding
is initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was
enforced with effect from 1.4.2001.

On this point, we have heard Mr. P.S. Mishra, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, Ms. Maharukh Adenwala, counsel for the intervener and E
Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned ASG for the State of Jharkhand. In fa,,t
counsel for the intervener has adopted the arguments of Mr. Mishra. Mr.
Mishra would submit that any proceeding against any person pending under
the 1986 Act would be covered by the 2000 Act and would extend the benefit
of being a juvenile as defined under the 2000 Act, if at the time of the F
commission of the offence he was below the age of I 8 years. To buttress his
point counsel heavily relied upon the provisions contained in Section .20 of
the Act and Rules 61 and 62 framed by the Central Government. Per contra
Mr. Sharan counsel for the respondent would contend that the 1986 Act has
been repealed by Section 69( I) of the 2000 Act and, therefore, the provisions G
of 2000 Act would not be exiended to a case/inquiry init!ated and pending
under the provisions of 1986 Act, the Act of 2000 being not retrospective.

To answer the aforesaid question, it would be necessary to make a
quick survey of .the definitions and Sections of 2000 Act, relevant for the
purpose of disposing of the case at hand.
H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.

A As stated hereinabove the whole object of :he Acts is to provide for the
care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of juveniles. The
Acts being benevolent legislations, an interpretation must be given which
would advance the cause of the legislation i.e. to give benefit to the juveniles.

The 1986 Act was holding the field till it was eclipsed by the emergence
B of2000 Act w.e.f. 1.4.2001, the date on which the said Act c:ame into force
by the Notification dated 28.2.200 I in the Official Gazette issued by the
Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (3)
of Section I of the Act. Section 69(1) of the Act repealed the 1986 Act. It •-
reads :
c 69. Repeal and savings.-(!) The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (53 of
1986) is her.:by repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or a~y action taken
under the said Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under
the corresponding provisions of this Act. " (emphasis supplied)
D
Sub-Section (2) postulates that anything done or any action taken under
t
the 1986 Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the
corresponding provisions of the 2000 Act. Thus, although the 1986 Act was
repealed by the 2000 Act, anything done or any action taken under the 1986
E Act is saved by sub-section (2), as if the action has been taken under the
provisions of the 2000 Act.

Section 20 on which reliance has been placed heavily by the counsel
for the appellant deals with the special provision in respect of pending cases.
It reads :
F "20. Special provision in respect ofpending cases. - Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile
pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes
into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act
had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has
G committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of
passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile
to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in
accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied
on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence."

H The striking distinction between the 1986 Act and 2000 Act is with
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.] I037
regard to the definition .of juvenile. Section 2(h) of the 1986 Act defines A
juvenile as under :

"2(h) "juvenile" means a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen
years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years;"

Section 2(k) of 2000 Act defines juvenile as under:- B
"2(k) "juvenile" or "child" means a person who has not completed
eighteenth year of age;"
_._,
Thus, the striking distinction between the 1986 Act and 2000 Act is
that under the 1986 Act a juvenile means a male juvenile who has not attained
the age of 16 years and a female juvenile who has not attained the age of 18
c
years. In the 2000 Act no distinction has been drawn between the male and
female juvenile. The limit of 16 years in 1986 Act has been raised to 18 years
in 2000 Act. In the 2000 Act wherever the word "juvenile" appears the same
will now have to be taken to mean a person who has not completed 18 years
of age. D
Section 3 provides as follows :

"3. Continuation of inquiry in respect ofjuvenile who has ceased
to be a juvenile. - Where an inquiry has been initiated against a
juvenile in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection
E
and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile or the child ceases
to be such, then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in
any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued
and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person
had continued to be a juvenile or a child."
F
-'r' Thus, even where an inquiry has been initiated and the juvenile ceases
to be a juvenile i.e. crosses the age of 18 years, the inquiry must be continued
and orders made in respect of such person as if such person had continued
to be a juvenile.

Similarly, under Section 64 where a juvenile is undergoing a sentence G
of imprisonment at the commencement of the 2000 Act he would, in lieu of
undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in a fit
> J.
institution. These provisions show that even in cases where a mere inquiry
has commenced or even where a juvenile has been sentenced the provisions
of the 2000 Act would apply. Therefore, Section 20 is to be appreciated in
H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A the contJd of the aforesaid provisions.
Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision
in respect of pending cases and begins with non-obstante clause. The sentence
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect
of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on date of which this Act came
B into force" has great significance. The proceedings in respect of a juvenile
pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act is relatable to
proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and which are
pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "any court" would
include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a '1uvenile" under
C the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts. They
would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or
girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where
a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet
crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that Court
as if the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile
D has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing
any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the
Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile. i

In this connection it is pertinent to note that Section 16 of the 2000 Act
is identical to Section 22 of the 1986 Act. Similarly Section 15 of the 2000
E Act is in pari materia with Section 21 of the 1986 Act. Thus, such an
interpretation does not offend Article 20( I) of the Constitution of India and
the juvenile is not subjected to any penalty greater than that which might
have been inflicted on him under the 1986 Act.

F Mr. Mishra placed reliance on Rules 61 and 62 framed by the Central
Government. According to him, particularly Rule 62 of the Rules covers the
pending cases and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Rule 62. Rule 62
reads :

"62. Pending Cases.-(!) No juvenile in conflict with law or a child
G shall be denied the benefits of the Act and the rules made thereunder.

(2) All pending cases which have not received a finality shall be dealt
with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the Act and the _. ,
rules made thereunder.

(3) Any juve11ile in conflict with law, or a child shall be given the
H
PRAT AP SING!! '"STATE OF JHARKHAND [SINHA . .I.] ] 039

benefits under sub-rule (I), and it is hereby clarified that such benefits A
shall be made available not only to those accused who was juvenile
or a child at the time of commission of an offence, but also to those
who ceased to be a juvenile or a child during the pendency of any
enquiry or trial.

(4) While computing the period of detention of s·1y .:if a juvenile in B
conflict with law or of a child, all such period which the juvenile or
the child has already spent in custody, detention o·· stay shall be
counted as part of the period of stay or detention contained in the
final order of the competent authority."

This Rule also indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that C
the provisions of the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided, on
1.4.200 I i.e. the date on which the 2000 Act came into force, the person was
a "juvenile" within the meaning of the term as defined in the 2000 Act i.e.
he/she had not crossed 18 years of age.

