R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTAversusTHIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.

                          [2019] 8 S.C.R. 869                            869


                     R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA                                 A
                                  v.
                   THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 7418 of 2009)
                           JULY 01, 2019                                 B
      [A. M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.96 and Or.41,r. 31 –
Respondent no.1 (original plaintiff) filed a suit for partition of
certain properties against appellant (defendant no.1), respondent
no.2 (defendant no.2), and original defendant no.3-father –              C
Respondent no. 1 pleaded that suit properties were purchased
ostensibly in the name of the appellant, however, the said properties
were purchased from joint family funds – The appellant/defendant
no.1 denied that suit properties were purchased by family from joint
family funds or they belonged to the Joint Hindu family and
submitted that he was absolute owner thereof since he had purchased      D
it out of his own funds – Trial Court found it in favour of respondent
no.1/plaintiff and partitioned the suit properties amongst the parties
– High Court upheld the findings of the Trial Court – Review Petition
was rejected – On appeal, held: The first appellate court must
analyse the entire evidence produced by the concerned parties and        E
express its opinion in the proper sense of the jurisdiction vested in
it and by elucidating, analysing and arriving at the conclusion that
the appeal is devoid of merit – In the impugned judgment High
Court after reproduction of the submission made by the parties,
straightaway proceeded to affirm the opinion of the Trial Court –
Appellant has also raised formidable issues on facts as well as on       F
law which ought to receive proper attention of the High Court, the
first instance in exercise of powers u/s.96 of CPC – Additionally,
some of the documents which were crucial, were not exhibited
although the same were submitted during the trial – Thus, parties
relegated before the High Court for consideration of the first appeal    G
afresh.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD : 1. After cogitating over the rival submissions made
during the elaborate arguments by the respective counsel and
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                                 869
870            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A     who had invited our attention to the pleadings and evidence on
      record, this Court deem it to appropriate to relegate the parties
      before the High Court for consideration of the first appeal afresh.
      It is said so for more than one reason. The first is that, the High
      Court has disposed of the first appeal by a cryptic judgment. For,
      the first five paragraphs of the impugned judgment are only
B
      reproduction of the submissions made by the counsel for the
      concerned parties. After doing so, the High Court straightaway
      proceeded to affirm the opinion of the Trial Court that the suit
      properties forming part of Schedule A and Schedule B to the plaint,
      are the joint family properties. [Para 16] [878-G; 879-A-B]
C            2. In the present case the suit came to be filed by the
      respondent No.1 as back as in 1982 and that the present appeal
      has remained pending in this Court from 2009, against the
      impugned judgment of the High Court. This Court was at one
      stage persuaded to consider and examine the matter on its own
D     merits instead of relegating the parties before the High Court.
      But, it is noticed that the appellant has raised formidable issues
      on facts as well as on law which ought to receive proper attention
      of the High Court, in the first instance in exercise of powers
      under Section 96 of CPC. Additionally, the High Court will have
      to address the grievance of the appellant that some of the
E     documents, which in the opinion of the appellant are crucial have
      not been even exhibited although the same were submitted during
      the trial, as noted in the written submissions filed by the appellant.
      Therefore, this Court does not wish to deviate from the consistent
      approach of this Court in the reported cases that the first appellate
F     court must analyse the entire evidence produced by the concerned
      parties and express its opinion in the proper sense of the
      jurisdiction vested in it and by elucidating, analysing and arriving
      at the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit. [Para 18]
      [881-F-G; 882-A-C]
G           C. Venkata Swamy v. H.N. Shivanna (Dead) by Legal
            Representative & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 604 : [2017] 12
            SCR 1 ; Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors. (2001) 4
            SCC 756 : [2001] 3 SCR 138 ; Mudi Gowda Gowdappa
            Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh (1969) 1
            SCC 386 : [1969] 3 SCR 245 ; G. Narayana Raju
H
    R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA v. THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.           871


