RAJVIR SINGHversusSECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & OTHERS

                          [2012] 4 S.C.R. 718


A                            RAJVIR SINGH
                                    v.
        SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & OTHERS
               (Civil Appeal No. 2107 of 2012)

                         FEBRUARY 15, 2012
B
               [AFTAB ALAM AND CHANDRAMAULI
                       KR. PRASAD, JJ.]

           Army Act, 1950 - ss. 122 and 52(f) - Court martial - Trial
C   if barred by limitation - Allegation that appellant, an Officiating
    Commandant at Central Ordnance Depot, caused wrongful
    loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 60. 18 lakhs in the
    process of procurement of stores through local purchase by
    committing procedural irregularities/illegalities - Direction for
D   the General Court Martial to re-assemble for his trial -
    Challenge to - Plea that trial was barred by time as provided
    under s. 122 - Held: The General Officer Commanding-in-
    Chief, Central Command [GOC-in-C, CC] was in knowledge
    of the offence and the identity of the appellant as one of the
E   alleged offenders on May 7, 2007 - Reckoning from that date,
    the order passed by the General Officer Commanding,
    Madhya Bharat Area [GOG, MB Area], to convene the General
    Court Martial on August 23126, 2010 was clearly beyond the
    period of three years and hence, barred in terms of s. 122 -
F   GOC-in-C, CC had come to know about the offence and the
    offender being the appellant on May 7, 2007 - It took one year
    from that date for him to pass the order for initiating
    disciplinary action against him on May 12, 2008 - There were
    still two years in hand, which is no little time but that too was
G   spent in having more than one rounds of hearing of the
    charges in terms of rule 22 with the result that by the time the
    order came to be passed to convene General Court Martial,
    more than three years had lapsed from the date of the
    knowledge of the competent authority - Direction by the GOG,

H                                  718
    RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF            719
              DEFENCE & OTHERS
MB Area, for reassembly of the General Court Martial         A
accordingly quashed.

     Appellant, an Officiating Commandant at Central
Ordnance Depot, allegedly caused wrongful loss to the
Government to the tune of Rs.60.18 lakhs in the process
                                                             B
of procurement of stores through local purchase by
committing procedural irregularities/ illegalities. The
Armed Forces Tribunal dismissed Original Application
filed by the appellant and rejected his challenge to the
direction for the General Court Martial to re-assemble for
his trial contending that his trial was barred by time as    C
provided under section 122 of the Army Act, 1950.

      In the instant appeal, it was contended on behalf of
the appellant that the period of limitation for his trial
 before the Court Martial commenced when on the basis 0
of the report of the Court of Inquiry, the General Officer
Commanding, Madhya Bharat Area [GOC, iVIB Area] sent
 his recommendation to the General Officer Commanding-
 in-Chief, Central Command [GOC-in-C, CC] indicting the
appellant; that the GOC, MB Area, who passed the order E
dated August 23/26, 2010 convening the General Court
Martial, directed the Commanding Officer to take further
summary of evidence in the hearing of the charges under
rule 22 and finally passed the order directing the Court
Martial to reassemble for the appellant's trial; that the F
GOC, MB Area was the competent authority to take action
against the appellant and it was the date of his knowledge
of the commission of the alleged offence and the identity
of the appellant as the alleged offender that is relevant
under section 122; that in any event the GOC-in-C, CC G
was undeniably the competent authority to initiate action
against the appellant; that on May 7, 2007, the alleged
offence and the identity of the appellant as the alleged
offender was fully within his knowledge on the basis of
the recommendation of GOC, MB Area and the report of
                                                           H
   720      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2012] 4 S.C.R.


A the Court of Inquiry ordered by him; that his knowledge
  is evident from his recommendation to Integrated HQ,
  wherein, he stated that the culpability of the appellant was
  established and that the period of limitation must,
  therefore, commence from a date not later than May 7,
B 2007 and reckoning from that date, the period of three
  years came to end on May 6, 201 O; that, however, the
  order for convening the General Court Martial was finally
  passed by the GOC, MB Area on August 23/26, 2010, that
  is, clearly beyond the period of limitation and hence the
C appellant's trial before the General Court Martial was
  clearly hit by section 122 and was barred by limitation.

