Holding

An order under Section 8 becomes final if not appealed, revision under Section 34 is maintainable by an aggrieved party but must be exercised within a reasonable time, and the corporation is an affected party entitled to notice and hearing; therefore the revisional order setting aside the earlier order is void and must be remitted for fresh consideration.

Summary

The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) was allotted land declared excess under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 after the State vested the land in it and the corporation paid the occupancy price. The land owners had earlier filed a statement under Section 6, received a final order under Section 8 and a notification under Section 10(3) but did not appeal that order; they later filed a revision under Section 34, which was initially dismissed and subsequently allowed, setting aside the earlier order without hearing the corporation. The High Court held that the corporation was not an "affected" party and that the revision was invalid for violating natural justice. The Supreme Court examined whether the order under Section 8 became final without appeal, the maintainability of revision by an aggrieved party, the applicability of a limitation period for revision, and whether the corporation should be heard. It held that the order under Section 8 was final, revision is maintainable by an aggrieved party, and the revision should be exercised within a reasonable time, considering the long delay and prejudice to the corporation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the revisional order and remitted the matter to the revisional authority for fresh consideration with due hearing to all parties.

Issues considered

The finality of the order passed under Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 in the absence of an appeal.
Whether a party aggrieved by an order can invoke the revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
The existence and scope of a limitation period for exercising revision under Section 34 and the meaning of "reasonable time".
The applicability of natural justice principles, including notice and hearing, to the corporation as an affected party.
The effect of earlier dismissals of appeal and revision on res judicata and the revisional authority's power.

Legislation cited

Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976s. 10(1), s. 10(3), s. 10(5), s. 33, s. 34, s. 6, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

Urban land ceilingRevision jurisdictionNatural justiceNotice and hearingReasonable timeRes judicataAffected partyMunicipal corporationLand acquisition

Judgment

PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

FEBRUARY 26, 2007

[C.K. THAKKER AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B

Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976:

Sections 6, 8, 9, JO, 33 and 34-Draft statement under Section 8(1),
properly addressed, sought to be served on declarants received back C
undelivered, treated as served and finalized without any change-Final
order as required by Section 9 passed, notification under Section 10(1)
issued intimating persons having interest in land to prefer their claims to
Competent Authority within specified time, declaration that excess land was
to be acquired by State free from all encumbrances issued notification under D
Section 10(3) and, applying Section 10(5), possession handed over to a
Corporation against payment of price by them-Declaration of land being
ir. excess and issuance offinal statement remaining unchallenged-However,
land owners' appeal against orders under Section 10(3) and 10(5) summarily
dismissed as non-maintainable-After more than a decade of dismissal of
appeal, one of land owners filing a revision but that also disposed of as non- E
maintainable-More than three years thereafter petition of another land
owner for revision of earlier orders allowed with directions to give them
sufficient opportunity of hearing-High Court not setting aside order in
second revision on ground that no notice was served on land-owners before
declaring their land to be excess and vacant, that order was violative of F
natural justice, there was no valid vesting of land in State and allowing
petition of Corporation would result in revival of an illegal order-
Correctness of-Held-As no appeal or revision was preferred against order
under Section 8, it became final and unless it was set aside, it could not be
termed as illegal or void order; setting aside by High Court of order in
second revision would not have resulted in restoration of any illegal order G
-Appeal against order under Section 10(3) was rightly held to be not
maintainable-Order in second revision was not sustainable as it did not
consider length of delay, earlier appeal as well as first revision, and prejudiced
the Corporation since it was passed without notice to them; these
277 H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A c irc11111stances could not be ignored merely on ground that order under
Section 8 was unlawful-The Corporation was an 'affected' party as
\' -
· possession of land was given to them on payment of price and they were
proceeding ll'ith construction thereon-Res integra found inapplicable-
Matter remitted to Revisional Authority for fresh decision after hearing the
parties, including the Corporation.
B
Sections 34-Revisional powers.

Nature of-Held-Remedy of revision was alternative to appeal under
Section 33 and not additional or supplementwy. -+
c Exercise of-Held-Though it could be exercised suo motto by State
Government, that did not mean that a party cannot invoke such jurisdiction-
Revision could be flied by a party inviting attention to illegality or impropriety
of any order passed under the Act.

limitation for exercise of-Held-Though the Act did not fix period of
D limitation, concept of 'reasonable time' was applicable and power. must be
exercised within that period-What could be length of reasonable time would
dependent on facts and circumstances of each case, and no rule of universal
application could be laid down.

Respondents were owners of certain lands and had filed a statement
E
under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. The
Competent Authority prepared draft statement under Section 8(1) and sought
it to be served to them in accordance with Section 8(3). Thereafter, it passed
an order under Section 8(4) observing that as the aforesaid notice properly
addressed was received back undelivered, it was treated as served and finalized
F without any change. Accordingly, a final order as required by Section 9 came
to be passed. A notification under Section 10(1) was issued intimating the
persons having interest in the land to prefer their claims to the Competent
Authority within the time period specified therein. Thereafter, the Competent
Authority issued notification under Section 10(3) declaring excess land to be
acquired by the State free from all encumbrances and offered it to the
G
appellant-Corporation for an occupancy price. Accordingly, it issued notice
under Section 10(5) directing the respondent land-owners to handover
possession.
f •
The order declaring the land as excess land as also issuance of final
H statement remained unchallenged. However, respondent-land owners preferred
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. r. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 279
an appeal under Section 33 against notifications under Section 10(3) and A
-.J 10(5). The Appellate Authority summarily dismissed it as non-maintainable
as against the notification under Section 10(5). Thereafter, the appellant-
Corporation paid the occupancy price and possession of the land was handed
over to them by the respondent-Government.

