RAJINDER PERSHAD (DEAD) BY LRS.versusSMT. DARSHANA DEVI

A                       RAJINDER PERSHAD (DEAD) BY LRS.
                                             v.
                                SMT. DARSHANA DEVI

                                    AUGUST IO, 200I

B         (SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.)


             Evidence Act, 1872 :

             Ss. 138 and 146-Witness-Examination of-Disputed part of
C statement-To be clarified in cross-examination.
             State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (dead) and Ors., 11998! 3 SCC 561, relied
    on.

            Rent and Eviction
D
          Eviction of tenant-Ground being default in payment of rent-Tenant
    refusing to receive demand notice and in court denying service of notice-
    Postman examined-Rent Controller recorded a finding that tenant refused
    to receive the notice and ordered eviction-Appellate authority and High
    Court upholding eviction-Before Supreme Court tenant pleading that
E   postman being on leave during relevant period, there was no refusal by
    tenant and thus no service of notice-Held, in the absence ofcross examination
    of Postman on this crucial aspect, his statement in chief-examination has
    been rightly relied on-Evidence Act, 1872-Ss. 138 and 146.

p           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5300 of
    2001.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 2.8.99 of the Delhi High Court in
    SAO No. 41/98.

G        P.S. Mishra, R.V. Sinha, Vishnu Sharma, Ms. S. Chandra SheJ,<.har, U.
    Mishra and Balraj Dewan for the Appellants.                      '

         P.Chidambaram and M.N. Krishnamani, Deepak Gupta, M.P. Jha, Ram
    Ekbal Roy and Anil K. Chopra for the Respondent.

            The following Order of the Court was delivered :
H                                       442
   RA.JINDER PERSHAD (DEAD) BY LRS. v. SMT. DARSHANA DEVI 443

      Leave is granted.                                                             A
      This is tenant's appeal, by Special Leave, against the judgment and
order dated 2.8.1999 of the High Court of Judicature at New Delhi dismissing
Second Appeal No. 41 of 1998 filed by the appellants-tenants and confirming
the order of eviction from the suit premises passed against him in landlady's
eviction case.
                                                                                    B

       In this order the parties will be referred to as the tenant and the
landlady. The case of the landlady is that the tenant did not pay the rent of
the suit premises from 1.7.85 in spite of service of notice of demand Exhibit
AWl/6 dated 5.8.86 and committed three consecutive defaults in payment of           C
rent. The tenant contested the case. He denied service of demand notice. The
Rent Controller, Delhi, on the basis of the evidence on record found that the
tenant refused to receive notice and there was default in payment of rent and,
therefore, ordered eviction of the tenant from the suit premises on I. 7 .1996.
The tenant's appeal presented to the Rent Control Tribunal, was dismissed.
He then carried the case in Second Appeal before the High Court which was           D
also dismissed by the judgment and order under challenge in this appeal.

       The only point urged albeit strenuously on behalf of the appellant, by
Mr. P.S .. Mishra, the learned senior counsel, is that as there has been no valid
service of notice so all proceedings taken on the assumption of service of          E
notice are illegal and void. He has invited our attention to the judgment of
the learned Rent Control Tribunal wherein it is recorded that Exhibit AW 116
dated 5.8.86 was sent by registered post and the same taken by the postman
to the address of the tenant on 6.8.86, 8.8.86, 19.8.86 and 20.8.86 but on those
days the tenant was not available; on 21.8.86 he met the tenant who refused
to receive the notice. This finding remained undisturbed by both the Tribunal       F
as well as the High Court. Learned counsel attacks this finding on the ground
that the postman was on leave on those days and submits that the records
called for from the post office to prove that fact, were reported as not
available. On those facts, submits the learned counsel, it follows that there
was no refusal by the tenant and no service of notice. We are afraid we             G
cannot accept these contentions of the learned counsel. In the Court of the
Rent Controller, the postman was examined as A.W.2. We have gone through
his cross-examination. It was not suggested to him that he was not on duty
during the period in question and the endorsement "refused" on the envelope
was incorrect. In the absence of cross-examination of the postman on this
crucial aspect his statement in the chief-examination has been rightly relied       H
     444                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A     upon. There is an age old rule that if you dispute the correctness of the
     statement of a witness you must give him opportunity to explain his statement
     by drawing his attention to that part of it which is objected to as untrue,
     otherwise you can not impeach his credit. In State of U.P. v. Nahar Sing
     (dead) and Ors., [1998] 3 SCC 561, a Bench of this Court (to which I was a
     party) stated the principle that Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a
B    valuable right to cross-examination a witness tendered in evidence by opposite
     party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence
     Act by permitting a witness to be questioned, inter alia, to test his veracity.
     It was observed.

c           "The oft-quoted observation of lord Herschell, l.C. in Browne v.
            Dunn clearly elucidates the principle underlying those provisions. It
            reads thus :

             "I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to be absolutely essential
            to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that
            a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his
D
            attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination
            showing that that imputation is intended to be made and not to take
            his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and
            then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might
            have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the
E           circumstances which, it is suggested, indicate that the story he tells
            ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of
            credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to
            impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give an
            opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as
            it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the
F           conduct of a case, but it is essential to fair play and fair dealing with
            witnesses."

          For the afore-mentioned reason no exception can be taken to the
    impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal fails and it is
G   accordingly dismissed. No costs.

    R.P.                                                        Appeal dismissed.