Holding

A Hindu widow's pre‑existing right of maintenance, recognised by the will and compromise decree, is governed by Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which converts her limited interest into absolute ownership; Section 14(2) does not apply.

Summary

Manraj Singh executed a will in 1946 leaving his entire property to his grandson Raghuvir Singh, but reserving "full control and ownership" of the property for himself and his wife Janak Dulari during their lifetimes. After Manraj's death Janak Dulari possessed the land; a compromise decree in 1947 confirmed that she would remain in "ownership and possession" until her death. After her death in 1969 the reversioners sued for possession, arguing that Janak Dulari had only a life interest created by the will and decree, and that Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applied, so she never became an absolute owner. The Supreme Court held that a Hindu widow's right to maintenance is a pre‑existing right under Shastric Hindu law, recognised by the 1937 and 1946 statutes, and that the will and decree merely recognised her ownership, not created a new title. Consequently, by virtue of Section 14(1) her limited interest automatically became an absolute ownership, rendering Section 14(2) inapplicable. The Court set aside the High Court judgment, restored the trial court decision, and affirmed that Janak Dulari was the absolute owner and her transfers were valid.

Issues considered

The existence and nature of a Hindu widow's pre‑existing right of maintenance and ownership under Shastric law.
Whether the will and compromise decree created a limited estate or merely recognised ownership for Janak Dulari.
Whether Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governs the widow's interest.
The validity of the sale deeds executed by Janak Dulari and the right of the reversioners to claim possession after her death.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2)
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActSection 14pre‑existing rightwidow's maintenancewill interpretationlimited estateabsolute ownershipcompromise decreeShastric Hindu law

Judgment

RAGHUBIR SINGH AND ORS. A
' v.
GCLAB SINGH AND ORS.

JCL Y 14, 1998

[DR. A.S. ANAND, CJ! AND V.N. KHARE, J.] B

Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Sections 14 (!) and 14 (2) Right to
maintenance ofHindu widow- Will executed infavour of grandson (daughter's
son) Recital in the Will to the effect that testator and his wife (later becoming
widow) would have full ownership and control of the property till their death C
and thereafter property to be vested in the said grandson Suit filed by the
reversioners to challenge the Will--.Compromise decree passed in the suit to
the effect that property would remain in rightful possession of the widow and
after her death. property would go to the deceased testator's grandson and
his heirs and LRs· Widow retained the possession of the property till her D
death in 1969- After her death. suit was again filed by reversioners for
possession of the said property as owners on the ground that widow had no
pre-exiMing right in the suit property and that the previous compromise
decree had created only life interest in the widow-It was also alleged in the
suit that in spite of Section 14 of the Act, widow never became absolute or
full owner of the property--Held, widow had a pre-existing right in the E
property which existed under Shastric Hindu law and later recognised by
Hindu Woman's Right to property Act, 1937 and Hindu Married Woman's
Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946- Will as widl as
compromise decree clearly show that the widow had full ownership and

-. possession of the property till her death after commencement of the Hindu
Succession Act· Further, even after assuming that she had only a limited
estate, by force of Section 14(/) of the Act, widow's limited interest got
F

automatically enlarged into an absolute right notwithstanding any restriction
placed under the document or the instruments- Even compromise decree did
not create any independent and new title in favour of widow for the first G
time Hence, Section 14(2) had no application in the case-·Hindu Woman's
Right to Property Act, 1937- -Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate
Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946· Shastric Hindu Law.

Deeds and Documents--Will---Interpretation of-Intention of the testator
under the documents- -To be given fall effect to. H
555
556 SlJPREMECOURlREPORTS [ 1998] 3 S.C.R.

A A Will was executed by M in favour of his daughter's son (appellant
No. I). The intention of the testator in the Will was to the effect that the
rights and control over the property shall be vested in appellant No. I only
after the demise of testator and his wife and that during the lifetime of either
of them the right, control and ownership of the property would remain with
B the survivors. Respondents, the reversmners, filed a suit for cancellation of
the Will in which a compromise decree was passed by which widow of
testator would remain in rightful possession of the property during her
lifetime and therefore the property would go to testator's grandson (appellant
No. I) and his other heirs and LRs.