Nothing was done by the respondent-land owners for more than a decade B
after the above order in appeal. Thereafter one of them preferred a revision
to the-revisional authority under Section 34, but it was disposed of as non-
maintainable. More than three years thereafter another of respondent-land
owners applied for revision of orders passed earlier. This petition was allowed
by the Rcvisional Authority with direction to give sufficient opportunity of C
hearing to land owners.

Aggrieved by the above order of revisional authority, appellant filed a
writ petition before High Court. The High Court, while dismissing the petition
held that (i) as the appellant had no right over the land, they were not an
'affected' party but merely beneficiary of allotment by the State which could D
only be done had there been a valid vesting in the State and they were not
entitled to be afforded any hearing by the Revisional Authority (ii) since no
notic, was served upon the respondent land-owners before declaring their land
to be excess and vacant under the Act, that order was violative of natural
justice, there was no valid vesting of property in the State and allowing the E
petition of appellant would result in revival of an illegal order. Hence the
present appeal.

Appellant contended that (i) though the respondent-land owners were
aware that land declared as excess was granted to them and had also filed a
suit where they obtained 'status quo' order, they were neither joined as F
opponent party nor the Revisional Authority issued notice to them (ii) the Act
.., does not confer right to file revision upon a person aggrieved and the State
alone was empowered to exercise revisional power.

Respondent land-owners contended that (i) appeal as also revision filed
earlier, were dismissed on the ground of maintainability, and not on merits, G
second revision was not hit by res judicata (ii) as no period for revision is
provided in the Act, that power could be exercised at any time.

Respondent-State Government contended that it was its duty to do justice,
act fairly and reasonably to the parties and when the record revealed that order H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A under Section 8 was passed without the requisite notice having been served
on the respondent land-owners, the order of the Competent Authority was
rightly set aside by the Revisional Authority

Allowing the appeal, the Court

B HELD I. I. The order passed under Section 8 of the Act was never
challenged by the land owners in the appeal. An appeal which was filed by the
land owners in 1979 was an appeal against an order passed under Section. ,.
10(3) of the Act. The Appellate Authority, therefore, rightly held such appeal
to be not maintainable. If the land owners were aggrieved by the order passed
under Section 8 of the Act, either they should have challenged the order before
C the Appellate Authority or before the Revisional Authority. The Land owners
did neither. The order, therefore, became final. [Para 21) (290-F-G)

1.2. The High Court has ignored an important fact that setting aside of
order by the Revisional Authority would not have resulted in restoring illegal
D order inasmuch as the original ord~r passed under Section 8 of the Act was
not challenged by the land-owners in an appeal filed in 1979. The order passed
by the Competent Authority, therefore, cannot be held void, still-born or
purported order. On the contrary, in the said order, it was stated that the notice
was properly sent at the address supplied by the declarant and the owner would
have to be treated as served. In the appeal also, it was never contended by the
E land-owners that they were not served and on that ground the order was bad.
Hence, unless the said order was set aside, it could not be termed as illegal
or void order. [Para 35) (295-E-G)

Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR
(1966) SC 828, Maharaj a Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar
F & Ors., [1999[ 8 sec 16 held inapplicable.

State of Punjab & Ors .. v. Gurdev Singh, (1991] 4 SCC 1, relied on

Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, [1956) l All ER 855, referred
to
G
2. The order of the Revisional Authority is conspicuously silent as to
filing of appeal as well as first revision by the land-owners. Therefore, the
order passed by the Revisional Authority deserves to be set aside. [Para 21]
(291-CJ

H 3.l Second revision was filed without arraying appellant-Corporation
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 28 J
_j as party respondent. It is indeed surprising as to how the Revisional Authority A
did not think it proper to issue notice and to afford hearing to Corporation,
though the record clearly revealed development from 1979 and allotment of
land to Corporation and payment of price by it. [Para 211 [291-BJ

3.2. The State has to act fairly. But the State or a public authority must
be fair not to one party but to all the parties to the litigation. The State B
Government was expected to issue a notice and afford hearing to the
Corporation when second revision petition was filed by the land-owners. The
t Government was aware of all the above facts which were on record. It was
also alive of the fact that a Civil Suit was filed before more than ten years in
1979 and status quo order was obtained by the land-owners. [Para 451 C
[298-A, B-C]

3.3. The High Court was wholly wrong in holding that Corporation was
not 'affected' party. When the land was assigned to Corporation and
Corporation made the payment of price, by no stretch of imagination, it can
be said that the Corporation was not 'affected' party. From the record, it was D
clear that possession was handed over by the State and was taken over by the
Corporation. The Corporation was proceeding to put up construction on the
land which compelled the land-owners to institute a suit and to obtain order
of status quo. The High Court in the circumstances ought to have allowed the
petition by setting aside the order of the Revisional Authority, by directing it
to issue notice to the Corporation, to afford hearing and to pass appropriate E
order on merits. By not doing so, the High Court has committed the same
error which had been committed by the Government and the order of the High
Court also cannot be sustained. [Para 341 [295-A, B-C]

3.4. Neither in the Memorandum of Appeal filed by the land owners in
1979, nor in the first revision nor in the second revision, which are part of F
the record, it was even alleged by the land-owners that they were not served
with the notice under Section 8 of the Act and they had no opportunity to put
forward their case and the order was, therefore, liable to be set aside. Had
such contention been taken by the land-owners and had the appellant-
Corporation been joined as party respondent before the Revisional Authority G
in the second revision, it could have pointed out that the land-owners were
), aware of the proceedings and because of such knowledge, they had not raised
such contention. Ultimately, in such matters, the Court would apply 'prejudice
· test'. If the circumstances had proved that the land-owners were in know of
proceedings, it is possible that the Revisional Authority might have refrained
from exercising discretionary jurisdiction. Moreover, the appellant- H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A Corporation could have contended that there was gross, unreasonable and v _
unexplained delay on the part of the land-owners and it was not a fit case to
exercise revisional power after such period. !Para 4611298-G, H; 299-A, B, CJ

4. The Revisional Authority was bound to apply its mind to the effect of
vesting of land 'free from all encumbrances' in the State and grant of land by
B the State in favour of appellant-Corporation. It was only after the land vested
in the State that it was disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. jPara 3311294-GI
t
5.1 It is no doubt true that the statute does not fix period oflimitation
C with in which revision al power should be exercised under Section 34 of the
Act. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has not fixed period of limitation as it
had empowered the State Government to exercise revisional power suo motu.
However, only in such cases i.e. where the period of limitation is not prescribed
that the concept of 'reasonable time' can be invoked and power must be
exercised within such period. !Para 271
D
State ofGujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors., 1196912 SCC 187, relied
on.