Mr. Mishra referred to the decision of the two-Judge Bench of this D
.. "* Court in Criminal Appeal No. 370 of 2003 decided on 31.3.2004 in the case
of Upendra Kumar v. State of Bihar, wherein this Court referred to the
earlier decisions of this Court rendered in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar,
(1997] 8 SCC 720, Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1984] Supp. SCC 228,
Bho_op Ram v. State of U.P., [1989] 3 SCC I and Pradeep Kumar v. State E
of U.P., (1995] Supp 4 SCC 419 where this Court came to the conclusion that
the accused who were juvenile could not be denied the benefit of the provisions
of the Act then in force.

We, therefore, hold that the provisions of 2000 Act would be applicable
to those cases initiated and pending trial/inquiry for the offences committed· F
under the 1986 Act provided that the person had not completed 18 years of
age as on 1.4.200 I.

The net result is :

(a) The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile G
is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced
before the authority or in the Court.
(b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in
any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending
when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.200 I.

The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.

S.B. SINHA, J. INTRODUCTION :

B Juvenile Justice Act in its present form has been enacted in discharge
of the obligation of our country to follow the United National Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985 also known
as Beijing Rules (the Rules).

THE RULES:
c Part I of the said Rules provides for the general principles which a;·e
said to be of fundamental perspectives referring to comprehensive social
policy in general and aiming at promoting juvenile welfare to the greatest
possible extent, which would minimize the necessity of int·ervention by the
juvenile justice system and, in turn, will reduce the harm that was caused by
D any intervention. The important role that a constructive social policy for
juvenile is to play has been pointed out in Rules 1.1 to 1.13 inter alia in the
matter of prevention of juvenile crime and delinquency. Rule 1.4 defines t ..
juvenile justice as an integral part of the national development process of
each country, within a comprehensive framework of social justice from all
E juveniles, and, thus, at the same time, contributing to the protection of the
young and maintenance of a peaceful order in the society. While Rule 1.6
refers to the necessity of the juvenile justice system being systematically
developed and coordinated with a view to improving and sustaining the
competence of personnel involved in the services including their methods,
approaches and attitudes, Rule 1.5 seeks to take account of existing conditions
F in Member States which would cause the manner of implementation of
particular rules necessarily to be different from the manner adopted in other
States. Rule 2.1 provides for application of the rules without distinction of
any kind. Rule 2.2 provides for the definitions which are as follows:

"(a) A juvenile is a child or young person who, under the respective
G legal systems, may be dealt with for an offence in a manner which
is different from an adult;

(b) An offence is any behaviour (act or omission) that is punishable
by law under the respective legal systems;

H (c) A juvenile offender is a child or young person who is alleged to
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SINHA. J.] 1041

have committed or who has been found to have committed an offence." A
Rule 2.3 inter alia provides for making a set of laws, rules and provisions
specifically applicable to juvenile offenders and institutions and bodies
entrusted with the functions of !IP ~d;i1ini>i•·J'i"n of juvenile justice and
designed·
B
.. (a) To meet the varying needs ul JUVC1111e uftenders, while protecting
their basic rights;

(b) To meet the needs of society;

(c) To implement the following rules thoroughly and fairly."
c
The age of a juvenile is to be determined by the Member Countries
having regard to its legal system, thus fully respecting the economic, social
political, cultural and legal systems. This has made a wide variety of ages
coming under the definition of "juvenile", ranging from 7 years to 18 years
or above. Rule 3 provides for extension of the Rules covering (a) status D
offences; (b) juvenile welfare and care proceedings and (c) proceedings dealing
- -t with young adult offenders, depending of course on each given age-limit.
Rule 4 provides that the minimum age of criminal responsibility should not
be fixed at too low an age level bearing in mind the facts of emotional,
mental and intellectual maturity. Rule 5 provides that the juvenile justice
system shall emphasize the well-being of the juvenile and shall ensure that E
any reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion to the
circumstances of both the offenders and the offence. Rule 6 provides for
scope of discretion. Rule 7.1 provides for the rights of juvenile which is as
under:

"Basic procedural safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, F
the right to be notified of the charges, the right to remain silent, the
right to counsel, the right to the presence of a parent or guardian, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to appeal
to a higher authority shall be guaranteed at all stages of proceedings."

Rule 8 provides for the protection of privacy. Rule 9 provides that the G
said rules shall not be interpreted as precluding the application of the Standard
) • Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners adopted by the United Nations
and other human rights instruments and standards recognized by the
international community that relate to the care and protection of the young.
Rule 27 also provides for application of the Standard Minimum Rules for the H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.

A treatment of prisoners adopted by the United Nations.

Part II of the said Rules provides for investigation and prosecution,
diversion, specialization within the police, detention pending trial. Rule 13
reads as under:

B "13.l Detention pending trial shall be used only as a measure of last
resort and for the shortest possible period of time.

13.2 Whenever possible, detention pending trial shall be replaced by
alternative measures~ such as close supervision, intensive care or
placement with a family or in an educational setting or home.
c 13.3 Juveniles under detention pending trial shall be entitled to all.
rights and guarantees of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the United Nations.

13.4 Juveniles under detention pending trial shall be kept separate
from adults and shall be detained in a separate institution or in a
D
separate part of an institution also holding adults.

13.5 While in custody, juveniles shall receive care, protection and all
necessary individual assistance - social, educational, vocational,
psychological, medical and physical - that they may require in view
E of their age, sex and personality."

Part Ill provides for adjudication and disposition in terms whereof
competent authorities prescribed were competent to a,djudicate. Rule 15
provides for legal counsel, parents and guardians. Rule 16 provides for Social
Inquiry Reports. Rule 16.1 reads as under:
F
".In all cases except those involving minor offences, before the
competent authority renders a final disposition prior to sentencing,
the background and circumstances in which the juvenile is living or
the conditions under which the offence has been committed shall be
properly investigated so as to facilitate judicious adjudication of the
G case by the competent authority."

Rule 17 provides for guiding principles in adjudication and disposition
.. \
which reads as under:

"17.1 The disposition of the competent authority shall be guided by
H the following principles:
PRA TAP SINGH v. STA TE OF ffiARKHANO [SINHA, J.] 1043
4
(a) The reaction taken shall always be in proportion not only to the A
circumstances and the gravity of the offence but also to the
circumstances and the needs of the juvenile as well as to the needs
of the .society;

(b) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile shall be imposed
only after careful' consideration and ~hall be limited to the possible B
minimum;
;..,.,
(c) Deprivation of personal liberty shall not be imposed unless the
juvenile is adjudicated of a serious act involving violence against
another person or of persistence in committing other serious offences
and unless there is no other appropriate response; c
(d) The well-being of the juvenile shall be the guiding factor in the
consideration of her or his case.