C After the death of the widow, a fresh suit was filed by revi:rsioners for
the possession of the suit land on the ground that the widow had no pre- ·
existing right in the property as Hindu Woman's right to Property Act was
not in force in Rewa State and that the compromise decree had created only
life interest in her and therefore, in spite of Section 14 of the Hin~u
Succession Act, the widow of testator did not become the full owner of the
D suit property. Respondents /reversioners questioned the validity of the sale
deeds in favour of the appellants/vendors on the ground that sales had not
been made for any legal necessity and therefore, vendees acquired no valid
title to the property ·purchased by them. Defence on the part of appellants was
that the widow had an inherent right of maintenance out of the estate of
E testator and that the compromise decree had conceded ownership of the land
to her in recognition of that right; that the widow had become an absolute
owner of that land by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act
and therefore, fully competent to transfer that land through sale deeds; that
after the death of the widow, the land devolved on appellant No. I in accordance
with the terms of the Will of testator. Trial court dismissed the suit. On
F appeal, Addi. District Judge allowed the same and the respondents' suit was
decreed in respect of certain portions of the suit lands. In second appeal,
High Court maintained the decree and judgement of the first appellate court
on the ground that the widow was only allowed to remain in possession of
and enjoy the property left under the Will during her lifetime and that the
G same position was reiterated by the compromise decree and therefore, she
had only restricted estate in that property. It was also held by High Court
that the property had not been bestowed on her in lieu of any pre-existing
right of maintenance and that her case was governed by Section 14(2) and
not by Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act. Hence this appeal.

H Allowing the appeal, this Court
R. SINGH v. G. SINGH 557
· HELD : 1.1 The right of maintenance of a Hindu female flows from A
the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and
that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right'', which existed
under the Shastric Hindu law long before the passing of Hindu Woman's
Right to Property Act, 1937 or Hindu Married Woman's Right to Separate
Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946. Those Acts merely recognised the B
position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a "statutory"
backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her
husband, she has right to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain
the possession of that (Ji·operty in lieu of her right to maintenance. The view
taken by the High Court that there could be no "pre-existing right" vesting
in the widow because of the non-applicability of the 1937 Act in Rewa State C
is clearly erroneous. Her right to maintenance existed under the Shastric
Hindu law and was not created by the 1937 or the 1946 Act. Those Acts
merely gave statutory backing to her existing rights. [569-G-H; 573-8)

V. Tulasmma v. Sesha Reddy, [1977] 3 SCC 99; Ram Kali v. Choudhri
Ajit Shankar, [1997) 9 SCC 613 and Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Boospal/i 0
Pedda Verrappa, [1977] 10 SCC 673, relied on.

Mui/a: Hindu law, 14th Edition; Mayne: Hindu law and Usage, I Ith
Edition, referred to.

1.2 In the Will the testator clearly declared his intention to the effect E
that the "right and control over" the suit property shall vest in the grandson
after the demise of the testator and his wife and that during the lifetime of
either of them, the "right, control and ownership" of the property would
remain with the survivor. Admittedly, the widow had the "possession and
control" of the suit property after the death of her husband and in terms of F
the Will, that right and control was by virtue of the recognition of
• "ownership" of the suit property. The use of the expression "till myself
along with my wife are alive, we shall have.full control over all our property,
moveable and immovable" as owners unmistakably shows that the righb
which the widow was declared to possess during her ~ifetime were the same
as those of the testator himself and that she was to remain in "full control G
over all the property, movable and immovable" during her lifetime as an
owner of the property. After the death of her husband, she continued to \

remain in possession of the suit property as its owner and she had full right
and control over the same. The terms of the compromise deed lends support
to this interpretation of the Will. It recognises her right to remain in
"ownership and possession" of the suit property. The terms of the Will and H
558 SL1PREME COl :u REPORTS ~ l 99813 S.C'.R.

A the compromise decree thus unmistakably show that even if it be assumed
for the sake of argument, (though the intention of the testator was clearly
otherwise) that the "right" which the widow had u11der the Will, was to
remain in posse,sion of the property during her lifetime only and enjoy the
property as well as its usufruct only during her lifetime, her limited estate
B ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act. [571-E; 572-B-H)

1.3. Again, it is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow's
limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right
notwithstandi11g any restriction placed under the document or the instruments.
C So far as sub-section (2) of Section 14 is co11cerned, it applies to instruments,
decrees, awards, gifts etc., which create an independent or a new title in
favour of the female for the first time. It has no application to cases where
the instrument/document either declares or recognises or confirms her
share in the property or her "pre-existing right to maintenance" out of that
property. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has
D a field of its own, without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) of
the Act. (570-D-F)

V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy, [1977) 3 SCC 99, relied on.