5.2. What is the length of the reasonable time would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can
E be laid down. !Para 3011292-E-FJ

Shailesh Jadavji Varia v. Sub-Registrar, Vadodara & Ors., (1996) 3 Guj
LR 783 (FB) approved

5.3. Merely on the ground that the order passed in 1977 was unlawful
F was not sufficient to ignore length of delay and other attenuating
drcumstances. [Para 421 [297-D]

6. It is true that Section 34 enables the State Government to exercise
revisional powers suo motu. That, however, does not mean that a party cannot
invoke such jurisdiction. A revision can also be filed by party aggrieved and
G it can invite the attention of the Revisional Authority as to illegality or
impropriety of any order passed under the Act. The revision filed by the land-
;f
owners, therefore, could not be held to be not maintainable. [Para 241

7. Revision is not an additional remedy over and above remedy of appeal
under Section 33 of the Act. Section 34 of the Act authorizes the State
H
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [THAKKER. J J 283

l - ·-y Government to exercise revisional jurisdiction in those cases in which "no
appeal has been preferred". Thus, the remedy of revision is alternative to
appeal and not additional or supplementary. !Para 2511292-BI
A

8. The doctrine of res judicata has nu application. That does not, however,
mean that Revisional Authority would not consider the extent of delay,
grounds/reasons for not approaching Revisional Authority and intervening B
circumstances. It is only thereafter on satisfaction of the Government that it
could consider the merits of the matter and pass an appropriate order in
+ accordance with law. IPara 43) 1297-E-FI

9. The matter is now remitted to the Revisional Authority for taking
fresh decision in accordance with law after hearing the parties, including c
the Corporation. It is open to all the parties to raise all contentions available
to them. It goes without saying that all proceedings taken in pursuance of the
order passed in revision are of no consequence and no effect can be given to
them. (Para 471 (299-D)
D
f'VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. I 084 of2006.

From the Judgment and Final Orcler dated 8.7.2004 of the High Court of
Judicature At Bombay in Writ Petition No. 643/1996.

Mukul Rohtagi, Dhruv Mehta, J.S. Wad, Ashish Wad, Neeraj Kumar,
E
Chirag Dave (for J.S. Wad & Co.) for the Appellant.

Shekhar Naphade, S.S. Shinde, V.N. Raghupathy for Ravinder K. Adsure,
Manoj Swamp, Uday Gupta, Atulesh, Amerendra Kumar Mehta and Chandan
Ramamurthy for the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C.K. THAKKER, J. I. This appeal. is filed by the Pune Municipal
Corporation ('Corporation' for short) against the judgment and order dated
July 8, 2004 passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Writ Petition No. 643of1996. By the said order, the High Court G
confinned the order passed by the State of Maharashtra on June 21, 1995 in
), purported exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Urban
Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
holding that no sufficient opportunity had been given to the land-owners
before declaring their land to be excess and vacant land under the Act.
H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A 2. The case has a checkered history and to appreciate rival contentions .....
raised by the parties in their proper perspective, it would be appropriate to
bear in mind the facts.

3. Pranlal Zaverchand Doshi (since deceased) who has been represented
through his heirs and legal representatives and Chandravadan Pranlal Doshi
B were owners of certain lands situate at village Mouje Parvati, Taluka Haveli,
District Pune in the State of Maharashtra. On February 17, 1976, the Act came
into force in the State of Maharashtra. The owners of the land filed a statement
under sub-section (I) of Section 6 of the Act in the prescribed form on
August 14, 1976. The Competent Authority, Pune Urban Agglomeration
+
-
c prepared draft statement under sub-section ( 1) of Section 8 of the Act. The
draft statement was sought to be served in accordance with the provisions
of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act. An order was passed by the
Competent Authority on April 20, 1977 under sub-section (4) of Section 8 of ...
the Act observing therein that a notice under Section 8(3) of the Act was
issued and sent to the declarant by Registered A.O. but it was received back
D 'undelivered'. It was also observed that the notice was properly sent at the
address given by the declarant and hence the owner was treated as 'served'.
Since the declarant had not raised any objection nor he remained present on
~~
the date fixed for enquiry, the notice was finalized without any change. A
direction was issued to pass final order as required by Section 9 of the Act.
E 4. Pursuant to the above direction, final order came to be passed on
April 25, 1977. After the final statement, a notification under sub-section (I)
of Section 10 of the Act was issued on April 28, 1977 intimating the persons
having interest in the land to prefer their claims to the Competent Authority
either personally or through an agent within a period of 30 days from the date
F of publication of notification in the Official Gazette. The said notification was
published in the Maharashtra Gazette on May 12, 1977. The case was fixed
for hearing on June 23, 1977. On June 16, 1978, the Competent Authority "'
issued notification under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act declaring
excess land to be acquired by the State. It was notified for the information
of general public that the land specified in the Schedule appended thereto
G would be deemed to have been acquired by the Government of Maharashtra
with effect from July 31, 1978 and would be deemed to have been vested in
the Government of Maharashtra free from all encumbrances from that date. -~

The said notification was published in the Official Gazette on August 24, 1978.

