Holding

Contempt proceedings were not required and cannot be used to enforce a money decree; the appeal under Section 19 is maintainable and the High Court's contempt order is set aside.

Summary

The State of West Bengal, having acquired land under the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, was ordered by a Land Acquisition Judge to pay compensation to certain claimants. The State later discovered that the claimants had no title to the land and sought to vacate the interim payment order of the Calcutta High Court. The claimants filed a contempt petition alleging non‑compliance with the High Court's order; the High Court accepted an unconditional apology but refused to discharge the contempt Rule and directed the State to deposit the compensation. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the contempt proceedings were unnecessary and that contempt cannot be used as a tool for executing a money decree where ordinary execution remedies exist. The Supreme Court held that the contempt proceedings were unwarranted, that the weapon of contempt should not be employed for decree execution, and that an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's contempt order and allowed the appeal, disposing of the pending appeals without costs.

Issues considered

The propriety of initiating contempt proceedings to enforce a money decree where ordinary execution remedies are available.
Whether the High Court could compel the State to pay compensation under contempt jurisdiction despite the State's dispute over title and alleged fraud.
Whether an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is maintainable against an order that does not discharge a contempt Rule.
The scope and limits of the contempt jurisdiction of courts in relation to execution of decrees.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 19, s. 20
Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Subjects

contempt of courtexecution of decreeland acquisitioncompensationjurisdictionappeal under Section 19civil procedurestate officers

Judgment

A R.N. DEY AND ORS.
v.
... •·
BHAGYABATI PRAMENIK AND ORS.

APRIL 19, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Contempt proceedings-Initiation of-
Against officers of State-For non-satisfaction of money decree awarding
compensation for the land acquired-Execution petition not filed-Held, the
c weapon of contempt cannot be used for execution of the decree or implemen-
tation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for-An
aggrieved party has no right to insist that Court should exercise such
jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemiior and the Court-Court should
be slow to haul up the officers of the Government for non-satisfaction of such
money decre-Civil Procedure Code, 1908-0rder XXI.
D
Section 19-Appeal under-Against interim order-Maintainability of-
Held, maintainable, since the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt
commences with initiation of proceedings for contempt-And if the order is
pa.ssed not discharging the Rule issued in contempt proceeding, it would be an
order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
....
E
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Compensation under-Payment of-State
disputing title of claimants over the property and contending that the decree of
award ofcompensation wa.s obtained by frau.d-lnitiation ofcontempt proceed-
ings for non-payment of compensation-Held, State cannot be dirncted to pay
F compensation, under the coercion ofcontempt proceeding-Estates Acquisition
Act, 1953-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Compensation in l"espect of the land in question, which was vested in
the State under Estates Acquisition Act, was, by mistake, paid to the
respondents/claimants which was further enhanced.
G
In appeal to High Court by the State against the order enhancing the
~
compensation, State was d.ireded to make ad hoc payment as interim relief
which was paid by the State. High Court, forther, in its interim order
directed the State to pay 3/4th of the admitted amount of compensation,
H against which, the State filed a petition to this Court. The same was
172
R.N. DEY v. B.PRAMENII( 173

-
>- ultimately withdrawn with liberty to move High Court for suitable ord€J('
..:...1

Thereafter, it came to the notice of the State that the claimants had no
right, title or interest in the land in question, as the land had vested in the
A

State, and therefore compensation was not ·payable to them. Hence, it
moved an application for vacation of the order for the payment.
B
The claimants/respondents filed contempt petition before High Court
against the appellants, for not having complied with its interim order. The
Court accepted unqualified apology tendered by the appellants and
directed the appellants to deposit the compensation money, but did not
discharge the Rule issued in the contempt proceeding.
c
In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the contempt
application was wholly untenable and the issuance of Rule was unjustifi·
able, since there was no specific order staying the award passed by the
Land Acquisition Judge, the respondents could have proceeded with the
execution of the decree of the award, instead of r.Iing the contempt petition. D "
The respondent contended that since the matter was pending before High
Court, this Court should not interfere at the interlocutory stage.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
.,t..
HELD : 1.1. The contempt proceedings were not required to be E
initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have
been accepted and further proceedings dropped and Rule ought to have
been discharged. [178-F]