1.4 The High Court therefore, erred in taking the view that the case
E of the widow was covered by Section 14(2) ofthe Act and not by Section 14(1)
of the Act. The "Will", declared und the compromise decree recognised the
right of the widow as an "owner in possession" of the property with all the
"rights and control" over it. The compromise decree did not create any
independent or new title in her favour for the first time. Sub-section (2) of
Section 14, thus has no application to her case. [573-CI
F
CIVIL APPELLATE Jt:RISDICTION : Civil Appeal 1"o. 4650 of
1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.1.81 of the Madhya Pradesh
G High Court in S.A No. 402 of 1980.

Pramod Swarup, Ms. Prcma Swarup and Prashant Chaudhary for the
Appdlants.

T.L.V. Iyer, S.S. Khanduja and B.K. Satija for the Respondents.

H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. Sl'.'JGH v. G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND. J.] 559
DR. A.S. ANAND, J. An answer to the question whether Smt. Janak A
... Dulari wife of Manraj Singh had any pre-existing right in the suit land
whether after the com!ng into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1958
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) she became the full or absolute owner of
that land, would determine the fate of this appeal by special leave.

The following table shows the relationship to between the parties: B

SUBRANSINGH
I
Hakim Singh Dashrath Singh Hukum Singh C
DhurJndhur Singh
~anraj Khcdu Di!raj Rabiraj Pancham
Singh Singh Singh Singh Singh
·Janak • Kalawati
Dulari D
Nartadia
o!ersingh
Rag ubir singh & Ors.
(Defendant No. I} Appellants
E
I I I
Guiab Singh Jokhai Sheojorsingh
(Pltiff. l) Singh (Pltff.3)
(Pltff.2)
(Respondents)
F
Manraj Singh son of Dhurandhar singh and grandson of Hakimsingh
son of the common ancestor of the parties Subransingh, executed a will (Ex.D-
5) on 23.7.1946. He died on 27.8.1946. Manpher Singh son of Dashrath Singh
son of the common ancestor Subransingh filed a suit for cancellation of the
will in which Smt.Janak Dulari widow of Manraj Singh and her grandson
Reguhvir Singh (son of Narbadia) were both made parties. That suit ended G
in a compromise and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise deed
(Ex-P-3) on 2.8.47. Clause Nos. 1 and 2 of the compromise decree read as
follows:-

"I. That as till her life time as Hindu widow per terms of Will dated
23.7.1946 executed by Manraj in favour ofRaghubar Singh Mst. Janak H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998]3 S.C.R.

A Dulari will remain in ownership and possession.

2. That after the death of defendant Janak Dulari Pawai (Jagirdar) Britt,
Pawai 55i45, except land which was received in partition ay the father
of Manraj Singh, Dhurandher Singh all property moveable and
immovable whole house will go to the heirs of Maniraj Singh,
B Defendant Raghubar Singh as owner and to his heirs and legal
representatives."

Smt. Janak Dulari continued to remain in possession of the suit property
after the death of her husband Manraj Singh on 27 .8.1946. She died on
3. l l.1969. The respondents (sons of Samsher Singh son of Dashrath Singh)
C herein, after the death of Smt. Janak Dulari, filed a suit for possession of the
suit land and mesne profits inter alia alleging that the land in suit was
ancestral Pawai land of Manraj Singh and on the death of Manraj singh, Smt.
Janak Dulari as his widow came into possession of the entire :and. That
Manraj Singh had no son and as his only issue, a daughter by name Narbadia,
D according to the law then in force in Rewa State (where the suit lands are
situated) could not inherit from her father. he (Manraj Singh) executed a will
on 23.6.46 gifting the entire property, movable and immovable, to Raghubir
Singh protecting the right of his wife Smt. Janak Dulari to enjoy the usufruct
from the land during her life time. It was also alleged that Janak Dulari had
no pre-existing r:ght in the suit land and that the compromise decree
E (Ex. P-3) had created only life interest in her and. therefore, despite Section
14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Smt. Janak Dulari, never became the
full or absolute owner of the suit property. According to plaintiffs (respondents
herein) they being the reversioners were entitled to possession as owners of
the land left by Manraj Singh. They also questioned the validity of the sale
F deeds executed by Smt. Janak Dulari in favour of defendant vendors on the
ground that sales had not been made for any legal necessity and, therefore,
the vendees acquired no valid title to the property purchased by them. The
plaintiffs further questioned the right of Raghubir Singh to the property left
by Manraj Singh on various grounds. They also claimed certain amounts by
way of mesne profits but did not pursue that claim later on.
G
The suit was contested. The defence on the part of the appellants
(defendants) was that Smt. Janak Dulari had an inherent right of maintenance
out of the estate of Manraj Singh and that the compromise decree (Ex. P-3)
had conceded ownership of the land to her in recognition of that right. It was
claimed that Smt. Janak Dulari had become an absolute owner of that land by
H virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act and was, therefore, fully competent to
R. SINGH v. G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.) 561

transfer that land through sale deeds Exs. D-13 and D-14 and that those A
alienations could not be challenged by the plaintiffs after her death. It was
further pleaded that after the death of Smt. Janak Dulari, the land devolved
on Raghubir Singh in accordance with the terms of the will of Manraj Singh
(Ex.D-5) and, therefore, the right of Raghubir Singh over the suit property, as
its owner was beyond doubt. The right of the plaintiffs to claim ownership B
and possession of the suit land was denied.

