Holding

Order XXI Rule 1 of the CPC applies to Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awards, and the judgment debtor is liable for interest from the date of deposit until notice of deposit is given to the decree holder.

Summary

The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (RSRTC) deposited the award amount from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the executing court but failed to give notice to the decree holders. The decree holders claimed interest from the date of deposit (June 27, 1986) until they were informed (April 19, 1989). The corporation argued that Order XXI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) did not apply to claims under Section 110(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and that Haryana’s adoption of the Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules did not incorporate the amendment inserting Order XXI. The Supreme Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to such claims and that the judgment debtor must give notice of deposit; failure to do so makes the debtor liable for interest until notice is given. Consequently, the corporation’s appeal was dismissed and the Tribunal’s award of interest upheld.

Issues considered

Whether Order XXI Rule 1(2) of the CPC applies to awards made under Section 110(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Whether the amendment inserting Order XXI into Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules was incorporated into the Rules adopted by Haryana, thereby making the provision applicable in Haryana.
Whether the judgment debtor is liable to pay interest from the date of deposit of the decretal amount to the date the decree holder is notified of such deposit.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI Rule 1
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 110(c)

Subjects

Motor Accident Claims TribunalOrder XXI Rule 1interest on decretal amountnotice of depositprocedural lawjudgment debtor liabilityincorporation of amendments

Judgment

A RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT ~,,-

CORPORATION JAIPUR
v.
SMT. POONAM PAHWA AND ORS.

JULY 9, 1997
B
(G.N. RAY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.j

Code uf Civil Procedure, 1908 : Order XX! Rule 1 (2)-Acci-
dent-Claims petition---Award--Appellant-Corporation deposited the decre-
c ta/ amount in the Court-No notice of deposit to the decree holders-Interest
from the date of deposit till the date of infonnation of deposit claimed-Al-
lowed by Tribunal-Review petition dismissed-On appeal, Held, it was
obligatory on the judgment-debtor to give notice to the decree holders about
the deposit of decretal amount-Liable to pay interest_:_No interference with
the judgment of the Tribunal-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939--Section
D
110(c)-Punjab Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908--0rder XX! Rule 1(2)-Applicability of
in respect of Sec. llO(c) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Punjab Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964--Rule
E
20--Amendment inserting Order XX! C.P.C.-Adoption of the Punjab Rules
by the State of Haryana-Therefore the Rules applicable in State of Haryana
along with the said amendment to Punjab Rules as, on the date of adoption
the Punjab Rules stood amended.

F A bus of the appellant-Corporation met with an accident and one 'S'
travelling in th~ bus died. Claim petition was filed by dependents of the
deceased (respondents 1 to 3). In pursuance to an award by the Tribunal,
the appellant-Corporation deposited the decretal amount in the Executing
Court. But the decree holders were not informed about the deposit either
by the Court or by the appellant. Therefore, a claim for further interest
G
from the date of deposit till the decree holders got information about the
deposit was made. The Tribunal allowed the said claim. The Revision
Petition of the appellant Corporation was dismissed by the High Court. ~
Hence the present appeal.

H The contentipn for the appellant-Corporation was that order XXI
698
RAJASTHAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POON AMPAHWA 699

Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable in respect of A
claims made under sec. UO(C) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was also
contended that amendment of Rule 20 of the Punjab Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal Rules, 1969 had not been incorporated in the Rules
applicable to the State of Haryana, and hence the provisions of Order XXI
of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable. It was also contended B
that judgment debtor had deposited the decretal amount and for failure
of the Court, no liability could be fastened on the judgment debtor.

The contention on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3 was that as
Haryana had adopted the Punjab Rules in 1972, by implication it will mean
that Punjab Rules as stood amended on the date of adoption of Punjab c
Rules in Haryana in 1972, were applicable in the State of Haryana. It was

-- further contended that the liability under Order XXI Rule 1 Code of Civil
Procedure could not be evaded by the judgment debtor.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court D
HELD : 1.1. The appellant cannot escape its liability to pay interest
to the decree holders for the period between the date of deposit of the
decretal amount and the date of notice of such deposit of the decree
,holders. [712-G]
E
1.2. Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code as amended in 1976
expressly provides that the judgment debtor shall give notice of the deposit
oFlhe decretal amount to the decree holder either through the court or
directly to the decree holder. The obligation of giving notice to the decree
holder is not absolved by simply depositing the amount without taking F
steps to ensure service of the notice of such deposit to the decree holder
through Court or otherwise. [712-F]