      The respondents, on the other hand, contended that
  the period of limitation in this case could only commence
  from May 12, 2008 when the GOC-in-C, CC directed that
D disciplinary action be initiated against the appellant and
  that later date must be deemed to be the date when the
  competent authority had the knowledge within the
  meaning of section 122 of the Act. This argument was
  adopted both in the order passed by the GOC, MB Area
E and the decision of the Tribunal upholding that order.

         Allowing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1. Both the GOC, MB Area and the Tribunal,
  base their orders on the decisions of this Court in. V.N.
F Singh and J.S. Sekhon. The decisions of the GOC, MB
  Area and the Tribunal appear to be based on a complete
  misinterpretation of the two decisions of the Court. In
  both, V.N. Singh and J.S. Sekhon, the real issue before
  the Court was who was the competent authority to initiate
G action against the delinquent officer and whose
  knowledge would be relevant for the purpose of section
  122 of the Act. In both cases, it was contended, on behalf
  of the delinquent officers, that the knowledge of "the
  person aggrieved" long preceded the knowledge of the
H competent authority and reckoning from the date of
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF             721
               DEFENCE & OTHERS
 knowledge of "the aggrieved person", the order A
 convening the General Court Martial was barred by
 limitation. In both cases, the Court held that that part of
 section 122 that referred to the knowledge of the person
 aggrieved had no application to the facts of the case and
the relevant date for computing the period of limitation B
was the date of knowledge of the competent authority to
 initiate action against the delinquent officer. In both the
cases, the authority competent to initiate action against
the delinquent officer had passed the direction for taking
action against the delinquent officer on the same day it c
came to know about the commission of the offence and
the identity of the offender. Hence, in both cases, at some
places, the date of knowledge and date of the direction
to initiate action against the delinquent officer are used
interchangeably and that is the reason for the Tribunal to 0
misinterpret the decision to mean that the period of
limitation would commence from the date of direction to
initiate action against the delinquent officer. [Paras 19, 20
and 21] [732-D-F-H; 733-A; 735-C, D]

     Union of India and others v. V.N. Singh (2010) 5 SCC     E
579 : 2010 (4) SCR 454 and J.S. Sekhon v. Union of India
and another (201 O) 11 sec 586 : 201 o (9) SCR 1025 -
referred to.

     2. The Tribunal is also incorrect in observing that on   F
May 7, 2007, GOC-in-C, CC had formed only a tentative
opinion about the appellant because on that date he
made the recommendation to the Integrated HQ for
investigation into the act of omission/commission in
respect of a Major General and any other higher authority,    G
including the appellant. The recommendation of the GOC-
in-C, CC to the Integrated HQ was only in regard to the
said Major General. So far as the culpability of the
appellant is concerned, he had already formed the
opinion on the basis of the report of the Court of Inquiry    H
   722     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A and the recommendation of the GOC, MB Area. Moreover,
  when the Integrated HQ vide its letter of February 19, 2008
  pointed out that the appellant was indicted by the Court
  of Inquiry ordered by him and in his case it was for him
  to "append directions", there was no further material
B before the GOC-in-C, CC in connection with the appellant.
  The order that the GOC-in-C, CC passed on May 12, 2008
  for taking disciplinary action against the appellant is
  almost in identical words as the one passed on May 7,
  2007. There is, therefore, no escape from the fact that the
c GOC-in-C, CC was in knowledge of the offence and the
  identity of the appellant as one of the alleged offenders
  on May 7, 2007. Reckoning from that date, the order
  passed by the GOC, MB Area, to convene the General
  Court Martial on August 23/26, 2010 is clearly beyond the
  period of three years and hence, barred in terms of
0
   section 122. [Paras 22, 23] [735-E-H;736-A; 737-D, E]

       3. One feels sorry to see a trial on such serious
  charges being aborted on grounds of limitation but that
  is the mandate of the law. It is seen that GOC-in-C, CC
E had come to know about the offence and the offender
  being the appellant on May 7, 2007. It took one year from
  that date for him to pass the order for initiating
  disciplinary action against him on May 12, 2008. There
  were still two years in hand, which is no little time but that
F too was spent in having more than one rounds of hearing
  of the charges in terms of rule 22 with the result that by
  the time the order came to be passed to convene General
  Court Martial, more than three years had lapsed from the
  date of the knowledge of the competent authority. [Para
G 24] [737-F-H; 738-AJ
       4. The judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is
  set aside and the direction by the GOC, MB Area, for
  reassembly of the General Court Martial is quashed. [Para
H 26) [738-E]
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                  723
               DEFENCE & OTHERS
                      Case Law Reference:                           A
     2010 (4) SCR 454           referred to           Para 3

     2010 (9) SCR 1025          referred to           Para 3

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                 B
2107 of 2012.