The Trial Court framed a number of issues and ultimately after recording

- evidence dismissed the suit The Trial Court held that Smt. Janak Dulari had
been given life interest in the property of her husband through the will and
that right was her pre-existing right and after the coming into force of the C
Hindu Succession Act in 1956, Smt.janak Dulari acquired absolute right over
that property and she had every right to sell that property. The Trial Court,
further held that since Smt. Janak D:ilari had got an absolute right over the
suit property in 1956, therefore, the question whether the transfer was made
for any legal necessity or not was irrelevant. The Trail Court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had any right or title over the suit D
land. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Trial Court, the respondents-
plaintiffs filed Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1978 which was heard by the First
Additional District Judge. The appeal was allowed and the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court was set-aside and plaintiffs suit was decreed in
respect of certain portions of the suit land. The defendants were directed to E
deliver vacant possession of agricultural holdings measuring about 32 acres
in village Baron, Tehsil Sirmaur, District Rewa to the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by
the judgment and decree of the First Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal
No. 58 of 1978, the appellants filed a Second Appeal in the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh. A learned Single Judge of the High Court partly allowed
the appeal by setting aside plaintiffs suit in so far as it related to Khasra F
' numbers 549, 538/3525, 486 and 551/3527 but maintained the decree and
judgment made by the first appellate court in respect of remaining land. The
High Court held that Smt. Janak Dulari had only been allowed to remain in
possession and enjoy the property under the will (Ex.D-5) and that same right
had been reiterated by the compromise decree (Ex.P-3) as well. That the said G
right was not in lieu of any pre-existing right of maintenance. The High Court,
therefore, held that Smt. Janak Dulari never became full owner of the estate
and that her case was governed by sub-section (2) of Section 14 and not by
sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the Act. It was also held that she was not
competent to transfer any portion of the suit land by sale and the transfers
made by her therefore, did not bind the plaintiffs after her death. The High H
562 SUPREME COL R ;' REPOR rs
1
I 1998] 3 S.C.R.
A Court accepted the plea of the plaintiff-respondents that under the will the
entire estate of tht: testaror was to devolve on the legatee Raghuvir Singh and
that no proprietory rights were ever created in favour of Mst. Janak Dulari
by the will and that she was only to remain in possession of the land and
enjoy the usufruct of the property during her life time. The High Court
B negatived the interpretation placed by the appellants on the terms of the Will
(Ex.D-5) as weU as the compromise decree and rejected the plea that Mst.
Janak Dulari had acquired the property of lier deceased husband :n lieu of
her right of maintenance. According to tht: learned single Judge of the High
(
Court. since the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 was not in force
in Rewa State in the year l 946, when Manraj Singh died, Smt. Janak Dulari
-
C acquired no pre-ex'.sting right, which could mature into full ownership after
the coming into force of the Act :n : 956. In the words of the learned Single
Judge:

"I am. therefore, of opinion that Janak Dulari was allowed to 1-

remain in possession and enjoy the property under the Will Ex.D-5
D and that the same right was reiterated by the compromise decree Ex.Pi
3 and not in lieu of any pre-existing right of maintenance. That being
so, she never became the full owner of the estate and her case would
be governed by sub-section (2) of Section 14 and not by sub-section
( 1) thereof. She was. therefore, not competent to transfer the lands to
the appellc.nts and those transfers. therefore, do not bind the plaintiffs
E after the death of Janak Dulari."