5. Since the land stood vested in the State of Maharashtra free from all
H
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (THAKKER,J] 285

encumbrances, the appellant-Corporation made an application in August, A
-t 1978 for purchase of land declared to be excess land under the Act and stood
vested in the State. The Competent Authority vide its letter dated January 8,
1979 offered the land to the appellant-Corporation for occupancy price of
Rs.1,45,000/- for Development Plan Reservation, Pune Municipal Corporation.
In the said communication, it was stated that the terms and conditions subject B
to which the land was offered, were enclosed in the form of Agreement. If
those terms and conditions were acceptable to the Corporation, the latter was
required to execute the Agreement with the Collector of Pune and to pay
~ occupancy price by challan.

6. On January 9, 1979, the Competent Authority also issued notice C
under sub-section (5) of Section I0 of the Act directing the land-owners to
handover possession of land within 30 days. It was stated in the said notice
that the notification under sub-section (3) of Section I 0 of the Act was
published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on August 24, 1978 and
the land specified in the Schedule had absolutely vested in the Government
of Maharashtra. It was further stated that since the owners were in possession D
of the land, they were required to surrender and deliver possession thereof

.. within 30 days to the Tehsildar, Pune City who was duly authorized by the
State Government to take it. It was also stated that in the event of their failure
or refusal to surrender the possession by the owners, appropriate steps
would be taken to take possession of the land by use of force. E
7. It appears that original owners of the land preferred an appeal under
Section 33 of the Act in the Court of Collector and Appellate Authority under
the Act at Pune on February 20, 1979. The said appeal was against an order
passed under sub-section (3) of Section IO of the Act. It may be stated that
so far as the order declaring the land as excess land under the Act as also F
issuance of final statement are concerned, no challenge was made to them.
?1 In the Memorandum of Appeal, it was stated that the enquiry under sub-
section (2) of Section I 0 was pending. It was also stated that the property
was not being utilized by the Pune Municipal Corporation for public purpose
because of shortage of funds. The appellants-owners intended to make use
of the land for public purpose such as hostel, cinema house, petrol pump, G
mangal karyalaya, lodge, hospital, godown etc. They had submitted layout
> plans to the Government of Maharashtra for construction and the matter was
under active consideration of the Government. It was further stated that even
though the order under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act was passed
on January 9, 1979, it was received by the appellants somewhere on 21st H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A January, 1979. The appeal was, therefore, within time, but even if there was
some delay, it might be condoned. A prayer was, therefore, made to set aside .r
the order dated January 9, 1979 passed under sub-section (5) of Section JO
of the Act.

8. It has come on record that the appellant-Corporation had paid the
B occupancy price of Rs.1,45,000/- for the land admeasuring 37,517 sq. meters
from Survey No. 33A/I, 32/A and 34/A/2+ 1 (part). It is also on record that
on February 22, 1979, possession of the land was handed over by the State
Government through Ti/athi Parvati to the appellant-Corporation. The
possession receipt has been duly signed in token of 'possession given' and
C 'possession taken' by the parties.

9. An order was passed on August 23, 1979 by the Appellate Authority
on the appeal filed by the land-owners under Section 33 of the Act. It was
stated that the appeal was against the notification under Section I 0(5) of the
Act, but such appeal was not maintainable. The Appellate Authority, therefore,
D summarily dismissed the appeal by inter alia observing as under:
"On perusal of the notification u/s. 10(5) of the Act produced by the
appellants it is observed that final notification u/s. 10(3) of the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has been published on
24.8.1978 and 26.10.1978 respectively from when the surplus land is
E deemed to have been acquired and vested in State Government free
from any encumbrances. Besides there is no remedy of appeal after
final notification u/s. 10(3) of the Act has been published. Considering
all these facts the present appeal is not tenable".

I0. It is pertinent to note that nothing was done by the owners of the
F land for more than a decade after the above order in appeal was passed in
August, 1979. On May 21, 1990, one Shaikh Issaqua Saikh Gafoor, Power of
Attorney of P.Z. Doshi, one of the owners of the land, preferred an appeal
to the Government under Section 34 of the Act. It was stated therein that the
land was jointly owned by P.Z. Doshi and G.P. Doshi and it consisted of 'a
G built-up bungalow of about 500 sq. meters'. The bungalow was existing on
the land since long i.e. when the land was purchased. It was further stated
that since the land attracted the provisions of the Act, the owners had filed
return (~tatement) under Section 6(1) of the Act. The Competent Authority,
Pune Urban Agglomeration, while deciding the case, should have accorded
two units i.e. 1,000 sq. meters each to P.Z. Doshi and C.P. Doshi to make total
H of2,000 sq. meters. The authority, however, had granted only one unit of 1,000
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. "· STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [THAKKER, J.] 287
sq. meters. A copy of the order under sub-section (4) of Section 8 was also A
enclosed by the appellants for ready reference. A grievance was also made
that the Competent Authority had not considered the build-up property of
bungalow required to be excluded from the total holding together with the
land appurtenant and additional land appurtenant. Thus, gross injustice had
been done to the owners. A prayer was, therefore, made to the Government
to redress the grievance and to award 2 units and to exclude built-up property B
of bungalow. The Revisional Authority disposed of the Revision on August
7, 1991 observing that there was no provision under Section 34 of the Act
to consider the application of the applicants and the application could not be
_ . . , considered.

