Holding

The nature of the transaction involving packing material is a question of fact; the assessing authority must ascertain the true character of the sale, and Section 6C, as a legal fiction, is valid and not discriminatory.

Summary

The appellants, manufacturers and dealers of beer and cement, challenged sales‑tax assessments under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the basis that the turnover of packing material (bottles, cartons, gunny bags) had been taxed at the rate applicable to the goods themselves, invoking Section 6C which deems packing material to be sold with the goods. The High Court had held that the containers were integral to the transaction and that the price paid included the value of the containers, thereby upholding the assessments. The Supreme Court held that whether packing material is sold or merely transferred is a factual question depending on the contract between the parties; the assessing authority must investigate the true nature of each transaction. Section 6C was described as a legal fiction, not unconstitutional, and the High Court’s assumption of an integrated sale without factual inquiry was erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, allowed the appeals and remanded the matters for proper fact‑finding and appropriate tax determination.

Issues considered

Whether the assessment of sales tax on packing material at the rate applicable to the goods, pursuant to Section 6C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, is valid.
Whether Section 6C is constitutionally valid or discriminatory.
Whether packing material is deemed to be sold with the goods or constitutes a separate taxable transaction.
Whether the High Court erred in treating the containers as an integral part of the sale without factual investigation.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957s. 5, s. 6C
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Ruless. 6

Subjects

sales taxpacking materialdeemed saleSection 6CAndhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Acttransaction naturetax assessmentlegal fictioncontainerbeercement

Judgment

~ RAJ STEEL & ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.
A
STATE OF A.P. & ANR. ETC. ETC.

MAY 16, 1989

{ [R.S. PATHAK, CJ. AND M.H. KANIA, J.] B

Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957/Andhra Pradesh
General Sales Tax Rules. Sections 2, 5, 6 and First Schedule Item 157/
~r, Rule 6--Assessees-Manufacturers of beer/cement-Goods-Beer sold
in botiles packed in cartons and cement in gunny bags-Assessment w
sales tax made on the turnover ofpacking material-Whether valid.
c
y
The appellants in some -Of the appeals are manufacturers of or
dealers in beer ,,the appellants in the other appeals are manufacturers of
or dealers in cement.

The appellants filed writ petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High D
Conrt challenging the assessment made under the Andhra Pradesh
General Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the turnover of packing material emp-
Joyed either by way of bottles for containing beer or by way of gunny
bags for packing cement. The appellants challenged the application of
_)..
such rate in assessments made in relation fo the period before 8 July,
1983. The appellants also challenged the application of that rate pro- E
posed pursuant to s. 6C in show cause notices issued by the concerned
authority. Section 6C was inserted in the Act with effect from 8 July,
1983.

-~
The High Court while dismissing the writ petitions, proceeded on
the basis that, having regard to the nature of the goods and to the trade F
practice in respect of beer and cement, the containers were necessary
concomitants in the transactions, and the transfer of property in the
containers was incidental or unavoidable, that the sale transactions had
to be regarded as composite and integrated sales of the containers and
their contents and what was really sold was the bottled beer or the
cement packed in gunny bags. The learned Jndges expressed the view G
that the consideration paid by the purchaser to the dealer consisted not
--{ only of the price of the contents, namely, beer or cement, but also
included the price of the containers, that is, the bottles and the cartons
in the case of beer and gunnies in the case of cement.

While allowing the appeals and ,remanding the cases to the High H
305
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.

A Court, and in the case of the writ petitions, while directing the assessing 'Y
authority to determine the matters after allowing the dealers to show
cause, this Court,

HELD: (I) A transaction of sale may consist of a sale of the pro-
duct and a separate sale of the container housing the product with
B respective sale considerations for the product and the container sepa-
rately; or it may consist of a sale of the product and a sale of the
container but'both Sales being conceived ofas integrated components ofa
single sale transaction;-or what may yet be of a third case, it may consist
of a sale of the product with the transfer of the container without any
sale consideration therefor. The question in every case will be a ques-
tion of fact as to the nature and ingredients of the sale. It is not right in
c law to pick on one ingredient only to the exclusion of the others and
deduce from it the character of the transaction. In every case, the
assessing authority is obliged to ascertain the true nature and character
of the transaction upon a consideration of all the facts and circum-
stances pertaining to the transaction. [310C-E; H; 311A]
D
Hyderabad Deccan Cigarette Factory v. The State of A.P., [1966]
17 STC 624, referred to.

