R. KAPILNATH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.versusKRISHNA

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                                                                                        ......
A                    R. KAPILNATH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
                                     v.
                                 KRISHNA

                                DECEMBER 13, 2002

B                    [R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]


           Statutory Interpretation :

           Legislative changes-Impact of on pending proceedings-Held: A new
C law bringing about a change in forum does not affect pending proceedings,
     unless a provision is made in it for change over of proceedings or there is
     some other clear indication that pending. actions are affected-On facts
     amendment in the Act not bringing about change in forum with regard to
     pending actions, thus the effect of amendment cannot deprive the Court of
D    Muns if of itsjurisdiction to try eviction matter over the premises belonging to
     religious institution-Karna/aka Rent Control Act, 1961-Karnataka Rent
     Control (Amendment) Act, 1994.

           Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:

E           Sections 21 (l)(b) and 3(h)-Pujari ofa temple receiving rent in respect
     of the premises is landlord within the meaning of section 3(h)-Pujari also
     claiming to be the owner-Claim for eviction-Maintainability of-Held, though
     pujari claiming to be owner but so long as he is found to be landlord he is
     entitled to maintain action for eviction.

           Words and Phrases:
F
          'Landlord'-Meaning of in the context of Section 3(h) of Karnataka
     Rent Control Act, 1961.

           Constitution of India, 1950:

G         Article 136-0bjection as to forum competence oftrial court-Not taken
     upto High Court, not in SLP too-Cannot be allowed to be urged belatedly
     by way of additional ground in Supreme Court.

           Suit premises, a residential house were owned by a temple-a
     religious institution. It was not under the management of the State
If                                         66
                            R. KAPILNATH v. KRISHNA                           67
    Government and was let out to appellant-tenant. Appellant-tenant paid           A
    rent to respondent's father who was the pujari and manager of the temple.
    Respondent claiming to be the owner of the premises filed eviction petition
    under Section 21(1)(h) and (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
    Court of Munsif granted eviction decree under clause (p) but not under
    clause (h). Appellant filed a Revision Petition before Additional District      B
    Judge. During pendency of the proceedings the Act was amended. From
    section 2(7) which excepted one of the categories of premises from the
    application of the Act viz, 'any premises belonging to a religious or
    charitable institution under the management of the State Government',
    the words 'under the management of the State Government' were deleted.
    ADJ dismissed the Revision Petition. Even High Court upheld the eviction        C
    decree under clause (p). Hence the present appeal.

          Appellant-tenant contended that the effect of the amendment
    deprived the Court of Munsif of its jurisdiction to hear and decide
    proceedings for eviction over the premises; and that the petitioner filing
    eviction petition must claim himself to be only a landlord and not an owner     D
    and the respondent claimed himself to be the owner of the premises which
    is inconsistent with his being a mere rent collector on behalf of the temple,
    thus the claim for eviction at his instance should have been refused.

         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
                                                                                    E
          HELD: I.I. A new law bringing about a change in forum does not
    affect pending actions, unless. a provision is made in it for change over of
    proceedings or there is some other clear indication that pending actions
    are affected. (70-F(

          1.2. In the instant case, the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 did        F
    not bring about a change in forum so far as the pending actions are
    concerned. By the time the amendment came into force, the proceedings
    before the Court of Munsif had already stood concluded and the case was
    pending at the stage of revision before Additional District Judge. The
                                                                                    G
t   amendment Act of 1994 was not given retrospective operation and there
    was nothing in the Act to infer restrospectivity by necessary implication.
    Further an objection laying challenge to forum's competence was not
    raised before the Additional District Judge nor before High Court. It was
    neither taken as a ground in the special leave petition. It was taken only
    by way of a separate petition filed subsequently, seeking leave to urge
    additional grounds. Such an objection cannot be allowed to be urged so          H
                                                           1
    68                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A belatedly. (70-G; 71-AI
          Principles ofStallltory Interpretation by Jusiice G. P. Singh, 8th Edition,
    2001, p.442, referred to.