     From the Judgment & Order dated 19.08.2011 of the The
Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow in Original
Application No. 116 of 2011.
                                                                    c
     R. Venkataramani, Piyush Sharma, Rajiv Manglik,
Virendeer, Aljo K. Josepth for the Appellant.

     Rajiv Dutta, Ashok Shrivastava, Madhurim Tatia, B.V.
Balramdas, Anil Katiyar for the Respondents
                                                                    D
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     AFTAB ALAM, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order      E
dated August 19, 2011 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal,
Regional Bench, Lucknow, by which it dismissed Original
Application No.116 of 2011 filed by the appellant and rejected
his challenge to the direction for the General Court Martial to
re-assemble for his trial contending that his trial was barred by
time as provided under section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 (for       F
the sake of brevity "the Act").

     3. A General Court Martial was directed to be convened
by order dated August 23/26, 2010 passed by the General
Officer Commanding, Madhya Bharat Area, ("GOG, MB Area"             G
for short) to try the appellant on different charges relating to
gross financial irregularities punishable under Section 52(f) of
the Act. The appellant challenged the order before the Armed
Forces Tribunal (in Original Application No. 216 of 2010) on
the plea that his trial by the General Court Martial was barred     H
    724     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A by limitation under section 122 of the Act. At that stage, the
  Tribunal did not go into the merits of the appellant's challenge
  and dismissed the Original Application leaving it open for the
  appellant to raise his objections before the Court Martial. In
  pursuance of the liberty given by the Tribunal, the appellant
B raised the objection before the Court Martial that his trial before
  it was barred by limitation. The Court Martial upheld the
  appellant's objection and by order dated February 17, 2011,
  allowed the "plea in bar" raised by the defence. However, the
  Confirming Authority, i.e., the (Officiating) GOC, MB Area,
c refused to confirm the order of the General Court Martial and
  by order dated March 29, 2011, which is in some detail, found
  and held that reckoning from the date on which the commission
  of the offence and the identity of the appellant as one of the
  offenders came within the knowledge of the competent
D authority, the order giving direction for convening the General
   Court Martial was passed within a period of three years and,
  therefore, the bar of limitation did not come in the way of the
   trial of the appellant before the General Court Martial. Having,
   thus, arrived at the finding, he directed the GCM to proceed
   with the trial of the appellant as if the "plea in bar" was found
E not proved. The appellant challenged the order of the Confirming
   Authority once again before the Tribunal in Original Application
   no. 116 of 2011. But the Tribunal, mainly relying upon the
   decisions of this Court in Union of India and others v. V.N.
   Singh (2010) 5 SCC 579 and J. S. Sekhon v. Union of India
F and another (2010) 11 SCC 586, held that the General Court
   Martial was convened within the period of limitation. It,
   accordingly, rejected the application and upheld the order
   passed by the Confirming Authority.

G        4. The charges against the appellant pertain to the periods
    2005-2006 and 2006-2007 when he was posted as officiating
    Commandant, Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. According to
    the charges, in procurement of stores he violated and flouted
    the relevant rules and in making purchases worth about Rs.2.2
H
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                725
      DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
crores he caused wrongful loss of Rs.60.18 lakhs to the          A
Government.

