RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGING DIRECTOR & ANR.versusRAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

                          [2020] 1 S.C.R. 113                             113


RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGING                             A
               DIRECTOR & ANR.
                                  v.
                   RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA
                   (Civil Appeal No. 7472 of 2011)                        B
                        JANUARY 16, 2020
     [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – ss. 2(k), s.2-A – Imposition of
fine on the respondents-workmen by the appellant-management –
                                                                          C
Assailed by respondents by filing suit in 2005 inter alia for permanent
injunction – Appellant filed application u/Or. VII, r.11, CPC for
rejection of the plaint and relegation of the respondents to the remedy
under the 1947 Act – Dismissed – Revision petition dismissed by the
High Court – On appeal, held: 1947 Act is an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism for the benefit of the workmen to provide            D
speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora
of procedural laws – Object is thus, to protect the workmen – In the
present case, the principles as set out in para 9 of the judgment in
the Premier Automobiles Ltd. case would govern – Present case
involves recovery of certain fine amount which cannot be said to
                                                                          E
be covered by s.2-A of the 1947 Act – Workmen in their wisdom (or
possibly, lack of it) approached the civil court and have been left
high and dry for the last fifteen years without any adjudication on
merits of their claims – Suit has not even been proceeded with on
the basis that matter is pending before Supreme Court – No ground
made out to interfere with the impugned order – Civil Judge to            F
forthwith proceed to try the suit and endeavour to complete the
trial and pronounce the judgment, if not already pronounced, in
the maximum period of six months from the date of receipt of the
order – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. VII, r.11.
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court                                   G
      HELD: 1. On examination, it is found that the principles
set out in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram
Wadke of Bombay & Ors. would govern i.e. as set out in para 9.

                                                                          H
                                 113
114            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     The Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is an alternative dispute
      resolution mechanism for the benefit of the workmen to provide
      “speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora
      of procedural laws. The object is thus, to protect the workmen.
      The impugned orders are also, in a sense interlocutory in
      character. The present case involves recovery of certain fine
B
      amount which cannot be said to be covered by Section 2-A of the
      Industrial Disputes Act. The workmen in their wisdom (or
      possibly, lack of it) approached the civil Court and have been left
      high and dry for the last fifteen years without any adjudication on
      merits of their claims. The impugned orders are also, in a sense
C     interlocutory in character. There is no ground made out to
      interfere with the impugned order and the appeal is consequently
      dismissed. In view of the lapse of time, the Civil Judge is directed
      to forthwith proceed to try the Civil Suit No.774/2005 and
      endeavour to complete the trial and pronounce the judgment, if
      not already pronounced in the maximum period of six months
D
      from the date of receipt of the order. [Paras 6, 8-12] [115-H;
      118-E; 119-A-C]
            Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram
            Wadke of Bombay & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 496 : [1976] 1
            SCR 427 – relied on.
E
           C.A. No. 7475/2011, C.A. No. 7474/2011, C.A. No.7473/
      2011 & C.A. No. 7476/2011
             The appeals are dismissed in view of the order passed above in
      Civil Appeal No.7472/2011.
F                              Case Law Reference
      [1976] 1 SCR 427                  relied on                 Para 6
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7472
      of 2011.
G           From the Judgment and Order dated 27.02.2008 of the High
      Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Revision Petition
      No. 130 of 2006.
            With
            Civil Appeal Nos. 7475, 7474, 7473, 7476 of 2011.
H
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGING                                    115
       DIRECTOR v. RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

