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Supreme Court of India

RAJINDERA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS.versusPREM MAI AND ORS.

Citation
2007 INSC 858
Decided
23 August 2007
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The High Court's order dismissing the restitution application cannot be sustained; the appellant is ordinarily entitled to possession of the suit land, subject to the interim status‑quo order in the later suit.

Summary

The appellant, Rajindra Singh (deceased) through his legal representatives, challenged a decree from a 1957 suit in which Prem Mai and Sudha Mai were granted declaration and possession of land. The decree was reversed on appeal, declaring the appellant a Sirdar and entitled to possession. While the suit was pending, a receiver took possession and the land was purportedly gifted to a college trust. The appellant later filed a restitution application under Section 144 of the CPC, which was rejected by lower courts and the Allahabad High Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's dismissal could not be sustained, affirming the appellant's ordinary right to possession, but noted that an interim status‑quo order in a later suit (Suit No. 242 of 2002) concerning an agreement to sell the land would govern possession pending that suit. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court order set aside, and possession directed to be subject to the status‑quo order. The Court also expressed concern over the extreme delay of the case, which spanned over five decades.

Issues considered

  • Whether the appellant is entitled to restitution of the suit land under Section 144 CPC after the appellate courts upheld his title.
  • Whether the Allahabad High Court's dismissal of the restitution application was legally correct.
  • Whether the interim status‑quo order in the subsequent suit for enforcement of a sale agreement affects the appellant's right to possession.

Legislation cited

Subjects

restitutionCPC s.144possessionland reformstatus quodelay in justiceappealland ownershipSirdargift of propertyreceiveragreement to sell

Judgment

A              RAJINDERA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS.
                                    v.
                            PREM MAI AND ORS.

                                   AUGUST 23, 2007

B                   (A.K. MATHUR AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.)


            Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

             s. 144-Application for restitution-Suit for declaration and possession
C     ultimately culminating in favour of defendant-However, during pendency of
      suit, plaintiff gifted suit iand to a College Trust and on court's direction
      receiver took possession thereof-Restitution application filed by defendant
      dismissed by courts below-Meanwhile defendant entering into an agreement
      for sale with respondent no. 2-Since agreement was not acted upon, suit
D     filed by R-2-Legal heirs of appellant also filing a suit-Interim order of
      status quo passed in the proceedings-Held: View taken by High Court in
      restitution application cannot be sustained and is set aside-Ordinarily,
      defendant-appellant would have been entitled to possession, but because of
       interim order of status quo, possession of suit land shall be subject to orders
      passed in those proceedings.
E
            Administration of Justice:

             Speedy disposal of cases-Court expressing anguish at the delay in
      disposal of cases in law courts-Observation made that authorities concerned
      should do the needful in the matter urgently to ensure speedy disposal of
F     cases.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1307 of2001.

            From the final Judgment and Order dated 06.09.1999 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in Execution Second Appeal No. 870 of 1976.
G
            Uma Datta for the Appellants.

            Nikhil Nayyar for the Respondents.

            The Order of the Court was delivered by
I-I                                         300
         RAJINDERA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. PREM MAI                   301
                                    ORDER                                         A
      I. This appeal by special leave has been filed by Rajindra Singh, (since
deceased) whose legal representatives have been brought on record, against
the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
dated 16th September, 1999 in Execution Second Appeal No. 870/1976 whereby
the Second Appeal filed by the defendant-appellant has been dismissed.            B
      2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that Smt. Prem Mai and
Sudha Mai filed a suit for declaration and possession of the suit land in the
Trial Court being Suit No. 487/57. The said suit was decreed against the
appellant herein on 21.9.63. Aggrieved against that decree, the appellant-
defendant preferred an appeal which was allowed on 16.4.64 and the judgment       C
and decree passed by the Trial Court· was reversed by the First Appellant
Court. The First Appellant Court was of the view that the defendant-appellant
was in cultivatory possession of the land in dispute since before the
commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951,
and the suit was barred by time in view of Section 180 U.P. Tenancy Act, and      D
hence the defendant had become a Sirdar.