17 .2 Capital punishment shall not be imposed for any crime committed
by juveniles: D
·~
17.3 Juveniles shall not be subject to corporal punishment.

17 .4 The competent authority shall have the power to discontinue the
proceedings at any time."

It has been pointed out that the main difficulty in formulating guidelines E
for the adjudication of young persons stems from the fact that there are
unresolved conflicts of a philosophical nature, such as the following:

(a) Rehabilitation versusjust result;
(b) Assistance versus repression and punishment; F
(c) Reaction according to the singular merits of an individual case
versus reaction according to the protection of society in general;
(d) General deterrence versus individual incapacitation.

OBJECTS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE LEGISLATION: G
J , The purpose of the Juvenile Justice Legislation is to provide succour to
the children who were being incarcerated along with adults and were subjected
to various abuses. It would be in the fitness of things that appreciation of the
very object and purpose of the legislation is seen with·a clear understanding
which sought to bring relief to juvenile delinquents. H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A The problem of Juvenile Justice is, no doubt, one of tragic human
interest so much so in fact that it is not confined to this country alone but cuts
across national boundaries. In 1966 at the second United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders at London this issue
was discussed and several therapeutic recommendations were adopted. To
B bring the operations of the juvenile justice system in the country in conformity
with the UN Standard Minimum Rule for the Administration of juvenile
justice, the juvenile Justice Act came into existence in 1986. A review of the
working of the then existing Acts both State and Parliamentary would indicate
that much greater attention was found necessary to be given to children who
may be found in situations of social maladjustment, delinquency or neglect.
C The justice system as available for adults could not be considered suitable for
being applied to juvenile. There is also need for larger involvement of informal
system and community based welfare agencies in the case, protection,
treatment, development and rehabilitation of such juveniles.

The provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to
D as "the 1986 Act") and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000 (56 of2000) (hereinafter referred to as "the 2000 Act") are required
to be construed having regard to the aforementioned Minimum Standards as
the same are specifically referred to therein.

The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 is aimed at achieving the following
E objects :
(i) To lay down an uniform legal frame-work for juvenile justice in the
country so as to ensure that no child under any circumstances is lodged in jail
or police lock-up. This is being ensured by establishing Juvenile Welfare
F Boards and Juvenile Courts;

(ii) To provide for a specialized approach towards the prevention and
treatment of juvenile delinquency in its full range in keeping with the
development needs of the child found in any situation of social maladjustment;

G (iii) To spell out the machinery and infrastructure required for the, case,
protection, treatment, developments and rehabilitations of various categories
of children coming within the purview of the Juvenile Justice system. This
is proposed to be achieved by establishing observation homes, juvenile homes
for neglected juveniles and special homes for delinquent juveniles;

H (iv) To establish norms and standard for the administration of juvenile
PRA TAP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKl!AND [SINHA. J.] 1045
I
justice in terms of investigation and prosecution, adjudication and disposition A
f and case, treatment and rehabilitation;

(v) To develop appropriate linkages and coordination between the fonnal
system of juvenile justice and voluntary agencies engaged in the welfare of
, neglected or society maladjusted children and to specifically define the areas
of their responsibilities and roles; B
(vi) To constitute special offences in relation to juveniles and provide
for punishment therefor;

(vii) To bring the operation of the juvenile justice system in the country
in conformity with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the c
Administration of Juvenile Justice.

The various provisions of the 1986 Act provide for a scheme of unifonn
juvenile justice system in the country so that a juvenile may not have to be
lodged in jail or police lock-up as well as for prevention and treatment of
~- juvenile delinquency for care, protection etc. Section 3 provides that where D
an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile even, during the course of
such inquiry a juvenile ceased to be such, then, notwithstanding anything
contained therein or any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry
may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such persons as if
such person had continued to be a juvenile. Chapter II of the Act speaks of E
competent authorities and institutions for juveniles such as Juvenile Welfare
Boards, Juvenile Courts, Juvenile Homes, special homes, observation homes
and aftercare organisations. Chapter III makes provision for neglected
juveniles. Section 17 makes provision for uncontrollable juveniles. Chapter
IV deals with delinquent juveniles. Sections 18 to 26 provide for bail and
custody of juveniles, accused of a bailable or non-bailable offence, the manner F
1"'
'
of dealing with them and the orders that may be passed regarding or against
delinquent juveniles. Proceedings as laid down in Chapter VIII of the Code
of Criminal Procedure are not competent against a juvenile. A juvenile and
a person who is not a juvenile cannot be jointly tried. No disqualification
attaches to conviction of a juvenile for any offence under any law. Special G.
provisions are contained in Section 26 as regard the proceedings in respect
J , of juveniles pending in any court on the date of the coming into force of the
Act. Chapter V (Sections 27 to 40) lay down the procedure of competent
authorities generally under the Act and appeals and revisions from orders of
such authorities. Chapter VI (Sections 41 to 45) provides for special offences
in respect of juveniles. Chapter VII (Sections 46 to 63) contains miscellaneous H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.
~
A provisions.
Section 32 of the 1986 Act mandates the competent authority to hold
'
enquiry as to the age of the delinquent brought before it.

The 1986 Act has been repealed and replaced by the 2000 Act.
B
The 2000 Act has brought about certain changes vis-a-vis the 1986 Act.
It has obliterated the distinction between a male juvenile and female juvenile.
In contrast with the definition of delinquent juvenile in the 1986 Act who
was found guilty of commission of an offence, a juvenile in conflict with law
is defined in the 2000 Act to mean a person who is of below 18 years of age
c and is alleged to have committed· an offence. Section 3 provides for
continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile.