          2. A petition for recovery of possession of any premises can be filed
B   by landlord against tenant within the meaning of Section 21(1) of the Act.
    Section 3(h) includes in the meaning of 'landlord' any person who is for
    the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any
    premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf or for
    the benefit of any other person etc. It cannot be doubted nor has it been
C   disputed that the respondent is landlord within the meaning of section 3(h).
    Though the respondent claimed himself to be an .owner also so long as he
    has been found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for
    eviction under section 2l(l)(p). The plaintiff or petitioner may claim a
    higher rent and may succeed in proving only a smaller right or entitlement
    to relief but that would not result in disentitling plaintiff or petitioner from
D   succeeding so long as the smaller right successfully substantiated by hi.m
    is enough in law to entitle him to a relief against the defendant. (71-D-F(

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2474 of
    1999.

E        From the Judgment and Order dated 11.4.1996 of the Karnataka
    High Court in H.R.R.P. No. 1549 of 1995.

            Ms. Kiran Suri, for the Appellant.

         B.K. Choudhary, Santosh Kumar and Amar L.V. for E.C. Vidya
F   Sagar, for the Respondent.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          R.C. LAHOTI, J. The suit premises are a residential house comprised
G   in CTS Nos. 936 & 939 of Ward II of Hubli City. The premises are owned
    by a temple a religious institution but not under the management of the State
    Government. The adoptive father of the respondent, Late Shankarbhat, was
    pujari and manager of the temple. The appellant was inducted as a tenant in
    the suit premises by Late Shankarbhat. Shankarbhat has, through a registered
    deed of adoption, adopted the respondent as his son who is presently pujari
H   and manager of the temple. The appellant has been paying rent to tlie
                R. KAPILNATH v. KRISHNA [R.C. LAHOTI, l.]                   69
respondent. It is not in doubt, nor in dispute, that whatever be the ownership     A
of the suit premises the respondent is certainly the rent collector.

       The respondent claiming himself to be the owner of the premises filed
a suit for eviction of the tenant-appellant on the grounds available under
Clauses (h) and (p) of sub-Section (I) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent
Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter 'the Act', for short). Availability of ground       B
under clause (h) has been negated' while the Court of Munsif upheld the
entitlement of respondent to a decree under Clause (p). The appellant preferred
a revision before the first Additional District Judge, Dharwad under Section
50(2) of the Act and subsequently a revision petition to the High Court under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both have been dismissed               C
conforming the decree for eviction under Clause (p) abovesaid. The finding
arrived at by all the courts is that the tenant has built or acquired vacant
possession of a suitable building. The tenant has preferred the present appeal
by special leave.

        The principal submission of Ms. Kiran Suri, the learned counsel for        D
 the appellant, centres around an amendment made in the Act by Karnataka
 Act No.32 of 1994. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant
 that the suit premises belong to a temple which is a religious institution. The
 Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 was enacted inter alia to control evictions
of tenants. The Act has a wide application. However, sub-Section (7) of
Section 2 provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to certain premises        E
specified in the several clauses therein. One of the categories of the premises,
excepted from the application of the Act, was 'any premises belonging to a
religious or charitable institution under the management of the State
Government'. By the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act
No.32 of 1994) which came into force with effect from 18th May, 1994, the          F
words "under the management of the State Government" were deleted. The
effect of the amendment is that while earlier only the premises belonging to
a religious or charitable institution under the management of the State
Government were exempted from the operation of the Act now subsequent
to the amendment, the scope of excepted category has been enlarged so as
to cover all premises belonging to a religious or charitable institution without   G
regard to the fact whether they are under the management of the State
Government or not. The proceedings for eviction of a tenant under Section
21 of the Act are maintainable in a Court which, as defined in Clause (d) of
Section 3, is the Court of Munsif. So fur as the suit premises are concerned,
the proceedings were initiated in the year 1986 in the Court of Munsif.            H
    70                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Revision petition before Additional District Judge was filed in the year 1990
    and came to be decided on 14th September 1995. During the pendency of the
    revision, the 1994 Amendment came into force. The effect of the amendment
    is that the suit premises were taken out of the operation of the Act and
    therefore the Munsif lost jurisdiction to try a case for eviction over such
B   premises. The learned Additional District Judge ought to have taken note of
    this change in law and directed the proceedings held before the Munsifto be
    a nullity for want of jurisdiction in view of the change in law.