     (dead) by his Legal Representative v. G. Chamaraju &   A
     Ors. AIR 1968 SC 1276 : [1968] SCR 464 ; Appasaheb
     Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa
     Chamdgade and Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 521 ; V.D.
     Dhanwatey v. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P.,
     Nagpur [1968] 2 SCR 62 ; Santosh Hazari v.
                                                            B
     Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 : [2001] 1 SCR
     948 ; U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekar and
     Another (2017) 15 SCC 309 : [2017] 7 SCR 608 ;
     H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (Dead) by Lrs. (2005)
     10 SCC 243 ; State Bank of India and Another v.
     Emmsons International Limited and Another (2011) 12    C
     SCC 174 : [2011] 10 SCR 436 ; Kurian Chacko v.
     Varkey Ouseph AIR 1969 Kerala 316 ; Jagannath v.
     Arulappa and Another (2005) 12 SCC 303 ; B.V. Nagesh
     and Another v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC
     530 : [2010] 11 SCR 784 ; Union of India v. K.V.
                                                            D
     Lakshman and Others (2016) 13 SCC 124 : [2016]
     5 SCR 622 – referred to.
                    Case Law Reference
[2017] 12 SCR 1             referred to           Para 13
[2001] 3 SCR 138            referred to           Para 13   E

[1969] 3 SCR 245            referred to           Para 13
[1968] SCR 464              referred to           Para 13
(2007) 1 SCC 521            referred to           Para 13
                                                            F
[1968] 2 SCR 62             referred to           Para 15
[2001] 1 SCR 948            referred to           Para 15
[2017] 7 SCR 608            referred to           Para 15
(2005) 10 SCC 243           referred to           Para 17
                                                            G
[2011] 10 SCR 436           referred to           Para 17
(2005) 12 SCC 303           referred to           Para 17
[2010] 11 SCR 784           referred to           Para 17
[2016] 5 SCR 622            referred to           Para 17
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872            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7418
      of 2009.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 07.09.2004 and 27.09.2007
      of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 456 of 2002 &
      RP No. 567 of 2005.
B           Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Prakash, Advs. for the Appellant.
            Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Pai Amit, Abhijat P. Medh, Advs. for
      the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C           A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
             1. The present appeal takes exception to the judgment and decree
      of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore dated 7th September, 2004,
      in RFA No.456 of 2002, whereby the High Court upheld the findings of
      the Trial Court, that the suit properties described in Schedules A and B
D     to the plaint were not self-acquired by the appellant (defendant No.1)
      but, instead, belonged to the Joint Hindu Family of which he was a member
      and, therefore plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 and 2 were equally entitled
      to 5/12th share in all the suit properties and defendant No.3 (a) (b) and
      (c) each were entitled to 1/24th share in all the suit properties and thus
      the same could be partitioned and distributed amongst the members of
E
      the said joint family. The High Court, however, granted liberty to the
      appellant to approach the Trial Court for an enquiry into the question
      whether the sale of agricultural lands belonging to joint family would
      bind the appellant (defendant No.1) and to pass another preliminary
      decree, if necessary. The appellant has also assailed the judgment of the
F     High Court rejecting his review petition being R.P. No.567 of 2002 dated
      27th September, 2006.
             2. The parties to this appeal are the children of the original
      defendant No.3-patriarch of the family, Hanumanthaiah Setty. The
      appellant is the eldest son, while respondent No.1 and respondent No.2
G     are his younger brothers. Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are the daughters of
      Hanumanthaiah Setty and thereby sisters to the appellant and respondent
      Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 came on record as the legal
      representatives of Hanumanthaiah Setty after he passed away during
      the course of the proceedings before the Trial Court.
H
     R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA v. THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.                              873
                 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       3. This appeal has its origins in a suit for partition of certain        A
properties, being O.S. 1300 of 1982, filed by respondent No.1 (original
plaintiff) against the appellant (original defendant No.1), respondent No.2
(original defendant No.2) and the original defendant No.3 Hanumanthaiah