(2) There can be as many different kinds of transactions as the \
circumstances of the case may require either by reason of prevailing ~'
E trade practice or market conditions or personal convenience, and as
human ingenuity may devise for bonafide reducing the burden of tax.
Whether a transaction for sale of packing material is an independent
transaction will depend upon several factors. [312E]

(3) The issue as to whether the packing material has been sold or
F merely transferred without consideration depends on the contract bet-
ween the parties. The fact that the packing is of insignificant value in
relation to the value of the contents may imply that there was no inten-
tion to sell the packing, but where any packing material is of significant
value it may imply an intention to sell the packing material. In a case
where the packing material is an independent commodity and the pack-
G ing material as well as the contents are sold independently. The sale of
the packing material is liable to tax independently; [313E-Gl
).-
Commissioner of Taxes, Assam v. Prabhat Marketing Co. Ltd.,
[ 1967] 19 STC 84; The State of Karnataka v. Shaw Wellace & Company 1
Ltd., [1981] 48 STC 169; Ar/em Breweries Ltd. v. The Assistant Com-
H missioner of Sales Tax, Panaji, [1983] 53 STC 172; M/s. Jamana Flour
RAJ STEEL v. STATE OF A.P. 307

Mill (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1207 and Punjab Distilling A
Industries Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Simla, [1959!
Supp. 1 SCR 683, referred to.

4. Section 6C seems to envisage a case where it is the goods which
are sold there is no actual sale of the packing material. The section
provides by legal fiction that the packing material shall be deemed to 8.
have been sold alongwith the goods. In that ev,,nt, the tax will be
Ieviable on such deemed sale of the packing mate1·ial at the rate of tax
applicable to the sale of the goods themselves. It is difficult to
comprehend the need for such a provision. It can at best be regarded as
a provision by way of clarification of an existing legal situation, which
merely explains that the components which have entered into determin- C
ing the price of the goods cannot be treated separately from the goods
themselves, and that no account was in fact taken of the packing mate-
rial when the transaction took place, and that if such account, must be
taken then the Same rate must be applied to the packing material as is
applicable to the goods themselves. l314D-E; 315A-Bf .
D
(5) It is difficult to accept the contention of the appellants that a
rate applicable to the packing material in the Schedule should be
applied to the sale of such packing material in a case under s. 6C, when
in fact there was no such sale of packing material and it is only by legal
fiction, and for a limited purpose, that such sale can be contemplated.
In the circumstances, no question arises of s. 6C bein_g constitutionally E
discriminatory, and therefore invalid. [315B-C]
•
(6) The High Court has proceeded on the assumption that what is
charged is the prke of the bottled beer or of cement packed in gunny
bags. No attempt was made by the tax authorities to ascertain the facts
of each case and to determine what were the actual ingredients of the F
contract and the intention of the ·parties. Assumptions had been made
when what was required was a detailed investigation into the facts.
Because of the lack of adequate and clear factual material, the High
Court also was compelled to proceed on the basis of generalised state-
ments and broad assumptions. [315C-E] ·
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1868- •
75 of 1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.2.1986 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in W.P. Nos. 10181of1983, 11830, 4677, 4763,
4778 of 1985, 4926, 4935 and 4948 of 1986. H·
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 3 S.C.R.

A A.K. Ganguli, A.K. Sen, Shanti Bhushan, Harish N. Salve, S. Y
Krishnan, J.B. Dada Chanji, Mrs. A.K. Verma, Joel Pares, R. Dave,
A. Subba Rao, Sunil Kumar Jain, Vi jay Hansaria, K. Srinivasa Murti,
Kailash Vasudev, Nauni Lal, A.T.M. Sampath, R. Kanmjawala, Mrs.
M. Karanjawala and H.S. Anand for the Appellants.
B
M.K. Banerjee, Solicitor General, B. Datta, Additional Solici- )'-
tor General, T.V.S.N. Chari, Ms. Sunita and Ms. Vrinda Grover for
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by {-..