1.3. After the amendment of Order XXI Rule 1 in 1976, there is no
scope for any controversy as to the liability of the judgment debtor when G
the decretal amount is deposited in Court but the notice of such deposit
is not given to the decree holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor
has to give notice to the decree holder about deposit for the decretal
amount. Since motor accident had taken place in 1983, Order XXI Rule 1
as amended in 1976 is clearly applicable. Even otherwise also, the
provision of Order XXI Rule 1 being a procedural law, amended provisions H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable even if the accident had taken place
prior to 1976 because such amendment of procedural law is retrospective ·•
in its operation. (715-D-E]

2.1. The State of Haryana has adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 by substituting the word 'Haryana' for Punjab
B in Rule 1 clause (b) and in Rule 2 Clause (b). In the Punjab Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal Rules amendment was effected by inserting
Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure in Rule 20 framed under Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939. When Haryana had adopted the Punjab Motor
Accidents Rule is 1972, it has adopted the Punjab Rules as .it stood on the
C date of adoption. Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure has been ....
expressly made applicable in Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
Rules by amending the Punjab Rules in June 1968 which was published in
Gazette. Therefore, by adopting the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal ':-
Rules 1964 in 1972, Haryana has adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 as stood amended on the date of adoption.
D [710-F-H; 711-A]
Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India, [1979) 2 SCC 529 and
Boiani Ores. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1974] 2 SCC 777, referred to.

2.2. There was no legislative intendment to restrict the Punjab Rules
E in its application in Haryana only to the extent of Punjab Rules of 1964.
The amendment in Punjab Rules in 1968 was made to bring to effect the
procedural law being followed by the Civil Courts for ensuring fair trial
and justice by inserting Order XXI Civil Procedure Code. [712-BJ

F State of Maharashtra v. Madhavrao Damodar Patil and Anr. etc., AIR
(1968) SC 1395, referred to.

3. The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are not in any way
inconsistent with the provisions for awarding just and fair compensation
in Motor Accident Claims. The real purpose of awarding just and fair
G compensation to victim of accident, or the legal heirs of such victim will
be fulfilled by applying the principle of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure
Code so that the awardee is not deprived of the opportunity of gainfully
utilising the amount under the award for want of notice about the deposit
made by judgment debtor resulting in the sum remaining unutilised.
H Therefore, there is no difficulty to apply the underlying principles under
RAJASIBAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POONAM PAHWA 701

Order XXI, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code in executing the award of com· A
pensation passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the
Tribunal is competent to invoke the beneficial provisions of Order XXI
Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. [714-D·F]

Mathunni Mathai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. and Ors., B
[1995] 4 SCC 26; Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Cor-
poration of India and Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 71; Meghraj v. Bayabai, [1969] 2
SCC 274; Laxminarayan Ganeshdas v. Ghasiram Dalchand Palaliwal, AIR
(1939) Nagpur 191 and State of Kera/av. Mahadeva Iyer, AIR (1969) Kerala
8, referred to.
c
Dr. M. Ismail Farnqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC
360; Magan/al Chagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay and Ors., [1975] 1 SCR; In Re Supreme Court The Special Courts
Bill, [1978], [1979] 2 SCR 476, 532, 571, 573; K. Narayan Reddiar v. P.
Venugopala Reddiar, (1976) ACJ 474 (AP); Amarjit Kaur v. Vanguard In- D
surance Co. Ltd., (1969) ACJ 286; Jai Singh v. V.NA. Subramaniam, (1983)
ACJ 1; M/s. South Indian Insurance Co. v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribuna~
J & K & Ors., AIR (1973) JK 38; New India Assurance Co. v. Punjab
Roadways, AIR (1964) Punjab 235; Bihar Cooperative Motor Vehicles In-
surance Society v. Rameshwar Raut, AIR (1970) Patna 172; Madras Motor
and General Insurance Co. v. K. Gopala Mudaliar,. (1972) ACJ 135 Mamt;is; E
South Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi and Ors., (1967) ACJ 153 and
M. Krishnan Nair v. Pankaj Jethaalal Sha, AIR (1979) Madras 259, cited.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4315 of
1997.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.3.91 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in C.R. No. 427 of 1991.

Rajeev Dhavan, (AC.), Gopal Singh, Anis Ahmad and Sushil Kumar
Jain for the Appellant. G

D.P. Mukherjee and (Lalita Kaushik) (NP) for the Respondents Nos. >~
4-6.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A G.N. RAY, J. Leave granted. Heard Learned counsel for the parties.

The question that calls for the decision of this Court is whether
Order XXI Rule 1(2) Code of Civil Procedure is applicable in respect of
the claims under Section llO(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and
whether it was justified in awarding interest on the decretal amount from
B June 26, 1986 (the date of deposit of the decretal amount in court) to April
19, 1989 (when decree holder came to know about the deposit of the
amount)?