       5. In this regard, first a pseudonymous complaint dated
 October 27, 2006 came making allegations of gross
 irregularities committed by the appellant in purchase of stores B
 for the Central Ordnance Depot. The complaint was seen by
 the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command
 ("GOC-in-C, CC" in short) on November 15, 2006. The
 complaint was followed by a report by the Central Command
 Liaison Unit which also highlighted the irregularities committed C
 in procurement of stores at the Central Ordnance Depot,
 Chheoki. This report was seen by the GOC-in-C on December
 6, 2006. On December 9, 2006, an order was issued on behalf
 of the GOC-in-C, for convening a Court of Inquiry to investigate
the alleged irregularities/misdemeanors in the Central
 Ordnance Depot during the financial years 2005-2006 and D
2006-2007. The irregularities/misdemeanors that were
required to be inquired into were listed under the headings {a)
 upgradations of demand and {b) local purchase. The Court of
Inquiry submitted its report on January 24, 2007 in which, apart
from some other officers, the appellant was clearly indicted. It E
appears that the report of the Inquiry Committee was first placed
before the GOC, MB Area, who on February 20, 2007 made a
recommendation in light of the report. In his recommendations
the GOC, MB Area, observed that the Court of Inquiry had
examined only a small fraction of the local purchase and had F
the Court gone into greater details more irregularities would
have come to light. However, on the basis of the materials
coming before the Court of Inquiry, the GOC, MB Area, found
that there was adequate evidence regarding cognizable acts
of omiss"ion/commission committed by several officers, G
including the present appellant in regard to whom he observed
that he was to be blamed for causing wrongful loss to the
government to the tune of Rs.60.18 lakhs in the process of
procurements of stores worth Rs.2.2 crores by committing a
number of procedural irregularities/illegalities.                 H
    726      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A      6. The report of the Court of Inquiry along with the
  recommendations of the GOC, MB Area was forwarded to the
  GOC-in-C, CC on April 26, 2007. On May 7, 2007, the GOC-
  in-C, CC wrote a note in the form of recommendations on the
  report of the Court of Inquiry convened on his direction. He
B started by saying that he had perused the proceedings of the
  Court of Inquiry and he partially agreed with the findings and
  opinion of the Court. He observed that there was cogent and
  adequate material evidence regarding the cognizable acts of
  omission/commission committed by various officers of the
c Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. In regard to the appellant
  the GOC-in-C made the following observations in paragraph 6
  of his recommendation:

          "6. The culpability of IC-42501 F Col Rajvir Singh, Offg
          Commandant, COD Chheoki, is established for causing
D         wrongful loss to the Govt to the tune of Rs.60.18 lakhs in
          the process of procurement of stores through local
          purchase in the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 by
          committing the following procedural irregularities/
          illegalities:-"
E
    (The above quoted passage was followed by a list of different
    irregularities/illegalities allegedly committed by the appellant).

       · 7. It, however, appears that on the basis of the materials
         before him the GOC-in-C, CC was also unhappy and
F        dissatisfied with the role of one Major General S.P. Sinha,
         who, at the material time, was the ADGOS (CN & A) in
         the Central Command and who at the time the GOC-in-C
         was making his recommendation was posted as MGAOC,
         HQ-Western Command. Hence, in paragraph 7 of his
G        recommendations he stated as follows:-

          ''7. I recommend .that a (sic.) appropriate (sic.) constituted
          C of I be ordered by integrated HQ of MoD (Army), MGO's
          Branch for investigation into the acts of omission/
H         commission in respect of Maj. Gen. SP Sinha, ADGOS
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                   727
      DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
     (CN & A) and any other higher auth, Col Rajvir Singh, Offg       A
     Commandant and offrs of the COD Chheoki as opined by
     the Court in the process of procurement of stores by the
     COD, Chheoki during the pd 2005-06 and 2006-07."

      8. It is significant to note that insofar as the appellant is   8
concerned, the GOC-in-C, CC, was undeniably the competent
authority to initiate proceeding against him and to convene a
General Court Martial to try him. Further, on the basis of the
Court of Inquiry report and the recommendation of the GOC,
MB Area, the GOC-in-C, CC, had clearly formed the opinion             C
that the culpability of the appellant was established and there
was cogent and adequate material evidence regarding the
cognizable acts of omission/commission committed by him.
Nonetheless, on May 7, 2007, the GOC-in-C, CC did not direct
for initiating proceeding against the appellant and to convene
the General Court Martial for his trial but clubbed his case with     D
Major General S.P. Sinha in whose case the integrated
headquarter of MoD Army was the competent authority and sent
his recommendation to the integrated HQ to hold a Court of
Inquiry to examine the role of the Major General in the
irregularities committed at the Central Ordnance Depot,               E
Chheoki, during his tenure there.

     9. On the basis of the recommendation made by the GOC-
in-C, CC, by his letter dated February 19, 2008, the integrated
headquarters of MoD directed the HQ, Western Command                  F
(where Major General S.P. Sinha was at that time posted) to
convene a Court of Inquiry to investigate the acts of omission/
commission on the part of the Major General the then ADGOS
(CN & A), detailing the issues into which the investigation was
required to be made. A copy of the letter was sent to the GOC-        G
in-C, CC for information and further advising him to issue
appropriate directions in respect of the appellant who was
indicted by the Court of Inquiry that was held on his direction.