..... -. , 11. Even after the disposal of the above application in 1991, nothing was C
done by the land-owners for quite some time. After more than three years on
September 21, 1994, through another Power of Attorney (Mr. Ashok Milapchand
Jain), C.P. Doshi and his wife Mrs. Rajnana P. Doshi requested the Minister
for Housing & Special Assistance Department to revise the orders passed
earlier. In the said application, it was said that the Additional Collector and D
Competent Authority, Pune Urban Agglomeration was pleased to decide the
case of applicants on February 20, 1979 declaring the applicants to be surplus
holders Jf land. (It may be stated that the order declaring surplus land was
·passed )Y the Competent Authority in April, 1977) It was stated that the
Compe1ent,d<\.uthority had decided the case 'without considering all the E
necess~ cy facts'. Then, a grievance was made with regard to units as also
exclusion of the land of built up area. It was stated that an ·appeal was filed
but it was rejected on the ground that remedy of appeal was not available
after the final notification under Section l 0(3) of the Act. It was also stated
that the land was proposed to be allotted to Pune Municipal Corporation but
applicants had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1913 of 1979 against the State F
Government and Pune Municipal Corporation and the learned Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Pune had granted status quo thereby restraining Pune
Municipal Corporation from taking possession of land or developing it. It was
asserted that the applicants had submitted a scheme under Section 20 of the
Act to the Competent Authority which was pending. The applicants were G
ready to construct a maternity home and hospital and for that purpose plans
were submitted. A prayer was, therefore, made to decide the matter on merits
and to issue direction to Additional Collector and Competent Authority to
scrutinize and sanction the scheme under Section 20 of the Act.

12. The Revisional Authority observed that it was proved that the H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S. C.R.

A applicant had not been given sufficient opportunity for showing the ownership ·
documents to the Competent Authority and Prima facie, the order of the
Competent Authority dated April 28, 1977 was 'wrong'. In exercise of power
under Section 34 of the Act, therefore, the said order was set aside and the
case was remitted for reconsideration to Additional Collector and Competent
B Authority, Pune. It was directed that the applicant should be given sufficient
opportunity by Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Pune before
deciding the matter.

13. It may be stated that neither the owners joined the appellant-Pune
Municipal Corporation as party respondent, nor notice was issued, nor _.4
C opportunity of hearing was afforded to the Corporation by the Revisional / ..,.
Authority though it was stated in the Revision itself that the land was allottc.a
to the Corporation and the Corporation was proceeding with construct'!on
thereon.

14. In view of the fact that the revision was allowed and th.e order
D passed by the Competent Authority was set aside without making the
Corporation a party and without affording opportunity of being h.eard, the
Corporation filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay. The petition
came up for hearing before the Division Bench and the Division, Bench
passed the impugned order holding that since no notice was served u1,on the
owners, the order passed by the Competent Authority was bad in l~ and
E was rightly set aside in revision. Regarding right of the Corporatiln, the
Division Bench was of the view that hearing could be afforded only to the
'affected' parties. According to the High Court, the Corporation could not be
treated as an 'affected' party as it was 'mere beneficiary of allotment by the
State of Maharashtra' which could only be done had there been a valid
F vesting in the State of Maharashtra. Since the order was passed by the
Competent Authority without hearing the owners, it was violative of natural
justice. In the circumstances, the Corporation had no right over the land and
it was not necessary to hear the Corporation. The High Court also held that
since the proceedings were initiated without serving notice to the land-
owners, there was no valid vesting of property in the State. Allowing the
G petition filed by the Corporation would, therefore, result in revival of an illegal
order. No Court of law would make an order which would restore illegal or
ultra vires order. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the petition and
directed tne Appellate Authority to decide the matter pending under Sections
8 and 9 of the Act within a period of three months from the date of judgment
H of the High Court. It is this order which is challenged in the present appeal.
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. 1·. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [THAKKER, J.] 289
-..,
15. Notice was issued by this Court on November 5, 2004 and stay A
against further proceedings was granted. The matter was thereafter heard
from time to time. Finally, on February 6, 2006, leave was granted and stay
continued. The matter has now been placed for final hearing.

16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
B
17. Learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation contended that the
Revisional Authority had committed grave error of law in entertaining revision
~-
> and in setting aside the order passed by the Competent Authority under the
Act. It was submitted that the order was passed by the Competent Authority
as early as in 1977 and several consequential actions had been taken thereafter.
Notifications under Section 10 were issued and the land stood vested 'free
c
.from all encumbrances' in the State Government. Pursuant to the demand
made by the appellant-Corporation, a part of land was granted to the
Corporation. An appeal filed by the owners under Section 33 was dismissed
in August, 1979. The said order was never challenged by the owners by
approaching the High Court. Revisional jurisdiction was invoked thereafter in D
1990 i.e. after more than ten years of disposal of the appeal. (Though it was
described as an appeal under Section 34 of the Act) Even that petition was
dismissed. Surprisingly after more than three years, second revision petition
was filed which was allowed by the Revisional Authority and the order of the
Competent Authority was set aside. The counsel also submitted that though
the land declared to be excess under the Act and vested in the Government E
was granted to appellant-Corporation and the owners were aware of the fact
and had also filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune
in 1979 and had obtained 'status quo' order, they did not think it proper to
join Corporation as party opponent, nor the Revisional Authority thought it
appropriate to issue notice and to afford hearing to the Corporation. The F
order passed by the Revisional Authority, therefore, was violative of principles
of natural justice and fair play. The Corporation, therefore, approached the
High Court. Unfortunately, however, the High Court committed the same
mistake and went on to observe that Corporation was not 'affected' party. The
order passed by the Revisional Authority and confirmed by the High Court,
therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. G
-
/,
18. The learned counsel for the land-owners supported the order passed
by the Government and confirmed by the High Court. He submitted that from
the record, it was clear that notice under Section 8 of the Act was never
served upon the owners. Declaration of surplus land was, therefore, violative
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A of principles of natural justice. Such an order cannot be said to be an order
in the eye of law and it was rightly set aside by the Government. Regarding
appeal as also revision filed earlier, it was submitted that they were dismissed
on the ground of 'maintainability' and not on merits. In the circumstances,
second revision was rightly allowed setting aside the order passed by the
B Competent Authority. The High Court correctly observed that since the initial
order passed by the Competent Authority was in contravention of principles
of natural justice, allowing the petition of the Corporation would result in
revival of an order which was illegal and unlawful. It, therefore, cannot be said
that the High Court committed an error. The present appeals, hence, deserve ·-
to be dismissed.
c 19. On behalf of the State Government, the learned counsel submitted
that it was the duty of the State to do justice to the parties and when the
record revealed that notice had never been served upon the owners of the
land, the order of the Competent Authority was rightly set aside by the
Revisional Authority and the action does not require interference.
D
20. Having given anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances
of the case in the light of statutory provisions, in our opinion, the appeal
deserves to be allowed.