Setty before the Court of the XXXI Additional City Civil Judge at
Bangalore. Respondent No.1, claiming to be a member of a Joint Hindu
                                                                                B
Family comprising the other parties to the suit, alleged that the scheduled
suit properties belonged to the said Joint Hindu Family since they had
been purchased by the original defendant No.3 father with money from
joint family funds. The crux of respondent No.1’s plea was that the suit
properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint had been
purchased ostensibly in the name of the appellant since he was the senior-      C
most member of the family (after defendant No.3) and also the eldest
son, however, in actuality, the said properties belonged to the joint family.
Respondent No.1 also asserted that suit properties were in the joint
possession of the appellant, respondent No.2 and the original defendant
No.3 and that the appellant was attempting to illegally dispose of the
                                                                                D
same and obstruct partition thereof, thus necessitating the suit.
Accordingly, respondent No. 1 sought a 1/4th share in the suit properties
and mesne profits in that regard.
       4. The original defendant No.3 father supported the stand of the
respondent No.1/original plaintiff, contending in his written statement
that the suit properties were purchased for and on behalf of the joint          E
family and were merely purchased in the name of the appellant/original
defendant No.1 since the original defendant No.3 could not travel to
Bangalore, where the properties in question were situated, and since the
appellant was the eldest son and “worldly-wise”. He denied that the suit
properties were self-acquired properties of the appellant and submitted         F
that the appellant was exploiting the fact that the properties had been
purchased in his name. He then submitted that his children, namely the
appellant and respondent Nos.1 and 2, had an equal share, right, title and
interest in the suit properties. Accordingly, the original defendant No.3
sought for a partition of the suit properties amongst his children after
making provisions for respondent Nos.3 to 5 herein (who, at the time of         G
filing the said written submissions, were his unmarried daughters and
had not been impleaded as parties to the suit). Respondent No. 2 (original
defendant no.2) supported and echoed the stance of respondent No.1
and the original defendant no.3.
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874             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A            5. The appellant/original defendant No.1 in turn, denied that the
      properties set out in Schedules A and B to the plaint had been purchased
      by family from joint family funds or that they belonged to the Joint Hindu
      family and submitted that he was the absolute owner thereof since he
      had purchased it out of his own funds and through loans. The appellant
      submitted that he had exclusive possession and enjoyment over the said
B
      properties since the date of their purchase and there was no question of
      any illegality in his dealings therewith. The appellant further submitted
      that a shop being run by him, constructed on one of the suit properties,
      had been sold by respondent No.2 and original defendant No.3, and that
      he was entitled to the sale consideration of the same. Additionally, the
C     appellant was entitled to 1/4th share in certain other ancestral property
      of the original defendant No.3 father. The appellant also filed an additional
      written statement wherein he alleged that certain joint family properties
      had intentionally been omitted from the plaint for nefarious purposes.
            6. On the basis of the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the
D     following issues:
            “7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues have been
            framed:
                i.   Whether the plaintiff and defendants are the members of
                     a Hindu Joint family?
E
                ii. Whether the suit schedule properties have purchased by
                    defendant No.3 in the name of defendant No.1 from out of
                    the joint family funds?
                iii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a share as claimed in
F                    the plaint schedule properties?
                iv. Whether the suit properties are self acquired properties of
                    defendant No.1?
                v. What order or decree?
                     Adl. Issue No.2 A : Whether suit properties are joint family
G                    properties of plaintiff and defendants?”
            7. During the pendency of the matter, the original defendant No.3
      expired and the present respondent Nos.3 to 5 daughters were brought
      on record as his legal representatives. Thereafter, the Trial Court
      rendered its judgment dated 30th January, 2002, wherein it found in favour
H
     R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA v. THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.                               875
                 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