The relevant facts of the case are that an accident had taken place
on May 7, 1983 in which one Shri Subhash Chand Pahwa who was travelling
C in the bus belonging to the appellant Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation from Jaipur to Delhi died due to accident by colliding with a
truck. A claim petition was filed on August 23, 1983 by respondent Nos. 1,
2 and 3, namely, the widow, minor son and daughter of the deceased
against the appellant and respondent No. 4, Shri Deepak Thakur who was
D the driver of Truck No. HRU 2995, respondent No. 5, Shri Durga Prasad
Parnarni, the owner of the said truck, respondent No. 6 M/s. New Delhi
Assurance Company limited are respondent No. 7, Ami Chand being the
driver of bus No. RNB 7720 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation.

The Accidents Claim Tribunal passed an award in favour of the
claimants, namely, Smt. Poonam Pahwa and her minor son and daughter
and against the respondents including the appellant Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) for a
sum of Rs. 2.5 lacs with 12% interest from the date of filing of the claim
petition till actual realisation.
F
The appellant-Corporation deposited a cheque of Rs. 3,36,111.30 on
June 27, 1986 in the executing Court comprising the decretal award of
compensation and interest calculated on the decretal award upto the date
of deposit of the said decretal amount. It is an admitted position that the
G decree holders were not informed either by the Court or by the judgment
debtors about the deposit of the said sum of Rs. 3,36,111.30 on June 27,
1986 and the decree holders came to know about such deposit only on
April 19, 1989. The decree holders, therefore, made a claim for further
interest at the said rate of 12% from the date of deposit till the decree
H holder got the information about such deposit made by the judgment
RATASTIIAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POON AMPAHWA [G.N. RAY, J.] 703

debtors. Such claim was opposed by the appellant-Corporation by A
contending inter alia that there was no obligation of the appellant
Corporation to give intimation to the decree holders about the deposit
made by the Corporation and the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1(2) of
the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in respect of the award
passed by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal and in any event if the B
Court had failed to give the intimation of such deposit, the judgment
debtors would not suffer any prejudice on account of the mistake
committed by the court. Such contentions, however, have been rejected by
the Tribunal in the execution proceedings. The appellant-Corporation
thereafter moved a Revision Petition before the Punjab and Haryana High C
Court against the order passed by executing court for depositing further
sum on account of the interest to be paid by the judgment debtors from
the date of deposit of the said decretal amount till the date when decree
holders had got the information of suc.h deposit. By the impugned
judgment, the Review Petition has been dismissed by the High Court.
D
Mr. S.K Jain, learne.d counsel appearing for the appellant, has
submitted that order XXI Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not
applicable in respect with the claim made under Section llO(C) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Mr. Jain has referred to the provisions of
Section llO(C) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which reads as under : E

"(1) In holding any enquiry under Section 110-B the claims tribunal
may subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow
such summary procedure as it thinks fit;

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers a Civil Court F
for th~ purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing
the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery
and production of documents and material objects and for
such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the claims
Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the G
purposes of Section and Chapter XXXV of Criminal Proce-
dure Code 1898 (Act 5 of 1988)."

Rules have been framed under Section 111-A of the Motor Vehicles
Act. Rule 20 of the said Rules prescribes that Order X, Rules 9 to 13 and
15 to 30 Order IX, Order XXXIII Rules 1 to 3 should be applicable in the H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A proceedings before Claims Tribunal.
The Punjab Government vide its Notification No. GSR
68/CA4/39/SIIl-Adm/(I) 68 dated June 21, 1968 amended Rule 20 to the
following effect :

B ''In the Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1969 in
Rule 20 between the words and figure Order XVII and Order
XXXIIO; the word and figure Order XXI shall be inserted."

Mr. Jain has contended that the said amendment of Rule 20 had not
C been incorporated in the Rules applicable in the State of Haryana. Hence,
in respect of the claim petition on account of accident taking place in the
State of Haryana, the Provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure has no manner of application. Mr. Jain has also submitted that c
in any event, the judgment debtor had deposited the decretal amount and
D such judgment debtor had no obligation to give notice to the decree
holders about making such deposit. He has submitted even if the Court
had a duty to inform the decree holders about such deposit, for the failure
of the Court, no liability can be fastened on the judgment debtor. Mr. Jain
has submitted that although the Tribunal rightly indicated the principle of
law that nobody should suffer on account of the mistake of the Court, the
E Tribunal erred in awarding interest for the said period against the
judgment debtor even though the judgment debtor did not commit the
mistake but deposited the entire decretal amount.