      10. It was only then that the GOC-in-C, CC gave direction
for initiation of disciplinary action against the appellant (and      H
    728          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A   some other officers) vide order dated May 12, 2008, for the
    misdemeanors as stated in paragraphs 4 to 12 of the order
    insofar as the appellant is concerned (and in paragraphs 13
    to 16 in regard to some other officers).

       11. Following the order of the GOC-in-C, CC, a tentative
8
  charge-sheet containing 18 charges was given to the appellant
  on August 20, 2008. The hearing of charges was then held as
  required under rule 22 of the Army Rules, 1954 and at the end
  of the hearing, the Commanding Officer found that none of the
  charges were proved and there was no sufficient evidence to
C proceed further with the charges. The Confirming Authority,
  however, did not accept the view taken by the Commanding
  Officer and by order dated September 7, 2009, directed for
  taking additional summary of evidence. As directed by the
  Confirming Authority, additional summary was taken but once
D again the Commanding Officer by his order dated March 9,
  2010, found that none of the charges were proved. The
  Confirming Authority i.e. the GOC, MB Area, once again did
  not accept the order of the Commanding Officer. He framed
  four charges under section 52(f) of the Act relating to financial
E irregularities in procurement of store for the Central Ordnance
  Depot and directed the appellant to be tried by Court Martial.
  It was pursuant to this order that the General Court Martial came
  to be constituted which was challenged by the appellant as
  barred by limitation, as noted above.
F
         12. Having narrated the relevant facts we may now take a
    look at the provision relating to limitation. Section 122 of the
    Act provides as follows:-

          "122. Period of limitation for trial. - (1)     Except as
G         provided by sub-section (2), no trial by court-martial of any
          person subject to this Act for any offence shall be
          commenced after the expiration of a period of three years
          [and such period shall commence. -

H          (a)     on the date of the offence; or
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                     729
      DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]

      (b)    where the commission of the offence was not known         A
             to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the
             authority competent to initiate action, the first day
             on which such offence comes to the knowledge of
             such person or authority, whichever is earlier; or
                                                                       B
      (c)    where it is not known by whom the offence was
             committed, the first day on which the identity of the
             offender is known to the person aggrieved by the
             offence or to the authority competent to initiate
             action, whichever is earlier.]
                                                                       c
             (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply
     to a trial for an offence of desertion or fraudulent enrolment
     or for any of the offences mentioned in section 37.

          (3) In the computation of the period of time                 o
     mentioned in sub-section (1), any time spent by such
     person as a prisoner of war, or in enemy territory, or in
     evading arrest after the commission of the offence, shall
     be excluded.

            (4) No trial for an offence of desertion other than        E
     desertion on active service or of fraudulent enrolment shall
     be commenced if the person in question, not being an
     officer, has subsequently to the commission of the offence,
     served continuously in an exemplary manner for not less
     than three years with any portion of the regular Army."           F

      13. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the period
of limitation for his trial before the Court Martial would
commence from February 20, 2007, when on the basis of the
report of the Court of Inquiry, the GOC, MB Area, sent his             G
recommendation to the GOC-in-C, CC indicting the appellant.
It is pointed out that it was the GOC, MB Area, who passed
the order dated August 23/26, 2010 convening the General
Court Martial, directed the Commanding Officer to take further
summary of evidence in the hearing of the charges under rule           H
    730      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A 22 and finally passed the order directing the Court Martial to
  reassemble for the appellant's trial. It is, thus, the GOC, MB
  Area who is the competent authority to take action against the
  appellant and it is the date of his knowledge of the commission
  of the alleged offence and the identity of the appellant as the
B alleged offender that is relevant under section 122.

        14. It is further submitted that in any event the GOC-in-C,
  CC was undeniably the competent authority to initiate action
  against the appellant. On May 7, 2007, the alleged offence and
C the identity of the appellant as the alleged offender was fully
  within his knowledge on the basis of the recommendation of
  GOC, MB Area and the report of the Court of Inquiry ordered
  by him. His knowledge is evident from his recommendation to
  Integrated HQ, wherein, he stated that the culpability of the
  appellant was established. The period of limitation must,
D therefore, commence from a date not later than May 7, 2007
  and reckoning from that date, the period of three years came
  to end on May 6, 2010. But the order for convening the General
  Court Martial was finally passed by the GOC, MB Area on
  August 23/26, 2010, that is, clearly beyond the period of
E limitation. Hence, the appellanfs trial before the General Court
  Martial was clearly hit by section 122 and was barred by
  limitation.