After holding that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit and that
the challenge mad1: on the basis of Section 37 of the V.P. Abolition of Jagirs
ruJd Land Reforms Act. 1952 could not operate as a bar. the learned single
;~

F Judge held that in the absence of any aHotment in plaintiffs favour, tht:y
could not lay any c1aim to the !and compr~s.:d m four Khasra Nos. namely 549, , \
538/3525, 486 and 55113527. The second appeal was thus partly allowed and
judgment and decree of the courts below insofar as it related to Khasra Nos.
549. 538/3525, 486 and 551/3527 was set aside and the plaintiff-respondents
suit relating to those Khasra numbers was dismissed. The decree passed by
G the first appellate court regarding the remaining part of the suit land was
maintained. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and
order of the learned. Single Judge in Second Appeal No. 402 of 1980 dated
20.1.1981.
•
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.
H Before proceeding to consider the submissions made by learned counsel for
>
R. Sll'<UH v.G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 563

. .the parties at the bar, it would be appropriate to first notice the relevant terms
of the Will (Ex.D-5):
A
.....-
"Now as 1 have grown old and cannot look after the household affairs
property therefore my whole property moveable and immovable Pawai
(Jagirdari) Britta, 55/45 Kothar (state owned) and 55/45 tenancy khata
No. 320 under 320 and under 320 area 8.03, 6.14, 16.92 rental Rs. 25 B
as six, Rs. five as nine and Rs.56 as six total area 31.09 Area total
rental Rs.87 as 5 with house gold silver, gram, Bullock, Cow, Buffalow,
labourer, trees mango, Mahuwa, Bair, Bamur, Jamun, Kaitha, lmli etc.
all property in my possession have given you all on condition that
you remain obedient to me and do service and homage to me and to
my wife and other members in my family till our death and after death
c
perform Gay a Barahe and remain in possession of property moveable
and immovable from generation to generation in case of need mortgage
and se!L But till myself along with my wife are alive we shall have full
control .over all our property moveable and immovable. After demise
of our lives you will have all power like ours in our property moveable D
and immovable. l, therefore, execute this gift deed so that it may
--,. ... remain in tact and may be helpful in case of need. The witnesses have
put their signature below and stamp ofRs.5 No.4291 dated 23.7.1946
is attached Miti Sawan Badi II Sambat 2003."

Since, there is some dispute about the correct translation of a material E
portion of the Will, we reproduce that portion of the will in the vernacular,
the language in which the Will was written:

"Jab tak ham apney dharam patni Samet jiwit hain tab tak kul
jaidad kula wa gair Mankula men hamara pura Adhikar Kayam Rahega
' bad Khatama ham logon ki jindgi key tumhara Adhikar Ku! Jaidad F
Kula we gair mankula me hamarey Adhikar ki tarah par hoga bas yeg
Bakshishnamah likh diya ki sanad rahey wakata par kam Awey."

Clause (1) of the compromise decree (Ex.P.3.) dated 2.8.1947 reads:-

" I. That as till her life time as Hindu widow per terms of Will dated G
23.7.1946 executed by Manraj in favour ofRaghubar Singh Mst.
Janak Dulari will remain in ownership and possession."

The main issue on which learned counsel for the parties have addressed
their arguments revolves around the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act
which reads: H
'
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S. C.R.

A "14.(1) Any propeny possessed by a female Hindu, wht:~her
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held
by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation.- In this sub-section, "property" includes both

B
movable and immovable prc.perty acquired by a female Hindu by
inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or
arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a rdative
r
\
or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion,
or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, ..
and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately
before the commencement of this Act.
c
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (I) shall apply to any property
acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instmment or
under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the r-
\
terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award
prescribe a restricted estate in such property."
D
According to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, Smt. Janak
~

Dulari was only allowed to remain in possession of and enjoy the property
left under the Will (Ex.D-5) during her life time and that the same position was
reiterated in the compromise decree (Ex.P-3) and therefore she had only a
E restricted estate ;n that property. It was also held that the property had not
been bestowed on her in lieu of any pre-existing right of maintenance and that
her case was governed by Section 14(2) of the Act and not by Section 14(1)
of the Act. In taking this view, the High court appears to have been mainly
influenced by the fact that Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 was

F not in force in Rewa State in the year 1946, when Manraj Singh died and ,
therefore Smt. Janak Dulari could not be said to have acquired any pre-
existing right over the suit property in lieu of her right to maintenance, which
right could ripen into an absolute ownership after the coming into force of
..
the Act in 1956 by Virtue of Section 14( 1) of the Act.

G Before considering the terms of the Will (Ex.D-5) and the compromise
decree (Ex.P-3), we consider it appropriate to first examine the question whether
the right of maintenance, as a pre-existing right of a Hindu widow, is traceable
only to the statutory provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property
.
Act, I 937 (which admittedly was not in force in Rewa State in 1946 when
H Manraj Singh died) as opined by the High court or does it flow from Shastric
)

R. SINGH v.G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 565

... Hindu Law on account of the incidence of marriage itself and that right A
received protection by th~ Act in 1956 through Section 14( I) of the Act.

