Holding

A Section 6 declaration that is invalid, ineffective, or withdrawn does not exhaust the Section 4 notification, and a later overlapping notification supersedes the earlier for the common lands.

Summary

The petitioners' lands were targeted for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through a Section 4 notification followed by a Section 6 declaration. They challenged the notification and declaration, alleging they were not heard and that the notification was issued mala fides. The government withdrew the first declaration, after which a fresh declaration was issued and the petitioners again challenged the original notification. The Supreme Court held that a valid Section 6 declaration exhausts the Section 4 notification, but this principle does not apply when the declaration is invalid, ineffective, or withdrawn, whether by court judgment or government action. Consequently, the earlier notification remains operative until a valid declaration is made, and a later overlapping notification supersedes the earlier one for the common lands. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

Whether the withdrawal or invalidity of a Section 6 declaration automatically renders the preceding Section 4 notification ineffective and infructuous.
Whether a valid Section 6 declaration exhausts the scope of the Section 4 notification.
What is the effect of a subsequent Section 4 notification that overlaps with an earlier one when the earlier declaration has been withdrawn?

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 48, s. 5A, s. 6

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 4 notificationSection 6 declarationInvalid declarationWithdrawal of declarationSupersession of notificationMala fidesStatutory interpretation

Judgment

RAGHUNATH & ORS.
A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

APRIL 7, 1988

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4 and 6-Valid declaration
r under section 6-Scope of Notification under section 4 gets exhausted-
Not so when declaration under section 6 is invalid, ineffective or
infructuous-No distinction between declaration held invalid by court
and declaration withdrawn by government when some illegality is
pointed out.
c
The appellants' lands were among those sought to be acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by means of a notiftcation under
·section 4, followed. by a declaration under section 6. The Notification
and the declaration were challenged by way of a Writ Petition on the D
short ground that the appellants had not been heard before making the
declaration. When the Writ Petition was heard, a statement on behalf
of the Government was made, to the effect that the notification under
section 6 ·was being withdrawn. On the basis of this statement the Writ
Petition was disposed of as withdrawn. Thereafter the appellants were
heard under section SA and a fresh declaration under section 6 was E
issued. The appellants filed a Writ Petition and again challenged the
Notification under section 4 as vitiated by ma/a /ides and non-applica-
tion of mind. The High Court rejected the same. Another question
raised before the High Court was that the withdrawal of the earlier
declaration had the automatic effect of rendering the Notification under
section 4 ineffective and infructuous. The High Court rejected that F
contention as well. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1. Once there is a valid declaration under section 6, the
scope of the notification under section 4 will get exhausted. This princi- G
pie cannot clearly apply to a case where the declaration under section 6
proves to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason. There is
no distinction between a case where a declaration under section 6 is
declared invalid by the Court and a case in which the Government itself
withdraws the declaration under section 6 when some obvious illegality
is pointed out. [444E, 44SB] H
441
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.

Girdhari Lal Amrit Lal v. State,. [1966] 3 SCR 437; State v.
A Haider Bux, [1976] 3 SCC 536 and State v. Bhogilal Keshavlal, [1980] 2
SCR 284 followed. ,·

State v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, [1966] 3 SCR 557 distinguished.
J
,.._- \

B Ajit Singh v. State, AIR 1972 Bombay 177 disapproved. !
{
\
2; Between the date of withdrawal of the earlier Writ Petition and\
the issue of the second declaration under section 6, the Government bad
\
issued a fresh Notification under section 4 for the acquisition of certain \
lands. The lands in the two Notifications under section 4 do not comp- i
Ietely overlap, but some fields are common in both. No declaration un- _
C der section 6 had been issued in furtherance of the second notification ~ \
under section 4 when the High Court heard the matter. In respect or the ,
lands covered by the first notification under section 4 which are also
covered by or comprised in the second notification nnder section 4, ·
further proceedings regarding acquisition shall be taken in accordance
D with law only in pursuance of the latter notification and the proceedings
initiated by the first notification should be deemed to have been
superseded. [445C-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeiil No. U74
of 1988. . ., 'tt
E
Froio the Judgment and Order dated 7.10.1986 of the Bombay
High Court in W.P. No. 1143of1985. ·

Masodkar and A.K. Gupta for the Appellant.
~· '.
F V.S. Desai and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATHAN, J. 1. ·We grant special leave and proceed to
dispose ofthe appeal after hearing both counsel. · . . l ·
G
2. The point raised in the appeal is a very short one_ The lands, L .
belonging to the petitioners were among those sought to be acquired !""'
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as .'the
Act') by means of a notification under Section 4)ssued on 22nd June,
1982. This was followed up by a declaration under Section 6 dated 15th
H March, 1983. The petitioners challenged both the notification and the
RAGHUNATH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [RANGANATHAN. J.1 443

declaration in writ petition No. 947 of !983 before the High Court. The
A
· notification under Section 4 was challenged on the ground of mala
fides and the declaration under Section 6 on the short ground that the
petitioners' objections had not been heard before the making of the
declaration. When this writ petition came up for hearing, a statement
was made on behalf of the Government that t.he notification under
Section 6 was being withdrawn. On this statement being made, the writ B
petition was withdrawn and disposed of accordingly. Thereafter the
petitioners were heard under Section 5 A of the Act and a fresh decla-

- ration under Section 6 was issu.ed on 4th April, 1985.