      3. Aggrieved against that, the respondent herein preferred Second Appeal
before the High Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 10.2.1971
and the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court was affirmed. It appears
that during the pendency of the suit the Trial Court had appointed a receiver     E
(one Pitamber Singh) who took possession of the suit land. Also, Prem Mai
and Sudha Mai purported to gift the suit land to the D.A. V. College Trust.
After the suit was dismissed by the First Appellate Court and the said
dismissal was affirmed by the High Court, the question arose about restitution
of the land in question to the defendant-appellant under Section 144 C.P.C.       F
However, by order dated 13.8.75 the restitution application was rejected.
Aggrieved against that order, the matter was taken up in first appeal which
was dismissed on 2.4. 76 and then to the High Court in second appeal which
was dismissed on 6.9.99. All the courts having dismissed the restitution
proceedings, the appellant is before us by way of the present appeal.
                                                                                  G
      4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the
record.

      5. From the bare facts it is apparent that the suit against the appellant
was dismissed by the First Appellate Court which held that the appellant is
the Sirdar of the land in question, and that judgment has been affirmed by        H
    302                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A   the High Court on.10.2. 71 in S.A.2.15 of L964,. which .order became finaL Hence
    in the ordinary course the appellant would be entitled to possessfon of the
    suit land: Therefore, we are of the opinion' that tile· view taken by the High
    Court by its order dated 6.9:99 and courts below cannot be· sustained.·

          6~ However,.wehave·been·informed by foamedlcounseHorthe respondent
B   No. 2 that after. these· proceedings were· over;, the defendant-appellant had
    entered. into an agreement to sell with respondent No; 2: for sale of the suit
    land. An application for bringing· on• record these subsequent facts has been
    filed by respondent No. 2. Since that agreement to' seff was not acted upon,
    respondent No: 2 has filed' a· civil· suit being Suit Nm 242 of2002 before tne
C   Civil Judge, Dehradun for enforcement of the. said agreement, and the legal
    representatives of the appellant have also filed: a suit against respondent No.
    2: In the said proceedings an interim order of'status.quo has been·passed in·
    April, 2002 by the Trial•Court. However,. thisiis notthe subject m~er before
    us and we do not wish to express any opinion' on· thiS issue. So far as the
    present case is concerned, we are of the opinion that after the title of Rajihdra
D   Singh (since deceased) has been upheld' by the· High: Court on l0:2.71 he or
    his legal representatives would ordinarily have:beementitfod'to take·possession
    of the suit land. Therefore, the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in
    the impugned order dated 6.9.99 cannot be sustained and' consequently the
    same is set aside. However, in view of the subsequent order· of" status quo
E   passed in Suit No. 242 of 2002 for enforcement or die agreement to sell
    pending between the parties, we do not wish to express any opinion thereon.

          7. Insofar as the present· proceedings; are· ctmcemed;· we set aside the
    impugnedjudgmenr andi order of the: Highi <i:ourt and' aifow this. appeal. The
    appellant would ordinarily have been entitled! tb' possession: of the suit land
F   but because of the· interim order of status quo> passed; iir Suit:; No. 242 of 2002,
                                                               1




    we direct that the possession of the· suit land' shalli be subject to• orders
    passed im those proceedings.

          8. The appeal is allowed: Nm order as, to1 costs;.

G         9. Before parting with this case we would like. to express our anguish
    at the delay in disposal of cases. in, our law courts .. The present case is a
    typical illustration. A suit filed in 1957 has, rolled on for half a century. It
    reminds one of the case Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. in Charles Dickens' novel
     'Bleak House' whiCh had rolled on for decades, consuming litigants and
    lawyers alike.
H
          RAJINDERA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. PREM MAI                     303
      10. We may quote a passage from 'Bleak House' written in Dickens'               A
inimitable style :-

        "Jamdyce and Jamdyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in
        course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what
        it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed
        that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, B
        without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises.
        Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable
        young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died
        out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made
        parties in Jamdyce and Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; C
        whole families have inherited legendry hatreds with the suit. The little
        plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when
        Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed
        himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world. Fair
        wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long
        procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of D
        bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality;
        there are not three Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old
        Tom Jamdyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffee house in
        Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jamdyce still drags its dreary length
        before the court, perennially hopeless."
                                                                                      E
        Is this not descriptive of the situation prevailing in India today ?

       11. People in India are simply disgusted with this state of affairs, and
 are fast losing faith in the judiciary because of the inordinate delay in disposal
of cases. We request the concerned authorities to do the needful in the matter
urgently to ensure speedy disposal of cases if the people's faith in the              F
judiciary is to remain.

RP.                                                              Appeal allowed.


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