Holding

A finding of breach of peace need not be recorded in the final order; its omission is a curable procedural irregularity and does not justify quashing the order under s.482.

Summary

The appellant challenged the Allahabad High Court's order quashing a magistrate's final decree under CrPC s.145, which granted him possession of disputed land. The magistrate had recorded a finding of breach of peace in the preliminary order but omitted such a finding in the final order. The High Court, invoking s.482, held the omission a fatal defect and set aside the magistrate's order. The Supreme Court held that once the magistrate is satisfied of a breach of peace and records it in the preliminary order, a repeat finding in the final order is not required; the omission is merely a curable procedural irregularity and does not attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of s.482. Consequently, the High Court's decision was reversed and the magistrate's order was confirmed.

Issues considered

Whether a magistrate must record a finding of breach of peace in the final order under s.145 of the CrPC.
Whether the omission of such a finding constitutes a manifest defect that can be corrected under s.482 of the CrPC.
Whether the omission is a curable irregularity that does not vitiate the magistrate's final order.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 145(1), s. 145(4), s. 145(5), s. 145(6), s. 482

Subjects

breach of peaceCrPC s.145preliminary orderfinal ordercurable irregularityrevision jurisdictionSection 482procedural defect

Judgment

92

A I
RAJPATI
v.
BACHAN & ANR.
B
July 28, 1980

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

Criminal Procedure Code, Section 145-Recording in the final order that it
was breach of peace is not necessary, once such a recording has been made in
C the preliminary order-Omission to do so is an error of procedure falling with·
in the domain of a curable irregularity.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court,
HELD: (1) A finding of existence of breach of the peace is not necessary
at the time when a final order is passed nor is there any provision in the Code
of Criminal Procedure requiring such a finding in· the final order. Once a
D preliminary order drawn up by the Magistrate sets out the reaso:is for holding
that a breach of the peace exists, it is not necessary that the breach of pea~e
should continue at every stage of the proceeding unless there is clear evidence
to show that the dispute has ceased tci exist so a:; to bring the case within
the ambit of sub-section (5) of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Un-
less such a contingency arises the proceedings have to be .carried to their logical
end cnlminating in the final order under sub-s. (6) of s. 145. Further, it is well
E settled that under s. 145 it is for the Magistrate to be satisfied regarding the
existence of a breach of the peace and once he records his satisfaction in the
preliminary order, the High Court in revision cannot go into the su!1lciency
or otherwise of the materials on the basis of which the satisfaction of the
Magistrate is based. [94C-F] /

R. H. Bhutani v. Miss Mani J. Desai & Ors., [1969] I S.C.R. SO, followed.

F Hari Ram & Ors. v. Banwari Lal & Ors., A.J..R. 1967 Punjab 378; Ramarao
v. Shivram & Ors., A.LR. 1954 Hyderabad p. 93, approved.
(2) Mere absence of a finding of the existence of breach of the peace by·
the Magistrate in the final order in the circumstances of the case cannot be
such a manifest defect so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 194B]
G (3) At the worst the omission on the part of the Magistrate to mention·
in his final order that there was breach of the peace could be said to be an
error of procedure clearly falling within the .domain of a curable irregularity
which is not sufficient to vitiate the order passed by the Magistrate, particularly
when there is nothing to show, in the instant case, ithat any prejudice was caused
to any of the parties who had the full opportunity to produce their evidence
before the Court. [95B-C]
H
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 474 of
1980.
RAJPATI v. BACHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 93

Appeal by Specia~ Leave from the Judgment and Order A·
dated 26-9-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr!. Misc. Case
No. 356/79.
f Pramod Swarup for the Appellant.
R. D. Upadhyaya and M. M. L. Srivastava for the Respondent
No. 1. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave involves a short point
. of law. Proceedings unde.r s. 145 was started by the Magistrate against
the respondents on the basis of a police report. After passing a
preliminary order on the 29th July, 1976 (wherein the Magistrate had
· recorded reasons for his being satisfied that a breach of the peace
c
existed), the Magistrate called upon the parties to file their written
statements and then after a full enquiry as provided by s. 145 the
Magistrate passed the final order on 17th July, 1978 declaring the
appellant to be in possession of the land in dispute. Against this
order, the respondents moved the High Court under s. 482 Cr.P.C. D
for quashing the order of the Magistrate. The High Court found that
as there was no clear finding by the Magistrate in the final order that
there was an apprehension of breach of the peace, therefore,' the final
order was bad and the High Court accordingly allowed the petition
and remitted the case to the Magistrate.
.E
We have heard counsel for the parties and in our opinion the
...... High Court erred in holding that the final order of the Magistrate
was vitiated in absence of a finding that breach of the peace existed
at the time the order was passed. It is not disputed that in the
preliminary order there was a clear finding by the Magistrate that
apprehension of breach of the peace did exist which was sufficient to
F
give jurisdiction to the Magistrate to initiate the proceedings. When
the parties filed their .written statements, they did not state that no
dispute between the parties existed but whereas one party said that
there was no apprehension of breach from their side, the 'other side
took the stand that ,there was an apprehension pf breach of the peace.
Thus, the stand taken by the two parties was contradictory; hence G