C PATHAK, CJ. These appeals are directed against the judgment
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissing several writ petitions ~
filed by the appellants challenging assessments made under the
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 1957 on the value of packing
material at the rate applicable to goods packed therein.
D
The appellants in some of the appeals are manufacturers of or
dealers in beer, the appellants in the other appeals are manufacturers
of or dealers in cement. The beer is sold in bottles packed in cartons.
The cement is sold in gunnies. Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh
General Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') provides
E for the levy of sales tax on the turnover of goods at the rates specified
in that provision. In the case of goods mentioned in the First Schedule
to the Act tax is leviable at the rates, and at the point of sale, specified
therein. In the case of goods mentioned in the Sixth Schedule, likewise
tax is leviable at the rates and at the points specified therein. Item 19
of the First Schedule speaks of 'Containers other than gunnies and
F bottles'. These goods are subject to tax at the rate of 5 paise in the
rupee at the point of first sale in the State. Item 123 of the First
Schedule enumerates 'glass and glassware', which is subject to sales
tax at 9 paise in the rupee at the point of first sale in the State. In
respect of cement tax is leviable by reference to item 18 of the First
Schedule at the rate of 10 paise in the rupee at the point of first sale in
G the State, while gunnies, formerly mentioned under item 67 of the
First Schedule, and now included in item 157 of that Schedule, are
subject to tax at the point of first sale in the State. And beer is covered
by item I of the Sixth Schedule under the category 'Country Liquor'
taxable at the rate of 10 paise in the rupee at every point of sale other
than at the point of last sale, at which point the rate is 5 paise per
H rupee.
RAJ STEEL v. STATE OF A.P. [PATHAK, CJ.] 309

~ Clause (s) of Section z·of the Act defines 'turnover' to mean the
A
total amount set out in the bill of sale (or if there is no bill of sale, the
total amount charged) as the consideration for the sale or purchase of
goods (whether .such consideration be cash, deferred payment or any
other thing of value) including any sums charged by the dealer for

.,, I
anything done in respect of goods sold at the time of or before the
delivery of the goods and any other sums charged by the dealer, what-
ever be the description, name or object thereof; or the aggregate of
B

amounts charged under section 5-C.

With effect from 8 July, 1983, section 6C was inserted in the Act
1' by Andhra Pradesh Act No. 11of1984, and it provides:

,,_ 'Notwithstanding anything in sections 5 and 6-A, where c
goods packed in any materials are sold or purchased, the
materials in which the goods are so packed shall be deemed
to have been sold or purchased along with the goods and
the tax shall be leviable on such sale or purchase of the
materials at the rate of tax, if any, as applicable to the sale, D
or, as the case may be, purchase of goods themselves.'

. The net turnover of a dealer assessable to tax is determined
under rule 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, after
deducting the amount specified in clauses (a) to (1) of that rule from
the total turnover. Of these clauses, clause (g) speaks of: E

'Amounts relating to charges for services rendered in
connection with the packing of goods when specified and
charged for by the dealer separately, without including
them in the price of goods sold.'
F
The appe]lants filed the writ petitions, out of which the present
appeals arise, 1n the High Court at Hyderabad challenging the assess·
ments to sales tax made on the turnover of packing material employed
either by way of bottles for containing beer or by way of gunny bags for
packing cement. The appellants challenged the application of such rate
in assessments made in relation to the period before 8 July, 1983. The G
appellants also challenged the application of that rate proposed
i pursuant to s. 6C in show cause notices issued by the concerned
authority. While dismissing the writ petitions, the High Court has
proceeded on the basis that having regard to the nature of the goods
and to the trade practice in respect of beer and cement the containers
were necessary concomitants in the transactions, and the transfer of l:I
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 3 S.C.R.