21. It is not in dispute by and between the parties that the land-owners
E filed a statement under sub-section (I) of Section 6 of the Act in August,
1976. Final order was passed declaring certain land to be .excess land under·
the Act in 1977. Notification under Section 10(3) was issued and the land
stood vested in the State 'free from all encumbrances'. A notice was issued
to the land owners to handover possession of the excess land and the
F possession was taken over by the authorities. Pune Municipal Corporation
applied for land and the State Government asked the Corporation to pay
occupancy price of Rs. l ,45,000/- which was paid by the Corporation in
February, 1979. So far as the order passed under Section 8 of the Act is
concerned, it was never challenged by the land owners in the appeal. An
appeal which was filed by the land owners in 1979 was an appeal against an
G order passed under Section 10(3) of the Act. The Appellate Authority, therefore,
rightly held such appeal to be not maintainable. If the land owners were
aggrieved by the order passed under Section 8 of the Act, either they should
have challenged the order before the Appellate Authority or before the
Revisional Authority. The Land owners did neither. The order, therefore,
H became final. More than a decade had passed thereafter. In 1990, land owners,
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [THAKKER, J.] 291

through one Power of Attorney (Shaikh lssaqua Shaikh Gafoor) approached A
Revisional Authority under Section 34 of the Act by filing an appeal (revision)
which was dismissed on the ground of maintainability. Again, the said order
had not been challenged. After more than three years, through another Power
of Attorney, (Ashok Milapchand Jain) second revision was filed without
arraying appellant-Corporation as party respondent. It is indeed surprising as
to how the Revisional Authority did n6t think it proper to issue notice and B
to afford hearing to Corporation, though the record clearly revealed
development from 1979 and allotment of land to Corporation and payment of
price by it. Moreover, the order of the Revisional Authority is conspicuously
silent as to filing of appeal as well as first revision by the land-owners. In our
opinion, therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation is right C
in submitting that the order passed by the Revisional Authority deserves to
be set aside.

22. Section 34 of the Act confers on Government revisional jurisdiction.
It reads thas;
D
34. Revision by State Government.-The State Government may, on its
own motion, call for and examine the records of any order passed or
proceeding taken under the provisions of this Act. and against which
no appeal has been preferred under Sec. 12 or Sec. 30 or Sec. 33 for
the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such
order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order E
with respect thereto as it may think fit;

Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the
person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.

23. The learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation submitted that F
the Act does not confer right to file revision upon a person aggrieved. The
State alone is empowered to exercise revisional power. The counsel submitted
that such power can be exercised by the State Government on its own motion
(suo motu) calling for and examining the records of any order passed under
the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself of the -legality and propriety of G
such order. It is, therefore, implicit that a party cannot invoke revisional
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.

24. We are, however, unable to uphold the said contention. It is true that
Section 34 enables the State Government to exercise revisional powers suo
motu. That, however, does not mean that a party cannot invoke .such H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A jurisdiction. A revision can also be filed by party aggrieved and it can invite
the attention of the Revisional Authority as to illegality or impropriety of any '-
order passed under the Act. The revision filed by the land-owners, therefore,
could not be held to be not maintainable.

25. But reading of the above provision makes it clear that revision is not
B an additional remedy over and above remedy of appeal under Section 33 of
the Act. Section 34 of the Act authorizes the State Government to exercise
revisional jurisdiction in those cases in which "no appeal has been preferred".
Thus, the remedy of revision is alternative to appeal and not additional or
supplementary.
-+ .... -
c 26. The learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation is also right in
contending that the Revisional Authority ought to have considered the fact
that such jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioner after several years. It may
be recalled that the first appeal filed by the land-owners was not against an
D order under Section 8 of the Act but against the notification under Section
10 of the Act, which was dismissed on the ground of maintainability. Likewise,
the first revision filed in the year 1990 was dismissed as not maintainable in
1991.

27. Now it is true that no period for revision is provided in the Act. It
E was, therefore, submitted on behalf of the land-owners that when the Legislature
did not think it fit to prescribe period of limitation, such power can be
exercised 'at any time' and no Court by a 'judicial fiat', usurp legislative power
and prescribe period of limitation. It is no doubt true that the statute does
not fix period oflimitation within which revisional power should be exercised
F under Section 34 of the Act. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has not fixed
period of limitation· as it had empowered the State Government to exercise
revisional power suo motu. In our judgment, however, only in such cases i.e.
where the period of limitation is not prescribed that the concept of 'reasonable
time' can be invoked and power must be exercised within such period.
G 28. In this connection, it would be profitable to refer to a leading
decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors.,
[ 1969] 2 SCC 187. In that case, an application was filed by the land-owner
under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 for converting
agricultural land to non-agricultural use. The permission was granted. The
H Municipal Committee, however, objected to such permission and the
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [fHAKKER, J.] 293

~. Commissioner, in purported exercise of revisional power under Section 211 of A
the Code,* set aside the order passed earlier. When the matter reached this
Court, it was contended by the owners, that though Section 211 did not
prescribe period of limitation, revisional powers ought to be exercised within
a reasonable time.

29. Upholding the contention and considering the scheme of Sections B
65 and 211 of the Code, this Court stated:

-,. "The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an
• order made under s. 65 at any time: It is true that there is no period
of /imitation prescribed under s. 211, but it seems to us plain that
this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of c
the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and
the nature of the order which is being revised.