of respondent No.1/original plaintiff on all the issues. The Trial Court         A
opined that the appellant had not claimed any partition or separation
from the joint family and infact, had pleaded for a 1/4th share in certain
other ancestral property of the original defendant No.3. This was
sufficient to establish that the parties viz the appellant (original defendant
No.1), respondent No.1 (original plaintiff), respondent No.2 (original
                                                                                 B
defendant No.2) and the original defendant No.3, belonged to a Hindu
Joint Family.
       8. The Trial Court relied upon several judgments to opine that
once the acquisition of the suit properties from the nucleus of a joint
family had been admitted or proved, thereafter, property acquired by
any member of the joint family would be presumed to be joint family              C
property subject to the condition that the acquired property had to be
such that it could have been acquired only by the aid of the family. It
reasoned that after the acquisition of the suit properties from the nucleus
of a joint family had been established, the burden of proof then shifted
on to the person who claimed that the property was self-acquired, to             D
prove that the property had been acquired without any aid from the
family. The Trial Court found that the evidence on record established
the existence of a joint family nucleus and thereafter, the appellant/original
defendant No.1 had failed to discharge the burden that the suit schedule
properties were self-acquired and had also failed to prove that his
business, from the proceeds of which he claimed to have purchased the            E
suit schedule properties, was conducted without the aid of family funds.
       9. The Trial Court also rejected the appellant’s contention that he
was the sole owner of the schedule suit properties by relying upon the
evidence of DW3 advocate. DW3 had deposed that he advised the original
defendant no.3 to purchase the said properties in the name of the appellant      F
since the original defendant No.3 was aged and resided in the village,
and since the parties were living as members of an undivided joint family.
The Trial Court also relied upon evidence which showed that the original
defendant No.3 had taken out loans and paid interest in that regard, for
some of the schedule suit properties. The Trial Court reasoned that if           G
the appellant was indeed the absolute and independent owner of the
properties, then there was no reason for the original defendant No.3 to
make any payments for the said properties. Additionally, evidence on
record established that various rent receipts for the businesses being run
on the scheduled properties had been issued in the name of the father of
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876             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A     plaintiff (original defendant No.3) and appellant original defendant No.1,
      thus proving that they were engaged in joint family businesses and not
      independently run by the appellant. The Trial Court also noted that the
      appellant had failed to explain as to why the original defendant No.3 had
      sided with the stance taken by the other respondents and not with the
      appellant. These factors established that the suit scheduled properties
B
      belonged to the joint family, rather than the appellant. Additionally, the
      properties in Schedule C to the plaint were admittedly joint family
      properties.
             10. The Trial Court also found that the village panchayat had already
      effected a prior partition of certain properties, including those set out in
C     Schedules A and B to the suit, between the parties, which indicated that
      such properties belonged to the joint family. On the basis of the aforesaid
      findings, the Trial Court ordered that the suit schedule properties be
      partitioned amongst the parties, with the appellant, respondent No.1 and
      respondent No.2 each getting 5/12th share and respondent Nos.3 to 5
D     getting remaining 1/12th share in the suit schedule properties. The Trial
      Court also ordered an enquiry into the mesne profits payable to respondent
      No.1.
             11. Aggrieved by the decision of the Trial Court, the appellant
      preferred an appeal to the High Court of Karnataka being RFA No. 456
E     of 2002. In its judgment dated 7th September, 2004, the High Court
      recorded that the contest was only in regard to the properties set out in
      Schedules A and B to the plaint and accordingly, upheld the findings of
      the Trial Court in that regard. The High Court noted the submissions of
      the plaintiff that although the properties had been purchased in the name
      of the appellant, the said purchases were done during the continuation of
F     the joint family status. The properties had been purchased with the help
      of loans and the interest on the same was, admittedly, being serviced by
      the original defendant No.3 and not by the appellant. The license of the
      business being conducted on the suit schedule property was in the name
      of respondent No.2, and the lease was taken in the name of the original
G     defendant No.3, while the appellant was merely managing the business.
      The purported businesses of the appellant were infact jointly conducted
      by all the parties and the appellant had failed to establish either that he
      had any independent business or that he had purchased the suit schedule
      properties without the aid of family funds. The High Court then went on
      to conclude that the findings of the Trial Court were just and proper and
H
     R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA v. THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.                             877
                 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