property in the containers was incidental or unavoidable, that the sale
A
transactions ·had to be regarded as composite and integrated sales of
the containers and their contents and what was really sold was. the
bottled beer or the cement packed in gunny bags. The learned Judges
observed further that even where money was paid to the dealer as
security deposit refundable on the return of the bottles the sale of the
B bottle could not be treated as an independent transaction different and )
distinct from the transaction of sale of the beer. So also was the case in
the sale of cement contained in gunnies. The learned Judges expressed
the view that the consideration paid by the purchaser to the dealer
consists not only of the price of the contents, namely, beer or cement,
but also includes the price of the containers, that is the bottles and the
cartons in the case of beer and gunnies in the case of cement.
c
It is commonly accepted that a transaction of sale may consist of
a sale of the product and a separate sale of the container housing the
product with respective sale considerations for the product and the
container separately; or it may consist of a sale of the product and a
D sale of the container but both sales being conceived of as integrated
components of a single sale transaction; 07, what may yet be a third
case, it may consist of a sale of the producJ with the transfer of the
container without any sale consideration therefor. The question in
every case will be a question of fact as to what are" the nature and
ingredients of the sale. It is not rigl\t in law to pick on one ingredient
E only to the exclusion of the others and deduce from it the character of
the transaction. For example, the circumstance that the price of the
product and the price of the container are shown separately may be
evidence that two separate transactions are envisaged, but that
circumstance alone cannot be conclusive of the true character of the
transaction. It is not unknown that traders may, for the advantage of
F their trade, show what is essentially a single sale transaction of product
and container, or a transaction of a sale of the product only with no
consideration for the transfer of the container, as divisible into two
separate transactions, one of sale of the product, and the other a sale
of the container, with a distinct price shown against each. Similarly
where a deposit is made by the purchaser with the dealer, the deposit
G may be pursuant to a transaction where there is no sale of the con-
tainer and its return is contemplated, and in the event of its not being
returned the security is liable to forfeiture. Alternatively, it may be a )
· case where the container is sold and the deposit represents the consi-
deration for the sale, and in the event of the container being returned
to the dealer the deposit is returned by way of consideration for the
H re-sale. In every case, the assessing authority is obliged to ascertain the
RAJ STEEL v. STATE OF A.P. (PATHAK, CJ.] 311

true nature and character of the transaction upon a consideration of all A
the facts and circumstances pertaining to the transaction. That "the
problem almost always requires factual investigation into the nature
and ingredients of the transactiqn has been repeatedly emphasised by
this Court. In Hyderabad Deccan Cigarette Factory v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh, (1966] 17 STC 624 this Court said:
B
"It is not possible to state as a proposition of law that
whenever particular goods were sold in a container the
parties did not intend to sell and buy the container also.
Many cases may be visualized where the container is com-
paratively of high value and sometimes even higher than
that contained in it. Scent or whisky may be sold in costly C
containers. Even cigarettes may be sold in silver or gold
caskets. It may be that in such cases the agreement to pay
an extra price for the container may be more readily imp-
lied. In the present case, if we may say so with respect, all
the authorities, including the High Court, dealt with the
question as a question of law without considering the rele- D
vant factors which would sustain or negative any such
agreement. ..... .

A perusal of the orders of the various authorities and the
High Court shows that a simple question of fact has been
sidetracked by copious citations. Whether there was an E
agreement to sell the packing materials is a pure question
of fact and that question cannot be decided on fictions or
surmises. That is what has happened in this case. The Com-
mercial Tax Officer invoked a fiction; the . Assistant
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes relied upon the
doctrine of "finished product"; the Appellate Tribunal re- F
lied upon surmises; and the High Court, on the principle of
implied agreement. But none has tackled the real question.
The burden lies upon the Commercial Tax Officer to prove
that a turnover is liable to tax. No doubt he can ask the
assessee to produce the relevant material; and if he does
not produce the same, he may draw an adverse inference G
against him. But, he must decide the crucial question
whether the packing materials were subject of the agree-
ment of sale, express or implied. To ascertain the said fact
he can rely upon oral statements, accounts and other docu-
ments, personal enquiry and other relevant circumstances
such as the nature and the purpose of the packing materials H
used."
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.