The first question, requiring an answer, therefore, is:

"What are the obligations of a Hindu husband towards the maintenance
of his wife both during his life time and after his death?" B
According to the old Shastric Hindu Law, marriage between two Hindus
is a sacrament - a religious ceremony which results in a sacred and a wholly
union ·of man and wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a part and parcel
of the body of the husband. She is, therefore, called Ardhangani. It is on
account of this status of a Hindu wife, under the Shastric Hindu law, that a C
husband was held to be under a personal obligation to maintain his wife and
where he dies, possessed of properties, then his widow was entitled, as of
right, to be maintained out of those properties. The right of a Hindu widow
to be maintained out of the properties of her deceased husband is, thus, a
spiritual and moral right, which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship D
of husband and wife, though the right is available only so long as the wife
.., continues to remain chaste and does not remarry.

Mulla in his classic work on "Hindu Law", 14th Edn., dealing with the
characteristic of the right of maintenance of a Hindu wife observes:-
E
"A wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband, whether he
possesses property or not. When a man with his eyes open marries
a girl accustomed to a certain style of living, he undertakes the
obligation of maintaining her in that style. The maintenance of a wife
by her husband is a matter of personal obligation arising from the
very existence of the relationship, and quite independent of the F
possession by the husband ofany property, ancestral or self-acquired."

(Emphasis ours)

Mayne in his Treatise on "Hindu Law and Usage" I Ith Edn., while
tracing the history and origin of the right of maintenance of a Hindu wife G
says:-

"The maintenance of a wife by her husband is, of course, a matter of
personal obligation, which attaches from the moment of marriage."

(Emphasis ours) H
566 SUPREMECOCRf RFP<>RTS ( 1998] 3 S.C.R.

A The obligations, ander the Shastnc Hinud Law, to maintain a Hindu
widow out of the properties of her deceased husband received a statutory
recognition with the coming into force of the Hindu Women's Rights to
Property Act, 1937. The law on the subject was, thereafter, consolidatt:d and
codified by the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and
B Residence Act, 1946 which came into force on April 23, 1946. The right to
maintenance of th.: Hindu widow, as a ~re-existing right, was thus recogni.ied
by the two statutt;s referred to above but it was not created for the first time
by any of those statutes. Her right to maintenance existed under the Shastric
Hindu Law long before statutory enactments came into force. After the
attainment of independence, the need for emancipation of women from feudal
C bondage became even more imperative. There was growing agitation by
Hindu women for enlargement of their rights as provided by the Shastric

D
Hindu Law in various spheres. It was at this juncture that the Parliament
sh!pped in and enackd various statutes like tht: Hindu Marriage Act, 1956.
The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and The Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 providing for intestate succession.
-
The Hmdu Succession Act, 1956 made far reaching changes in the
structure of Hindu law by removing the traditional limitations on the powers
of a Hindu widow to deal with the property of her deceased husband, in her
possession in lieu of her right to maintenance and the Act made her an
E absolute owner of the property, over which hitherto fore she had only a
limited right.

A most elaborate discussion about the rights of a female Hindu before
and after the coming :nto force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and

F
particularly the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, is contained in a three
Judge Bench judgment of this court in V Tulasamma and others v. Sesha
;r
I {
Reddy, (Dead) by LRs., [1977] 3 SCC 99. Dealing with the provisions of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, this Court in V. Tulasmma and other v. Sesha
Reddy, (Dead) by LRs., (supra) observed:-

"The Act is a codifying enactment, and has made far-reaching changes
G in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The
Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, an'd sweeps
away the traditional :imitations on hi;r powt:rs of dispositions which
were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate ......"

Fazal Ali, J in his exhaustive judgment, dealing with the question of the
H pre-existing right of a Hindu widow laid down:
)

R. SINGH v. G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 567
"Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the A
authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu Law on the
subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents
and characteristics of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance:

(I) that a Hindu woman's right to. maintenance is a personal
obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to B
maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property
then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable
charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property
carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow;

(2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to C
property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i.e. it
is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow
who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property
either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;

(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of D
such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser
has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is
legally bound to provide for her maintenance;

(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing
right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the E
Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;

(Emphasis ours)

(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal
.. relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the
wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband,
F
though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and

(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of
her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her
maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or G
purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her
maintenance."

• Dealing with the scope of Section 14 of the Act, the learned Judge
opined that the provisions of the Section must by liberally construed in order
to advance the object of the Act, which is "to enlarge the limited interest H
\.
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A possessed by a Hindu widow" in "consonance with the changing temper of
the times" and observed:-

"that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching
changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to
carry out the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long-
B felt need and tried to do away with the invidious distinction between
a Hindu male and female in matters of intestate succession;

The learned Judge then interpreted Section 14 thus:

"\. Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in
c the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour
of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and
promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long-
needed legislation. ·

2. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has
D a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section
14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so
as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection
granted by Section 14( I) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent
with the main provision.