3. The petitioners again filed a writ petition in the High Court,
being writ petition no. 1143 of 1985, the judgment in which forms the
subject matter of the present appeal. In this writ petition they again c
challenged the notification under Section 4 as vitiated by ma/a fides
and non-application of mind. The High Court has found no merit in
this contention and rejected the same. We see no reason to interfere
with this conclusion of the High Court.
D
4. However, another question was also raised by the petitioners,
namely, that the withdrawal of the earlier declaration dated 15.3.1983
had the automatic effect of also rendering the notification under Sec-
tion 4 dated 22.6.1982 ineffective and infructuous. On the strength of
the decision of this Court in State v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, [1966] 3
SCR 557, it was contended that, once a declaration under section 6 was E
issued, the notification under Section 4 exhausted itself. It made no
difference, it was said, that the notification issued under S. 6 had been
withdrawn. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Bombay
High Court in Ajit Singh v. State, AIR 1972 Bombay 177 in support of
this proposition. This contention, however, was rejected by the High
Court and hence the present appeal. F

5. We are of opinion that the decision of the High Court is
correct and should be upheld. The Bench has rightly pointed out that
Ajit Singh's case (supra) had failed to take note of the decisions of this
Court in Girdhari Lal Amrit Lal v. State, [1966[ 3 SCR 437: State v.
Haider Bux, I1976] 3 SCC 536 and Staie v. Bhogilal Keshavlal, I1980] 2 G
SCR 284 and therefore, does not represent the correct law.

6. In Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case (supra) the question for con-
sideration of this Court was whether there could be successive declara-
tions in respect of various parcels of land covered by a notification
under Section 4(1). Considering the scheme of the Act as it then stood, H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 19881 3 S.C.R.
"A the Court held that the Act envisaged a single declaration u~dor ~ec
tion 6 in respect of a notification under Section 4and1~iat, \vhc~r. nn . . e a
declaration under Section 6 particularising the area in the locality
. specified in the notification under Section 4(1) is issued, the remaining
non-particularised area stands automatically released. The Court also
referred to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act in this context. The
B following observations appear in the judgment of Sarkar J. ~
" ..... It seems to me that if the correct interpretation is
that only one declaration can be made under S. 6, that also
would exhaust the notification under S. 4; that notification
would no longer remain in force to justify successive decla-
-1
rations under S. 6 in respect of different areas included in~ "---
c it. There is nothing in the Act to support the view that it is ...:;
only a withdrawal under S. 48 that puts a notification under
S. 4 completely out of the way. The effect of s. 48 is to
withdraw the acquisition proceedings, including the notifi-
cation under s. 4 with which it started. We are concerned
D not with a withdrawal but with the force of a notification
under S. 4 having become exhausted."

7. The High Court was correct in pointing out that the above
observations were made in the context of a valid declaration under S.
6. The Court held that once there is a valid declaration under S. 6, the
E scope of the notification under S. 4 will get exhausted. This principle
cannot clearly apply to a case where the declaration under S. 6 proves
to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason. It has been so
held by this Court in a number of decisions. In Girdhari Lal Amrit
La/'s case (supra) which was decided about a week earlier to Vishnu
Prasad Shanna's case, this Court held that, where a notification under
·. F, S. 6 is invalid, the Government may treat it as ineffective and issue in
r
its place a fresh notification under S. 6 and that there is nothing in S.
48 of the Act to preclude the Government from doing so. This view has
been repeated in State v. Haider Bux, 11976] 3 SCC 536 and State v.
Bhogila/ Keshavlal, 11980] 2 SCR 284, These decisions have clearly
pointed out the distinction between a ~ase where there is an effective
G · declaration under S. 6 (which precludes the issue of further declara-
tions in respect of other parts of the land covered by. the notification
under S. 4 not covered by the declaration issued under S. 6) and a case
-t-
. . _ ·-- where, for some reason, the declaration under S. 6 is invalid.

: 8. It is true that in the present case there was no occasion for the
H High Court in the earlier writ petition to pronounce the declaration
RAGHUNATHv. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA!RANGANATHAN.J.J 445

dated 15.3.1983 to be invalid. But the validity of the declaration had A
been challenged on the ground that the petitioners had not been heard
under S. SA, an irregularity, which ex facie rendered the declaration
invalid. The State Government obviously acknowledged this and with-
drew the declaration on its own instead of obtaining a judgment to that
effect from the Court. In principle, there is no distinction between a
B
case where a declaration under S. 6 is declared invalid by the Court
and a case in which the Government itself withdraws the declaration
under S. 6 when some obvious illegality is pointed out. The point in
issue in this appeal is thus directly governed by the three earlier deci-
sions of this Court and the High Court was fully justified in dismissing
the writ petition on this ground.
c
9. Before concluding we must refer to one circumstance which
was brought to our notice by learned counsel for the petitioners and
which has also been noticed in the judgment of the High Court. It
appears that, between the date of withdrawal of the earlier writ peti-
tion (namely, 23rd August, 1983) and the issue of the second declara-
D
tion under S. 6 (namely, 4.4.1985), the Government had issued a fresh
notification under S. 4 for the acquisition of certain lands. The lands in
the two notifications under S. 4 do not completely overlap but it
appears that some fields are common in both. No declaration under S.
6 appears to have been issued in furtherance of the second notification
under S. 4 when the High Court heard the matter. Learned counsel for
E
the petitioners points out that, atleast in respect of such of the lands
comprised in the S. 4 notification dated 22.6.1982 as are also covered

- by the subsequent notification under S. 4, it is legitimate to infer that
the State Government has superseded the earlier notification by the
latter one. This contention is clearly well founded. We would, there-
fore, like to make it clear that in respect of the lands covered by the
first notification under S. 4 which are also. covered by or comprised in, F
the second notification under S. 4, further proceedings regarding
acquisition should be taken, in accordance with law, only in pursuance
of the latter notification and the proceedings initiated in respect of
such lands by the first notification dated 22.6.1982 should be deemed
to have been superseded.
G
10. With the above clarification, we affirm the order of the High
-~ Court had dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, however, we
make no order as to costs.

G.N. Appeal dismissed.