       15. On behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, it is
F argued that the period of limitation in this case can only
  commence from May 12, 2008 when the GOC-in-C, CC
  directed that disciplinary action be initiated against the appellant
  and that later date must be deemed to be the date when the
  competent authority had the knowledge within the meaning of
G section 122 of the Act.

        16. This is the argument adopted both in the order passed
    by the GOC, MB Area and the decision of the Tribunal
    upholding that order.

H         17. In the order, dated March 29, 2011 passed by the
    RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                 731
     DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
GOC, MB Area, in paragraph 34, it is observed as under: -         A

    "If the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
    been followed, the only question which the Court was to
    decide was, (sic.) which was the date on which the
    authority competent to initiate action issued its direction
                                                                  B
    to initiate disciplinary action. However, the reasons given
    by the Court show that the Court was squarely guided by
    the issues framed by the learned Judge Advocate, which
    ran absolutely contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble
    Supreme Court (as also the policy in vogue referred to by     C
    the learned Advocate Judge)".

                                           (emphasis added)

     18. Affirming the view taken by the GOC, MB Area, the
Tribunal in paragraph 12 of its judgment held and observed as     D
follows -

    "In the case at hand on 7/5/2007, the date on which the
    applicant alleges the competent authority to have acquired
    knowledge, perusal of the said document which is
    Annexure No. A-6 to the Original Application reveals that     E
    the respondent No. 3 is not able to form an opinion as to
    whether or not any offence has been established and
    furthermore he is not able to form. a definite opinion
    regarding culpability of the applicant therefore he
    recommends for constitution of an appropriately               F
    constituted Court of Inquiry by Integrated HQ of the Mod
    (Army), MGO's Branch for investigation into the acts of
    omission/commission in respect of ADGOS (CN & A), the
    applicant and the officers of the Central Ordnance Depot,
    Chheoki. Thus it cannot be conclusively established           G
    regarding knowledge of the offence by respondent No. 3
    at this stage. However, pursuant to recommendations of
    7/5/2007 HQ Central Command approached Integrated
    HQ of the Mod (Army) for further inquiry in respect of
    officers for their involvement in the allegations. On 12/5/   H
    732       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A         2008 the respondent No. 3 perused the proceedings of the
          Court of Inquiry held to investigate the allegations of
          various irregularities in Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki
          and agreed with the recommendations of General Officer
          Commanding Madhya Bharat Area. The culpability of
B         applicant, according to respondent No. 3 was established
          for causing wrongful loss to the Government. Upon being
          so satisfied regarding establishment of culpability the
          respondent No. 3 on 12/5/2008 he directed disciplinary
          action against the applicant. It is that date which would be
c         counted as starting point towards computation of limitation
          for the purposes of Section 122(1) (b) of the Act."

                                                  (emphasis added)

        19. As noted above, both the GOC, MB Area and the
D Tribunal, base their orders on the decisions of this Court in.
  V.N. Singh (supra) and J.S. Sekhon (supra). The decisions of
  the GOC, MB Area and the Tribunal appear to be based on a
  complete misinterpretation of the two decisions of the Court.
  In both, V.N. Singh and J.S. Sekhon, the real issue before the
E Court was who was the competent authority to initiate action
  against the delinquent officer and whose knowledge would be
  relevant for the purpose of section 122 of the Act. In both cases,
  it was contended, on behalf of the delinquent officers, that the
  knowledge of "the person aggrieved" long preceded the
F knowledge of the competent authority and reckoning from the
  date of knowledge of "the aggrieved person", the order
  convening the General Court Martial was barred by limitation.
  In V.N. Singh, it was submitted on behalf of the officer that one
  Brigadier K.S. Bharucha was the aggrieved person and in J.S.
G Sekhon, it was submi~ted that the Commander Works
  Engineer was the person aggrieved and if the period of
  limitation was computed from the date of their knowledge then
  the order convening the General Court Martial was barred by
  limitation. In both cases, the Court held that that part of section
  122 that referred to the knowledge of the person aggrieved had
H
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                   733
      DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
no application to the facts of the case and the relevant date for    A
computing the period of limitation was the date of knowledge
of the competent authority to initiate action against the
delinquent officer. In paragraphs 32 and 34 of the decision in
V.N. Singh, the Court observed as follows: -
                                                                     B
    "32. The term "the person aggrieved by the offence" would
    be attracted to natural persons i.e. human beings who are
    victims of an offence complained of, such as offences
    relating to a person or property and not to juristic persons
    like an organisation as in the present case. The plain and       C
    dictionary meaning of the term "aggrieved" means hurt,
    angry, upset, wronged, maltreated, persecuted, victimised
    etc. It is only the natural persons who can be hurt, angry,
    upset or wronged or maltreated etc. If a Government
    organisation is treated to be an aggrieved person then the
    second part of Section 122(1) (b) i.e. "when it comes to         D
    the knowledge of the competent authority to initiate action"
    will never come into play as the commission of offence will
    always be in the knowledge of the authority who is a part
    of the organisation and who may not be the authority
    competent to initiate the action. A meaningful reading of        E
    the provisions of Section 122(1 )(b) makes it absolutely
    clear that in the case of government organisation, it will be
    the date of knowledge of the authority competent to initiate
    the action, which will determine the question of limitation.
    Therefore, the finding of the High Court that Brigadier K.S.     F
    Bharucha was an aggrieved person is legally and factually
    incorrect and unsustainable.