By reason of the aforementioned provisions a legal fiction has been
created to treat a j•Jvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile as a person as if
he had continued to be a juvenile. Chapter II provides for constitution of a
D Juvenile Justice Board. Its power had been outlined 'in Section 6..section 7 -;
mandates that a Magistrate before whom a juvenile is produced must without
any delay record his opinion, and if it is found that a person brought before
him is a juvenile, he shall record th!! same and forward him with the record
of the proceeding to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the
E proceeding. Sections 8 and 9 provide for observation homes and special
homes. Section I 0 provides that on apprehension of a juvenile in conflict
with law; he shall be placed under the charge of a special juvenile police unit
or the designated police officer who shall immediately report the matter to a
member of the Board. Section 12 provides for bail. In no circumstances, a
person who appears to be juvenile is to be placed in a police lock-up. He is
F to be kept in an observation home in the prescribed manner until he can be .....
brought before the court. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 mandates the Board
to make an order sending a juvenile to the observation home instead of
committing him to prison. Section 14 provides for holding of an inquiry by
the Board regarding a juvenile within a period of four months. Section 15
G provides for an order that may be passed regarding juvenile, clause (g) of
sub-section (I) whereof reads, thus:

"15. Order that may be passed regarding juvenile - (I) Where a
. ~

Board is satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed an offence,
then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other
H law for the time being in force, the Board may, if it thinks so fit, -
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE Of JHARKHAND [SINHA, J.] 1047

i (g) make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home- A
(i) in the case of juvenile, over seventeen years but less than eighteen
years of age for a period of not less than two years;

(ii) in case of any other juvenile for the period until he ceases to be
a juvenile: B
Provided that the Board may, if it is satisfied that having regard to the
nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case it is expedient
so to do, for reasons to be recorded, reduce the period of stay to such
period as it thinks fit."

Section 16 mandates that no juvenile shall be sentenced to death or c
life imprisonment or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in
default of furnishing security. Sections 20 and 64 which are relevant for our
purpose read as under:

"20. Special provision in respect of pending cases - Notwithstanding D
anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile
pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes
into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act
had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of
passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile E
to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in
accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied
on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.

64. Juveniles in conflict with law undergoing sentence at
commencement of this Act - In any area in which this Act is brought F
into force, the State Government or the local authority may direct that
a juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing any sentence of
imprisonment at the commencement of this Act, shall, in lieu of
undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in fit
institution in such manner as the State Government or the local G
authority thinks fit for the remainder of the period of the sentence;
and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the juvenile as if he had
been ordered by the Board to be sent to such special home or institution
or, as the case may be, ordered to be kept under protective care under
sub-section (2) of section 16 of this Act."
H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Sections 4 to 28 occur in Chapter II which deal with juvenile in conflict
with law and Section 64 occurs in Chapter V dealing with miscellaneous
provisions. It is interesting to note that all the provisions occurring in Chapter
II or Section 20 do not use the expression juvenile in conflict with law
whereas Section 64 specifically uses that expression.

B Section 20 of the Act permits continuation of proceedings of a juvenile
court in any area on the date on which the Act came into force by providing
"it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect
of that juvenile, shall forward him to the board which shall pass orders in
respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provision of this Act as if it
C has been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that juvenile had committed the
offence".

Section 68 provides for rule making power of the State Government.
No State unfortunately has framed any rule in exercise thereof. The Central
Government, however, in purported exercise of its power under Section 70
D of the Act published the principles which are fundamental to the development
of strategies, interpretation and implementation of the Act of 2000 and the
model rules which the State Governments are required to frame. Rule 6lof
the said Model Rule is as under:

"61. Temporary application of model rules - It is hereby declared that
E until the new rules are framed by the State Government concerned
under section 68 of the Act, these rules shall mutatis mutandis apply
in that State."

Rule 62 deals with pending cases and sub-rule (3) thereof reads as
under:
F
"It is hereby clarified that such benefits shall be made available not
only to those accused, who was juvenile or a child at the time of
commission of an offence but also to those who ceased to be a juvenile
or a child during the pendency of any enquiry of trial."

G The legislation relating to juvenile justice should be construed as a step
for resolution of the problem of the juvenile justice which was one of tragic
human interest which cuts across national boundaries. The said Act has not
' ' .
only to be read in tern1s of the Rules but also the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and •he United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
H protection of juveniles.
PRAT AP SINGH v. ST ATE OF .IHARKHAND [SINHA, l] I049
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
The Juvenile Justice Act specially refers to international law. The relevant
provisions of the Rules are incorporated therein. The international treatises,
covenants and conventions although may not be a part of our municipal law,
the same can be referred to and followed by the courts having regard to the
fact that India is a party to the said treatises. A right to a speedy trial is not B
a new right. It is embedded in our Constitution in terms of Articles 14 and
21 thereof. The international treaties recognize the same. It is now trite that
' " any violation of human rights would be looked down upon. Some provisions
of the international law although may not be a part of our municipal law but
the courts are not hesitant in referring thereto so as to find new rights in the C
context of the Constitution. Constitution of India and other ongoing statutes
have been read consistently with the rules of international law. Constitution
is a source of, and not an exercise of, legislative power. The principles of
International Law whenever applicable operate as a statutory implication but
the Legislature in the instant case held itself bound thereby and, thus, did not
legislate in disregard of the constitutional provisions or the international law D
as also in the context of Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The
law has to be understood, therefore, in accordance with the international law.
Part III of our Constitution protects substantive as well as procedural rights.
Implications which arise therefrom must effectively be protected by the
judiciary. A contextual meaning to the statute is required to be assigned E
having regard to the Constitutional as well as International Law operating in
the field.

[See Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd v. M V. Sea Success
I and Anr., [2004] 9 SCC 512]

In Regina (Daly) v. Secretary ofState for the Home Department, (2001)
F
2 AC 532, Lord Stein observed that in the law context is everything in the
following terms:
• in approach between the traditional grounds of
"28. The differences
review and the proportionality approach may therefore sometimes G
yield different results. It is therefore important that cases involving
Convention rights must be analysed in the correct way. This does not
mean that there has been a shift to merits review. On the contrary, as
Professor Jowell [2000] PL 671, 681 has pointed out the respective
roles of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and will
remain so. To this extent the general tenor of the observations in H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Mahmood [2001) I WLR 840 are correct. And Laws LJ rightly
emphasized in Mahmood, at p 847, para 18, "that the intensity of
review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in
hand". That is so even in cases involving Convention rights. In law
context is everything."

B Constitution of India and the Juvenile Justice Lt:gislations must
necessarily be understood in the context of present days scenario and having
regard to the international treaties and conventions. Our Constitution takes
note of the institutions of the world community which had been created. • ·
Some legal instruments that have declared the human rights and fundamental
C freedoms of humanity had been adopted but over the time even new rights
had been found in several countries, as for example, South Africa (S. v.
Makwanyane, (1995) 3 SA 391), Canada (Reference re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alberta), (1987) I SCR 313 at 348), Germany
(Presumption of Innocence and the European Convention on Human Rights,
(1987) BverfGE 74, 358), New Zealand (Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,
D (1994) 2 NZLR 257 at 266), United Kingdom (Pratt v. Attorney-Genera/for
Jamaica, (I 994) 2 AC I and United States (Atkins v. Virginia, (2002) 536 US
304 and Lawrence v. Texas, (2003) 539 US 558). New ideas had occupied
the human mind as regard protection of Human Rights. (See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, (2004) 72 USLW 4607, Russel v. Bush, (2004) 72 USLW 4596
E and Rumsfield v. Padila, (2004) 72 USLW 4584).
Now, the Constitution speaks not on'y "to the people of India who
made it and accepted it for their governance but also to the international
community as the basic law of the Indian nation which is a member of that
community". Inevitably, its meaning is influenced by the legal context in
p which it must operate.