A Again, in Commissioner of Taxes, Assam v. Prabhat Marketing Co., )
Ltd., [1967] 19 STC 84 this Court accepted as well-founded submission
that the parties may have intended in the circumstances to sell
hydrogenated ~ii apart from the containers, and the mere fact that the
price of the containers was not separately fixed would make no differ-
ence in the assessment of sales tax, and went on to observe:
B
"It is well-established that in order to constitute a sale it is
necessary that there should be an agreement between the
parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods, the
agreement must be supported by money consideration, and
that as a result of the transaction the property should actu-
ally pass in the goods. Unless all the ingredients are present
c in the transaction there could be no sale of goods and sales
tax cannot be imposed State of Madras v. Gannon
Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd., [1959] S.C.R. 379

D The question as to whether there is an agreement to sell
packing material is a pure question of fact depending upon
the circumstances found in each case."

There can be as many different kinds of transactions as the
circumstances of the case may require either by reason of prevailing
E trade practice or market conditions or personal convenience, and as
human ingenuity may devise for bona fide reducing the burden of tax.
In The State of Karnataka v. Shaw Wallace and Company Ltd., [1981]
48 STC 169 the High Court of Karnataka pointed out that there was an
agreement to sell the bottles and crates in which the liquor was con-
veyed and there was also an agreement in regard to the price of those
F containers, and therefore the turnover in regard to those items had to
be determined and the appropriate rate of sales tax had to be charged
as provided in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. Reference was made to
the requirement in the Karnataka Excise Act, 1966 that the liquor had
to be sold in sealed containers but that, the High Court said, did not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the same rate of sales tax was
G applicable to containers also. lt was observed that such a presumption
could not be made, specially when separate rates were specified in the
Sales Tax Act in regard to the containers and the contents. In Arlem J
Breweries Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Panaji,
[ 1983] 53 STC 172 the Panaji Bench of the High Court of Bombay
noted that item 22 of the First Schedule to the Goa, Daman and Diu
H Sales Tax Act, 1964, which spoke of the item "foreign liquor and
RAJ STEEL v. STATE OF A.P. !PATHAK, CJ.I 313

India-made foreign liquor" indicated that the tax was levied only on
A
the liquor and not against the bottle and liquor or bottled liquor. The
sale was of beer and the bottles were treated separately. It was also
pointed out that the agreement by the assessee with the wholesaler did
not create any obligation on the purchasers to return the bottles nor
did it fix any time for their return. The payment of an amount for the
bottles in advance as a term of the sale was referred to as cost of the B
bottles and this, the High Court said, constituted the sale price of the
bottles although described as a deposit. In Mis Jamana Flour & Oil
Mill (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1207 this Court affirmed
the finding that there was an implied agreement of the sale of gunny
bags. It said:

"Admittedly gunny bags are a different commodity and
c
sale thereof is assessable to tax at 41/z % . It is not disputed
that the appellant bought gunny bags for packing wheat
products for the purpose of sale. The control order contem-
plates a net weight which means that the weight of the bag
is included in the price to be charged by the dealer. Under D
the Explanation when packing is done in doth-bags, a
higher rate is admissible. The scheme clearly suggests that
the price of gunny bags is inclusive and where cloth-bag is
used, a higher price over and above what has been pro-
vided for ordinary containers is permitted."
E
It is, therefore, perfectly plain that the issue as to whether the
packing material has been sold or merely transferred without consi-
deration depends on the contract between the parties. The fact that
the packing is of insignificant value in relation to the value of the
contents may imply that there was no intention to sell the packing, but
where any packing material is of significant value it may imply an F
intention to sell the packing material. In a case where the packing
material is an independent commodity and the packing material as well
as the contents are sold independently, the packing material is liable to
tax on its own footing. Whether a transaction for sale of packing mate-
riaJ is an independent transaction will depend upon several factors,
some of them being: G

1. The packing material is a commodity having its own identity
and is separately classified in the Schedule;

2. There is no change, chemical or physical, in the packing
either at the time of packing or at the time of using the content; H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.