    34. The facts of the present case establish that the
    Technical Court of Inquiry was convened by DOST,                 G
    Headquarter Delhi Area on 8-1-1994 which recommended
    examination of certain essential witnesses for bringing into
    light the correct details and the persons responsible for the
    irregularities by a Staff Court of Inquiry and accordingly the
    Staff Court of Inquiry was ordered on 7-5-1994 by GOC-           H
    734      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 4 S.C.R.

A         in-C Western Command which concluded in its report
          dated 31-8-1994, mentioning for the first time the
          involvement of the respondent in the offence. The GOC,
          Delhi Area i.e. the next Authority in chain of command to
          the respondent recommended on 19-10-1994 initiation of
B         disciplinary action against the respondent whereas the
          GOC-in-C, Western Command gave directions on 3-12-
          1994, to initiate disciplinary action against the respondent.
          Therefore, the date of commencement of the period of
          limitation for the purpose of GCM of the respondent,
c         commenced on 3-12-1994 when direction was given by
          GOC-in-C, Western Command to initiate disciplinary
          action against the respondent. The plea that the date of
          submission of the report by Technical Court of Inquiry
          should be treated as the date from which period of
          limitation shall commence has no substance. It is relevant
D
          to notice that no definite conclusion about the correct
          details and the persons responsible for the irregularities
          was mentioned in the report of Technical Court of Inquiry.
          On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this
           Court is of the view that the High Court wrongly concluded
E         that the period of limitation expired on 4-3-1996."

          20. Similarly, in paragraphs 16 and 19 of the decision in
    J. S. Sekhon, it was held as follows -

F         "16. According to the counsel appearing for the appellant,
          when the vigilance check report was submitted,
          Commander Works Engineer who is the person aggrieved
          came to know that there was a commission of an offence
          and therefore period of limitation as envisaged under
          Section 122 of the Act would commence from that date
G
          and when limitation is computed from the said date,
          convening of the General Court Martial on 9-3-1998 was
          barred by time, as it was beyond the period of three years
          as contemplated under Section 122 of the Army Act.
H         19. In our considered opinion, the expression "person
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                    735
      DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
     aggrieved by the offence" is irrelevant in the facts and          A
     circumstances of the present case and what is relevant is
     the "knowledge of the authority competent to initiate
     action". The aforesaid acts were committed against the
     Government and not a natural person. In the facts of the
     present case no single person can be said to be                   B
     aggrieved person individually due to the act of defrauding
     the Army. What is applicable to the facts of the case is the
     expression when it comes to the knowledge of the
     competent authority to initiate action."

      21. In both the cases, the authority competent to initiate       C
action against the delinquent officer had passed the direction
for taking action against the delinquent officer on the same day
it came to know about the commission of the offence and the
identity of the offender. Hence, in both cases, at some places,
the date of knowledge and date of the direction to initiate action     D
against the delinquent officer are used interchangeably and that
is the reason for the Tribunal to misinterpret the decision to
mean that the period of limitation would commence from the
date of direction to initiate action against the delinquent officer.
                                                                       E
     22. The Tribunal is also incorrect in observing that on May
7, 2007, GOC-in-C, CC had formed only a tentative opinion
about the appellant because on that date he made the
recommendation to the Integrated HQ for investigation into the
act of omission/commission in respect of Major General S.P.            F
Sinha and any other higher authority, including the appellant. It
is noted above that the recommendation of the GOC-in-C, CC
to the Integrated HQ was only in regard to Major General S.P.
Sinha. So far as the culpability of the appellant is concerned,
he had already formed the opinion on the basis of the report           G
of the Court of Inquiry and the recommendation of the GOC,
MB Area. Moreover, when the Integrated HQ vide its letter of
February 19, 2008 pointed out that the appellant was indicted
by the Court of Inquiry ordered by him and in his case it was
for him to "append directions", there was no further material
                                                                       H
    736       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 4 S.C.R.