thus rejected the appellant’s contentions, although it allowed the appellant   A
to approach the Trial Court for an inquiry as to whether the sale of
agricultural land by the other parties would bind the appellant and to
pass another preliminary decree in that regard, if necessary.
      12. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a review petition before
the same High Court being R.P. No. 567 of 2005. The said review petition       B
was dismissed on 27th September, 2006. Hence, the present appeal.
        13. We have heard Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, counsel for the appellant.
The main contention of Mr. Madiyal is that the High Court dismissed the
first appeal cursorily without discussing or considering the documentary
or oral evidence produced by the parties. Further, the plaintiff had failed    C
to plead and also to prove that the joint family was in possession of a
nucleus and which was adequate to fund the purchase of properties at
schedule ‘A’ & ‘B’ respectively. Hence, no presumption of jointness of
the said property can be drawn in this case. It is then urged that both the
courts have failed to consider crucial evidence which established that
the appellant had paid for the purchase of the schedule suit properties        D
with his own, personal funds and hence, was the absolute owner thereof.
He also contends that the Trial Court grievously erred in putting the
burden of establishing the existence and adequacy of such a nucleus on
the appellant/original defendant No.1 and the High Court ought not to
have supported such an approach. Mr. Madiyal refers to the judgments           E
of C. Venkata Swamy Vs. H.N. Shivanna (Dead) by Legal
Representative & Anr.1, Madhukar & Ors. Vs. Sangram & Ors.2,
Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh Vs. Ram Chandra Ravagowda
Sankh3, G. Narayana Raju (dead) by his Legal Representative Vs.
G. Chamaraju & Ors.4 and Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade Vs.
Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade and Ors. 5 to buttress his                         F
submissions.
       14. We have also heard Mr. Raghavendra Srivatsa, counsel for
respondent No.1 (plaintiff), who argues that the evidence on record shows
that the members of the family were living as an undivided joint family
and that the schedule suit properties were purchased in the name of the        G

1
  (2018) 1 SCC 604 (paragraph nos.10-11, 13-18)
2
  (2001) 4 SCC 756 (paragraph no.5)
3
  (1969) 1 SCC 386 (paragraph no.6)
4
  AIR 1968 SC 1276 (paragraph no.3)
5
  (2007) 1 SCC 521 (paragraph nos.12-17)                                       H
878             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A     appellant on legal advice but infact the consideration amount was paid
      from the joint family funds. He then contends that it is settled law that
      once admitted or proved that there was a sufficient joint family nucleus
      out of which the properties could be acquired, thereafter, the presumption
      would arise that the properties are joint family properties. It is then for
      the opposing party, in this case, the appellant, to prove that he had acquired
B
      the properties out of his own funds. In the present case, the business
      conducted from the schedule suit properties were clearly established as
      joint family business being run by the family members and acquired out
      of joint family funds. The appellant failed to impeach the evidence given
      by respondent No.1/plaintiff and the existence of the joint family nucleus
C     had been proved by the respondent No.1/original plaintiff and admitted
      by the appellant/original defendant No.1.
             15. The respondents have relied on Appasaheb Peerappa
      Chamdgade (supra) in support of the submission that when it is proved
      or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of
D     which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a
      presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the
      individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him
      without the aid of the said nucleus. Additionally, reliance is placed on
      V.D. Dhanwatey Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P., Nagpur6
      for the same proposition. While, refuting the argument that the High
E     Court cursorily dismissed the first appeal without adverting to the relevant
      points and evidence on record, it is urged by the respondents that the
      High Court after noticing the relevant aspects was pleased to uphold the
      finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court being convinced that the
      same was just and proper. It was unnecessary for the High Court to
F     restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the
      Trial Court as observed by a three judge Bench in the case of Santosh
      Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari7 and U. Manjunath Rao Vs. U.
      Chandrashekar and Another8.
             16. After cogitating over the rival submissions made during the
G     elaborate arguments by the respective counsel and who had invited our
      attention to the pleadings and evidence on record, we deem it to
      appropriate to relegate the parties before the High Court for consideration