1.2. Weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused.
Normally, it cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation F.
)'..
of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. DiScretion
given to the Courtis to be exercised for maintenance of Court's dignity and
majesty of law. Further an aggrieved party has no right to insist that Court
should exercise such jurusdictlon as contempt is between a contemnor and
the Court. (176-H; 177-A]
G
1.3. Under the coercion of contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be
-'t
directed to pay the compensation amount which they are disputing by
asserting that claimants were not the owners of the property in que!Stion
and that decree was obtained by supp~g the material fact and by
fraud. Even presuming that claimants are entitled to recover the amount of H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation awarded by the trial court as no stay order is granted by the
High Court, at the most they are entitled to recover the same by executing
the said award wherein the State can or may contend that the award is
nullity. In such a situation, as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience
of the order, the initiation of q,mtempt proceedings was wholly unjustified.
[177-B-D]
B
1.4. The decree-holder, who does not take steps to execute the decree
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, should not be encour-
aged to invoke contempt jurisdiction ofthe court for non-satisfaction of the
money decree. In land acquisition cases when a decree is passed the State is
C in the position of a judgment debtor and hence the court should not
normally lend help to a party who refuses to take legally provided steps for
executing the decree. At any rate, the court should be slow to haul up
officers of the Government for contempt for non-satisfaction of such money
decree. [177-D-F]

D 2. When the Court either suo moto or on a motion or a reference,
decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes
jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish
for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt
and if the order is passed not discharging the Rule issued in contempt
proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction
E to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable.
If the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contempt
asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal
against the said ~rder is maintainable. [178-A-B]

F P.D. Goel v. B.S. Dhillon and Other, [1978] 2 SCC 370, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLKI'E JURISDICTION : I.A. Nos. 1 and 2

Jn

Civil Appeal Nos. 5371-5372 of 1999.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.8.98 of the Calcutta High Court
in Contempt Rule No. 628/98 in F.A. No. 232of1988 and Contempt Rule No.
1186 of 1993.

T.C. Ray, Bhaskar P. Ganpat, U.ijwal Banerjee, H.K. Puri, S.K. Puri,
H N.R. Chaudhary, J.P. Pandey, Somnath Mukherjee, Ranjan Mukherjee and
R.N. DEY v. B.PRAMENIK [SHAH, J.] 175
y Rasamoj Mandal for the appearing parties. A
-.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Delay condoned.

These appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 4th B
August, 1998 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in C.R. No. 628 of 1998
and C.P.A. N. No.1822 of 1997 in P.A. No.232 of 1988. By the impugned
order, the Court accepted unqualified apology tendered by the appellants in
compliance with the orders of the Court for not paying the balance award
money due to the respondents. The Court further directed the appellants to
deposit with the Registrar (Appellate Side) the compensation money deter-
c
mined in terms of order of the learned Land Acquisition Judge in respect of
the lands acquired by the State as mentioned in the order and decree within
~ two weeks from the date of the order without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties in such proceedings. Further, the Court did not pass
any order on the application filed by the Collector for vacating the Rule issued D
in the contempt proceeding holding that Collector cannot go behind the Award
passed by him as provided under the Land Acquisition Act.

It is the contention of the appellant that the land in question has vested
in the State Government under the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and the
intermediaries were paid compensation under the said enactment It is also E
contended that respondents-claimants have obtained a decree by fraud in their
favour after the said Act, therefore, it is nullity as the land vested in the State
Government Further, by mistake, the Collector made an order under the Land
Acquisition Act for the acquisition of 39.02 acres of land @ Rs. 27,126 per
acre. That compensation was enhanced to Rs. 4,23,500 per acre. The State of F
West Bengal filed appeal (First Appeal No. 232 of 1988) against the said
Judgment and Decree. In the said appeal, an application for stay was also filed
on which the High Court made an order diFecting that payment @ Rs. 600 per
cottah be made as an interim relief. The claimants filed an application before
the Appellate Court for a direction that compensation amount be paid.
However, the Appellate Court directed an ad hoc payment of Rs. 1,00,000. G
At That amount was paid. Further, on 15th May 1992, the High Court passed an
interim order which reads"'as under:

"Accordingly, the appellant should pay at this stage to the respondent/
claimant a sum equivalent to 3/4th of the rate admitted by the H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 3 S.C.R.
A appellant. i.e., 3/4th of Rs. 800 per cottah including the benefits ..
awarded by the learned L.A. Judge within two months from today."
,
thereafter, it came to light that claimants have no right, title or interest
in theJand and, therefore, no compensation was payable to them. In these
circumstaiices, the State of West Bengal moved an application for vacation of
B the order for the payment. Thereafter, the claimants filed an application stating
that the officers of the. State of West Bengal were in contempt for not having
complied with the order of the High Court.

It is also pointed out that against the order of the High Court directing
that 2/3rd of the compensation be paid to the claimants, the State approached
c this Court by filing a petition but the same was withdrawn with liberty to move
the High Court for suitable orders. Subsequently, claimants filed an application
before this Court seeking clarification of order dated 09.9.1992. This Court
vide order dated 23.8.1993 clarified its order by stating that order dated
09.9.1992 does not. in any way, come in the way of claimants getting the
D admitted compensation. Subsequently, the High Court passed an order that
application for vacating interim order would be heard on the date fixed for
he~g of the contempt rule.