E 3. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees,
awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour
of the females for the first time and has no application where the
instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or
recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in
F favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14( I) will not
operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares
or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or
partition or share to which the female is entitled, tbe sub-section has
absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would
automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section
G 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would
have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred
to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument
is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed
by Section 14( l) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the
H transferee.
)

R. SINGH v. U. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND. J.) 569

4. The use of express tenns like 'property acquired by a female A
Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu or maintenance', 'or arrears of
maintenance', etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes
sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been
expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section (2)."

The judgment in Tulasamma 's case has held the field till date See also B
with advantage: Ram Kali (Smt.) v. Choudhri Ajit Shankar and others, [1997]
9 SCC 613 and Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy and another v. Bhoospalli
Pedda Verrapa (Dead) by L.Rs. and another, (1997] 10 SCC 673.

Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the proposition that the
right to maintenance of a Hindu female is a pre-existing right, which existed C
in the Hindu Law long bdore the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into
force and is not a creation of those statutes, which only recognised that
position. In the words of Faz.al Ali, J. in Tulasamma 's case (supra):

"The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty fonnality D
or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity,
but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and
enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed
even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnava!kya to Manu.
Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against E
property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his
wife and ifhe or the family has property, the female has the legal right
to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance
of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any
rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a
pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such F
a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms
the pre-existing rights.

Accoraingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female
flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the G
wife and that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right", which
existed under the Shastric Hindu Law long before the passing of the 193 7 or
the 1946 Acts. Those acts merely recognised the position as was existing
• under the Shastric Hindu Law and gave it a "statutory" backing. Where a
Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she has a right
to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that H
\

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
Explaining the meaning of the expression "possessed" as used by the
legislature in Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act in Tulasamma's case (supra) this
Court held:

B "The words •possess\:d by' used by the Legislature in Section
14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of
owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical
possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the
property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the
1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession
c under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed
by her and by force of Section 14(/) she would get absolute interest
in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the
widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title,
because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank
D trespasser without any right or title." (Emphasis supplied)

It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow's limited
interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right notwithstandin3 .
any restriction placed under the document or the instrument. So far as sub-
section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees,
E awards, gifts etc., which create an independent or a new title in favour of the
female for the first time. It has no application to cases where the instrument/
document either declares or recognises or confirms her share in the property
or her "pre-existing right to maintenance" out of that property. As held in
Tulasamma 's cas1: (supra), sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a
proviso and has a field of its own, without interfering with the operation of
F Section 14(1) of the Act. ,.
Having examined the legal position, let us now advert to the salient
facts of a the pnisent case.

The suit filed by Manpher Singh against Smt. Jana.'< Dulari and Raghubar
G Singh, questioning the validity of the will executed by Manraj Singh on
23.6.(7).1946 and s::eking the cancellation of the said Will ended in a compromise
decree dated 2.8.194 7. Manraj Singh died on 27 .8.1946. Smt. Jana.'< Dulari died
on 3.11.1969 and admittedly till her death she was in rightful possession of •
the suit property which position was duly recognised in the compromise
H decree also. The case set up by the plaintiff in the subsequent suit out of
R. SINGH v. G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 571
which the present appeal arises, as already noticed, was that Smt. Janak Dulari A
had no pre-existing right to the suit land but only a restricted right under the
Will and that the compromise decree only created a life interest in her favour
for the first time and therefore Smt. Janak Dulari never became full or absolute
owner of the property in dispute even after the coming into force of the 1956
Act and as such after her death, the plaintiffs became entitled to possession
of the suit property, being reversioners of Manraj Singh. According to them B
her case was governed by Section 14 (2) of the Act. The case of the defendants
on the other hand was that in the Will itself, it was recognised that smt. Janak
Dulari would remain in possession of the suit property as its owner and this
position was accepted in the compromise decree as well and as such her
"ownership and possession" of suit property was protected by Section 14(\) C
of the Act. While dismissing the suit, the Trial Court opined that Smt. Janak
Dulari had become an absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and, therefore she could legitimately
alienate the property in favour of the defendants and that plaintiffs could
make no challenge to it after her death.
D
Learned counsel for the parties have reiterated the stand of their
respective clients before us also. With a view to appreciate the rival stand of
the parties, it is appropriate to find out the intention of the testator when he
executed the Will on 23 .6.(7).1946 and the effect of the compromise decree.