A before the GOC-in-C, CC in connection with the appellant. The
  order that the GOC-in-C, CC passed on May 12, 2008 for
  taking disciplinary action against the appellant reads as follows:


          "1. I have perused the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry
B
          held to investigate the allegations of various irregularities
          in Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki vide Headquarters
          Central Command, convening order Number 174091/57/
          C/A(PC), dated 09 December 06 and generally agree with
          the recommendations of the General Officer Commanding,
c         Madhya Bharat Area.

          2. The Court of Inquiry proceedings reveal that there is
          cogent and adequate evidence on record to establish
          various acts of omission/commissions on part of certain
D         officers of Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki as mentioned
          in the succeeding paragraphs.

          IC-42501 F Colonel Rajvir Singh

          4. The culpability of IC-42501 F Colonel Rajvir Singh,
E         Officiating Commandant, Central Ordnance Depot
          Chheoki, is established for causing wrongful loss to the
          Government to the tune of Rs. 60.18 Lakhs (Rupees Sixty
          Lakh eighteen thousand only) in the process of
          procurement of stores through local purchase in the year
F         2005-06 and 2006-07, by committing the following
          illegalities:-
                  (a) xxx

                  (b) xxx
G
                  (c) xxx

          5.xxx

          6.xxx
H
     RAJVIR SINGH v. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF                  737
      DEFENCE & OTHERS [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
     7.xxx                                                          A

     8.xxx

     9.xxx

     10.xxx                                                         B

     11. )()()(

     12.xxx

     13. to 16. xxxxxxx                                             c
     17. Apropos above, I direct that disciplinary action against
     the above mentioned officers be initiated for the
     misdemeanors as mentioned against each of them in Para
     4 to 16 above."
                                                                    D
     23. It is, thus, to be seen that the order dated May 12,
2008 is almost in identical words as the one passed on May
7, 2007. There is, therefore, no escape from the fact that the
GOC-in-C, CC was in knowledge of the offence and the identity
of the appellant as one of the alleged offenders on May 7, 2007.    E
Reckoning from that date, the order passed by the GOC, MB
Area, to convene the General Court Martial on August 23/26,
2010 is clearly beyond the period of three years and hence,
barred in terms of section 122.
                                                                    F
     24. One feels sorry to see a trial on such serious charges
being aborted on grounds of limitation but that is the mandate
of the law. It is seen above that GOC-in-C, CC had come to
know about the offence and the offender being the appellant
on May 7, 2007. It took one year from that date for him to pass     G
the order for initiating disciplinary action against him on May
12, 2008. There were still two years in hand, which is no little
time but that too was spent in having more than one rounds of
hearing of the charges in terms of rule 22 with the result that
by the time the order came to be passed to convene General          H
   738      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 4 S.C.R.

A Court Martial, more than three years had lapsed from the date
  of the knowledge of the competent authority.

       25. Before concluding, we may also note that other officers
  who were allegedly involved in irregular purchases for the
B Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki, also seem to have got away
  with very light, if at all, any punishment. Major General S.P.
  Sinha was subjected to an administrative action in which an
  order was passed on August 6, 2010 expressing severe
  displeasure (non-recordable) against him. Lt. Col. Neeraj Gaur
  was finally acquitted by the General Court Martial. Lt. Col. Aloke
C Ghose was given severe displeasure (non-recordable) after the
  Commanding Officer found charges against him not proved.
  Major (now Lt. Col.) M.K. Bawa was similarly given severe
  displeasure (non-recordable) after the Commanding Officer
  found charges against him not proved. Against Lt. Col. Uma
D Shankar no further action was taken after charges against him
  were not proved in SoE.

       26. In light of the discussions made above, the appeal must
  succeed. The judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is set
E aside and the direction by the GOC, MB Area, for reassembly
  of the General Court Martial is quashed.

        27. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to
   costs.

F B.B.B.                                          Appeal allowed.