It seems to us that s. 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable
time within which the Commissioner must act under s. 211. Under s.
65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his D
decision on the application within a period of three months the
permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This
section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for
the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature
thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed
E
to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems
to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers
within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable
time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes
the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations
at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this F
case the Commissioner set aside the order of the 'Collector on October
12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that
this order was passed too late". (emphasis supplied)

30. The law laid down in Patel Raghav Natha has been reiterated by this
G
*The relevant part of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. 1879 reads thus;

}. "211 The State Government an any revenue officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or
Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Survcr, in their respective departments. may
call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate
revenue officer, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself. as the case may be. as
to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed. and as to the regularity of
the proceedings of such officer." H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A Court in several cases. We do not intend to burden our judgment with all
those cases. We may only state that broad contention of the land owners that
when no period of limitation is prescribed, revisional jurisdiction can be
exercised at any time cannot but be rejected. If the law prescribes period of
limitation, the action must be taken within such period. But where the law
B does not prescribe limitation, the Court would import the concept of'reasonable
time'. We may, however, hasten to add that what is the length of the reasonable
time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule
of universal application can be laid down. [See also Shai/esh Jadavji Varia
v. Sub-Registrar, Vadodara & Ors., (1996) 3 Guj LR 783 (FB)].

c Revisional
31. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the
Authority was duty bound to take into account the length of
deley, intervening circumstances and subsequent events from 1977 to 1995
and to consider whether the powers should have been exercised or not. Since
no such exercise has been undertaken, the order suffers from legal infirmity
and must be quashed. '·
D
32. We have also gone through the.grievance of the land-owners when
they had filed an appeal in 1979 against an order under Section I 0(3) of the
Act as also appeal (Revision) in 1990 (first revision). There was no whisper
about non-service of notice and non-observance of principles of natural
justice. Reading of Memorandum of Appeal, grounds and prayers makes it
E clear that contentions were raised as to legality of decision on merits. It was
urged, inter alia, that certain land was sold prior to the commencement of the
Act which could not have been taken into account for the purpose of declaring
the land to be surplus; that constructed portion and built up area (bungalow)
ought to have been excluded and that two units ought to have been granted.
F Even in the second revision filed in 1994, there is nothing about non service
of notice or absence of hearing by the Competent Authority. The Revisional
Authority, in our view, ought to have considered that aspect as well.

33. Again, the Revisional Authority was bound to apply its mind to the
effect of vesting of land 'free from all encumbrances' in the State and grant
G of land by the State in favour of appellant-Corporation. It was only after the
land vested in the State that it was disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. After the notification under Section 10(3) was issued,
a prayer was made by the Corporation to allot the land. The prayer was
granted and .payment of Rs.1,45,000/- was made by the Corporation and it
H started construction. They were indeed relevant and material facts and
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STATE OF MAHARASIITRA [THAKKER, J.] 295
~ circumstances, The Revisional Authority, however, has not even referred to A·
those facts and circumstances, The impugned order thus suffers from serious
infirmity.

34. To us, the High Court was wholly wrong in holding that Corporation
was not 'affected' party. When the land was assigned to Corporation and
Corporation made the payment of price, by no stretch of imagination, it can B
be said that the Corporation was not 'affected' party. From the record, it was
clear that possession was handed over by the State and was taken over by
the Corporation, The Corporation was proceeding to put up construction on
the land which compelled the land-owners to institute a suit and to obtain
order of status quo. The High Court in the circumstances, ought to have C
allowed the petition by setting aside the order of the Revisional Authority,
by directing it to issue notice to the Corporation, to afford hearing and to
pass appropriate order on merits. By not doing so, the High Court has
committed the same error which had been committed by the Government and
the order of the High Court also cannot be sustained.
D
35. The High Court was also wrong in referring to and relying upon
Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR
(1966) SC 828 and also Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State
of Bihar & Ors., [ 1999] 8 SCC 16 for the proposition that allowing a petition
of the Corporation would result in reviving and restoring of illegal order. In
our view, the High Court has ignored an important fact that setting aside of E
order by the Revisional Authority would not have resulted in restoring illegal
order inasmuch as the original order passed under Section 8 of the Act was
not challenged by the land-owners in an appeal filed in 1979. The order
passed by the Competent Authority, therefore, cannot be held void, still-born
or purported order, On the contrary, in the said order, it was stated that the F
notice was properly sent at the address supplied by the declarant and the
owner would have to be treated as served. In the appeal also, it was never
contended by the land-owners that they were not served and on that ground
the order was bad. Hence, unless the said order was set aside, it could not
be termed as illegal or void order.
G
36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored altogether unless a
finding is recorded that it was illegal, void Qr not in consonance with law. As
Prof. Wade states; "The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand
\
of invalidity' is plainly visible; for there also the order can effectively be
resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court".
H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A 37. He further states: ~

"The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order
only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right
proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a
nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiffs
B lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy,
because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In
any such case the 'void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid.
It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for ~ ...__

another, and that it may be void against one person but valid against
another".
c
38. In Smilh v. East Elloe Rural Dislrict Council, (1956) AC 736 at 769
: [1956) 1 All ER 855, Lord Redeliffe had an occasion to consider a similar
argument (that the order was null and void). Negativing the contention, the
Law Lord made the following off-quoted observations:
D "(T)his argument is in reality a play on the meaning of the word
'nullity'. An order even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable
of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its
forehead. Unless !he necessary proceedings are taken at law to
establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise
E upset, it will remain as effeclive for its os/ensible purpose as the most
impeccable of orders". (emphasis supplied)

39. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in
Stale of Punjab & Ors .. v. Gurdev Singh, [1991) 4 SCC 1. In Gurdev Singh,
a suit for declaration was instituted by the plaintiff contending that the order
F dismissing him from service was ultra vires, unconstitutional, violative of
principles of natural justice and void ab initio and he continued to be in
service. Such suit, in accordance with the provisions of Article 113 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, must be filed within three years from the date of passing
of order or where departmental appeal or revision is filed from the date of
dismissal of such appeal/revision. The suit was, however, filed beyond the
G per_iod of three years. The High Court held that since the order was void, the
provisions of Limitation Act would not apply to such order. The aggrieved -;',

State approached this Court.