          The above submission ·of the learned counsel has been stated only to
  be rejected. It is pertinent to note that the proceedings in the Court of Munsif
C had already stood concluded by the time the amendment came into force. It
  is not disputed that Amendment Act No.32 of 1994 has not been given a
  retrospective operation and there is nothing in the Act to infer retrospectivity
  by necessary implication. The Act has been specifically brought into force
  w.e.f. the 18th day of May, 1994. The learned counsel for the appellant cited
  a number of decisions laying down the law as to how an amendment in
D legislation brought into force during the pendency of legal proceedings has
  to be given effect to. Without stating the decisions so cited, suffice it to
  observe that all those decisions deal with substantive rights having been
  created or abolished during the pendency of legal proceedings and depending
  on the legislative intent and the language employed by the Legislature in the
E relevant enactment, this Court has determined the impact of the legislation on
  pending pro'ceedings and the power of the Court to take note of change in
  law and suitably mould the relief consistently with the legislative changes. So
  far as the present case is concerned, the only submission made by the learned
  counsel for the appellant is that the effect of the amendment is to deprive the
  Court of Munsif of its jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings for eviction
F over such premises as the suit premises are. In other words, it is a change in
  forum brought during the pendency of the proceedings. The correct approach
  to be adopted in such cases is that a new law bringing about a change in
  forum does not affect pending actions, unless a provision is made in it for
  change over of proceedings or there is some other clear indication that pending
G actions are affected. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P.
  Singh, 8th Edition, 2001, p.442) We have already indicated that the Act does
  not bring about a change in forum so far as the pending actions are concerned.
  Moreover. by the time the amendment came int6 force, the proceedings before
  the Munsif had already stood concluded and the case was pending at the
  stage of revision before the Additional District Judge. Further we find that an
H objection laying challenge to forum's competence was not raised before the
                 R. KAPILNATH v. KRISHNA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]                   71
 learned Additional District Judge nor the objection was taken before the High     A
 Court in the civil revision preferred by the appellant. It was not taken as a
 ground in the special leave petition. It has been taken only by way of a
 separate petition filed subsequently and seeking leave to urge additional
 grounds. Such an objection cannot be allowed to be urged so belatedly.
 However, we have already held the argument based on 1994 Amendment as             B
 of no merit.

         It was next submitted that though a petition for eviction under Section
 21 (I )(p) of the Act can be filed by a landlord and it is not necessary that he
 must also be the owner of the premises yet it is necessary that the petitioner
 must claim himself to be only a landlord and not an owner. The learned C
 counsel further submitted that the respondent has claimed himself to be the
 owner of the premises which claim is inconsistent with his being a mere rent
  collector on behalf of the temple and so the claim for eviction at his instance
 should have been refused. This submission too is wholly devoid of any merit.
  A petition for recovery of possession of any premises can be filed by the
  landlord against the tenant within the meaning of Section 21(1). Clause (h) D
 of Section 3 includes in the meaning of 'landlord' any person who is for the
 time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises
 whether on his own account or on account or on behalf, or for the benefit of
 any other person etc. It cannot be doubted nor has it been disputed that the
 respondent is 'landlord' within the meaning of Section 3{h) abovesaid. Though E
 the respondent claimed himself to be an owner also so long as he has been
 found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for eviction under
 Section 21(1) (p). The plaintiff or petitioner may claim a higher right and
 may succeed in proving only a smaller right or entitlement to relief but that
 would not result in disentitling the plaintiff or petitioner from succeeding so
 long as the smaller right successfully substantiated by him is enough in law F
 to entitle him to a relief against the defendant.

        For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is held to be devoid of any merit
 and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed with costs throughout. The decree
 for execution shall not be available for execution for a period of four months
 from today subject to the appellant clearing all the arrears of rent and filing   G
 the usual undertaking-both within a period of three weeks from today-for
 delivering vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord-respondent on the
 expiry of the said period of four months and continuing to clear 'the arrears
 falling due month by month till then.

. N.J.                                                       Appeal dismissed.     H