The legal instruments that have declared legal rights and fundamental
freedoms, founded in the nations of human dignity and Charter of United
Nations were not known earlier which is manifest today. [Charter of the
United Nations, signed at San Fransisco on 26.6.1945. Preamble). Political,
G social and economic development can throw light on the meaning of
Constitution.

In Lawrence (supra), Kennedy J., for the Supreme Court, after references
to international human rights law, concluded:

H "Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SINHA, J.] 105]
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the A
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have
been more specific. They did not presume of have this insight. They
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can B
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."

The questions, therefore, in our opinion, should be determined having
regard to the aforementioned principles.

EXPEDITIOUS PROCEEDINGS :
c
In terms of Rule 20. l of the Rules we may notice that some statutes,
as for example, the Family Court Act of some States of U.S.A. contains
provisions establishing time limitations governing each stage of juvenile
proceedings, the purpose whereof is to assure swift and certain adjudication
at all phases of the proceeding. (See In re Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408) D
}
A similar issue was examined by the Supreme Court of California in
Alfredo v. Superior Court, 849 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1993) wherein a juvenile
sought habeus corpus to obtain release. The court held that the Fourth
Amendment provides the authority for the promptness required for a juvenile
hearing. It was further held that a minor must be released upon expiration of E
the statutory time limit for detention due to the juvenile's interest in freedom
from institutional restrains. The court implied that the time allowed to have
the hearing shall stand extended once the juvenile is released, and that dismissal
is not the only necessary remedy.

In Robinson v. Texas, 707 S.W.2d 47, the Texas Court of Appeals held F
that in calculating the time for a speedy trial continuances should not be
included. In that case, the court found that continuances based on reset forms
signed by appellant's attorney were excludable from the statutory time limits
for a speedy trial.

In Jllinois v. Stufflebean, 392 N.E. 2d 414, the Appellate Court of G
Illinois held that the remedy for detention of a juvenile beyond the statutory
limit was immediate release, not dismissal. In Stufflebean, the court denied
a probationer's request for dismissal based on incarceration exceeding statutory
limits.
H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 1 S.C.R.

A QUESTIONS :

The questions which arise for consideration in this reference are:

(i) What would be reckoning date in detennining the age of offender,
viz., date when produced in a Court, as has b1~en held by this
B Court in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, [2000] 5 SCC 488 or the
date on which the offence was committed as has been held in
Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, [1982] 2 SCC 202.

(ii) Whether the 2000 Act will be applicable in cases which were
pending before the enforcement thereof.
.
'

c RE.: QUESTION NO. i :
We have noticed hereinbefore that the decisions in Umesh Chandra
(supra) and Arnit Das (supra) are in conflict with each other. Whereas in
Umesh Chandra (supra), a clear finding has been recorded by this Court that
D the relevant date for applicability of the Act is the date on which the offence
takes place; in Arni! Das (supra), Lahoti, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then
was) speaking for a Division Bench held that Section 8(a) of the Act and the
Scheme as also the phraseology employed by the Parliament in drafting the
Act suggests that the relevant date for finding out the age of juvenile is the
date when he is produced before the Board. It was observed that indisputably
E the definition of juvenile or any other provisions contained in the Act does
not specifically provide the date for reference to which a crime has to be
detennined so as to find out whether he is or she is a juv·enile or not.

In support of the view taken in Arnit Das (supra), the learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the Respondent submitted that the Act aims
F at protection of a juvenile in the sense that he is to be kept in the protective
custody and dealt with separately by not sending him to prison or police
lock-up which is possible to be directed only when a juvenile is arrested or
produced in court and not prior thereto. Similarly, on conviction, he cannot
be sentenced and may be directed to be housed in a protective home and,
G thus, the relevant date would be the one on which the delinquent juvenile is
produced before the Board ..

This argument cannot be accepted for more than one reason. The said
Act is not only a beneficient legislation, but also a remediai one. The Act
Gims at grant of care, protection and rehabilitation of a juvenile vis-a-vis the
H adult criminals. Having regard to Rule 4 of United Nations Standard Minimum
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND [SINHA,J.] I053
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, it must also be borne in A
mind that the moral and psychological components of criminal responsibility
was also one of the factors in defining a juvenile. The first objective, therefore,
is the promotion of the well-being of the juvenile and the second objective
bring about the principle of proportionality whereby and whereunder the
proportionality of the reaction to the circumstances of both the offender and B
the offence including the victim should be safeguarded. In essence, Rule 5
calls for no less and no more than a fair reaction in any given case of juvenile
, :.. delinquency and crime. The meaning of the expression 'Juvenile' used in a
statute by reason of its very nature has to be assigned with reference to a
definite date. The term 'Juvenile' must be given a definite connotation. A
person cannot be a juvenile for one purpose and an adult for other purpose. C
It was, having regard to the constitutional and statutory scheme, not necessary
for the Parliament to specifically state that the age of juvenile must be
determined as on the date of commission of the offence. The same is in-built
in the statutory scheme. The statute must be construed having regard to the
Scheme and the ordinary state of affairs and consequences flowing therefrom.
The modern approach is to consider whether a child can live up to the moral D
and psychological components of criminal responsibility, that is, whether a
child, by virtue of his or her individual discernment and understanding can
be held responsible for essentially anti-social behaviour.

In construing a penal statute, the object of the law must be clearly E
borne in mind. The importance of time-bound investigation and a trial in
relation to an offence allegedly committed by a juvenile is explicit as h~s
been dealt with in some details hereinbefore. While making investigation it
is expected that the accused would be arrested forthwith. He, upon his arrest;
if he appears to be a juvenile, cannot be kept in police custody and may be
released on bail. If he is not released on bail by the arresting authority, he F
has to be produced before the competent Court or Board. Once he appears
to be juvenile, the competent court and/ or board may pass an appropriate
order upon releasing him for bail or send him to a protective custody. An
inquiry for the purpose of determination of age of the juvenile need nGt Le
resorted to if the person produced is admitted to be a juvenile. An inquiry G
would be necessary only if a dispute is raised in that behalf. A decision
_, thence is required to be taken by the competen~ court and /or board having
regard to the status of the accused as to whether he is to be released on bail
or sent to a protective custody or remanded to police or judicial custody. For
the said purpose what is necessary would be to find out as to whether on the
date of commission of the offence he was a juvenile or not as otherwise the H
-
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.(:.R.