Mr. Jain has submitted that even though the provisions of Order XXI
F was not applicable in respect of the said claim petition because amendment
of Rule 20 in the State of Punjab by making Order 21 Civil Procedure Code
expressly applicable in 1968 had not been incorporated in Rules applicable
in Haryana, it has been erroneously held that provisions of Order XXI Civil
Procedure Code are applicable. He has, therefore, submitted that im-
G pugned decision in awarding further interest for the period between the
date of deposit and the date on which the decree holders got the informa-
tion about the deposit was illegal and wholly unjustified and therefore, this
appeal should be allowed setting aside the impugned judgment. ..<
Shri D.P. Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.
H 6 namely, M/s. New Delhi Assurance Company Limited and Ms. Lalita
RAJASTHANS.R.T.C.JAIPURv. POONAMPAHWA[G.N. RAY,J.] 705

Kaushik, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, A
namely, the driver and owner of the said truck, however, did not advance
any submission presumably because such respondents are not directly
concerned with the impugned decision.

Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior counsel at the request of this
Court, has appeared as amicus curiae in this appeal. Dr. Dhavan has B
submitted that by GSR 20/CA-4/39-S lllA/72 dated .January 28, 1972
Haryana has adopted the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules by indicating "In
Haryana the Punjab Motor Vehicles Claims tribunal Rules, 1964 adopted
after substituting the word Haryana for Punjab in Rule 1 Clause (b) and
in Rule 2 Clause (b)."Order XXI Civil Procedure Code was inserted in C
Rule 20 in the State of Punjab by amendment made on June 21, 1968 and
published in Gazette on July 12, 1968. As the Haryana has adopted the
Punjab Rules in 1972 by implication it will mean that Punjab Rules as stood
amended on the date of adoption of Punjab Rules in Haryana in 1972, was
applicable in the State of Haryana. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that in the D
impugned decision, no reference to 1972 notification of the Haryana
Government has been made and only reference is to the judgments of
Punjab and Haryana High Court of 1968 and 1970 (1968 ACT 360 (DB)
and (AIR 1970 Punjab 506).

Dr. Dhavan has submitted that if Order XXI of Civil Procedure E
Code is expressly applicable, law is well settled that the judgment debtor
has obligation to notify the date of deposit of decretal amount to the decree
holder. Btit even if Order XXI Civil Procedure Code is not expressly
applicable, the Tribunal having been exclusively vested with the power of
adjudication of the claims arising out of accident of motor vehicles, it has
to decide such claims fairly and reasonably by applying the underlying F
principles of the Civil Procedure Code.

Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the question, therefore, requires to
be considered in his case is :-

(1) Is the Civil Procedure Code or the principles underlying the G

-• provisions of the Code to be followed in the absence of any
specific incorporation of the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure particularly where a selective incorporation has
been made and some· provisions of the Code have been
incorporated but the relevant provisions of Order XXI have H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A not been incorporated specifically?

(2) Should the rule notice in Order XXI Rule 1(2) be applied
where no specific incorporation of the said rule has been
made and what rules to be applied where there is lacuna in
the procedure?
B
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that as an adjudicating authority of the
claim arising out of motor vehicle accident, the Tribunal has a duty to act
judicially and fairly by following the principles underlying the Code of Civil
Procedure as a bench mark for fairness unless any particular rule of the
C Code of Civil Procedure has been specially excluded. Dr. Dhavan has
submitted that in the instant case, there is no dispute that the procedure
of the judgment debtor's giving notice to the decree holder was not
followed. It is also not disputed that the executing court did not inform the
decree holder. The Claims Tribunal has been declared to be civil court
D for the purposes of taking evidence on oath, forcing attendance of
witnesses, discovery and production of document and such matters as may
be prescribed and also for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1988 as contained in Section 110(c) of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and corresponding Section 169(2) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under the rule making power under the said c
E Motor Vehicles Act, the State Government can inter alia lay down the
procedure to be followed by the tribunal and the powers vested in a civil
court which may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal. Rule 20 of the Motor
Vehicles Act states that the Code of Civil Procedure will apply in certain
cases. The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil
F Procedure 1908 shall in so far as may be applied to proceedings before the
Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15, Order IX, Order
XIII, Rules 3 to 10, Order XVI Rules 2 to 21, Order XVII, and Order
XXXIII, Rules 1 to 3. Amendment to Rule 20 has been made in different
states. In the State of Punjab, Order XXI was inserted in Rule 20 on June
21, 1968 and published in the Gazette on July 12, 1968. As already
G indicated, the State of Haryana adopted the Punjab Rules in 1972 after the
inclusion of Order XXI in the Punjab Rules in 1968, by GSR 20/CA-4/39/S
lllA/72 dated January 28, 1972.

Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the motor Vehicles legislation creates
H a Claims Tribunal which is a body for the purpose of adjudicating claims
RAJASTHANS.R.T.C.JAIPUR v. POONAMPAHWA(G.N. RAY,J.) 707

and it is headed by qualified legal personnel and it has a duty to give parties A
a chance to be heard and make an award determining the amount of
compensation. For the said contention, Dr. Dhavan has drawn the attention
of the Court to Sections 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and cor-
responding Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. Dr. Dhavan has
submitted that the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunals are in lieu of Civil B
Courts by excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts. For such contention,
reference has been made to Section llOF of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
and corresponding Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Dr.
Dhava11 has submitted that it will, therefore, appear that the Tribunal has
a duty to act judicially in a fair manner consistent with the stat11tory scheme
that ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. Dr. Dhavan has submitted C
that procedurally the Tribunal is supposed to act by way of summary
procedure as it thinks fit (Section llOC of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and
Section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). Dr. Dhavan has also contended
that the rule making power makes a distinction between the procedure to
be followed and the powers vested in a civil court which may be exercised D
by a Claim Tribunal and any other matter that may be prescribed. (Section
lllA of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 176 of Motor Vehicles Act,
1988). Dr. Dhavan has submitted that even if certain empowerments in the
Code of Civil Procedure are not made, the procedure may be prescribed
or not, the procedure to be followed must be fair. Dr. Dhavan has sub-
mitted that the criteria for determining the right procedure are the Civil E
Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code. In practice, the principles
underlying the Civil Procedure Code and the general law have been
followed as being consistent with public policy and due process.

Referring to Wade's Administrative Law (7th Edition page 931), Dr. F
Dhavan has contended that more generally, following the tribunalization of
justice, there is a need that the tribunals that are set up should be
commensurate to the task.

Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the need for a fair procedure stems
from the following sources : G
(i) Justice, equity and good conscience - it is a part of Indian
.. Law and must be deemed to have continued by virtue· of
Article 372 of the Constitution.

(ii) Article 21 as interpreted by this Court after Maneka Gandhi's H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A case [1978] 2 SCR 621 mandates a fair procedure.

(iii)· The principles of natural justice are founded on fairness, a
right to be heard and dealt with ,fairly.

It has also been submitted by Dr. Dhavan that as a matter of rule of
B law, where the right to adjudicate one's disputes is taken away from a court
of law, the alternative dispute settlement mechanism must be fair. For this
contention, Dr. Dhavan has drawn the attention of the Court to the
decisions in Dr. M. Ismail Fmuqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] .
6 SCC 360 at pp. 412, 422; Magan Lal Chagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal
C C01poration of Greater Bombay and Ors., [1975] 1 SCR at pp. 23, 24, 55
and In Re Supreme· Cowt. The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476,
532, 571, 573. Dr. Dhavan has also submitted that the underlaying prin-
ciples of general law have been made applicable on the footing that they
are consistent with the public policy. In support of this contention, Dr.
D Dhavan has referred to the decision of this Court in P. Sambamwthy &
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., [1987] 1 SCC 362 where the
application under Order XXIII in the writ proceedings has been upheld.
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the practice of this Court and the High
Courts has been to incorporate general principles underlying the provisions
of Civil Procedure Code even though such provisions of the Code have not
E been specifically incorporated in the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules.
In this connection, Dr. Dhavan has referred to the decision in State of
Haryana v. Darshana Devi, [1979] 2 SCC 236 where Order XXXIII dealing
with the provisions for suing as forma pauperis has been made applicable
in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Dr. Dhavan has also referred to
F the decision in Bhagwati Devi v. l.G. Goel, (1983) ACJ 123 SC where it has
been held following the principle in Darshana Devi, that claims tribunals
are courts within the meaning of Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Dr. Dhavan has also referred to a number of decisions of various High
Courts where the application of the principles underlying the Civil Proce-
dure Code have been invoked in the endeavour to make the procedure of
G the Tribunal workable and fair.

In K Narayan Reddiar v. P. Venugopala Reddiar, (1976) ACJ 474 at
483 (AP) - general provisions of the C.P. Code have been made applicable
to the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal on the footing that the Tribunal
H has the trappings of the Court Application of underlying principles of C.P.
RAJASTHAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POONAMP AHWA [G.N. RAY, J.] 7rJ)

Code has also been made in the decisions in Amarjit Kaur v. Vang11ard A
Ins11rance Co. Ltd., (1969) ACJ 286; Jai Singh v. V.NA. Subramaniam,
(1983) ACJ 1; M/s. South Indian Insurance Co. v. Motor Accidents Claims
Trib11nal, J & K & Others, AIR (1973) JK 38; New India Assurance Co. v.
P1111jab Roadways, AIR (1964) Punjab 235; Bihar Cooperative Motor
Vehicles Insurance Society v. Rameshwar Ra11t, AIR (1970) Patna 172 and B
Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. v. K Gopala Mudaliar, (1972)
ACJ 135 Madras. Similarly, the application of provisions in respect of filing
additional statements under Order VIII Rule 9 has been made in the South
Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi and Ors., (1967) ACJ 153. Applica-
tion of provisions on power to issue Commissions has been made in M. C
Krishnan Nair v. Pankaj Jethaalal Sha, AIR (1979) Madras 259.