We have rt:ferred to the relevant clauses of the Will as also clauses 1 E
and 2 of the Compromise Decree in an earlier part of this judgment. A careful
reading of the Will shows that the testator clearly declared his intention to
the effect that the "right and controf' over the suit property shall vest in
Raghuvir Singh after the demise of the testator and his wife and that during
the life time of either of them, the "right, control and ownership''. of the
property would remain with the survivor. This position emerges quite clearly F
from the vernacular portion of the Will which has been referred to in an earlier
part of this judgment. A free english translation of that vernacular portion
would read:

" ......... Till such time as myself and my wife remain alive and till then G
we shall have full right, control and ownership of the entire property
but after the death of both of us all those movable and immovable
properties which vest in myself and my wife would devolve on Raghuvir
Singh like they vest in us".

(Emphasis ours) H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A It is, thus, clear from a reading of the above portion of the Will, that
Manraj Singh and Janak Dulari were to retain all their rights and control over
the property as owners then:of till their death and all those rights which they
had over the suit property, were to later on devolve upon Raghuvir Singh
after their death. Raghuvir Singh was to acquire only such ·'rights" and
"control" over the suit property, which the testator and his w[fe Smt. Janak
B Dulari themselves had in respect of the suit property during their life time. It
is an admitted case of the parties that Smt. Janak Dulari had the "possession
and control" of the suit property after the death of her husband and in terms
of the Will that right and control was by virtue of the recognition of her
"ownership'' of the suit property. Even if it be assumed for the sake of
C argument, (though the intention of the testator was clearly otherwise) that the
"right" which Smt. Janak Dulari had under the Will, was to remain in possession
of the property during her life time only and enjoy the property as well as
its usufruct only during her life time, her limited estate ripened into full
ownership by virtue of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act.
Admittedly she had continued to remain in possession of the property till her
D deati). in 1969, long after the coming into force of the Act in 1956. On a proper
construction of the Will, we hold that the use of the expression •'till myself
along with my wife are alive we shall have fall control over all our property
movable and immovable" as owners unmistakably shows that the rights
which Smt. Janak Dulari was declared to possess during her life cime were the
E same as those of the testator himself and that she was to remain in "full
control over all the property movable and immovable" during her life time as
an owner of the property. After the death of her husband, she continued to
remain in possession of the suit property as its owner and she had full right
and control over the same. Clause I of the Compromise Deed filed in the suit
tiled by Manpher Singh which reads:
F ;
per terms of Will dated 23. 7 .1946 executed by Manraj in favour of
Raghubar Singh Mst. Janak Dulari will remain in ownership and
possession."

(Emphasis ours)
G
lends support to the interpretation which we have placed on the Will. It
recognises her right to remain in "ownership and possession" of the suit
property. The terms of the Will and the compromise decree thus unmistakably
show that Smt. Janak Dulari had the "ownership and possession of the suit:
•
property" till her death and (even if it be assumed to be her "limited estate".,
H for the sake of argument) it ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section
R. SINGH v. G. SINGH [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.) 573

14(1) of the Act. A
The impugned judgment of the learned single Judge of the High court
suffers from a misconception about the nature of the "pre-existing right" of
a Hindu widow. The opinion of the learned single that there could be no "pre-
existing right" vesting in Smt. Janak Dulari because of the non-applicability
of the 1937 Act in Rewa State is clearly erroneous. Her right to maintenance B
existed under the Shastric Hindu Law and was not created by the 1937 or 1946
Acts. Those Acts merely gave statutory backing to her existing rights.

The High Court also fell in error in holding that the case of Smt. Janak
Dulari was covered by Section 14(2) of the Act and not by Section 14(1) of
the Act. The 'Will' as already noticed declared and the Compromise Decree C
recognised the right of Smt. Janak Dulari as an "owner in possession" of the
suit property with all the "rights and contro I" over it. The compromise decree
did not create any independent or new title in her favour for the first time.
Sub-section (2) of Section 14, thus has no application to her case. By virtue
of sub-section ( l) of Section 14, the limited interest (even if it be assumed for D
the sake of argument that Smt. Janak Dulari had only a limited interest in the
property of which she was in possession as an owner) automatically got
enlarged into an absolute one, her case was clearly covered by Section 14(1)
of the Act.

The impugned judgment of the High Court thus cannot be sustained.
This appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of
the High Court is set-aside and that of the Trial Court restored. The parties
are however directed to bear their own costs.

R.K.S. Appeal allowed .•
'