A purpose for which the Act was enacted would be defeated. The provisions of
the said Act, as indicated hereinbefore, clearly postulate that the necessary
steps in the proceedings are required to be taken not only for the purpose of
adopting a special procedure at the initial stage but also for the intermediary
and final stage of the proceedings. If the person concerned is a juvenile, he
B cannot be tried along with other adult accused. His trial must be held by the
Board separately. Having regard to Rule 20. I of the Rules his case is required
to be determined, without any unnecessary delay. In the trial, the right of the
ju.venile as regard his privacy must be protected. He is entitled to be represented , ;
by a legal adviser and for free legal aid, if he applies then:for. His parents
and/or guardian are also entitled to participate in the proceedings. The Court
C would be entitled to take into consideration the Social Inquiry Reports wherein
the background and the circumstances in which the juvenilf: was living and
the condition in which the offence had been created may be properly
investigated so as to facilitate juvenile adjudication of the case by the
competent authority. At all stages, the Court/Board is required to pass an
appropriate order expeditiously. Right of a juvenile to get his case disposed
D of expeditiously is a statutory as also a constitutional right.
Even at the final stage, viz., after he is found to be guilty of commission
of an offence, he must be dealt with differently vis-a-vis adult prisoners.
Only because his age is to be determined in a case of dispute by the competent
E court or the board in terms of Section 26 of the Act, the same would not
mean that the relevant date therefor would be the one on which he is produced
before the Board. If such an argument is accepted, the same would result in
absurdity as, in a given case, it would be open to the police authorities not
to produce him before the Board before he ceases to be juvenile. If he is
produced after he ceases to be juvenile, it may not be necessary for the Board
F to send him in the protective custody or release him on bail as a result
whereof he would be sent to the judicial or police custody which would
defeat the very purpose for which the Act had been enacted. Law cannot be
applied in an uncertain position. Furthermore, the. right to have a fair trial
strictly in terms of the Act which would include procedural safeguard is a
G fundamental right of the juvenile. A proceeding against a juvenile must
conform to the provisions of the Act.

In Dilip Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1978) Calcutta 529 a Full ·-
Bench of the Calcutta High Court in arriving at the conclusion that the date
of reckoning shall be the one on which the offence has been committed
H referred to Article 20 of Constitution of India in the following terms:
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SINHA, J.] 1055.
i
"22. If we interpret S. 28 to mean that it prohibits a joint trial of a A
child and an adult only when the child is a 'child' at the time of trial,
that interpretation would go against the provisions of Art. 20(1) of
the Constitution which prescribes that no person shall be convicted of
any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of the act charged as an offence nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the
B
law in force at the time of the commission of the offence."
f ;.,
We, with respect, agree with the said observation.

The statute, it is well known, must be construed in such a manner so
as to make it effective and operative on the principle of Vt res magis va/eat c
quam pereat. The courts lean strongly against any constructions which tend
to reduce a statute to a futility. When two meanings, one making the statute
absolutely vague, wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless and the other
leading to certainty and meaningful are given, in such an event the latter
should be followed. [See Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State ofAssam D
, ) and Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 709 [See Andhra Bank v. B. Satyanarayana and
Ors., [2004] 2 SCC 657 and Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 589].

The submission of the learned Addi. Solicitor General that this Court
in Umesh Chandra (supra) has wrongly applied the test of imputing mens rea E
in holding that Children Act was enacted to protect young children from the
consequences of their criminal acts on the footing that their mind at that age
cannot be said to be mature as in the case of adult, may have some substance
but the said statement of law must be read and understood in the context of
Ru le 4. I of the Rules. So read, the Act would be understood in its proper
F
perspective.

The question raised in paragraph 17 of Amit Das (supra) is not apposite.
A hypothetical question would only lead to a hypothetical answer. The court
in an appropriate case is not powerless to pass an order as is contemplated
under the statute if the situation so demands but only because a person is G
produced before the Court after he attains majority either on his own volition
_. or by reason of machinations adopted by the investigating agency, the same
would not be determinative of the fact that the said person is to be differently
dealt with. Law favours strict adherence of the procedures subject to just
exceptions. The Court in Amit Das (supra) observed:
H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A "16 ......... .The Preamble speaks for the Act making provisions for the
things post-delinquency. Several expressions employed in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons vocally support this view. The Act
aims at laying down a uniform juvenile justice system in the country
avoiding lodging in jail or police lock-up of the child; and providing
for prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency, for care,
B protection, etc. post-juvenility. In short the field sought to be covered
by the Act is not the one which had led to juvenile delinquency but
the field when a juvenile having committed a delinquency is placed i .
for being taken care of post-delinquency."

C With great respect, we cannot agree to the said statement of law. It is
incorrect to say that the preamble speaks of the things of post-delinquency
only. The Act not only refers to the obligations of the country to re-enact the
existing law relating to juveniles bearing in the mind, the standards prescribed
in various conventions but also all other international instruments. It states
that the said Act was enacted inter alia to consolidate and amend the law
D relating to juveniles. Once the law relates to delinquent juveniles or juveniles
in conflict with law, the same would mean both pre and post-delinquency. *
The definition of 'Juvenile' under the 1986 Act, of c:ourse refers to a
person who has been found to have committed offence but tlhe same has been
clarified in the 2000 Act. The provisions of 1986 Act, as noticed hereinbefore,
E sought to protect not only those juveniles who have been found to have
committed an offence but also those who had been charged therefor. In terms
of Section 3 of the 1986 Act as well as 2000 ".'-ct when an enquiry has been
initiated even if the juvenile has ceased to be so as he has crossed the age
of 16 and 18 as the case may be, the same must be continued in respect of
F such person as ifhe had continued to be a juvenile. Section 3 of the 1986 Act
therefore cannot be given effect to if it is held that the same only applied to
post delinquency of the juvenile.

The field covered by the Act includes a situation leading to juvenile
delinquency vis-a-vis commission of an offence. In such an event he is to be
G provided the pos! delinquency care and for the said purpose the date when
delinquency took place would be the relevant date. It must, therefore, be held
that the relevant date for determining the age of the juvenile would be one ,_
on which the offence has been committed and not when he is produced in
court.

H
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND [SINHA. l] I 057
j
RE: QUESTION N0.2 : A
The salient features of the Act of 2000 may be noticed at the outset.