Dr. Dhavan has submitted that Order XXI Rule 1 provides for
that:

(i) the obligation to pay interest continues until notice is given D
to the judgment debtor

(ii) the payment into court does not constitute a payment for the
decretal amount with interest
E
(iii) the judgment debtor may treat the said payment as towards
·- interest, with the result that the principal amount is still due

(iv) any payment into court without notice does not amount to
payment in full satisfaction of the decree and interest will
continue until notice is given (Order XXI Rule 1(4) Civil F
Procedure Code).

Dr. Dhavan has also submitted that the failure of not giving notices
not a technical matter but constitutes an important principle of fairness.

Dr. Dhavan has lastly submitted that admittedly the judgment debtor G
did not give notice for the decretal amount being deposited in Court even

- though the judgment debtor had an obligation under Order XXI Rule 1
Code of Civil Procedure to give such specific notice of the date of deposit
of the decretal amount to the decree holder. The judgment debtor,
therefore, cannot avoid the liability by contending that it was the duty of H
/

710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A the Court to intimate \J.nd if the Court has committed the mistake in not
informing the decree holder, the judgment debtor cannot suffer on account
of the !aches of the Court. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that since Rule 20
was amended by the State of Punjab in 1968 and Haryana has adopted the
said Rule in 1972, it should be held that the Haryana has adopted Rule 20
B with all amendments incorporated in Punjab Rules on the date adoption
of Punjab Rule by Haryana. Hence, the liability under Order XXI Rule 1
Code of Civil Procedure because of the expres$ application of Order XXI
in the Punjab Rules since adopted by State of Haryana cannot be evaded
by the Judgment debtor.

c Dr. Dhavan has further submitted that even if it is assumed that the
State of Haryana has adopted the Punjab Rules of 1964 without
amendment effected subsequently in 1968 by which Order XXI Civil
Procedure Code has been made expressly applicable, the Tribunal has the
authority to apply the underlying principle of Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil
D Procedure Code in awarding interest against the judgment debtor because
such principle under Order XXI Rule 1 is consistent with justice and
fairplay and the Tribunal having been vested with exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claims arising out of motor accidents, has to act fairly and
reasonably in resolving the claim. Therefore, the impugned judgment is
quite legal and valid and interference against the said decision is not called
E for.

After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances
of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
appellant and by Dr. Dhavan, the learned Senior counsel appearing as
F amicus curiae in this appeal, it appears to us that the State of Haryana has
adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 by
substituting the word 'Haryana' for Punjab in Rule 1 Clause (b) and in
Rule 2 Clause (b). Such adoption in the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal, 1964 was made on January 20, 1972. In the Punjab Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules 1964, amendment was effected on June
G 21, 1968 by inserting Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure in Rule
20 framed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In our view, Dr. Dhavan is
justified in his submission that when Haryana has adopted the Punjab
Motor Accidents Rules in 1972, it must be held that it has adopted the
Punjab Rules as it stood on the date of adoption, namely, January 20, 1972.
·-
H Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure has been expressly made
RAJASTHAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POON AMP AHWA [G.N. RAY, J.] 711