... \
it must be taken for granted that the apprehension of breach of peace
-continued to exist and it was not a case where it could be said that
no dispute existed, as contemplated under s. 145(5) Cr.P.C.
After considering the record and evidence produced by the parties,
the Magistrate passed the final order in favour of the appellant. H
The High Court thought that it was absolutely essential for the
Magistrate to give a finding that a breach of peace existed e_ven in
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A the final order. It may have been proper if the Magistrate had given
a finding on this aspect of the matter also but in the circumstances, it
can be safely presumed that apprehension of breach of peace existed
and such a finding was implidt in the final order passed by the
Magistrate so it was not necessary for the Magistrate to repeat what
he had said in the preliminary order in the final order also. Moreover,
B mere absence of finding by the Magistrate in the final order in ,{he
circumstances as mentioned above cannot be such a manifest defect
so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of ,the High Court under
s. 482 of Cr.P.C.
It is, therefore, manifest that a finding of existence of breach of
c the peace is not necessary at 'the time when a final order is passed
nor fa there any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring·
such 'a finding· in the final order. Once a preliminary order drawn
up by the Magistrate sets out the reasons for holding that a breach
of the peace exists, it is not necessary that the breach of peace should
continue at every stage of the proceedings unless there is clear evidence
D to show that the dispute has ceased to exist so as to bring the case
within the ambit of sub-section (5) of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal
:procedure. Unless su.ch a contingency ari1ses the proceedings have·
to be carried to their logical end culminating in the final order under
sub-s. (6) of s. 145. As already indicated the cbntradictory stands
taken by the parties clearly show that there was no question of the
E dispute having ended so as to lead to cancellation of the order under
sub-section (5) of s. 145 nor was such a ·case set up by any party
before the Magistrate or before the High Comit. Further,, it is well'
·'!-·
settled that under s. 145 it is for the Magistrate to be satisfied regarding
the existence of a : breach of the peac1~ and once he records his
satisfaction in the preliminary order, the High Court in revision cannot
F
go into the sufficiency ol' otherwise of the materials on the basis ct
which the satisfaction of the Magistrate is based. In R. H. Bhutani
v. Miss Mani J. Desai & Ors.( 1), this Court pointed out as follows:
"The section requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied
before initiating proceedings ,that a dispute regarding an immovable
G property exists and that such dispute is likely to cause breach
of peace. But once he is. satisfied on these two conditions, the
section requires him to pass a preliminary order under sub-s. (l}
and thereafter to make an enquiry under sub-s., (4) and pass a
final order under sub-s. (6). It is not necessary that at the time of
H
passing the final order the apprehension of breach IOf peace should
continue or exist. The enquiry under s. 145 is limited to the

(1) [19691 1 S.C.R. 80.
RAJPATI v. BACHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 95

question to who was in actual possession on ·the date of the A
preliminary order irrespective of the rights of the parties... The
High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would
not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has
· satisfied the Magistrate."
(Emphasisours) B
In H ari Ram & Ors. v. Banwari 'Lal & Ors.(1) it was held that
once a Magistrate finds· that there is a breach of peace it is not necessary
that the dispute should continue to exist at other stages of the
proceedings also. In ·this connection, the High Court observed as
follows: ·
c
"Of course, Magistrate· can under sub-section (1) of s. 145,
Criminal Procedure Code, assume jurisdiction only if he is satisfied
that at the time of passing the preliminary order a dispute likely
to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land etc.
Once ·that is done the Magistrate is thereafter expected to call D
upon the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in
person or by pleader and put in written statements of their
respective claims as respects ·the fact of actual possession of the
subject of dispute. The enquiry, therefore, after the initial
satisfaction of the Magistrate and after the assumption ct
E
jurisdiction by him, has to bd directed only as respects the fact
of actual possession. At that \time he has not to record a finding
again about the existence of h dispute likely to cause a breach
of the peace." I

(Emphasisours)
I F
To the same effect is a decisio~ of the Hyderabad High Cour·t
in Ramarao v. Shivram & Ors.(2) wh~re Srinivasachari J. observed as
1

follows:-
"As regards this contentio n I am of· opinion that once the
1

Magistrate has given a finding to the effect that there is
apprehension of breach of peate and than he has jurisdiction to G
take proceedings under s. 14S, Cr.P.C., he can continue the
proceedings. It is not necessafy that at each stage he should be
satisfied that there exists an imminent apprehension of breach of
I
peace."
(Emphasisours) ff

(1) A.I.R. 1967 Punj. 378.
(2) A.l.R. 1954 Hyderabad 93.
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] I S.C.R.

A We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations
made by the Punjab and Hyderabad High Courts, extracted above,
which lay down the correct law on the s.ubject. A,

Assuming, however, that there was an omission on the part of
the ~agistrate to mention in his final order that ,there was breach of
B the peace, that being an error of procedure would clearly fall within
the domain of a curable irregularity which is not sufficient tc vitiate ~
the order passed by the Magistrate, particularly when there is nothing
to show in the instant case that any prejudice was caused to any of _
the parties who had the full opportunity to produce their evidence'
before the Court. It was therefore not correct on the part of the
c High Court to have interfered with the order of the Magistrate on ::i.,
a purely technical ground when the aggrieved party had a clear remedy
in the civil court.
• I
For these reasons therefore, we are satisfied that the order passed
. by the High court is legally erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand.
D The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is
set aside and the order of the Magistrate is confirmed.
V. D. K. Appeal allowed.