3. The packing is capable of being reused after the contents have
A
been consumed;

4. The packing is used for convenience of transport and the
quantity of the goods as such is not dependent on packing;

B 5. The mere fact that the consideration for the packing is
merged with the consideration for the product would not y
make the sale of packing an integrated part of the sale of the
product.
In one case, Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. The Commissioner of
Income Tax, Simla, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 683 where the bottles were
C sold by the assessee under a buy-back scheme, the security deposit for
the return of the bottles was held to be merely in the nature of an
incentive to the buyer to return the bottles.
Turning to s. 6C of the Act, it seems to envisage a case where it is
the goods which are sold and there is no actual sale of the packing
D material. The section provides by legal fiction that the packing mate-
rial shall be deemed to have been sold along with the goods. In other
words, although there is no sale of the packing material, it will be
deemed that there is such a sale. In that event, the section declares,
the tax will be leviable on such deemed sale of the packing_ material at !he
rate of tax applicable to the sale of the goods themselves. It is difficult
E to comprehend the need for such a provision. It can at best be re-
garded as a provision by way of clarification of an existing legal situa-
tion. If the transaction is one of sale of the goods only, clearly all that·
can be taxed in fact is the sale of the goods, and the rate to be applied
must be read in the case of such goods. It may be that the price of the
goods is determined upon a consideration of several components,
F including the value of the packing material, but nonetheless the price
is the price of the goods. It is not open to anyone to say that the value
of the different components which have entered into a determination
of the price of the goods should be analysed and separated, in order
that different rates of tax should be applied according to the character
of the component (for example, packing material). Whats. 6C intends
G to lay down is that even upon such analysis the. rate of tax to be applied
to the component will be the rate applied to the goods themselves.
And that is for the simple reason that it is the price of the goods alone
which constitutes the transaction between the dealer and the purch-
aser. No matter what may be the component which enters into such
price, the parties understand between them that the purchaser is pay-
H ing the price of the goods. Section 6C merely clarifies and explains that
RAJ STEEL v. STATE OF A.P. [PATHAK, CJ.) 315

the components which have entered into determining the price of the
A
goods cannot be treated separately from the goods themselves, and
that no account was in fact taken of the packing material when the
transaction took place, and that if such account must be taken then the
same rate must be applied to the packing material as is applicable to.
the goods themselves. We find it difficult to accept the contention of
the appellants that a rate applicable to the packing material in the B
Schedule should be applied to the sale of such packing material in a
case under s. 6C, when in fact there was no such sale of packing
material and it is only by legal fiction, and for a limited purpose, that
such sale can be contemplated. In the circumstances, no question
arises of s. 6C being constitutionally discriminatory, and therefore
invalid.
c
·In the appeals before us, we find that the High Court has pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the transactions are covered by trade
practice and having regard to the nature of the goods it has inferred
that what is charged is the price of the bottled beer or of cement
packed in gunny bags, and reference has also been made to the Excise
Law and the Cement Control Order requiring that the liquor or the 0
cement, as the case may be, must be sold in bottles or in gunny bags
respectively. We are constrained to observe that no attempt has been
made by the tax authorities to ascertain the facts of each case and to
determine what were the actual ingredients of the contract and the
- _).. intention of the parties. Assumptions have been made when what was
required was a detailed investigation into the facts. We have indicated .. E
·earlier the several possibilities which are open in cases of this kind, and
how the ultimate conclusion can be vitally affected by the tests to be
... applied. Because of the lack of adequate and clear factual material,
the High Court also was compelled to proceed on the basis of
generalised statements and broad assumptions. We are unable, in. the
circumstances, to hold that the cases can be regarded as disposed of F ·
finally. It is regrettable but the cases must go back for proper findings
on facts to be ascertained on fuller investigation.
In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed, the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court in the several cases are set aside
and the cases are remanded to the High Court for further considera- G
tion and disposal in the light of the observations made by us. In the
case of the writ petitions before us, the assassing authority will allow
the dealer to show cause and thereafter upon evidence led before it
determine the matter. There is no order as to costs.

R.S.S. Appeals allowed. H