: In the background of these facts, it is submitted by the learned counsel
.for the appell~ts that First Appeal No. 232 of 1988 is pending before the
:· g --· Court and that there is no specific order staying the judgment and award
~assecl by the Land Acquisition Judge. Therefore, instead of filing contempt
-~· .. ' appli~ation, the claimants could, at the most, have proceeded with the
~xec~tion of the decree or award. It is further submitted that in view of the
. facts' stated above contempt application was wholly untenable and the issuance
. .· ..f ~ of Rule .in said matter was unjustifiable. Hence, the High Court committed
grave·error in proceeding on the basis that the officers of the State Goveniment
ate in contempt. It is also pointed out that pursuant to the various orders, the
.. ·. State haS paid in all appeals approximately Rs. 50 lacs even though it is the
ci>ntention of the State Governffient that nothing was payable to the claimants
as the land has vested in the State Government. As against this, it has been
. : G~ ~ontended by the l~arned counsel for the respondents that after tendering
1,1-.

µnqualified apology it was not open to the appellant to file these appeals. At
present, ~ince the matter is kept pending before' the High Court, this Court
~ . ~hould not interfere at this interlocutory stage.

H We may reiterate that weapon of co~tempt is not to be used in

,.·
~:
R.N. DEY v. B.PRAMENIK [SHAH, J.] 177
y
.... abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for execution of the decree
or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided
A

for. Discretion given to the Court is to be exercised for maintenance of Court's
dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist
that Court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemnor
and the Court. It is true that in the present case, the High Court has kept the·
B
matter pending and has ordered that it should be heard along with the First
Appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under the coercion of
contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be directed to pay the compensation
amount which they are disputing by asserting that claimants were not the
owners of the property in question and that decree was obtained by suppress-
ing the mate:ial fact and by fraud. Even presuming that claimants are entitled c
to recover the amount of compensation as awarded by the trial court as no stay
order is granted by the High Couit, at the most they are entitled to recover the
same by executing the said award wherein the State can or may contend that
the award is nullity. In such a situation, as there was no willful or deliberate
disobedience of the order, the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly
D
unjustified.

Further, the decree-holder, who does not take steps to execute the decree
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, should not be encouraged
to invoke contempt jurisdiction of the court for non-satisfaction of the money
decree. In land acquisition cases when a decree is passed the State is in the E
position of a judgment debtor and hence the court should not normally lend
help to a party who refuses to take legally provided steps for executing the
decree. At any rate, the court should be slow to haul up officers of the
Government for contempt for non-satisfaction of such money decree.

The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after issuance of F
notice for contempt proceedings initiated by the respondents, the Court has
only issued Rule and the matter is not finally decided, therefore, the appeal
against such order is not maintainable. It is submitted by the learned counsel
for the appellants that respondents want to take undue advantage of pending
contempt proceedings and coerce the officers of the State in making payment
G
on the basis of the award even though they are not entitled to recover the same
~ as the property had already vested in the State and that the appellants were
• required to pay in all approximately Rs. 50 lakhs to the claimants .

In our view the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the
respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the H
A
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
notice, concerned officers tendered unconditional apology and after accepting
the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the Rule issued
for contempt action. When the Court either suo moto or on a motion or a
~
..
reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it
assumes jurisdiction to pooish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to
punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for
B contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the Rule issued in contempt
proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction .a.
to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable.

For the aforesaid purpose, reference can be made to the decision in P.D.
Goel v. B.S. Dhillon and Others, [1978] 2 SCC 370 wherein the Court
c observed that :

"If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before
the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of
its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds
that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would
D
lie to this Court under Section 19 from such an order although the
proceeding has remained pending in the High Court."

The Court further observed that if the order decides some disputes raised
before the Court· by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one
E ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable.

In the present proceedings the question whether appeal under Section
19 is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as, in our view, ....
facts of this case are grossly inadequate and the contempt proceedings were
not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology
F tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and Rule
ought to have been discharged.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order passed by the
High Court issuing Rule in contempt proceedings is set aside. The First Appeal

G
filed by the State is pending since 1988 and it has been contended by the State
that the property which was acquired had already vested in the State Govern- •
ment, therefore, the High Court is requested to expedite the hearing of the First ._,\,.
Appeal and dispose it of as early as possible. The appeals stand disposed of ,.
accordingly with no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeals allowed and
H IAs disposed of.