Section I (3) of the Act of 2000 states that it would come into force on
such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint. The Central Government had issu .. d c.n appropriate B
notification in terms whereof; 1.4.2001 has been specified as the 'appointed
date' from which the provisions of the said Act will come into force. The
' " Act, thus, is prospective in its operation. However, the Act of 2000 has
repealed the Act of 1986. It has obliterated the distinction between juvenile
of different sex by reason whereof, a male juvenile would also be juvenile
if he has not crossed the age of 18. C
A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was not a juvenile.
In that view of the matter the question whether a person above 16 years
becomes 'juvenile' within the purview of the Act of 2000 must be answered
having regard to the object and purport thereof . D
In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could be tried
in any court. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 takes care of such a situation
stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that court as if that Act
has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of commission
of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in the judgment of E
conviction, if any, but instead of passing any sentence in relation to the
juvenile, he would be forwarded to the Board which shall pass orders in
accordance with the provisions of the Act as if he has been satisfied on
inquiry that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction has, thus,
been created in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well-known must be
~ given its full effect although it has its limitations. [See Bhavnagar University F
v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) ltd. and Ors., (2003] 2 SCC 111 ITW Signode
India ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (2003) 9 SCALE 720 and See
Ashok Leyland ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2004] 3 SCC I]

The effect of the expression "as if' has recently been considered in Ml G
s Maruti Udyog ltd. v. Ram Lal, (C.A. No. 2946 of (2002) disposed of on
25.1.2005)

Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a juvenile, has
to be treated to be one by the Board for the purpose of sentencing which
takes care of a situation that the person although not a juvenile in terms of H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 1 S.C.R.

A the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000 Act for the
said limited purpose. The Act provides for a beneficent consequences and,
thus, it is required to be construed liberally.

We are not oblivious of the proposition that a beneficent legislation
should not be construed so liberally so as to bring within its fore a person
B who does not answer the statutory scheme. [See Deepal Girishbhai Soni and
Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. ltd. Baroda, [2004] 5 SCC 385].

However, as would appear from the provisions of the Act of 2000 that ' <

the Scheme of the 2000 Act is such that such a construction is possible. The
same would also be evident from Section 64 which deals with a case where
c a person has been undergoing a sentence but if he is a juvenile within the
meaning of the 2000 Act having not crossed the age of 18, the provisions
thereof would apply as if he had been ordered by the Board to be sent to a
special home or the institution, as the case may be.

D Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be applicable when a
person is below the age of 18 years as on 1.4.200 I. For the purpose of
attracting Section 20 of the Act, it must be established that : (i) on the date
of coming into force the proceedings in which the petitioner was accused was
pending; and (ii) on that day he was below the age of 18 years. For the
purpose of the said Act, both the aforementioned conditions are required to
E be fulfilled. By reason of the provisions of the said Act of2000, the protection
granted to a juvenile has only been extended but such extension is not absolute
but only a limited one. It would apply strictly when the conditions precedrnt
therefor as contained in Section 20 or Section 64 are fulfilled. The said
provisions repeatedly refer to the words 'juvenile' or 'delinquent juveniles'
F specifically. This appears to be the object of the Act and for ascertaining the
true intent of the Parliament, the rule of purposive construction must be
adopted. The purpose of the Act would stand defeated if a child continues to
be in the company of an adult. Thus, the Act of 2000 intends to give the
protection only to a juvenile within the meaning of the said Act and not an
adult. In other words, although it would apply to a person who is still a
G juvenile having not attained the age of 18 years but shall not apply to a
person who has already attained the age of 18 years on the date of coming
into force thereof or who had not attained the age of 18 years on the date of
commission of the offence but has since ceased to be a juvenile.

The embargo of giving a retrospective effect to a statute arises only
H when it takes away vested right of a person. By reasons of Section 20 of the
PRATAPSINGH v.STATEOFJHARKHAND[SINHA,l.] 1059

Act no vested right in a person has been taken away, but thereby only an A
additional protection has been provided to a juvenile.

In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, [1964] 7 SCR 676, this Court has
held:

" ..... Under Art. 20 of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted B
of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of
the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to
a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the
law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. But an ex
post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does
not fall within the said prohibition. If a particular law makes a provision C
to that effect, though retrospective in operation, it will be valid. The
question whether such a law is retrospective and if so, to what extent
depends upon the interpretation of a particular statute, having regard
to the well settled rules of construction ......"

Referring to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Subba Rao, J.(as
D
His Lordship then was) opined:

" ... This is not a case where an act, which was not an offence before
the Act, is made an offence under the Act; nor is this a case where
under the Act a punishment higher than that obtaining for an offence E
before the Act is imposed. This is an instance where neither the
ingredients of the offence nor the limits of the sentence are disturbed,
but a provision is made to help the reformation of an accused through
the agency of the court. Even so the statute affects an offence
committed before it was extended to the ·area in question. It is,
therefore, a post facto law and has retrospective operation. In F
considering the scope of such a provision we must adopt the rule of
beneficial construction as enunciated by the modem trend of judicial
opinion without doing violence to the provisions. of the relevant
section ......"

Yet again in Basheer alias N.P. Basheer v. State of Kera/a, [2004] 3 G
SCC 609, this Court held :

"If the Act had contained any provisions to the detriment of the
accused, then undoubtedly, it would have been hit by the rule against
post facto legislation contained in Article 20( I). However, we find H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005 J I S.C.R.

A that the amendments (at least the ones rationalizing the sentencing
structure) are more beneficial to the accused and amount to
mollification of the rigour of the law. Consequently, despite
retrospectivity, they ought to be applied to the cases pending before
the Court or even to cases pending investigation on the date on which
the amending Act came into force. Such application would not be hit
B by Article 20( I) of the Constitution."

Section 6(1) and Section 8 of the Human Rights Act, 1998 of United
Kingdom also provide for expeditious disposal of cases. The effect of non- • '
fulfillment of requirement that the a criminal charge be heard within a
C reasonable time came up for consideration recently before the House of Lords
in Attorney General's Reference [No. 2 of (200 I)] [(2004) 2 AC 72] wherein
it was held that the remedy as regard breach of reasonable time guarantee
would depend upon the fact involved in each case. While holding such a
right exists in an accused, it was observed :

D "This reasoning depends, as I have said, on categorizing the within
a reasonable time obligation as referring to a characteristic of the
hearing or determination just as are the fair, "public'', "independent",
"impartial" and "tribunal established by law" requirements. It is this
categorization which I suggest is fundamentally wrong. A within a
reasonable time obligation relates to a quality of the performance, not
E to the attributes of the service or article here the hearing or
determination to be provided by the person under the obligation. This
may all sound over-sophisticated but it can be simply demonstrated
both as a matter of the ordinary use of language and by reference to
basic principles of the law of obligations."
F In India such a right of expeditious disposal is contained in Article 21
of the Constitution, the relevance whereof for the purpose of interpretation
of the Act cannot be minimized.