applicable in Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules by amending A
the Punjab Rules in June 1968 which was published in Gazette on July 12,
_I
1968. Therefore, by adopting the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules,
1964 in 1972, it should be held that Haryana has adopted the Punjab Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 as stood amended on the date of
adoption. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this B
Court in Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India, [1979] 2 SCC 529 and
Boiani Ores Ltd. v. Stµte of Orissa, [1974] 2 SCC 777. In Mahindra and
Mahindra's case, it has been held that if there is mere reference to a
provision of statute in another without incorporation, then unless a dif-
ferent intention clearly appears, Section 8(1) of General Clauses Act would
apply and the reference would be construed as a reference to the provision C
as may be in force from time to time in the former statute. But if a provision
of one statute is incorporated in another, any subsequent amendment in
the former statute or even its total repeal would not affect the provision as
incorporation in the latter statute.
D
In the decision in Boiani Ores' case, the question came up for
consideration of this· Court as to whether the definition of 'motor vehicles'
in Section 2(18) of the Bi1'.ar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 .
as incorporated in Orissa by the Orissa Amendment Act of 1940 will
include the definition 'motor vehicles' in the Motor Vehicles Act as
amended in 1956. It has been held by this Court that incorporation of the E
definition of 'motor vehicles' in the Orissa Taxation Act would not be
affected by subsequent amendment of the definition of 'motor vehicle' in
the Motor Vehicles Act. In appreciating the definition of 'motor vehicle'
as incorporated by the Taxation Act, regard must be had to the intention
of the legislature in adopting such a method, its purpose and intendment F
as also the definition of the Motor Vehicles Act. It has also been indicated
that nature of tax under the Taxation Act must remain compensatory and
regulatory in character. If a vehicle does not use the public road, it cannot
be taxed. Therefore, legislature only intended to incorporate by reference
to the definition of motor vehicles as in 1940.
G
There is nothing to indicate that in Haryana, the Punjab Motor
~·
Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 without the amendment effected
in the said Rules after 1964 were adopted. Hence, when Punjab Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal Rules were adopted by only referring the Rules
and not by expressly indicating that the said Punjab Rules of 1964 as it H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A stood in 1964 were only adopted, it must be held that the Punjab Rules as
stood amended on the date of adoption by Haryana are applicable in the
State of Haryana. It cannot also be held that there was a legislative
intendment to restrict the Punjab Rules in its application in Haryana only
to the extent of Punjab Rules of 1964. The amendment in Punjab Rules in
B 1968 was made in order to bring in effect the procedural law being followed
by the civil courts for ensuring fair trial and justice by inserting Order XXI
Civil Procedure Code. In this connection, reference may be made to a
decision of a seven Judges' Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v.
Madhavrao Damodar Patil and Anr. Etc., AIR (1968) SC 1395. The ques-
tion arose for consideration by. this Court in the said case was whether
C amendments effected in the Maharashtra State Agricultural Land (Ceiling
on Holdings) Act, 1961 have the protection for being included in Ninth
Schedule of the Constitution when for inclusion in Ninth Schedule, only
the said principal Act of 1961 was mentioned without mentioning the
amendment acts. It has been held by this Court in the said decision that
D although for some purposes an amending Act retains its individuality but
this, however, does not lead to conclusion that when an Act is referred· to,
it is not intended to include the amendments made in it. Therefore, the
amendments effected in the said Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 will also get the protection for being
included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.
E
Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code as amended in 1976 ex-
pressly provides that the judgment debtor shall give notice of the deposit
of the decretal amount to the decree holder either through the Court or
directly to the decree holder. The obligation of giving the notice to the
decree holder is not absolved by simply depositing the amount without
F
taking steps to ensure service of the notice of such deposit to the decree
holder through Court or otherwise. Therefore, the appellant cannot escape
its liability to pay interest to the decree holder for the period between the
date of deposit of the decretal amount and the date of notice of such
deposit of the decree holder.
G
Even if it is assumed that by adopting the Punjab Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 the subsequent amendments effected in the
said Rules were not adopted or incorporated by th.e State of Haryana and
therefore, Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be held to be
H expressly applicable in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules of
RAJASTIIAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POONAMP AHWA [G.N. RAY, J .] 713

Haryana, the appellant, in our view, can be fastened with the liability to A
pay interest for the aforesaid period on account of not giving notice of the
deposit of the decretal amount to the decree holder by applying the
underlying principles of Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. The
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been constituted under the Motor
Vehicles Act to adjudicate the disputes arising out of claims on account of B
motor accidents. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been
constituted by given the exclusive jurisdiction tci determine such disputes
by excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal being a statutory Judicial Tribunal specifically constituted for
adjudicating the claims arising out of Motor accidents, have the trappings
of the Court. In Bhagwati Devi's case (supra) this Court has applied the C
provisions of Section 25 of Civil Procedure Code for transferring the case
from one Court to another by indicating that the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunals are courts within the meaning of Section 25 of the Civil
Procedure Code. In Darshana Devi's case (supra), this court also applied
Order XXIII dealing with the provisions for suing by an indigent person D
in forma pauperis even though in Rule 20, neither order XXIII nor Section
25 of Civil Procedure Code have been made expressly applicable. Dr.
Dhavan has taken pains in referring to the number of decisions of various
High Courts where the underlying principles of Civil Procedure Code have
been made applicable in the proceedings before the statutory judicial
tribunals on the footing that such provisions for Civil Procedure Code are E
based on equitable principles for ensuring fair trial.