     S. K. Bhattacharya, L.K. Paonam, Ms. Seema Sharma, Niraj                    A
Bobby Paonam, Mrs. Tomthinnganbi Koijam, Advs. for the Appellants.
       Bankey Bihari Sharma, Yash Pal Dhingra, Parmanand Gaur, Advs.
for the Respondent.
       The following Order of the Court were passed :
                                                                                 B
                                ORDER
       Civil Appeal No.7472/2011
       1. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.
       2. None has appeared for the respondent(s).
                                                                                 C
       3. The civil suit was filed by the workmen for declaration and
permanent injunction assailing a fine imposed on them by the appellant
management. It is, inter alia, the plea of the respondents that what has
been done is in violation of Regulation 35 of the standing order (which is
non-statutory) in effect thus, the contractual obligation inter se the parties
                                                                                 D
is alleged to have been breached.
       4. The appellant endeavoured to stall the suit by raising a plea
under order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 claiming that
the plaint is liable to be rejected and the respondents to be relegated to
the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The plea did not
                                                                                 E
find favour with the learned Civil Judge, Jaipur City who dismissed that
application by order dated 16.5.2006. The revision petition preferred
against the same was dismissed by the High Court on 27.02.2008. Twelve
years hence we are determining whether this exercise of the two forums
below was valid or not!
       5. We may note that only notice was issued in the matter and no           F
interim order was granted. Logically speaking, the suit would have been
tried and decided in the meantime, if not the appeal also considering the
time period which has lapsed. We are, however, informed that the suit
has not even been proceeded with on the basis that matter is pending
before this Court. The facts pain us that the recourse to justice can be         G
delayed for such an ad infinitum period of time.
     6. On examination, we find that the principles set out in The
Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay
& Ors.- 1976(1) SCC 496 would govern i.e. as set out in para 9 below:
                                                                                 H
116             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A           “9. It would thus be seen that through the intervention of the
            appropriate government, of course not directly, a very extensive
            machinery has been provided for settlement and adjudication of
            industrial disputes. But since an individual aggrieved cannot
            approach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redress
            of his grievance without the intervention of the government, it is
B
            legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under the
            Act is not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction of the civil
            court for trial of industrial disputes. If the dispute is not an industrial
            dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) or within the meaning
            of Section 2A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for
C           adjudication of such disputes under the Act. Civil courts will be
            the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for the
            purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability under the
            general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability
            created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an
            election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the
D
            machinery under the Act or to approach the civil court. It is plain
            that he can’t have both. He has to choose the one or the other.
            But we shall presently show that the civil court will have no
            jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it
            concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only
E           under the Act. In that event civil court will have no jurisdiction
            even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened
            injury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract
            is one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Act
            alone.”
F            7. Learned counsel does not dispute that the view taken in the
      aforesaid judgment has not been overruled but seeks to submit that the
      legal position has been elucidated in the case of the appellant in Rajasthan
      State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and
      Ors.-(1995) 5 SCC 75 as under:
G           “35. We may now summarise the principles flowing from the above
            discussion:
            (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e.,
            where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of
            contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not
H           maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGING                               117
       DIRECTOR v. RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

   “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section       A
   2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
   (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance
   or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the
   Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums
   created by the said Act.                                                 B
   (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance
   or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments
   like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,1946 - which
   can be called ‘sister enactments’ to Industrial Disputes Act- and
   which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the        C
   only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the
   Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes
   within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial
   Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute
   shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall
   be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial            D
   Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open.
   (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the
   Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason
   that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made
   by the appropriate government. The power to make a reference             E
   conferred upon the government is to be exercised to effectuate
   the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is
   to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a
   totally frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred is the power
   to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the          F
   government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex-facie
   frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.
   (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to
   the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision
   enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial               G
   Tribunal directly - i.e., without the requirement of a reference by
   the government - in case of industrial disputes covered by Section
   2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in
   removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the
   remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.
                                                                            H
118             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A           (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance
            with the Industrial employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 are
            statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon
            the employers and employees, though they do not amount to
            “statutory provisions”. Any violation of these Standing Orders
            entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums
B
            created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where
            recourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles indicated
            herein.
            (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and
            its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution
C           mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy,
            inexpensive, informal and un-encumbered by the plethora of
            procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable
            to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals
            under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the
D           sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in
            the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.”
             8. We must keep in mind that the Industrial Dispute Act is an
      alternative dispute resolution mechanism for the benefit of the workmen
      to provide “speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the
E     plethora of procedural laws. The object is thus, to protect the workmen.
             9. It has also been observed that dispute arises from general law
      of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general
      law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not
      maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial
F     dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial
      Disputes Act, 1947. It is only when the dispute involves recognition,
      observance or inforcement of or obligations created by the Industrial
      Disputes Act, the only remedy would be exclusively under the provisions
      of the Industrial Disputes Act Act. The facts of this case involved the
      termination of service of workmen and thus the remedy was inter alia
G     under the Industrial Disputes Act.
             10. The present case involves recovery of certain fine amount
      which cannot be said to be covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial
      Disputes Act. The workmen in their wisdom (or possibly, lack of it)
      approached the civil Court and have been left high and dry for the last
H     fifteen years without any adjudication on merits of their claims. We
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGING                                  119
       DIRECTOR v. RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

may also note that the impugned orders are also, in a sense interlocutory      A
in character.
       11. We are thus, of the view that there is no ground made out to
interfere with the impugned order and the appeal is consequently
dismissed.
       12. In view of the lapse of time, we direct the Civil Judge to          B
forthwith proceed to try the Civil Suit No.774/2005 and endeavour to
complete the trial and pronounce the judgment, if not already pronounced
in the maximum period of six months from the date of receipt of the
order.
      13. The appeal is dismissed in terms aforesaid.                          C

     C.A. No. 7475/2011, C.A. No. 7474/2011, C.A. No.7473/
2011 & C.A. No. 7476/2011
       The appeals are dismissed in view of the order passed above in
Civil Appeal No.7472/2011.                                                     D


Divya Pandey                                              Appeals dismissed.



                                                                               E




                                                                               F




                                                                               G




                                                                               H