      6
        (1968) 2 SCR 62(paragraph nos.4 and 5)
      7
        (2001) 3 SCC 179 (paragraph no.15)
      8
H       (2017) 15 SCC 309
     R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA v. THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.                               879
                 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

of the first appeal afresh. We say so for more than one reason. The first        A
is that, the High Court has disposed of the first appeal by a cryptic
judgment. For, the first five paragraphs of the impugned judgment are
only reproduction of the submissions made by the counsel for the
concerned parties. After doing so, in paragraph no.6 of the impugned
judgment, the High Court straightaway proceeded to affirm the opinion
                                                                                 B
of the Trial Court that the suit properties forming part of Schedule A and
Schedule B to the plaint, are the joint family properties. It is apposite to
reproduce paragraph nos.6 and 7, whereby the first appeal has been
disposed of. The same read thus:
       “6. I find no merit in the appeal in so for as A and B schedule
       propertied are concerned. The opinion of the trial court that they        C
       are the joint family propertied is sound and proper. But in respect
       of the sales of agricultural lands made by the defendants No and
       3 and plaintiff. I feel that the appellant can make another application
       before the trial court for an enquiry to find out whether the
       impugned sales would bind the appellant. To that extent, the              D
       appellant can pursue his remedy for another preliminary decree
       before the trial court.
       7. In so far as A and B schedule propertied are concerned the
       finding of the trial court is sound and proper, Accordingly, the
       appeal is disposed of.”                                                   E
      17. In a recent decision of this Court in U. Manjunath Rao (supra),
the Court after adverting to Santosh Hazari (supra), Sarju Pershad
Ramdeo Sahu Vs. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.9,
Madhukar (supra), H.K.N. Swami Vs. Irshad Basith (Dead) by LRs. 10
and State Bank of India and Another Vs. Emmsons International                    F
Limited and Another11 went on to observe thus:
       “11. ……………Thus, in the first appeal the parties have the
       right to be heard both on the questions of facts as well as on law
       and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the
       aspects and decide the case by ascribing reasons.                         G
       12. In this context, we may usefully refer to Order 41 Rule 31
       CPC which reads as follows:
9
  AIR 1951 SC 120 (paragraph no.15)
10
   (2005) 10 SCC 243 (paragraph no.3)
11
   (2011) 12 SCC 174                                                             H
880               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A                                           “ORDER 41
                              APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES
                                           *        *        *
                   31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.—The
B                  judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall
                   state—
                   (a) the points for determination;
                   (b) the decision thereon;
                   (c) the reasons for the decision; and
C                  (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the
                   relief to which the appellant is entitled,
                   and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated
                   by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”
               13. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the judgment
D              of the appellate court has to state the reasons for the decision. It
               is necessary to make it clear that the approach of the first appellate
               court while affirming the judgment of the trial court and reversing
               the same is founded on different parameters as per the judgments
               of this Court. In Girijanandini Devi12, the Court ruled that while
               agreeing with the view of the trial court on the evidence, it is not
E
               necessary to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the
               reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement
               with reasons given in the trial court judgment which is under appeal
               should ordinarily suffice. The same has been accepted by another
               three-Judge Bench in Santosh Hazari13. However, while stating
F              the law, the Court has opined that expression of general agreement
               with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should
               not be a device or camouflage to be adopted by the appellate
               court for shirking the duty cast on it. We are disposed to think, the
               expression of the said opinion has to be understood in proper
               perspective. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the
G              first appellate court can quote passages from the trial court
               judgment and thereafter pen few lines and express the view that
               there is no reason to differ with the trial court judgment. That is