In Mathunni Mathai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. and Ors.,
[1995) 4 SCC 26, it has been held .that Order XXI Rule 1 as amended in
1976 is applicable in executing the award made under the Land Acquisition F
Act after indicating the principle that if the decretal amount is deposited
by the judgment debtor pursuant to the order of the Court and the
judgment debtor has not given notice of such deposit to the decree holder
and also does )lot specify the manner in which the amount should be
appropriated, the decree holder will be entitled to appropriate the amount
deposited by the judgment debtor towards interest and other expenses and G
the decree holder is not bound to adjust the same towards the principal.

In Prem Nath Kapur and Another v. National Fertilizers Corporation
of India and Others, (1996) 2 SC~ 71, the decision in Mathunni Mathai's
case has been expressly overruled by a three Judges Bench of this Court H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A on the finding that Order XXI Rule 1 being inconsistent with the provisions
contained in Sections 34 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. Such
provision of Civil Procedure Code cannot be extended to the execution of
award made under the Land Acquisition Act. Dr. Dhavan has rightly
contended that in Prem Nath's case non applicability of Order XXI Rule
B 1 Civil Procedure Code on the score of inconsistency with provisions of
Land Acquisition Act relating to awards under the said Act has been
indicated and for the said re"ason, applicability of Order XXI, Rule 1 Civil
Procedure Code as held in Mathunni's case has been overruled. But
applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code in other cases has
not been doubted and the principle indicated in Mathunni's case has also
C not been disca~ded. On the contrary, it has been held in Prem Nath's case
that the decision of this Court in Meghraj v. Bayabai, [1969) 2 SCC 274
since relied in Mathunni's case is applicable to a debtor and creditor in an
ordinary civil suit governed by Civil Procedure Code.

D It appears to us that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are not in
any way inconsistent with the provisions for awarding just and fair
compensation in Motor Accident Claims. The real purpose of awarding
just and fair compensation to the victim of the accident or the legal heirs
of such victim will be fulfilled by applying the principle of Order XXI Rule
1 Civil Procedure Code so that the awardee is not deprived of the
E opportunity of gainfully utilising the amount under the award for want of
notice about the deposit made by judgment debtor resulting in the sum
remaining unutilised. In our view, therefore, there is no difficulty to apply
the underlying principles under Order XXI, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code
in executing the award of compensation passed by the Motor Accidents
F Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal must be held to be competent to invoke
the beneficial provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code.

We may indicate here that before the amendment of Order XXI
Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code by the Amending Act, 1976 on the question
of liability of the judgment debtor to give notice when the decretal amount
G is deposited in Court, the High Courts took different views. In
Laxminarayan Ganeshdas v. Ghasiram Dalchand Palaliwa~ AIR (1939)
Nagpur 191, it has been held that where a decree orders the payment of a
<
sum of money awarding interest m1til payment and the money is paid by
payment into Court under the provision of Order XXI Rule 1, the interest
H does not run until notice has been given to the decree holder under Order
RAJAS1HAN S.R.T.C. JAIPUR v. POONAM PAHWA [G.N. RAY, J.] 715

XXI Rule 1(2) but ceases to run from the date of such payment. Such view A
of the Nagpur High Court was dissented from in a later decision by the
Kerala High Court in State of Kera/av. Mahadeva Iyer, AIR (1969) Kerala
8. The Kerala High Court in the said decision has held that where the
interest is awarded by the decree on the decretal amount until payment, it
does not cease to run merely by reason of the making of the deposit of the B
decretal amount into court unless it is followed up by the service of notice
as required by Clause (2). It is only when the factum of deposit is brought
to the knowledge of the decree holder by service of such notice that the
deposit will amount to payment within the meaning of Order XXI Rule 1.
In taking the said view, the Kerala High Court has relied on the decision
of other High Courts (AIR 1932 Calcutta 111, AIR 1951 Bombay 394, AIR C
1952 Travancore Cochin 236, AIR 1955 Madh Bha 126, AIR 1956
Travancore Cochin 46).

After the amendment of Order XXI Rule 1 in 1976, there is no scope
for any controversy as to the liability of the judgment debtor when the
decretal amount is deposited in Court but the notice of such deposit is not D
given to the decree holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor has
to give notice to the decree holder about deposit for the decretal amount.
Since motor accident in the instant case, had taken place on May 7, 1983,
Order XXI Rule 1 as amended in 1976 is c!early applicable. Even otherwise
also, the provision of Order XXI Rule 1 being a procedural law, amended E
provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable even if the accident had
taken prior to 1976 because such amendment of procedural law is
retrospective in its operation.

In the aforesaid circumstances, no interference is called for against
the impugned decision and the appeal is dismissed, without however any F
order as to cost. Before we part, we intend to palace on record our deep
appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Dr. Dhavan who has
taken pains in assisting the Court by appearing as an amicus curiae.

S.V.K.I. Appeal dismissed.

>