40. Setting aside the decree passed by all the Courts and referring to
H several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA lTHAKKER_ J] 297

order intends to approach the Court for declaration that the order against him A
~ was inoperative, he must come before the Court within the period prescribed -
by limitation_ "If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give
the declaration sought for"_

41. The Court then stated;
B
"If an Act is void or ultra vires it is enough for the Court to
declare it so and it collapses automatically. It need not be set aside.
The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and
not binding upon him. A declaration merely declares the existing state
of affairs and does not 'quash' so as to produce a new state of
affairs". c
42. In the present case, no period of limitation is prescribed for preferring
Revision under Section 34 of the Act. The principle laid down in Patel Raghav
Natha, hence, applies. If, therefore, the Revisional Authority was inclined to
exercise jurisdiction, it ought to have been satisfied that such power was D
invoked by the petitioner within reasonable time. Merely on the ground that
the order passed in 1977 was unlawful was not sufficient to ignore length of
delay and other attenuating circumstances

43. It was also contended that the order passed by the Appellate
Authority dismissing appeal as 'not maintainable' and order passed in first E
revision refusing relief on the same ground i.e. non-maintainability ofrevision
would not operate as res judicata. In this connection, our attention has been
invited by the counsel for the land-owners to several decisions of this Court_
It is not necessary to refer to those decisions since in our opinion, the
respondents are right that the doctrine of res judicata has no application_
That does not, however, mean that Revisional Authority would not consider F
the extent of delay, grounds/reasons for not approaching Revisional Authority
and intervening circumstances_ It is only thereafter on satisfaction of the
Government that it could consider the merits of the matter and pass an
appropriate order in accordance with law.

44. The learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra strongly urged
G
that the State authorities must act fairly and reasonably. When it found that
an order was passed under Section 8 of the Act but the requisite notice was
not served upon the land-owners, it must fairly state that the order was illegal
and an opportunity should be given to the land-owners as to why appropriate
order should not be passed under the Act after hearing them. H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A 45. There can be no two opinions about it. The State has to act fairly.
But the State or a public authority must be fair not to one party but to all ~
the parties to the litigation. In the present case, an order was passed by the
Competent Authority in 1977, and in 1979, the land vested in the State,
possession was taken over from land-owners, application was made by the
B Pune Municipal Corporation, land was allotted to it, an amount of Rs.1,45,000/
- was paid by the Corporation, possession was handed over to the Corporation
and Corporation was undertaking construction activities. An appeal by the
land-owners was dismissed in 1979 and revision, which was filed after more
than ten years met with the same fate. The State Government was, therefore,
expected to issue a notice and afford hearing to the Corporation when second
C revision petition was filed by the land-owners. The Government was aware
of all the above facts which were on record. It was also alive of the fact that
a Civil Suit was filed before more than ten years in 1979 and status quo order
was obtained by the land-owners. Therefore, when it was submitted that the
State ought to have acted fairly towards land owners, it ought to have acted
fairly towards Municipal Corporation also. But Pune Municipal Corporation
D was never issued any notice, nor given opportunity for hearing. Even when
the Corporation challenged the order passed by the Revisional Authority in
a writ petition in the High Court, it was not conceded by the State that the
order in revision was liable to be set aside as it was not made by the
Revisional Authority in observance of principles of natural justice and the
E matter must be sent back to the Government to decide it afresh after extending
opportunity of hearing to all the parties. The matter did not end there. Even
in this Court, the State counsel submitted that the Revisional Authority
rightly set aside the order passed against the land-owners as they could not
be served before the impugned order was passed under Section 8 of the Act.
The State counsel also supported the order passed by the High Court, but
F the counsel did not state that the same reasoning would apply to an order
passed by the Revisional Authority and by the High Court without hearing
Pune Municipal Corporation. The State has its own concept of'fairness'. We,
however, express our inability to put seal of approval on the stand taken by
. the State and on its concept of 'fairness'.
G 46. It may be recalled that neither in the Memorandum of Appeal filed
by the land owners in 1979, nor in the first revision nor in the second revision,
which are part of the record, it was even alleged by the land-owners that they
were not served with the notice under Section 8 of the Act and they had no
opportunity to put forward their case and the order was, therefore, liable to
H be set aside. In fact, no appeal was filed against an order passed under
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPRN. r. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [THAKKER,J] 299
Section 8 of the Act. Be that as it may, had such contention been taken by A
the land-owners and had the appellant-Corporation been joined as party
respondent before the Revisional Authority in the second revision, it could
have pointed out that the land-owners were aware of the proceedings and
because of such knowledge, they had not raised such contention. Ultimately,
in such matters, the Court would apply 'prejudice test'. If the circumstanct:s B
had proved that the land-owners were in know of proceedings, it is possible
that the Revisional Authority might have refrained from exercising discretionary
jurisdiction. Moreover, the appellant-Corporation could have contended that

- there was gross, unreasonable and unexplained delay on the part of the land-
owners and it was not a fit case to exercise revisional power after such period.

47. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed by the
c
Revisional Authority and confirmed by the High Court is liable to be set aside
and is hereby set aside. The matter is now remitted to the Revisional Authority
for taking fresh decision in accordance with law after hearing the parties,
including the Corporation. It is open to all the parties to raise all contentions
available to them. It goes without saying that all proceedings taken in pursuance D
of the order passed in revision are of no consequence and no effect can be
given to them. We may clarify that we have not entered into correctness or
otherwise of the allegations and coimter-allegations and we may not be
understood to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. As and
' when the Revisional Authority will take up the matter for consideration, it will E
decide the same without being influenced by the observations made by the
High Court as also by us. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.

v.s. Appeal allowed.
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

f

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