      12
           AIR 1967 SC 1124
      13
H          (2001) 3 SCC 179
     R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA v. THIPPAIAH SETTY & ORS.                             881
                 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       not the statement of law expressed by the Court. The statement          A
       of law made in Santosh Hazari has to be borne in mind.
       14. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in Asha Devi v.
       Dukhi Sao14 is worthy of noticing, although the context was
       different. In the said case, the question arose with regard to power
       of the Division Bench hearing a letters patent appeal from the          B
       judgment of the Single Judge in a first appeal. The Court held that
       the letters patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law.
       The purpose of referring to the said decision is only to show that
       when the letters patent appeal did lie, it was not restricted to the
       questions of law. The appellant could raise issues pertaining to
       facts and appreciation of evidence. This is indicative of the fact      C
       that the first appellate court has a defined role and its judgment
       should show application of mind and reflect the reasons on the
       basis of which it agrees with the trial court. There has to be an
       “expression of opinion” in the proper sense of the said phrase. It
       cannot be said that mere concurrence meets the requirement of           D
       law. Needless to say, it is one thing to state that the appeal is
       without any substance and it is another thing to elucidate, analyse
       and arrive at the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit.”
       In another recent decision in C. Venkata Swamy (supra), once
again this Court reiterated the settled legal position regarding the purport
of power of the appellate court coupled with its duty, under Section 96 of     E
the Code, while deciding the first appeal, by adverting to decisions in
Kurian Chacko Vs. Varkey Ouseph15, Santosh Hazari (supra), H.K.N.
Swami (supra), Jagannath Vs. Arulappa and Another16, B.V. Nagesh
and Another Vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy 17, S.B.I. (supra) and Union
of India Vs. K.V. Lakshman and Others18. The court, even in this               F
reported case relegated the parties before the High Court for
reconsideration of the first appeal afresh.
       18. We are conscious of the fact that in the present case the suit
came to be filed by the respondent No.1 as back as in 1982 and that the
present appeal has remained pending in this Court from 2009, against
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the impugned judgment of the High Court. We, at one stage were
14
   (1974) 2 SCC 492
15
   AIR 1969 Kerala 316
16
   (2005) 12 SCC 303 (paragraph no.2)
17
   (2010) 13 SCC 530 (paragraph nos.3 and 5)
18
   (2016) 13 SCC 124                                                           H
882                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 8 S.C.R.


A     persuaded to consider and examine the matter on its own merits instead
      of relegating the parties before the High Court. But, it is noticed that the
      appellant has raised formidable issues on facts as well as on law which
      ought to receive proper attention of the High Court, in the first instance
      in exercise of powers under Section 96 of CPC. Additionally, the High
      Court will have to address the grievance of the appellant that some of
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      the documents, which in the opinion of the appellant are crucial have not
      been even exhibited although the same were submitted during the trial,
      as noted in the written submissions filed by the appellant. Therefore, we
      do not wish to deviate from the consistent approach of this Court in the
      reported cases that the first appellate court must analyse the entire
C     evidence produced by the concerned parties and express its opinion in
      the proper sense of the jurisdiction vested in it and by elucidating, analysing
      and arriving at the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit.
              19. We refrain from analysing the pleadings and the evidence in
      the form of exhibited documents and including the non-exhibited
D     documents and expect the High Court to do the same and arrive at
      conclusions as may be permissible in law. In other words, we should not
      be understood to have expressed any opinion either way on the merits of
      the controversy. The High Court shall decide the first appeal uninfluenced
      by any observation made in the impugned judgment. As the remanded
      first appeal pertains to year 2002, we request the High Court to dispose
E     of the same expeditiously.
             20. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment
      and decree and orders dated 7th September, 2004 and 27th September,
      2006 respectively, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
      are set-aside and instead remand the RFA No.456 of 2002 to the High
F     Court with the aforementioned directions. No order as to costs. All pending
      applications are disposed of.


      Ankit Gyan                                                       Appeal allowed.

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