In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors., JT (2004) 8 SC 589,
G Lahoti, CJ., opined that rule against retrospectivity cannot be applied to
..
legislations which are explanatory and declaranatory in nature. [See also R.
(on the application of Uttley) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
(2004) 4 All ER I]

Yet again in Dayal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, JT (2004) Supp. I SC
H 37, this Court upon referring Rattan Lal (supra) held :
PRATAPSINGH v.STATEOFJHARKHAND[SINHA,J.] 1061

"11. The decision approves of the principle that ex post facto law A
which only mollifies the rigour of the criminal law, though
retrospective in operation, will be valid. After enunciating this principle
the court interpreted section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act and
came to the conclusion that on a true interpretation of the provision
the High Court had jurisdiction to exercise the power at the appellate B
stage, and this power was not confined to a case where the trial court
could have made that order. The phraseology of the section was wide
enough to enable the appellate court or the High Court when the case
came before it, to make such an order. We, therefore, do not find that
Rattan Lal made a departure from the well settled principle that no
person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law C
in force at the time of the commission of that act charged as an
offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than with which he
might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offence. This Court only laid down the principle
that an ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal
law did not fall within the said prohibition, and if a particular law D
made a provision to that effect, though retrospective in operation, it
will be valid..... "

Interpretation of a statute depends upon the text and context thereof
and having regard and object with which the same was made.
E
The aforementioned provision of the 2000 Act is furthermore a remedial
statute. (See discussions ofG.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation,
Ninth Edition, 2004, page 733) They are, thus, required to be given liberal
construction.

A remedial statute applied in a pending proceeding would not mean
F
that thereby a retrospective effect and retroactive operation is being given
thereto.

We do not intend to say that no other view is possible. But in a case
of this nature where an additional protection had been granted pursuant to or G
in furtherance of the international treaties and keeping in view of the experience
which had been gathered by the Parliament after coming into force of the
1986 Act, we think that it should be read in such a fashion so that the
extended benefit can be granted even to the juvenile under the 2000 Act.
Furthermore, sub-section (2) of Section 69 provides that all proceedings shall
be deemed to have been held under the new Act. This is also suggestive of H

_l
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A the fact that the new Act would, to the aforementioned extent, apply to a
pending proceeding which was initiated under the 1986 Act.

MODEL RULES :

We, however, do not agree that the model rules have been framed in
B terms of the provisions of the Act so as to attract the principles that rules
validly framed are to be treated as part of the Act. It is one thing that the
rules validly framed are to be treated as part of the Act as has been held in
Chief Forest Conservator (Wildlife) and Ors. v. Nisar Khan, [2003) 4 SCC
595 and National Insurance Co. ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Ors., [2004) 3
c sec 297 but the said principle has no application herein as in terms of the
provisions of the said Act, the Central Government does not have any authority
to make any rules. In absence of any rule making power it cannot refer to the
omnibus clause of power to remove difficulty inasmuch as it has not been
stated that framing of any model rule is pennissible if a difficulty arises in
giving effect to the provision of the Act. The Central Government is a statutory
D functionary. Its functions are circumscribed by Section 70 of the Act only.
It has not been authorized to make any rule. Such rule making power has
been entrusted only to the State. The Central Government has, thus, no say
in the matter nor can it exercise such power by resorting to its power 'to
remove difficulties'. Rule making power is a separate power which has got
E nothing to do with the power to remove difficulty. By reason of the power
to remove difficulty or doubt, the Central Government has not been conferred
with any legislative power. The power to remove doubt or difficulty although
is a statutory power but the same is not akin to a legislative power and, thus,
thereby the provisions of the Act cannot be altered. [See Mis Jalan Trading
Co. Private ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, AIR (1967) SC 691 at 703)
F
The age of the delinquent juvenile, therefore, cannot be detennined in
terms of the model rules 62. Any law mandating the court to take into
consideration certain documents over others in determining an issue, must be
provided for only by law. Only a validly made law can take away the power
of the court to appreciate evidence for the purpose of determination of such
G a question in the light of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. It cannot be
done by the Central Government in exercise of the executive power. (See
Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510 and State of U.P. v.
Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714)
•

In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR ( 1988) SC 1796 , this
H Court held :
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SINHA, J.] I063
" ... To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions A
must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a
public or other official book, register or record, secondly, it must be
an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and thirdly, it must be
made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any
other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An
entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant B
and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding to
the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary
value to prove the age of the person in the absence of material on
which the age was recorded ..."

In Sushi/ Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003] 8 SCC 673, this Court as
c
regard determination of age of a candidate in terms of Section 36(2) of the
Representation of the People Act, I 951 observed :

"32. The age of a person in an election petition has to be determined
not only on the basis of the materials placed on record but also upon D
taking into consideration the circumstances attending thereto. The
initial burden to prove the allegations made in the election petition
although was upon the election petitioner but for proving the facts
which were within the special knowledge of the respondent, the burden
was upon him in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It is also
trite that when both parties have adduced evidence the question of the E
onus of proof becomes academic (See Union of India v. Sugau/i
Sugar Works (P) ltd., (1976] 3 SCC 32 and Cox and Kings (Agents)
ltd. v. Workmen, (1977] 2 SCC 705]. Furthermore, an admission on
the part of a party to the !is shall be binding on him and in any event
a presumption must be made that the same is taken to be established." F
This Court therein followed, inter a/ia, Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand
Purohit, AIR (1988) SC I796 and several other decisions.

The Court, therefore, must determine the age of the appellant herein
keeping in view our aforementioned findings that the relevant date for G
reckoning the age of the juvenile wou Id be the date of occurrence and not the
?ate on which he was produced before the Board.

The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is :

(i) In terms of the 1986 Act, the age of the offender must be reckoned H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A from the date when the alleged offence was committed;
(ii) The 2002 Act will have a limited application in the cases pending
under the 1986 Act;

(iii) The model rules framed by the Central Government having no
B legal force cannot be given effect to.
(iv) The court, thus, would be entitled to apply the ordinary rules of
evidence for the purpose of determining the age of the juvenile taking into • ·
consideration the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

C Subject to the aforementioned, I, with respect, agree with the conclusions
arrived at by Brother Serna, J.

K.K.T. Appeal disposed of.

•
r